Conditions for the possibility of critical discussion cannot be rationally challenged without performative contradiction. — plaque flag

I think this assumes there's only one rationality. If there are two, though, then you could rationally challenge the possibility of critical discussion on the basis of the rationality chosen without contradiction.

The OP makes sense to me though. Ontology is one of those disciplines that I generally view with skepticism, but from the perspective that our knowledge doesn't touch what the ontologist cares about. If the ontologist is more circumspect in not claiming knowledge, though, then that's where I think ontology begins to be interesting. However, in so doing I think the whole foundational approach is not only made harder, but also it loses its attraction: if knowledge is not necessarily clear and certain, but rather depends upon the kind of knowledge we're dealing with to understand it in its depths (math is clear and certain, but knowing-how to play jazz piano is not as clear), then there is no reason to suppose a general foundation is there -- rather we're just able to do some things that happen to be different from one another, and "knowledge" is the word we use to designate that a person is able (but it depends upon what they're able to do to be able to say anything about the knowledge).

That's my first stab! Basically I think I'd reject foundations, and also I'd loosen the love of certainty (but then the question is how do you maintain discipline such that we are not just daydreamers and mystics?)

I think this assumes there's only one rationality. If there are two, though, then you could rationally challenge the possibility of critical discussion on the basis of the rationality chosen without contradiction. — Moliere

Fascinating point, which touches on whether Enlightenment rationalism is truly universal or ethnocentric hubris.

Possible objection, your honor. From what perspective can someone claim there are two rationalities ? Only (I think) from a higher and truer 'actual' synthesizing rationality.

Can a unified subject believe in two, truly opposed 'rationalities' ? In opposed inferential norms ?

In any case, you've opened a juicy can of worms right out of the gate !

Ontology is one of those disciplines that I generally view with skepticism, but from the perspective that our knowledge doesn't touch what the ontologist cares about. If the ontologist is more circumspect in not claiming knowledge, though, then that's where I think ontology begins to be interesting — Moliere

I may be an eccentric in my use of 'ontology,' but I'm hopefully within the limits of decency. I'm focused on ontology as the study of the basic structure of being (biggest picture stuff). I think it's finally the place where we don't cut corners (holism, useful reductive fictions finally pay up.) We can sweep all kinds of things aside in 'proper' sciences, but in ontology we face those gnarly issues of how or whether the subject exists or is entangled with the object. We figure out whether indirect realism is confused baloney or the one sure starting point. Then there's lots of beautiful Heidegger stuff that is tangential here.

As I see it, epistemologies usually depend on ontological assumptions. My own foundational offering is skeptical about skepticism. I'm interested personally in the 'presumption' of the Kantian project, but I'm doing a Kantian project myself about such projects. It seems to me that many humble-sounding 'skeptical' positions ( psychologism , pragmatism, relativism ) are actually bold ontological claims about the subject. They are 'credulously incredulous.' In other words, philosophy marries its gravediggers, because its gravediggers are confused philosophers in denial about their ontological ambitions.

My foundationalism is therefore weirdly skeptical about skeptics who show up and try to pretend they are inside and outside of the game at the same time. Deeper than whatever we may call it is the normative game of giving and demanding reasons. It seems that I'm either appealing to authority of rational norms (perhaps to problematically attack those same norms), or I'm an outright joker or sophist (who need not be taken seriously, which don't mean they can't be fun.)

Basically I think I'd reject foundations, and also I'd loosen the love of certainty (but then the question is how do you maintain discipline such that we are not just daydreamers and mystics?) — Moliere

What I get from Karl-Otto Apel is that we mostly need to disallow performative contradiction. But there's got to be some categorical imperative in there somewhere too perhaps.

(math is clear and certain, but knowing-how to play jazz piano is not as clear) — Moliere

:up:

I take that as a worthy ontological insight. Different regions of entities play by different rules.

Possible objection, your honor. From what perspective can someone claim there are two rationalities ? Only (I think) from a higher and truer 'actual' synthesizing rationality.

Can a unified subject believe in two, truly opposed 'rationalities' ? In opposed inferential norms ? — plaque flag

I think the member of one community would have to regard the member of another community with a sufficiently different logic as insane. @Banno could maybe add something about our inability to recognize a radically other conceptual scheme.

Possible objection, your honor. From what perspective can someone claim there are two rationalities ? Only (I think) from a higher and truer 'actual' synthesizing rationality. — plaque flag

Couldn't you do so from an emotive base?

Rationality is motivated in its actual use, after all.

It would have to be a "rational" emotion to count as a rational attack. But that's not too hard. I'd go to aesthetics for a place to think through emotions on the rational level, and there are certainly aesthetic values that can come into conflict with respect to an individual inference.

But then we might say that the aesthetics are not the truly rational rationality :D

But for that I'd just point out the differences between Descartes and Kant -- I'd side more Kant when it comes to the questions of ontology or metaphysics: knowledge requires a justification, and there are no justifications when it comes to ontology. Ontology presupposes its own justifications from the outset.

But I also don't put knowledge as the most important thing in philosophy, so that's why I'm open to ontology at another level. In a way ontology is more proper for philosophy than epistemology -- it's just harder to do well.

Can a unified subject believe in two, truly opposed 'rationalities' ? In opposed inferential norms ?

Hrmm I'm not sure about truly opposed rationalities, though that'd be an interesting case if so. I was thinking more orthogonal rationalities -- like one just doesn't really talk about the same things as the other. Then there's a choice with respect to which rationality one ought to appeal to with respect to the circumstances.

Take Gould's notion of non-overlapping magesteria -- you still have to judge what belongs to each magesteria even though there are different rules for the different kinds of things.

I think the member of one community would have to regard the member of another community with a sufficiently different logic as insane. Banno could maybe add something about our inability to recognize a radically other conceptual scheme. — plaque flag

Only if they were a rationalist ;).

But, no, I'm not reaching for full on incommensurability or conceptual schemes here. It's always a thing in the background of my thoughts, but I pretty much take Davidson's argument on conceptual schemes, which @Banno introduced me to, as basically correct. Or at least in my attacks on it I've never been able to really get around the basic argument around conceptual schemes -- historical schemes, practical schemes, or just difference in general not-conceptual, but I find the argument solid and not easy to step aside.

So the question then becomes, in the case of two rationalities, if its not a conceptual scheme, what is it?

I'm tempted to become a parody of myself and just say "It's the ethical!" :D But I actually don't think rationality is an ethical matter. I think of it as instrumental to whatever it is the human heart wants. And sometimes it doesn't want the rational, and sometimes it wants the rational to be different. It's in this creation of the rational order for different purposes that we can come to have different rationalities, though I agree I'd be surprised if a single subject held two rationalities which are contradictory (unless, of course, they are exploring dialethism -- then, perhaps, there'd be a way to hold two contradictory rationalities at once -- but within a rational frame)

However! With that being said, I really love this:

the embodied-enworlded-'enlanguaged' rational community — plaque flag

I think I'd say that your expression is that embodiment, worldhood, and language are equiprimordial, to use some Heidegger.

That sits well with me. It's the foundationalism that I'm questioning more than the ontology. I'd say we can just begin with this and go from there, but that there are any number of places a philosopher could begin from, and then that would serve as what appears to be a foundation to that philosopher. But I'd call it a jumping off point, or a point of return to home.

I'm tempted to become a parody of myself and just say "It's the ethical!" :D But I actually don't think rationality is an ethical matter. I think of it as instrumental to whatever it is the human heart wants. — Moliere

The 'special' rationality of the heroic philosopher is, in my view, exactly and particularly and essentially ethical. As philosopher (or scientist, basically the same ethic), 'I' hold myself to certain standards. I put on a costume and adopt an ethic.

Though there's also the usual instrumental rationality.

Above you might be (seem to be) collapsing the two. Now to me that'd be psychologism, which says that all rationality is really rationalization --- we are really just objects in the causal nexus, emitting adaptive concepts, with illusion of free will or responsibility, not to be trusted. But that would be (however tempting) the self-subverting false-skepticism that makes a profound ontological claim about the subject in order to disallow the authority of profound ontological claims.

I hope not! I'm saying there is more than one rationality, not that rationality is really some other thing. If it were then I'd be arguing there are zero rationalities.

Though your mention of heroism is a point of difference between us. I've come to a place in my life where I don't want the heroes journey. I'm just me doing my things trying to be happy. At this point part of me is being honest, and I like rationality -- but notice how different that is from heroism. Heroes face adversity. I just like these things.

It's a softer version of existentialism.

Couldn't you do so from an emotive base? — Moliere

I think that'd basically be some version of mysticism. I love 'since feeling is first' from e.e. cummings, , for instance, but I couldn't justify it, I don't think, by appealing to my feelings. Now I don't have to justify unless I can't resist trying to be ontological. Think of 'transrational' mystics who (because of their consistency) never bother with philosophical debate. They 'win' the game by not playing.

I'd side more Kant when it comes to the questions of ontology or metaphysics: knowledge requires a justification, and there are no justifications when it comes to ontology. Ontology presupposes its own justifications from the outset. — Moliere

To me, knowledge requires a justification is very much an ontological claim -- proposed as knowledge. (I'm not trying to be difficult, I swear.) Kant is precisely the kind of disavowed ontologist that I'm interested in. If he was quietly skeptical, no problem, but he did a weird super-metaphysics that looks very humble while making intense absolute ontological claims. Fascinating personality.

I think I'd say that your expression is that embodiment, worldhood, and language are equiprimordial, to use some Heidegger. — Moliere

Yes, Heidegger is a huge influence, but it's fun to reach for synonyms, pull in Apel (who loves Peirce). I think Habermas is about this kind of thing too.

That sits well with me. It's the foundationalism that I'm questioning more than the ontology. — Moliere

Well the foundation I'm aiming at is the minimal foundation that is already implied in the role of the philosopher. I'm making a transcendent argument as described here (it'll help me to quote.)

As standardly conceived, transcendental arguments are taken to be distinctive in involving a certain sort of claim, namely that X is a necessary condition for the possibility of Y—where then, given that Y is the case, it logically follows that X must be the case too.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/transcendental-arguments/

So Y is 'I'm a philosopher,' and X is the stuff that makes Y intelligible -- basically what Apel said, but it's world, language, justification norms. Crucially, the details are left minimally specified. Because the foundation should be absolutely the least constraint that will work. Ontologists will fight over the details within that undeniable framework. [So I'm being Kantian in a way. ]

Though your mention of heroism is a point of difference between us. I've come to a place in my life where I don't want the heroes journey. I'm just me doing my things trying to be happy. — Moliere

I hear you, but I like to think of the hero concept as very flexible. Yang heroes, yin heros. Even anti-heros. What I have in mind is any relatively stable ideal toward which the self tends.

And let me reiterate that I don't think people are existentially constrained by my proposed foundation. I'm just postulated that a certain role, optionally adopted, has certain implications.

If X is a 'scientific' / 'rational' ontologist (metaphysician, philosopher), then X cannot deny [ stuff ].

Only if they were a rationalist — Moliere

Yes, exactly ! But I'm assuming they are. And such rationalists are a weird little minority. I play one on TV myself, but I take off the costume now and then and play Uno instead.

Well the foundation I'm aiming at is the minimal foundation that is already implied in the role of the philosopher. I'm making a transcendent argument as described here (it'll help me to quote.)

As standardly conceived, transcendental arguments are taken to be distinctive in involving a certain sort of claim, namely that X is a necessary condition for the possibility of Y—where then, given that Y is the case, it logically follows that X must be the case too.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/transcendental-arguments/

So Y is 'I'm a philosopher,' and X is the stuff that makes Y intelligible -- basically what Apel said, but it's world, language, justification norms. Crucially, the details are left minimally specified. Because the foundation should be absolutely the least constraint that will work. Ontologists will fight over the details within that undeniable framework. [So I'm being Kantian in a way. ] — plaque flag

Heh. You're speaking my honey, then. I love the transcendental argument. I'm pretty familiar with it.

I've come to criticize it though. I agree it is valid. It's definitely powerful. And in the frame of Kant's philosophy I think it's tempered through the deduction of the categories: you can make the argument, but it must be made to the court of reason, and the court will then decide accordingly. So make it a good argument! Or fail.

But it's so easy to use the form outside of an entire philosophy -- what I believe is a necessary condition for the possibility of Y -- Y=our conversation, therefore what I believe is the case.

We couldn't recognise a conceptual scheme that was radically different to ur own, as a conceptual scheme. :wink:

Is what wales and dolphins do, with all that clicking and so on, a conceptual scheme?

Transcendental arguments are treacherous. It's the bit that says "The only way in which Y could be true is if X". It's usually wrong, either because there are other unnoticed reasons for Y besides X, or because we've misunderstood Y int he first place.

We couldn't recognise a conceptual scheme that was radically different to ur own, as a conceptual scheme. — Banno

My thinking to. Hence one logic.

Granted that transcendent arguments are tricky, what in mine works or does not in your views ?

...if knowledge is not necessarily clear and certain, but rather depends upon the kind of knowledge we're dealing with to understand it in its depths (math is clear and certain, but knowing-how to play jazz piano is not as clear), then there is no reason to suppose a general foundation is there... — Moliere

You don't think that a robot will be able to play jazz one day?

I can see a transcendental structure -- the necessary preconditions for rational discourse are such and such, here we are having a rational discussion, therefore we must accept such and such preconditions on pain of contradiction.

There is no ideal rational community which binds our rational discussions, though. I think we can imagine an ideal community and aspire to such a community, but that we're not speaking to it as much as we're speaking with our fellows, all of whom are not ideal -- including myself. Rather we collaborate on what works for our group of seekers. Surely there's the demand to step outside of myself and not just spout my own opinion -- that wouldn't be very interesting after all, since we all have those. And in that demand we get the structure of rationality: but it changes from group to group. There are some generalities that seem the same, but the practices diverge.

Or, at least, this is what my first thought is -- pretty standard. Usually I'm overwhelmed by multiplicity, and find it difficult to generalize at the level of the transcendental. Further I think transcendental arguments, after they are accepted, become self-fulfilling in a way. Now that we know that rationality is such-and-such we can exclude this or that -- but the world changes, and with it so do our practices, and we need that flexibility. But with flexibility comes doubt of transcendental structures.

Or, at least, this is where my thoughts go.

You could probably get a robot to do it now, even. But if you look at the code, while it all has a definite meaning, it won't be clear and distinct how it lines up with the jazz piano -- that is, while the robot might operate on clear and distinct (though elaborate) code, we don't. Reading the code won't give us the knowledge of how to play jazz piano.

There is no ideal rational community which binds our rational discussions, though. I think we can imagine an ideal community and aspire to such a community, but that we're not speaking to it as much as we're speaking with our fellows, all of whom are not ideal -- including myself. — Moliere

I agree with you that all actual communities are not ideal. No actual circle is the perfect circle. But the ideal itself seems to me to exist, even if it's blurry. You might say this thread is primarily an attempt to get a better look at this ideal which was always there in the background as the condition of its possibility. We are all imperfectly living toward or into some always imperfect grasp of a horizonal ideal which is largely about autonomy. To me anyway the respect of others in their difference is part of that. I have to give reasons for my claims. I don't brutishly impose them. But I do not let myself be brutishly imposed upon.

So ethics is first philosophy here. You might say I'm sketching the end of history here in some quasi-Hegelian sense. Am I as a flesh-and-blood person optimistic ? Actually quite the reverse. Moloch demands a tower ! The world is a runaway machine, and the exponential primate cannot control itself. I might be lost without my coalblack gallowshumor.

I can get on board with that, though I'd insist that the ideal doesn't exist :D

I see us as having minor differences here. But in the spirit of the forum I thought I'd offer some criticism rather than just nodding along.

...if knowledge is not necessarily clear and certain, but rather depends upon the kind of knowledge we're dealing with to understand it in its depths (math is clear and certain, but knowing-how to play jazz piano is not as clear), then there is no reason to suppose a general foundation is there...

You don't think that a robot will be able to play jazz one day?

↪chiknsld You could probably get a robot to do it now, even. But if you look at the code, while it all has a definite meaning, it won't be clear and distinct how it lines up with the jazz piano -- that is, while the robot might operate on clear and distinct (though elaborate) code, we don't. Reading the code won't give us the knowledge of how to play jazz piano. — Moliere

So you concede your point?

Btw. I hope you don't mind, but I figured you might not understand (the concession) so I asked chatgpt for help...

Prompt: "They might be acknowledging that the example of robots playing jazz shows that complex tasks can be performed without necessarily having the kind of knowledge that humans possess."

sure but if they both can do it, then does he not concede his point that there is no foundation for knowledge? at this point he now has to start over to prove it

You're right in pointing out a potential inconsistency in their argument. If they acknowledge that both humans and robots can perform a complex task like playing jazz, it does raise questions about their initial claim that there is no general foundation for knowledge. If both humans and robots can achieve the same task, despite potentially different modes of achieving it, it could be seen as a concession or a weakening of their original argument.

However, it's also important to consider that philosophical discussions can evolve, and individuals may revise or clarify their positions as they engage in the conversation. It's possible that they might provide additional context or explanations for their views.

If you're seeking clarification and a deeper understanding of their perspective, you could ask follow-up questions to explore this apparent change in stance. For example, you could inquire about how this new insight aligns with their earlier argument about the lack of a general foundation for knowledge. This way, you can continue the conversation in a constructive and exploratory manner. — chatGPT

I don't think I'm conceding a point, though I could be misunderstanding you.

I'm saying that machine-knowledge is different from human-knowledge, where here we can use "knowledge" because both the machine and the human are demonstrating know-how in a very strict functionalist sense. We can functionally perform the same thing, but we don't do it the same way -- so there's not a common base between the common know-how, which suggests there's no foundation for knowledge (if we're being liberal enough with "knowledge" that we include machine-learning and such)

I think you are missing the central normative essence of rationality. You appeal to it without accounting for it.

I have some knowledge of neural networks, SGD, backprop. Cool stuff. But equating us with machines looks like psychologism, which is to say a self-subverting flavor of irrationalism.
Thinking of judgements as the outputs of algorithms is similar to thinking of all rationality as mere rationalization, so that this proposed equivalence itself is unjustified and unjustifiable.

We are all imperfectly living toward or into some always imperfect grasp of a horizonal ideal which is largely about autonomy. — plaque flag

Now this is definitely something which goes against my notions of rationality, given what I've said thus far. I tend to think of rationality as the tool, ala Hume.

Also it's fun and interesting and everything else that I've always loved about it.

But I've put down the rationalist charge. It's fine that we are not rational. There are some irrationalities that are harmful, and those are bad, but I don't know to what extent a rational ethic -- or theology? -- would really help people because at base I think we're pretty much irrational creatures.

However I think we can imperfectly live towards the horizon of autonomy. And that's certainly an ethical stance. And I'd even go so far as to say that rationality is a tool that can help in that project. I just don't know that I'd put autonomy as the rational -- in a way the rational is dependent upon the horizon you imperfectly live towards.

And if we're not a singular, simple subject, but a bundle (I'm still trying to think of a good way to express The Subject as multiplicity while retaining its coherency) we can even throw ourselves towards multiple horizons. Which is where I think we'd start to see conflicts in rationality, and when we'd have to start making choices between horizons when they come into conflict (if they come into conflict).

EDIT: Which, again, I'm kind of picking up the stuff that we can disagree upon because there's so much agreement that I expect this to be the more interesting avenue for exploration.

Now this is definitely something which goes against my notions of rationality, given what I've said thus far. I tend to think of rationality as the tool, ala Hume. — Moliere

As a former pragmatist, I totally understand the charm of that view. But mere instrumental rationality, present surely in rabbits, misses the heart of Enlightenment humanism, which is autonomy. The reason claims have to be justified is because we are laws to ourselves. We are only [ ideally ] bound by authorities we recognize. Rationality in this higher sense is a framework of freedom and responsibility. Brandom even gets semantics from inferential norms ---and he seems to at least offer a chunk of the truth.

Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding [= reason[33]] without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. Sapere aude! [Dare to be wise!] Have courage to make use of your own understanding [= reason]! is thus the motto of enlightenment.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/