:up:I really don't like the labels either way and think they are not very useful, or were part of a historical context that perhaps doesn't pertain to every argument about philosophy of mind. — schopenhauer1
Oh come now, get off the pedestal. I was just pointing out problems with the move to information processing which I know is a popular approach. — schopenhauer1
1. Subjectivity is the being of the world from/for a certain perspective. — plaque flag
2. The world is only given perspectively. — plaque flag
(from another thread)existence itself implies and requires a perspective. Things don't exist from no point of view, they exist within a context, and the mind provides that context. But we don't notice that, because we're looking from it, not at it. — Quixodian
3. All entities exist interdependently in the same semantic-inferential-causal nexus. — plaque flag
True, but what this nexus is, is very much the question at issue. — Quixodian
The resolution to this "hidden dualism" is to recognize that the brain and its functions are also representations and, thusly, the brain-in-itself is not what one ever studies in a lab. E.g., neurons firing is an extrinsic representation (within our perceptions) of whatever the brain-in-itself is doing.
The next step is to realize that the brain-in-itself cannot be quantitative (for quantities never produce qualities and we know directly of qualities as our conscious experience). — Bob Ross
I don't like labels much either. The real stuff is in the back and forth. Meaning is intensely cumulative and contextual. — plaque flag
:up:Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. — Quixodian
existence itself implies and requires a perspective. Things don't exist from no point of view, they exist within a context, and the mind provides that context. But we don't notice that, because we're looking from it, not at it. — Quixodian
But "the mind" does not appear tous, it appears as us. — Quixodian
I agree with you that when we study the brain, just as when we study anything else, we are studying the brain as it appears to us. We have no idea what it, or anything else, is in itself apart form how it appears to us. — Janus
We never see even familiar objects exhaustively. — plaque flag
My issue is: why do we insist that the familiar world is appearance behind which lurks some Reality ? As far as I can tell, it's only by taking brains and eyes in the familiar world seriously that we can find indirect realism plausible, but indirect realism says those same brains and eyes are mere appearance.
I sincerely don't think this objection has been addressed sufficiently by indirect realists. — plaque flag
We inhabit our cognitions, and we know they cannot be explained in in terms of themselves: thus, we cannot but assume that something more that we cannot be aware of is going on. — Janus
The alternative is phenomenalism, which seems to be incapable of explaining anything. — Janus
So the stuff our language intends --- the stuff of experience we can talk about meaningfully, -- ought to be embraced as real rather than as mere appearance. But this does not mean we pretend that we do or can ever know it exhaustively. — plaque flag
In principle we can know exhaustively whatever is accessible to our senses, both what is available naturally and what is available to our senses however augmented technologically. — Janus
I see that as no reason to claim that there is nothing more than what can be known, in principle via the senses. — Janus
I also want to say that although that position is what seems reasonable to me. I don't think there is any imperative that it must seem reasonable to you, because in matters that cannot be determined either empirically or logically, I think what is acceptable or rejectable comes down to personal assessments of what seems plausible or coherent. — Janus
Sounds to me like that makes the familiar worried doubly removed. Because we're only getting appearances from organs that are, themselves, appearances.My issue is: why do we insist that the familiar world is appearance behind which lurks some Reality ? As far as I can tell, it's only by taking brains and eyes in the familiar world seriously that we can find indirect realism plausible, but indirect realism says those same brains and eyes are mere appearance.
I sincerely don't think this objection has been addressed sufficiently by indirect realists. — plaque flag
Many of us do not share the belief that "the relationship between chemistry and life is analogous to the relationship between neurology and mind." We do not see a hard problem of biology, because chemistry and biology are both physical processes. We see a hard problem of consciousness because, while neurology is a (bunch of) physical process(s), we believe consciousness is not. Physical processes, like movement or flight, are reducible to the physical properties of the involved entities, which are ultimately reducible to the properties of the particles that make everything up. Even processes of the brain, like vision and behavior, fall into this category.As I pointed out, the relationship between chemistry and life is analogous to the relationship between neurology and mind. Are you saying there is a hard problem of biology too? If that's true, then there must be a hard problem of chemistry also. Otherwise how to explain all those atomic processes all mixed up with chemical processes. — T Clark
Because we're only getting appearances from organs that are, themselves, appearances. — Patterner
But what physical properties, at any level, explain the various aspects of consciousness - such as my experience of blueness, or my awareness at different levels - that exist on top of the physical properties that explain vision and behavior? — Patterner
But what physical properties, at any level, explain the various aspects of consciousness - such as my experience of blueness, or my awareness at different levels - that exist on top of the physical properties that explain vision and behavior? — Patterner
The evidence that there is a hard problem of consciousness is that it consists of mental processes which can't be studied by science because of... the hard problem of consciousness. — T Clark
But in your case, the first step is recognizing the distinction, even if for semantic or historical reason, if not substantial ones of ontology. — schopenhauer1
Exactly. Reexamining ourselves is not necessarily a bad thing. And keeping the communication going can't be bad, either.But what physical properties, at any level, explain the various aspects of consciousness - such as my experience of blueness, or my awareness at different levels - that exist on top of the physical properties that explain vision and behavior?
— Patterner
First off, I appreciate the clear, direct response. I've been in a lot of discussions about consciousness and it always comes down to this. I keep telling myself not to get involved, but the subject is right at the heart of the kinds of issues I like best. Even when it never gets resolved, I get to reexamine my understanding of how the world and my own self-awareness work. — T Clark
I look at it this way... If we saw a skyscraper made entirely of liquid water, we would be stunned. To put it mildly. The properties of water and/or H2O molecules do not allow for such a thing. But here it is! A skyscraper made of water! We'd think there was something going on that we are, for some reason, unable to see. And we'd put quite a bit of effort into figuring out what was going on.I think what bothered me most about this particular iteration of the conflict is it's blatant circularity. The evidence that there is a hard problem of consciousness is that it consists of mental processes which can't be studied by science because of... the hard problem of consciousness. Of course, as I noted, all these arguments come down to this same contradiction. — T Clark
Odd innit? In the attempt for empirical knowledge, the irreducible origin of it is impossible to know.
Humans don’t think/cognize/comprehend in its rational method, in the same terms as the source of their knowledge requires in its physical method.
It's the familiar experience of the brain in causal relationships with other familiar objects that motivates [ a paradoxical ] indirect realism in the first place.
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It's because indirect realism makes the brain it depends on an 'illusion' that it fails.
The brain-in-itself (if you continue bravely along the path as you seem to be doing) starts to sound 'mystical as fuck.' I don't think it can be given meaning that it doesn't steal from 'mere appearance.'
I can follow your thinking to some degree. Your point is justified and fascinating within the framework of indirect realism -- but the framework don't work, seems to me.
I claim that methodological solipsism only works properly at the level of the entire species. But this gives us an anthropocentric direct realism.
we cannot come to any warranted conclusions about the in itself.
Quantities and qualities are merely different categories of appearances
Whatever we might think about that must remain a matter of faith
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