He did inherit from others the so-called methodological solipsism…..how could he not, being immersed in academia — Mww
I am me because there are others who are not me. — plaque flag
The problem is semantic. What is this 'I' ? — plaque flag
But who will doubt that he lives, remembers, understands, wills, thinks, knows, and judges? For even if he doubts, he lives. If he doubts where his doubs come from, he remembers. If he doubts, he understands that he doubts. If he doubts, he wants to be certain. If he doubts, he thinks. If he doubts, he knows that he does not know. If he doubts, he judges that he ougth not rashly to give assent. So whoever acquires a doubt from any source ought not to doubt any of these things whose non-existence would mean that he could not entertain doubt about anything. — Augustine, On the Trinity 10.10.14
I agree that the argument is apodictic, that it can't be plausibly denied. But when you ask 'what is this "I"?, if you're seeking an objective response to that question, there won't be one, as the self is never an object of cognition (save for in a metaphorical sense of being an 'object of enquiry'. I take that as the meaning of the 'transcendental ego' in Kant and Husserl.) — Quixodian
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/apel-karl-otto-1922According to Apel,... the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant must be fundamentally reconceived...Apel's strong thesis is that his transcendental semiotics yields a set of normative conditions and validity claims presupposed in any critical discussion or rational argumentation. Central among these is the presupposition that a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification (1980).
The "Cartesian move" as you call it can, in fact, be performed by any person who makes up the human family who wishes to perform it. And the truth of the Cogito Sum can be verified by any person who wishes to verify it in the first person present tense mode. — charles ferraro
Why say the 'I' is never an object of cognition ? — plaque flag
Even the source you quote, David Hume, says that he never discerns a self, but only a stream of thoughts. — Quixodian
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/reason-in-philosophy-animating-ideas/Since Brandom’s Kant also holds that an entity is responsible for its judgments and its acts just in case it is capable of taking responsibility for those acts and judgments, Brandom’s Kant is committed to the view that having a mind is a matter of the minded entity taking responsibility for what it believes and does. Put in slightly more Kantian terms, Brandom’s Kant is committed to the view that the unity of apperception is achieved through a process in which an agent unifies her judgments by coming to believe what she ought to believe (has reason to believe) given her other judgments and the content of the concepts ingredient in those judgments.
https://sites.pitt.edu/~rbrandom/Texts/From_German_Idealism_to_American_Pragmat.pdfKant’s most basic idea, the axis around which all his thought turns, is that what distinguishes exercises of judgment and intentional agency from the performances of merely natural creatures is that judgments and actions are subject to distinctive kinds of normative assessment. Judgments and actions are things we are in a distinctive sense responsible for. They are a kind of commitment we undertake. Kant understands judging and acting as applying rules, concepts, that determine what the subject becomes committed to and responsible for by applying them.
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The responsibility one undertakes by applying a concept is a task responsibility: a commitment to do something. On the theoretical side, what one is committed to doing, what one becomes liable to assessment as to one’s success at doing, is integrating one’s judgments into a whole that exhibits a distinctive kind of unity: the synthetic unity of apperception. It is a systematic, rational unity, dynamically created and sustained by drawing inferential consequences from and finding reasons for one’s judgments, and rejecting commitments incompatible with those one has undertaken. Apperceiving, the characteristically sapient sort of awareness, is discursive (that is, conceptual) awareness. For it consists in integrating judgments into a unity structured by relations of what judgments provide reasons for and against what others. And those rational relations among judgments are determined by the rules, that is the concepts, one binds oneself by in making the judgments. Each new episode of experience, paradigmatically the making of a perceptual judgment, requires integration into, and hence transformation of the antecedent constellation of commitments. New incompatibilities can arise, which must be dealt with critically by rejecting or modifying prior commitments. New joint consequences can ensue, which must be acknowledged or rejected. The process by which the whole evolves and develops systematically is a paradigmatically rational one, structured by the rhythm of inhalation or amplification by acknowledging new commitments and extracting new consequences, and exhalation or criticism by rejecting or adjusting old commitments in the light of their rational relations to the new ones.
Incidentally, précis of 'transcendental apperception' which might be relevant to the 'Apel' quotation. — Quixodian
The self is the 'unknown knower, the unseen seer.' Granted, that is from Vedanta, rather than from Kant, but it is in this precise respect that Kant and Vedanta are said to converge. — Quixodian
The mistake I'm arguing against is precisely the 'naturalisation of reason' i.e. regarding the rational subject (you and I) as the object of natural science. — Quixodian
Brandom’s Kant is committed to the view that the unity of apperception is achieved through a process in which an agent unifies her judgments…..
I take it -- and I'm hoping you do too --that the point of the philosophical enterprise is getting clearer on reality. — plaque flag
‘Tis vain hope, I must say, although you are nonetheless welcome to take that point. — Mww
Philosophy gets us clearer on empirical reality perhaps, and I think that is the only reality that plaque flag allows. — Janus
Philosophy gets us clearer on empirical reality perhaps…. — Janus
They are early accustomed to take the hollowest jingle of words for philosophical thoughts, the most miserable sophisms for acuteness, and silly conceits for dialectic, and their minds are disorganised through the admission of mad combinations of words to which the mind torments and exhausts itself in vain to attach some thought. — Mww
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