From what I understood of him, there was no way to tell. He was arguing against those who said they had a point of leverage to move the activity one way or another.

As I understood it via Bernando Kastrup, all of reality emanates from the mind of God and this allows for apparent object permanence and the regularities of nature.

This from Bertrand Russell -

George Berkeley … is important in philosophy through his denial of the existence of matter—a denial which he supported by a number of ingenious arguments. He maintained that material objects only exist through being perceived. To the objection that, in that case, a tree, for instance, would cease to exist if no one was looking at it, he replied that God always perceives everything; if there were no God, what we take to be material objects would have a jerky life, suddenly leaping into being when we look at them; but as it is, owing to God’s perceptions, trees and rocks and stones have an existence as continuous as common sense supposes. This is, in his opinion, a weighty argument for the existence of God.

Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (1945), III, I., Ch. XVI: "Berkeley", p. 647

Russell's opinion misses a quality of Berkeley when Berkeley says nobody can actually question the phenomenal. Object permanence happens. God, in this situation, is not me.

Hello Charles Ferraro,

I would suggest reading his ‘A Treatise Concerning The Principles of Human Knowledge’, which is a relatively short work outlining his idealism, to determine for yourself an answer. However, with that being said, I will attempt to give you my interpretation of him.

Firstly, to answer you directly:

Bottom Line: Did George Berkeley mean that the existence of the entire world was dependent upon human perception, or divine perception?

He clearly meant dependent on all perception (viz., on perceivers) (and, as a side note, the divine perception is what keeps things continually existing), and this is not disputed by anyone in the literature (as far as I am aware). In fact, he states it quite explicitly and adamently in the previously mentioned work:

Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but ALL MINDS WHATSOEVER

(A Treatise…, p. 24).

I didn’t add in those all-caps: that’s how emphatically he wants us to understand that point.

It is disputed how much of a subjective idealist he really was and to what degree of difference he has with the newer objective idealists (like Bernardo Kastrup); and, to me, after reading him, I think he was a hybrid premordial formulation of idealism which both subjective and objective idealists owe respect. He was the first to carve out idealism in the west, and you will find even ideas that Kant uses in his views—like, for example, you see space being argued as ‘a priori and synthetic’ in a more rudimentary way in his work:

first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is the colour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only in some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived

(A Treatise..., p. 48)

His main point is to refute materialism, which was the predominant and newly fashionable view at the time, and so he really focuses on the mind-dependence of one’s experience; but he uses a term ‘perception’ for it, which is what causes a lot of trouble in his view (for modern day objective idealists): it entails that that the objects only exist so long as something is perceiving them, and not merely so long as they are ideas in a universal mind, and thusly, for Berkeley, he gets around this by postulating that God, very similarly to ourselves, is constantly perceiving the world. This is an entirely different view from modern objective idealists, like Bernardo Kastrup, who posit that the universal mind cannot perceive and is much more fundamental and primitive then ourselves, as we are evolved minds. The objects exist mind-dependently for objective idealists, no doubt, but not on a mind consciously experiencing them like we do.

Now, I would like to include a response from @Tom Storm:

George Berkeley … is important in philosophy through his denial of the existence of matter—a denial which he supported by a number of ingenious arguments. He maintained that material objects only exist through being perceived. To the objection that, in that case, a tree, for instance, would cease to exist if no one was looking at it, he replied that God always perceives everything; if there were no God, what we take to be material objects would have a jerky life, suddenly leaping into being when we look at them; but as it is, owing to God’s perceptions, trees and rocks and stones have an existence as continuous as common sense supposes. This is, in his opinion, a weighty argument for the existence of God.

Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (1945), III, I., Ch. XVI: "Berkeley", p. 647

This is the exact issue objective idealists tend to have with Berkeley, and tends to make them claim he was a subjective idealist for it; but it is important to remember that he was the first to sketch out the entire family of views under idealism (as he is quite literally the father of idealism) and, upon a close examination of his works, he isn’t entirely consistent nor coherent—but that’s true of pretty much every main philosopher that started a movement.

Hopefully that helps.

Empiricists cut through the issue by reducing the objects of perception to the perceptions themselves. This would make it difficult to define what a hallucination even is, or how my perceptions relate to those of other people, but it certainly is a matter of pushing Empiricist principles to their logical conclusion. Berkeley and Hume are good at that.
George Berkeley's motto for his idealist philosophical position that nothing exists independently of its perception by a mind except minds themselves.

Human or divine perception?

According to Berkeley, the mind of God always perceives everything. Unlike God’s perception of his own perfect ideas, human perceptions are imperfect and so provide incomplete or unclear knowledge of reality.
Nonetheless, Berkeley’s ’esse is percipi’ has been criticized for implying epistemological solipsism, the main argument being that different minds cannot harbor numerically one and the same idea.

Thank you for your comprehensive answer to my question.

So then, I would conclude from what you and others responded that the positing of a perceiving Master Mind by Berkeley was necessary in order for him to avoid solipsism and to preserve the integrity and explanatory power of his epistemology. The will of the Master Mind also provides a rational foundation for the lawfulness we perceive in nature and for the ways in which the particular objects we perceive are organized, since the will of individual perceivers plays no part in determining either. A very sophisticated form of "proving" the existence of God or of simply postulating a "Deus ex Machina," I think. Yes???

By the way, how similar or different are Kastrup's ideas about Objective Idealism compared to those of Hegel's Objective Idealism?

Hello Charles,

A very sophisticated form of "proving" the existence of God or of simply postulating a "Deus ex Machina," I think. Yes???

In my opinion, God, as a person that perceives, just doesn’t work as a parsimonious account of reality. Reality seems, empirically speaking, to have existed prior to any perceptions.

By the way, how similar or different are Kastrup's ideas about Objective Idealism compared to those of Hegel's Objective Idealism?

I can’t speak for Hegel, as I don’t know enough about his absolute idealism. But Kastrup’s differences mainly lie in the world being perception-independent and he has a new resolution to the problem of decomposition: dissociative identity disorder. He posits that the way you get derivative minds is via alters, just like people who host genuinely different personalities.

Think of Berkeley as saying God perceived the world, and the world is only real insofar as that.

Think of Kastrup as saying God (or mind-at-large) is the world, and everything in the world is real insofar as it is within it as mental events.

Guided by what you stated about him, Kastrup seems to me to be promoting a contemporary version of Spinoza's pantheism. Both thinkers claim that the world and God are one. Spinoza claims that mind and extension (that which comprises the world) are modes of expression and manifestation of an ultimate Substance. Kastrup seems to be saying much the same thing, however with the major stress being placed upon Substance as mind-at-large.

Bottom Line: Did George Berkeley mean that the existence of the entire world was dependent upon human perception, or divine perception? — charles ferraro

Bottom Line: The latter, ultimately. For, according to the good ol’ bishop, without the divine mind, there would be no human perceivers, & so neither their perceptions.

Hello Charles,

Guided by what you stated about him, Kastrup seems to me to be promoting a contemporary version of Spinoza's pantheism

Spinoza, I would say, was arguing that the one substance is God, which doesn’t entail in itself a mind nor something mind-independent. In modern terms, I think he was basically saying ‘being’ is God (i.e., ‘essence involves existence’).

Kastrup is arguing for full blown ontological idealism; that is, the universe is mind-dependent and the substance is ‘mental’.

How can Kastrup argue for "full-blown ontological idealism" without first proving the existence of "God, or Mind at Large"?

Does he anywhere attempt an ontological argument, or any other type of argument, for the existence of God, or Mind at Large?

Also, when you state that Kastrup argues "the universe is mind-dependent and the substance is 'mental,'" to what substance are you referring? I thought Berkeley convincingly argued that, upon detailed analysis, material substance and nothingness had identical meanings.

Did George Berkeley mean that the existence of the entire world was dependent upon human perception, or divine perception? — charles ferraro

At the time I was studying various philosophers --quite far in the past-- Berkeley appeared to me as quite an obscure philosopher and he remains so. Just to show this and also set the "climate" in which he discoursed:

"It is, I think, a receiv’d axiom that an impossibility cannot be conceiv’d. For what created intelligence will pretend to conceive, that which God cannot cause to be? Now it is on all hands agreed, that nothing abstract or general can be made really to exist, whence it should seem to follow, that it cannot have so much as an ideal existence in the understanding. (Works 2:125)"
(https://iep.utm.edu/george-berkeley-british-empiricist/)

Well, although my English reading is excellent, I have a difficulty in understanding the above passage. Of course, we are talking about 17th century English, but even so.

I believe that the following says a lot about your question:

Now, about the "esse est percipi" principle itself, I cannot formulate any conclusive or even certain overall idea about it. So I prefer quoting ideas from others, much more knowledgeable than me on the subject. Maybe you can make something out of it for your quest:

"Berkeley's immaterialism argues that 'esse est percipi (aut percipere)', which in English is to be is to be perceived (or to perceive). That is saying only what perceived or perceives is real, and without our perception or God's nothing can be real."
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Berkeley)

"In the Principles and the Three Dialogues Berkeley defends two metaphysical theses: idealism (the claim that everything that exists either is a mind or depends on a mind for its existence) and immaterialism (the claim that matter does not exist). His contention that all physical objects are composed of ideas is encapsulated in his motto esse is percipi (to be is to be perceived)."
(https://iep.utm.edu/george-berkeley-british-empiricist/)

"For any nonthinking being, esse est percipi ('to be is to be perceived')."
(https://www.britannica.com/topic/esse-est-percipi-doctrine)
It seems that this principle is not applied to humans! So, if this is true, then all gets quite obscure ...

As I told you in the beginning, I found and still find Berkeley quite an obscure philosopher.

Anyway, I hope some of all this has added a small pebble to your topic ...

Now it is on all hands agreed, that nothing abstract or general can be made really to exist, whence it should seem to follow, that it cannot have so much as an ideal existence in the understanding. (Works 2:125)" — Berkeley

This is the major weakness in Berkeley, as he is a nominalist, i.e. denies the reality of universals.

George Berkeley … is important in philosophy through his denial of the existence of matter—a denial which he supported by a number of ingenious arguments. He maintained that material objects only exist through being perceived. To the objection that, in that case, a tree, for instance, would cease to exist if no one was looking at it, he replied that God always perceives everything; if there were no God, what we take to be material objects would have a jerky life, suddenly leaping into being when we look at them; but as it is, owing to God’s perceptions, trees and rocks and stones have an existence as continuous as common sense supposes. This is, in his opinion, a weighty argument for the existence of God.

Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (1945), III, I., Ch. XVI: "Berkeley", p. 647

@Tom Storm 'what we take to be material objects would have a jerky life, suddenly leaping into being when we look at them' - this illustrates one of the fundamental misconceptions of idealism in my view. This has to do with the idea that, when it is stated that 'the object exists in dependence on mind', that, in the absence of a mind, it literally ceases to be, or goes out of existence. There was a similar argument, or sentiment, expressed by G E Moore, when he said that, when the passengers are all seated in the train, the wheels must dissappear, as they are no longer perceived.

I want to make a couple of points about this. The first is a reference to the Copenhagen Intepretation of quantum physics. According to it, the object of analysis of an experiment does not exist until it is measured or observed ('no phenomena is a phenomena until it is an observed phenomena' ~ Neils Bohr.) But a corollary of this was that it was incorrect to say that the object did not exist until it was observed. Rather, nothing could be said about it, until it was observed. (Positivism was to exploit that for their own ends.) What I would rather say, is that the kind of existence it had was indeterminate, prior to the observation of it. And this is supported by the principle of the wave function, which after all is a distribution of possibilities: if you ask, 'where is the (x) before the measurement', the answer is the wave function, i.e. a possibility distribution. 'It' neither exists nor doesn't exist prior to measurement - all it is, is a tendency to exist.

The second point, related, as that we have a flawed understanding of the meaning of 'to exist'. When we imagine the train wheels dissappearing, that is simply their imagined non-existence. We are attempting to assume a perspective from which we can envisage or see them outside any conception of them - which, of course, we cannot actually do. We can safely assume, or behave as if, they possess 'object permanence', which for the purposes of naturalism, they do. But what naturalism does not see, is the role of the observing mind in constituting the object - and that applies to any object whatever. And this is the main contribution of all forms of idealism - to throw into relief the role of the observer in the constitution of what we take to be real independently of any act of perception.

Compare with this passage on Husserl's critique of naturalism:

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point of departure, for Husserl. Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge... — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, p144

The whole point of idealist philosophy is to come to understand the constitutive role of the mind in the generation of experience. And you can actually see that awareness growing in modern cultural discourse, with phenomenology being one of the key tributaries of it. But Berkeley, Kant, and Schopenhauer are all significant precursors to it (god bless 'em).

Bottom Line: Did George Berkeley mean that the existence of the entire world was dependent upon human perception, or divine perception? — charles ferraro

I'm not an expert on such esoteric questions, but my rather naive interpretation of "esse est percipi" means just the opposite of Solipsism : "the view or theory that the self is all that can be known to exist". Apparently he was merely stating the underlying assumption of traditional Idealism : that we observers are merely ideas, concepts, Forms, avatars in the mind of God (or LOGOS for Plato ; or the Universe Game for players). In other words, we humans, including bodies, are merely instances of universal Mind : parts of the whole ; chips off the old block. Is that hubris or modesty? Can we prove our claimed patrimony? Can the part question the Whole?

Both Self-image and God-image are imaginary concepts in your mind, not empirical objects. But, which came first : the Causal Principle or the Actual Effect ; the universal-eternal Creator or the local-temporal Conceiver? I guess that depends on your opinion of the reality/ideality/necessity of Eternity/Infinity to explain Space-Time and Consciousness. The computed answer is "42". :smile:

Mind of God :
Plato thought that forms (which he called Ideas) exist in a realm of their own. However, Aristotle considered that forms only exist in so much as they are instantiated in the things they inform. St Augustine, taking a basically Platonic point of view, placed the realm of the Ideas in the mind of God. In this question, Aquinas attempts to reconcile the teaching of St Augustine concerning Ideas in the mind of God with an Aristotelian metaphysical framework.
http://readingthesumma.blogspot.com/2010/05/question-15-ideas-in-mind-of-god.html

Hello charles,

How can Kastrup argue for "full-blown ontological idealism" without first proving the existence of "God, or Mind at Large"?

Kastrup usually starts by positing a mind-at-large as the best account of reality (to explain consciousness and newer empirical knowledge). My point before was not that Kastrup starts with something other than, well, his idealism but, rather, that his is very different in many ways to Berkeley (but likewise shares different aspects as well).

Does he anywhere attempt an ontological argument, or any other type of argument, for the existence of God, or Mind at Large?

Not that I am aware of; as he is very much an empiricist, like me, at his core. There’s no way to prove, in itself, from pure reason that God exists without the aid of empirical knowledge (of experience). Also, Kastrup is a naturalist; so by ‘God’ he means more a pantheism and definitely not a form of theism.

Also, when you state that Kastrup argues "the universe is mind-dependent and the substance is 'mental,'" to what substance are you referring?

The substance is ‘mental’. In substratum theory, the idea is that properties are bore by a substrate, which serves as the compresence for the properties of a given thing, and there’s typically two kinds of substances people posit: mental and physical. Physical is a mind-independent substance (a substrate that bears the properties) and mental is a mind-dependent substance (ditto). It’s just to help denote the type of existence which one is positing as bearing the properties of things.

Kastrup is arguing that within the ‘mental’ substance, the fundamental thing is a mind.

I thought Berkeley convincingly argued that, upon detailed analysis, material substance and nothingness had identical meanings.

By substance, I was referring to substratum theory (i.e., the substrate that bears properties) and not a ‘material substance’ in the sense of a tangible object that exists. Berkeley is definitely against materialism, which, in its most basic form, is a substance monist view that posits a ‘physical’ substance and, in the case of materialism, that what fundamentally exists therein is fundamental particles (which are tangible). Personally, I don’t think material things, if they existed in that sense, would be identical to nothingness; rather, I think he had a good point that prima facie speaking about a material object is nonsensical, albeit potentially true, because nothing we experience is ever directly that material object.

Tom Storm 'what we take to be material objects would have a jerky life, suddenly leaping into being when we look at them' - this illustrates one of the fundamental misconceptions of idealism in my view. — Quixodian

Mine too. I was referring to the commonplace view. Bernado Kasturp has posited that the reason his car remains in the garage after the door is closed and he is sitting with a drink is that Mind at Large allows for object permanence. He seems more Berkeley than Kant.

The whole point of idealist philosophy is to come to understand the constitutive role of the mind in the generation of experience. And you can actually see that awareness growing in modern cultural discourse, with phenomenology being one of the key tributaries of it. But Berkeley, Kant, and Schopenhauer are all significant precursors to it (god bless 'em). — Quixodian

This is an important aspect of the discussion - thanks.

To clarify - are we not talking about two distinct accounts of idealism here? The phenomenological account where we 'co-create' our reality (this would be similar to Kant, perhaps) and the more transcendental variety wherein there are no material things and a cosmic consciousness is the guarantor of reality - Kastrup or Berkeley? Can you say some more on this?

Also do you have a brief take how a Vedanta conception of reality might fit into this schema?

To clarify - are we not talking about two distinct accounts of idealism here? — Tom Storm

I think it's developed through the kind of dialectical process over many years of discussion and analysis, although I think that Kant was the watershed.

Also do you have a brief take how a Vedanta conception of reality might fit into this schema? — Tom Storm

Buddhism and Vedanta are traditionally opponents in this respect, in that Vedanta posits something analogous to Kastrup's 'mind at large', whereas Buddhism does not.

I'm more inclined to the Buddhist analysis although the subtleties are hard to understand and to present. But I think it is something along these lines: that what we need to grasp is that all we know of existence — whether of an immediate object or the Universe at large — is a function of our world-making intelligence, the activity of the sophisticated hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species. That’s what ‘empirical reality’ consists of. After all, the definition of ‘empirical’ is ‘based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience.’ So, asking of the Universe ‘How does it exist outside our observation or experience of it?’ is an unanswerable question. But there is no need to posit a ‘mind at large’ to account for it, because there’s nothing to account for. Put another way: the Universe doesn’t exist outside consciousness, but neither does it not exist, so there is no need to posit any agency to explain its supposedly ‘continued’ existence. This is the ground of one of those paradoxical sayings of the Buddha - 'when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one.' ¹ And I think that is because, right from the outset, the Buddha understood the real sense in which 'mind creates world'.

This is the sense in which Buddhist philosophy is said to be opposed to speculative metaphysics. Any attempt to name or to posit what it is that exists apart from or outside the organs of cognition and understanding is bound to culminate something like one of Kant's antinomies of reason (explicated in T R V Murti 'Central Philosophy of Buddhism'). We have to thoroughly realise that we really don't know (there's a Korean Son (Zen) school that is based on 'only don't know')

But this is also part of the background of The Embodied Mind, by Varela and Thompson et al, which brings together elements of Buddhist philosophy and phenomenology. I know it's kind of baffling to think about, that's where I think some element of Zen practice is kind of essential for it.

that what we need to grasp is that all we know of existence — whether of an immediate object or the Universe at large — is a function of our world-making intelligence, the activity of the sophisticated hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species. That’s what ‘empirical reality’ consists of. After all, the definition of ‘empirical’ is ‘based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience.’ — Quixodian

That's so elegantly expressed.

So, asking of the Universe ‘How does it exist outside our observation or experience of it?’ is an unanswerable question. But there is no need to posit a ‘mind at large’ to account for it, because there’s nothing to account for. — Quixodian

Got ya. This is so interesting and what a wonderful summary you've provided. Has your view of idealism changed much in the past 2 or 3 years?

when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one.' 1 — Quixodian

I feel like I need to smoke a continental jazz cigarette to really savor that one. I'll need some time with that one.

Has your view of idealism changed much in the past 2 or 3 years? — Tom Storm

Some elements of it I've had for a long time, but I keep seeing new implications.

Russell's opinion misses a quality of Berkeley when Berkeley says nobody can actually question the phenomenal. Object permanence happens. God, in this situation, is not me. — Paine

Object permanence is not strictly speaking a phenomenon. All we know, phenomenologically speaking (and of course trusting our memories) is that objects commonly appear unchanged in all particulars, including their locations, when we return to them.

The individual mind could not be responsible for this, because that posit could not explain how we all see the same things in the same places and with the same features. So if it is not to be mind-independent existents then it must be connected or entangled human minds or a universal mind to which we are all connected or something else we cannot imagine.

But I think it is something along these lines: that what we need to grasp is that all we know of existence — whether of an immediate object or the Universe at large — is a function of our world-making intelligence, the activity of the sophisticated hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species. — Quixodian

This cannot explain how it is that other species see the same things we do. Also, we have individual intelligences, so my intelligence could not make the world for you and vice versa; and yet we see the same things. Perhaps our intelligences are connected in ways we cannot be aware of, but if we cannot be aware of it...?

Some elements of it I've had for a long time, but I keep seeing new implications. — Quixodian

Unfortunately, you never seem to be able to see the problems.

This cannot explain how it is that other species see the same things we do — Janus

Yes, but you will still never know what it's like to be a bat.

That doesn't seem relevant: I don't even know what it is like to be you. I do, however know that we all, you me and the dogs see the same objects; this is constantly confirmed by everyday experience.

I don’t see how that is relevant. Cats and dogs are sentient beings and are minds quite near to ours in evolutionary terms. But at the same time, they inhabit vastly different ‘meaning worlds’. If there were beings that saw using a completely different frequencies of light how could you say that they see the same things as humans?

I'm not talking about seeing different light frequencies or seeing things in exactly the same ways or as having the same meanings, but simply about seeing the same objects in the environment. Evolved similarities of cognitive setup cannot explain that.

But the ultimate constituents of objects are described by physics, which, since the advent of qm, has undermined their mind independent status. (Google ‘The Mental Universe’, Richard Conn Henry.)

QM does not undermine the mind-independent status of objects, although it might throw it into question. You seem to be jumping to unwarranted conclusions.

In any case, that has nothing to do with the question. If you and I and everyone else we might ask see an orange on the table, how could our similar cognitive setups explain the fact that we all see a table with an orange on it rather than some else altogether?

It's not about how things appear to us, but what appears to us. I am genuinely puzzled that you don't seem to get this distinction.

If you and I and everyone else we might ask see an orange on the table, how could our similar cognitive setups explain the fact that we all see a table with an orange on it rather than some else altogether? — Janus

What do you think idealism is saying? Why do you think that idealism would suggest anything other than that? It's not saying that 'the world is all in your mind'. What I take it to be saying is that the fundamental ground of reality is experiential in nature, it doesn't comprise the objects or physical properties posited by physicalism which are said to exist completely independently of experience (yet at the same time, somehow mysteriously give rise to experience). But as Bernardo Kastrup frequently points out, that doesn't actually change anything about what science observes, or what we observe, day to day.

Also, we have individual intelligences, so my intelligence could not make the world for you and vice versa; and yet we see the same things. — Janus

Bernardo Kastrup suggests that if the entire universe is mind, the presence of dissociative personalities creating individual consciousnesses answers questions that defeat other ontologies. In this view, each of us is a dissociated alter, and just like conventional alters are, we can be aware of and interact with each other without mentally overlapping or seeing into each other’s minds (drawing on studies of dissociative personality disorders which provide a kind of limited example of the principle).

Kastrup proposes our individual experiences in the physical world aren’t an issue because they’re not what they seem: they’re merely “patterns of self-excitation of cosmic consciousness.” That’s to say there is no physical world as such, but rather “It is the variety and dynamics of excitations across the underlying ‘medium’ that lead to different experiential qualities.” Within that, it is natural that we see the same things, particularly because we operate at more or less the same level of adaption.

Right, I don't deny the idea that we can think of mind as fundamental (in some sense we have no way of understanding) but that wouldn't change the status of objects as existing independently of our minds. Likewise, we can say that physicality is fundamental, and which is the more plausible might be said to be a matter of personal opinion. Either way, there seems to be no doubt that the existence of what appears to us, but obviously not of the appearances themselves, is independent of our minds, of our very existence.

I'm familiar with Kastrup's views, but the whole idea of a universal mind holding the incredible diversity and invariance we see in place by thinking it seems implausible to me. And in any case what practical difference would it make whether mind or mind-independent physical existents were the fundamental constituents of reality; what difference would it make to how we live our lives?

Additionally, if everything. including everything we think and everything anyone has ever thought were a manifestation of this one mind, how to explain the remarkable diversity of opinion regarding the nature of things?