But I haven't quite figured out what it has to do with this thread. — Leontiskos

The question of the thread is about whether philosophy is still relevant or, as you suggest, whether it ever was. Bacon is instructive with regard to the question of the pull of philosophy, for here we can see a change in the direction in which philosophy pulled the world.

This movement includes a change in what philosophy itself is. Philosophy became not simply for the improvement of the philosopher but for the improvement of mankind. Philosophy's own self-transformation continues with Kant's Copernican Revolution and Hegel's shift from timeless truths to thinking in time.

As to the question of whether philosophy is still relevant we can look to where it has been in order think about where it might go. In other words, the current state of philosophy is not the whole of the story of what philosophy is and will be. Right now the movement of philosophy includes a looking back. But this is not simply a matter of seeing what was that no longer is. The way forward includes a movement back. For there are prescientific ways of thinking and seeing and being that science occludes. Questions and problems of life that science does not address.

In other words, the current state of philosophy is not the whole of the story of what philosophy is and will be — Fooloso4

Exactly. And this is exactly the nature of consciousness itself, its present experience is a living amalgam of the past and future, per Cassirer: this monadic being is therefore not contained in the simple present....but rather encompasses the totality of all aspects of life, the present, past, and future...

As I suggested on another thread (all things being related) this can be comprehended as a kind of "experimentalism," a metaphysical conception that is realized through and as the scientific method. Again to quote Cassirer (sorry but it is what I'm currently reading): We experience ourselves as having an influence...[an] essential, constitutive aspect in all our "consciousness of reality."

In other words, I guess, we are engaged and implicated in constructing reality, and reality is what is engaged by the construction thereof.

In the Charmides Socrates suggests that wisdom is knowledge of what you know and don't know.

Our lack of knowledge of knowledge is at the heart of the problem of knowledge.

In the Charmides Socrates suggests that wisdom is knowledge of what you know and don't know. — Fooloso4

But Socrates' belief in anamnesis implies the things you don't know you have in some sense forgotten (hence the Platonic strategy of evoking knowledge through dialogue). Unfortunately this creates a nasty circularity.

:up:

I don't want to get too sidetracked so will keep this brief.

The myth of anamnesis requires having at some time previous to this life learned what is in a later life to be recollected. In this earlier life knowledge could not be recollection. However this knowledge was gained it was not by recollection.

Without reincarnation there can be no anamnesis or recollection. If, as Socrates claims in the Phaedo, the human soul is immutable then how can we make sense of the idea that it can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)?

Accepting that Socrates' soul is immortal is not the same as accepting that Socrates is immortal. Plato addresses this problem in terms of number. If the soul is one thing then the body is another. Is Socrates then some third thing?

This all may be, but my understanding is that the theory of anamnesis is a species of innate knowledge theory. Do you have citations pertaining specifically to the fact that this knowledge had to have at some time been gained directly?

Theory of anamnesis / myth of anamnesis. Potato potato? I don't think so. How we interpret a theory is not how we should interpret a myth. But whether this is a myth or theory requires a deep dive that I won't undertake here. In my opinion, and I am certainly not alone here, the dramatic situation in which a dialogue takes place should not be ignored. In the Theaetetus, a dialogue about knowledge there is no mention of anamnesis. It does play a role in the Meno where someone who seems to be completely lacking in virtue asks if it can be taught. And in the Phaedo where Socrates attempts to charm his friend's childish fears of death and deal with the problem of misologic in the face of philosophy's inability to give an satisfactory account of death, which leads Socrates to appeal to myths.

Do you have citations pertaining specifically to the fact that this knowledge had to have at some time been gained directly? — Pantagruel

It is not spelled out. That is characteristic of Socratic philosophy. There cannot be an infinite regress in which what is recollected was not a some time first learned.

There cannot be an infinite regress in which what is recollected was not a some time first learned. — Fooloso4

That's certainly the logical conclusion. :up:

Anamnesis, as it relates to forms, is a metaphor for learning but Plato uses others that do not treat objects of knowledge as something we possess already. Consider the use of myth in the following where men learn for the first time:

Socrates: It is a method quite easy to indicate, but very far from easy to employ. It is indeed the instrument through which every discovery ever made in the sphere of the arts and sciences has been brought to light. Let me describe it for your consideration.

Protarchus: Please do.

Socrates: There is a gift of the gods---so at least it seems evident to me---which they let fall from their abode, and it was through Prometheus, or one like him, that it reached mankind, together with a fire exceeding bright. The men of old, who were better than ourselves and dwelt nearer the gods, passed on this gift in the form of a saying. All things, so it ran, that are ever said to be consist of a one and a many, and have in their nature a conjunction of limit and unlimitedness. This then being the ordering of things we ought, they said, whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single form and search for it, for we shall find it there contained; then, if we have laid hold of that, we must go on from one form to look for two, if the case admits of there being , otherwise for three or some other number of forms. And we must do. And we must do the same again with each of the 'ones' thus reached, until we come to see not merely that the one that we started with is a one and an unlimited many, but also just how many it is. But we are not to apply the character of unlimitedness to our plurality until we have discerned the total number of forms the thing in question has intermediate between its one and its unlimited number. It is only then, when we have done that, that we may let each one of all these intermediate forms pass away into the unlimited and cease bothering about them. There then, that is how the gods, as I told you, have committed to us the task of inquiry, of learning, and of teaching one another, but your clever modern man, while making his one----or his many, as the case may b----more quickly or more slowly than is proper, when has got his one proceeds to his unlimited number straightaway, allowing the intermediates to escape him, whereas it is the recognition of those intermediates that makes all the difference between a philosophical and a contentious discussion. — Plato, Philebus, 16c, translated by R. Hackforth

Socrates follows this immediately with an example of coming to understand music.

This method is far from the 'Theory of the Forms' Cornford (and some Neo-Platonists) connect to the picture of Anamnesis.

Good post. Fair points.

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Very interesting. :up:

Everything you mention involves a determinate pull in a particular direction, and so promotes the thesis that philosophy does have a determinate pull in a particular direction. I am not particularly concerned with the question of whether an endpoint is ever reached.

Again to quote Cassirer (sorry but it is what I'm currently reading): We experience ourselves as having an influence...[an] essential, constitutive aspect in all our "consciousness of reality." — Pantagruel

There is an awareness in contemporary philosophy that h. sapiens is 'the universe become self-aware'. One of its proponents was Julian Huxley, a passionate advocate of a scientifically-informed secular humanism.

Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately. — Julian Huxley, Evolution and Meaning

But then, if it's also true that

there are prescientific ways of thinking and seeing and being that science occludes. Questions and problems of life that science does not address. — Fooloso4

Then it would not be wise to restrict the scope of knowledge to science alone, as Huxley was inclined to do (but then, his brother, Alduous, author of The Perennial Philosophy, had a broader outlook).

Our lack of knowledge of knowledge is at the heart of the problem of knowledge. — Fooloso4

Among the paradoxes of the figure of Socrates...is that we cannot classify him as belonging either to the theoretical or the practical world. Every attempt at such a classification immediately turns dialectically into its opposite....Our "knowledge" is transformed into "ignorance" (Cassirer, PSF4, "Basis Phenomena")

This accords with my perspective on the ongoing dialectical tension of antinomies.

With your interest in the text, I would like to add that Socrates seems to be admitting here that his speech has not always been purely philosophical. The use of legendary stories often cut in different directions depending upon how 'contentious' the environment Socrates finds himself in. In Meno, for instance, Socrates is provocative to both Meno and Antyus. The story of anamnesis is presented immediately after Socrates insults Meno:

Socrates: I know what you mean. Do you realize that what you are bringing up is the trick argument that a man cannot try to discover either what he knows or what he does not know? He would not seek what he knows, for since he knows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he does not know what he is to look for.

Meno: Well, do you think it is a good argument?

Socrates: No.

Meno: Can you explain how it fails?

Socrates: I can. I have heard from men and women who understand the truths of religion.... — Plato, Meno, 81, translated by W.K.C. Guthrie

This is followed quickly by quoting a Pindar poem regarding the immortality of the soul.

This response is germane to the topic of the OP. As a matter of rhetoric, is Socrates giving a trick answer to a trick question? It seems clear that he is doing that to some extent, but it is not clear at which point he departs from it as an idea or sees it in other ways. At the same time, his response is not the sort of inquiry demonstrated in the Philebus. We are given a map of 'philosophical' discussion said to have originated from the gods. This passage displays the tension Plato often presents between what is given to us through our ancestors and what can be revealed through inquiry.

Fast forward to Heidegger and his report that metaphysics is dead. Does this mean the tension brought into view by Plato has been overcome?

I think you are right and you have touched a very important point in philosophy.
This is my intepretation of what happened:

- phylosophical systems of ideas were perceived as lacking a strong basis;

- analytical philosophy thought it found a strong basis in the critical analysis of language and our involvement in it;

- analytical philosophy has actually several issues:

• it is not clear what the difference is between it and science of language;
• there is no strong evidence that language is the best field to get the best understanding of our human condition;
• critical analysis of language is at risk of becoming just a new hidden metaphysics, as to say: we found reality, objectivity: it is language!
• analytical philosophy can’t avoid the human sensation that it is very disconnected from humanity, from real everyday life and feelings, human interest in existential meanings, human emotions, human psichology and relationships.

In this sense I agree with your question: if philosophy carries on going through this way of looking for strong things, then it is dead, it has no reason to exist; science is much better at doing this job.

Philosophy, in my opinion, should instead recover its ancient roots of being a human experience, a spiritual activity, as Pierre Hadot has shown us. It is true that this way philosophy lacks the strength of science, but why should philosophy envy science? Rather, at this point, the problem is how philosophy differs from literature, poetry, art. I think philosophy can be different by taking on the task that traditionally was held by religion. Religion is revealing less and less able to face the criticism coming from people who want to give importance to critical thinking. A lot of people abandon religion, but they don’t want to abandon their sensitivity and interest in intuition, dreaming, transcendence, art. Many of them define themselves “spiritual, but not religious”. Unfortunately, the word “spiritual” is very vulnerable, fragile, because traditionally it is understood as “believing in the objective existence of supernatural, non material things”. But some philosophers are making efforts to recover the word “spiritual” to a secular, or atheist or materialist context.
This way philosophy would differ from literature and art in that it can build on its immense heritage and experience about critical thinking, especially in connecting things to the most general perspectives on human existence.
We could say that philosophy worked so much on “how to understand things” and this made it forget its being an experience more than a science. Let’s leave to science the task of understanding things and let’s restore to philosophy the task of exploring understanding as an existential human experience.
So, let’s discuss philosophically about metaphysics, language, morality, criticism, any philosophical topic, but not with the purpose of understanding it; rather, with the purpose of experimenting the pleasure, the depth, the seductive attraction of exploring connections between ways of understanding and human existence.

Philosophy, in my opinion, should instead recover its ancient roots of being a human experience, a spiritual activity, — Angelo Cannata

I'd agree that it should be 'animated' by this spirit.

I think philosophy can be different by taking on the task that traditionally was held by religion — Angelo Cannata

Yes, I think talking about spirituality as something metaphysical takes away the hocus pocus from the former, rather than introducing it to the latter. I would say 'in spirit' I agree with you.

if philosophy carries on going through this way of looking for strong things, then it is dead, it has no reason to exist; science is much better at doing this job. — Angelo Cannata

What do you mean by ‘strong things’? Understanding the raw truths of the world?

We could say that philosophy worked so much on “how to understand things” and this made it forget its being an experience more than a science. Let’s leave to science the task of understanding things and let’s restore to philosophy the task of exploring understanding as an existential human experience.
So, let’s discuss philosophically about metaphysics, language, morality, criticism, any philosophical topic, but not with the purpose of understanding it; rather, with the purpose of experimenting the pleasure, the depth, the seductive attraction of exploring connections between ways of understanding and human existence — Angelo Cannata

I couldn’t disagree more. Philosophy at its best is absolutely about directly furthering an understanding of the world It is in this sense a more comprehensive and through going science than empirical research.

Philosophy at its best is absolutely about directly furthering an understanding of the world It is in this sense a more comprehensive and through going science than empirical research. — Joshs

:up: .

What do you mean by ‘strong things’? — Joshs

Ideas that pretend to be able to withstand any criticism.

Philosophy at its best is absolutely about directly furthering an understanding of the world — Joshs

Is there at least one single thing that philosophy has been able to understand of the world, able to withstand criticism?

Is there at least one single thing that philosophy has been able to understand of the world, able to withstand criticism? — Angelo Cannata

What contemporary philosophy are you familiar with, other than analytic?

If philosophy is unable to mention one single thing that it has been able to understand about the world, I don’t think that assessing my competence will be a help to fill this gap.

If philosophy is unable to mention one single thing that it has been able to understand about the world, I don’t think that assessing my competence will be a help to fill this gap — Angelo Cannata

If I mention innumerable ways in which contemporary approaches in Continental advance our understanding of the world, and you have no competence to grasp the substance of that understanding, because you haven’t read the work of these authors well enough, then I’m not sure how I could convince you.

This is too easy a way to defend any argumentation. Normally philosophers do the opposite: instead of trying to support their arguments with others’ ignorance (which would be actually bizarre: how can ignorance support an argument, even if it’s the ignorance of the other person?), they embrace the challenge of showing that they have understood their own arguments.

FWIW, my thread on the 'worldly foolishness' of philosophy is largely a reaction to the invisibility of its power and validity for those who presuppose a 'cash value' pragmatist epistemology of if it's gear, it's here. Probably we all do most of the time, given the pressures of practical life. But ought we embrace this irrationalism even such pressure relents ?Is a page of pure math 'empty' because we don't have the training to appreciate its beauty and truth yet ?

For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.

Of course people can overestimate their own attainment, but one form of this is denying the attainment of others.

Thanks -

At the same time, his response is not the sort of inquiry demonstrated in the Philebus. — Paine

Right, and in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle would go that route directly and point to the intermediate, where learning involves a particular kind of potency.

Fast forward to Heidegger and his report that metaphysics is dead. Does this mean the tension brought into view by Plato has been overcome? — Paine

The tension between "what is given to us through our ancestors and what can be revealed through inquiry"? Isn't Heidegger's point that metaphysics is not the sort of thing that can be handed down, and also that we have lost our capacity to "inquire" into metaphysics? That being is concealed from us?

I can see how Meno and Philebus relate to this thread, but I'm still not clear on how Heidegger's report could be thought to indicate the overcoming of that tension.

I was thinking that the distinction between what Plato marked out as 'philosophical' versus purely 'disputational' went beyond particular theses or method such as Aristotle worked out. The dialectic is not presented as the best path from Alpha to Omega. It is presented as better than the alternatives,.

Since the topic is whether an activity is relevant or not, the importance of history is put front and center.
Heidegger is an important part of that discussion because his view of metaphysics is (to some large part) a story of philosophical thought. While very different from Hegel as an understanding of the human condition, the thesis is a claim that we are bounded by historical circumstances, and they can be identified.

A dialectical response to this claim would question how history is to be understood as a given. Leo Strauss wrote interesting challenges to the idea we know where we are. Here is a bit from Natural Rights and History:

The primeval notion of "custom" or "way" is split up into the notions of "nature", on the one hand, and "convention," on the other. The distinction between nature and convention, between physis and nomos, is therefore coeval with the discovery of nature.Nature would not have to be discovered if it were not hidden. Hence "nature" is necessarily understood in contradistinction to something else, namely , to that which hides nature in so far as it hides nature. There are scholars who refuse to take "nature" as a term of distinction, because they believe that everything which is , is natural. But they tacitly assume that man knows by nature that there is such a thing as nature or that "nature" is as unproblematic or as obvious as , say, "red — Strauss, Natural Rights and History, page 90

The dialectic is not presented as the best path from Alpha to Omega. It is presented as better than the alternatives,. — Paine

In the Republic and elsewhere there is diminution from what is simply best to the best we can do and obtain. From the truth itself to what in the absence of knowledge are likely stories. And to emphasize this difference unlikely stories as well.

The dialectical movement in the Republic can be seen in the rejection of the first city that Socrates establishes in speech. Glaucon objects. It is too austere. In response Socrates allows for certain "luxuries". The best city is one man is unwilling to live in.

The best city is unnatural. Certain accommodations must be made to man as he is. This raises the question of whether there is a nature or natures of men, and how this is to be determined. Tellingly, Socrates presents a lie about man's nature.

Dialectic itself is presented in the Republic as if the method of hypothesis could free itself from hypothesis. This stands in contrast to the story of the direct apprehension of the Forms themselves by imagined philosophers who possess the wisdom actual philosophers desire but do not possess.

Socratic philosophy straddles the line between poetry in the ancient sense and science in the modern sense. Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are modern practitioners of this way of doing philosophy. To the extent that this is true it is clear that science cannot take the place once held by philosophy.

Interesting thoughts, thank you. I will have to think more about this. :smile: I am going to have a closer look at Philebus.

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Okay, interesting, so you would find philosophy's distinctiveness in the idea that it has a poetic admixture, whereas science does not?