You're defining it as someone who practically assents to anti-natalism. — Michael
But not having children is not a practical assent to assigning a negative value to giving birth. — Michael
Yes, indeed, that's why I've always argued, or tried to argue (forgive me if I didn't or wasn't clear) that it is practical assent to anatalism, not anti-natalism. — Thorongil
Did I?
Anatalism can either be the belief that you don't want to there to be kids or it can be the belief that you do want for their to be kids, depending upon whether you define "assent" to me that you agree with the idea that there shouldn't be kids or whether you simply engage in behavior that will lead to their not being kids. A person who hates kids, but who has kids might be an anatalist or might be a natalist, depending upon the definition you happen to be using. The hate kids (thus an anatalist) but had kids (thus a natalist).Then what's anatalism? Because I thought you were defining anatalism as a practical assent to anti-natalism. — Michael
In your opening post you said "It could also be someone whose lifestyle negates the possibility of having children, e.g. if one is celibate, meaning that they practically assent to anti-natalism, if not theoretically." — Michael
Yes, the weak form, which I then re-termed anatalism. What's your point? — Thorongil
All definitions are stipulative and based on historical usage. — Thorongil
I might believe that having children is justified but still not have children. — Michael
If "justified" is understood as a permissibility, then it is equivalent to "it is not wrong to have children", which is contained in Thorongil's "anatalism" — Soylent
I can believe that having children is permissible and still not have children. — Michael
Anti-natalism would seem to assert that having children is impermissible, or that "one ought not have children". Thorongil has rejected that view, which was previously held, or at least used to self-identify, for the weaker "anatalist" view, which falls somewhere in the middle. — Soylent
It would matter a great deal what fuels the doubt. Doubt about the justification for natalism might be expressed as nihilism or another meta-ethical foundation that makes justification claims dubious. An anti-natalist is not going to express meta-ethical moral doubts while simultaneously holding that one ought not have children. An anatalist might hold both the pro-natalist and anti-natalist to task for any moral obligation. A nihilist might nonetheless have children, whereas Thorongil will not. — Soylent
I mean, that an anatalist would hold an anti-natalist to account for explicitly committing to the claim that one ought not have children, whilst they themselves do so implicitly, is like the pot calling the kettle black.
I think that the difference between the two is somewhat superficial. — Sapientia
It seems that anatalism, borrowing from weak anti-natalism, doesn't commit one way or the other in terms of the behaviour of the adherents. — Soylent
A weak anti-natalist as someone that believes having children is not wrong (permissible), can consistently hold the position and have children. In this sense, the prefix "a" meaning "without" might be a cognitive stumbling block to understanding the position, since one might self-identify as "anatalist" and have children. In light of that, I'm not sure anatalism is susceptible to the hypocrisy criticism. — Soylent
If "justified" is understood as "permissible" and "not wrong" is also understood as "permissible", the anatalist position seems to be: "having children is permissible and not permissible". — Soylent
The anatalist position is that having children or not having children are both permissible[...] — Soylent
Birth sucks, life sucks, we all know it. — The Great Whatever
What you are arguing for, ↪Thorongil, is that actions precede a person's position, when it should be the opposite. A person's position (assuming they are not disingenuous) should precede their actions. — darthbarracuda
So is having children (procreation) wrong? My answer is no, because the mere act of procreation (consensual, unprotected sex with a fertile female) doesn't frustrate the will of another being; one can't harm that which doesn't exist. — Thorongil
However, does the fact that procreation is not wrong thereby make it right? Of course not, for one must provide reasons to have children, which is in effect to argue for natalism. In my case, I find none of the reasons for having children compelling. — Thorongil
I would also claim that it's irrational for everyone to have children, in addition to myself, but that depends on an argument I have not raised in this thread. For the purposes of this thread, I'm only speaking about myself. — Thorongil
Well, no, you're not. A number of times you've said that the celibate assents to this position. That's the claim we've been arguing against. — Michael
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