One essential criticism about Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” is that we have no idea about what “to be” or “to exist” means. — Angelo Cannata

You can't argue for [ anything implying ] the impossibility of communication.

Perhaps we should say that certain concepts could use some clarification.

I don’t think that questioning our understanding of “to be” is equivalent to say that communication is impossible. We don’t need to assume that we have a clear idea about the meaning of “to be” to be able to communicate.

I don’t think that questioning our understanding of “to be” is equivalent to say that communication is impossible. We don’t need to assume that we have a clear idea about the meaning of “to be” to be able to communicate. — Angelo Cannata

OK, but being is everywhere in our talk. Heidegger, etc.

Yes, of course we cannot speak without using the verb to be. But this does not imply that we must have a strongly clear idea about its meaning.

Yes, of course we cannot speak without using the verb to be. But this does not imply that we must have a strongly clear idea about its meaning. — Angelo Cannata

:up:
You are just repeating my point.

One essential criticism about Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” is that we have no idea about what “to be” or “to exist” means. The same applies to our conversation as a proof that the world exists, which is almost the same argumentation adopted by Descartes: it cannot be a proof of the existence on the world, because we have no idea of what “existence” means. — Angelo Cannata

Angelo, it is quite easy to rationalize that we know what is going on, hence our convo. :smile:

I'm confused — Count Timothy von Icarus

So am I. The Wittgenstein you critique is very far from the Wittgenstein with whom I am familiar.

The argument that seems salient to 's OP is that if one can say nothing about the mooted "base reality", then it is irrelevant to our conversations.

Alternately, if we do talk about this "base reality", then it's not the case that we can say nothing about it.

Seems to me that we are left with the socks and books and cups and so on, that participate in our everyday conversations. The mooted noumenon either drops out of consideration or can be replaced by the stuff around us.

Everyone "knows" they have made a mistake AFTER it has been discovered. But ten minutes BEFORE their mistake has been pointed out could be exactly the situation you are referring to. How can you tell the difference?

The argument that seems salient to ↪vanzhandz's OP is that if one can say nothing about the mooted "base reality", then it is irrelevant to our conversations. — Banno

You aren't ruling it out, you're just saying you don't want to talk about it.

Meanwhile you are talking about it.

You aren't ruling it out, you're just saying you don't want to talk about it.

Meanwhile you are talking about it. — frank

If I can jump in, to me the big Hegelian insight against postulating a hidden Base Reality is that anything that's meaningful for us is caught up in our inferences --- the game of justifying our claims and explaining our deeds. If the Base Reality is given no inferentially significant relationship whatsoever to other entities, it's also given no meaning. If, on the other hand, it is caught up in such reason-giving, it's on 'this' side of 'appearance.' [ So we get a continuous immanent flat ontology with no disconnected quasi-mystical disconnected points.]

If I can jump in, to me the big Hegelian insight against postulating a hidden Base Reality is that anything that's meaningful for us is caught up in our inferences --- the game of justifying our claims and explaining our deeds. If the Base Reality is given no inferentially significant relationship whatsoever to other entities, it's also given no meaning. If, on the other hand, it is caught up in such reason-giving, it's on 'this' side of 'appearance.' [ So we get a continuous flat ontology with no disconnected quasi-mystical disconnected points.] — plaque flag

I think the big Hegelian insight for postulating a hidden bass reality (I just prefer bass to base) is that the world we know is a dismantled cuckoo clock. That's all the intellect can deal with: partial truths.

That's all the intellect can deal with: partial truths. — frank

That being too a partial truth?

Don't get me wrong. I appreciate having a sense of humor about these things. But chess is more fun when one is trying to win, so ontology/metaphysics might be silly in a larger context, but let's play if we're going to play, right ?

I get the feeling you don't know Hegel as well as you think you do. :wink:

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Maybe I do and maybe I don't, but I get the feeling that you getting a feeling isn't terribly authoritative. It's a bit cowardly to resort to cheap ad homs instead of, I don't know, doing some actual philosophy. Fucking weak, bro. — plaque flag

Damn. Who peed in your cornflakes?

Alternately, if we do talk about this "base reality", then it's not the case that we can say nothing about it. — Banno

Once the solid common sense of direct realism is paradoxically violated and we are cast headlong into a world of representation, we end up being forced to admit that more and more of everyday reality, including the scientific image and even time and space itself (!?!), must be 'just representation,' till the represented shrinks to a point without extension, a sign without meaning.

Then, hopefully, we see that representation has vanished with the represented.

Meanwhile you are talking about it. — frank

Yrs, in much the same way as Antigonish is about a little man who wasn't there.

It's a bit cowardly to resort to cheap ad homs instead of, I don't know, doing some actual philosophy. — plaque flag

, like most folk, agrees with you, but only when someone else is doing the cheap ad homs.

(I just prefer bass to base) — frank

Something felt more than heard? An interesting metaphor?

Although I may only work within the confines of my own subjective reality, this does not disprove a bass reality that exists outside of my own perceptions. — vanzhandz

Like the sustained double low C of Sunrise in Also Sprach Zarathustra, a barely audible 65.4 Hz.

But that is both played and felt, spoken of and created. Again, The mooted noumenon either drops out of consideration or can be replaced by the stuff of the every day.

Only realism works.

How can you tell the difference? — LuckyR

Well, on the one hand, you thought you knew where your keys were but you were mistaken.

You can only properly be said to "know" something if it is true. Otherwise you allow folk to know things that are false, and our use of "know" becomes inconsistent. Of course, we can muse about such inconsistencies, but only by keeping at hand the clear and consistent use with which they contrast.

It's a bit of basic philosophical grammar. A convention, if you like.

Yrs, in much the same way as Antigonish is about a little man who wasn't there. — Banno

But you didn't rule out the unknown or unknowable reality. You just said that talking about it is useless. Wasn't Wittgenstein saying that even addressing whether there is an unknown reality is language on holiday? Isn't that what getting to the top of the ladder means? Realizing that?

like most folk, agrees with you, but only when someone else is doing the cheap ad homs. — Banno

I don't how this happened, but everybody on this forum has decided to treat me like shit. What the hell?

Only realism works. — Banno

Yes. Though that still leaves some wiggle room.

But you didn't rule out the unknown or unknowable reality. — frank

There are things we don't know, yes.

(Odd, this, the entry of realism. Realism is the view that there are true statements that are unknown. Antirealism says that unknowns are neither true nor false. But I'll choose to say that it is either truth that the socks with the guitars printed on them are in the draw, or they are not, and I don't know which, and to reject the antirealist view that the it is neither true nor false)

That's not language on holiday. Antigonish is, though.

Not much more might be involved than a choice of ways of speaking about the unknown.

Realism is the view that there are true statements that are unknown. — Banno

I'm sure you've addressed the issue of unstated statements and such. I don't remember how you did it though.

Not much more might be involved than a choice of ways of speaking about the unknown. — Banno

Perhaps.

You can only properly be said to "know" something if it is true. Otherwise you allow folk to know things that are false, and our use of "know" becomes inconsistent

Exactly. You agree that "know" and "true" can only be linked retrospectively (after truth has been verified) or in other words they aren't linked prospectively (my original point).

Thus in Real Life (which is experienced prospectively) , better to decouple any connection between the two concepts.

When I say "Base Reality" I do not purpose that there is a definite physical reality in which I exist, I am, instead, pointing more to a thought or an argument. I am incapable of witnessing any sort of base reality but I am not incapable of inferring its existence. — vanzhandz

If you cannot define what "base reality" is, how can you witness it? :smile:
It's like saying "I cannot know or feel how it is being in love, whatever that is". See what I mean?

The argument that seems salient to ↪vanzhandz's OP is that if one can say nothing about the mooted "base reality", then it is irrelevant to our conversations.

Alternately, if we do talk about this "base reality", then it's not the case that we can say nothing about it.

Right, but that's the very point of disagreement re the noumena generally.

Kant obviously doesn't say "nothing," about the world of bare noumena, he has a very elaborate explanation of it. It's not incoherent. Arguably though, it has become "useless," over time. It ends up not doing any lifting in explaining the world, doesn't appear to be falsifiable, appears to be based on dogma, etc., all the critiques that have been around since he published the First Critique, but which have been more fully explored over time.

I tend to agree with Rorty's critique that "meaningless," and "nonsense," were never good terms for the attack on pre and post Kantian metaphysics vis-á-vis late Wittgenstein's conception of meaning. "Useless," might be appropriate, although even though Rorty recommends this substitute he clearly doesn't think such metaphysics were totally "useless" either, rather, they outgrew their usefulness for philosophy as a whole.

Even if my consciousness did exist before it was aware of its consciousness, then in what reality did that unconscious mind exist?

Thoughts? — vanzhandz

I'd say consciousness depends on being aware of itself and that the idea of consciousness existing but not being aware of itself is oxymoronic.

You might like to consider that for the Perennial philosophy consciousness and reality are (is) the same phenomenon and mind would be emergent. The 'I Am' of consciousness would be fundamental, but this would not be 'your' consciousness or mine but the global phenomenon in which we all share. This is the consciousness that is referred to when it is said that if we can transcend our egoic 'me' and 'my world' consciousness then we may 'partake of the perpetual'. These ideas complicate the issues or simplify them, depending on one's pov. . . . .