You are basically throwing away, by my lights, the vast majority of biological and neurological knowledge that we have gained in the past 2 centuries and saying that, somehow, we are actually not filtering the world but, rather, directly experiencing it. — Bob Ross
Are you saying that our brains just let the data of experience 1 to 1 pass-through? — Bob Ross
Ah! I understand. Thanks.Even if that's true, it still would be different in very significant ways that, it seems to me, would not be predictable. — T Clark
IIRC, The people who got the Nobel accidentally discovered it. They were trying to find the source of the "noise" in there readings. Something like that?I thought this was an accidental discovery by some geeks with a microwave detector in the 1960s. — T Clark
As far as I understand, the person who first adopted neutral monism, though I don't believe his used this term, was William James. Russell was influenced by it and then developed a version of it. I unsure if Whitehead would accept this very label, probably sticking to "the philosophy of organism". — Manuel
In any case, I think that the actual problem is matter - not consciousness, we know very little about matter, much more about consciousness. But people tend to go the opposite route and say that experience is the problem. — Manuel
I share the view of you and Chalmers as to the amount of sleight of hand that goes on in consciousness studies. It's an epidemic. . . — FrancisRay
I feel that calling it hidden dualism is a bit misleading because this is a wider problem afflicting the whole of Western philosophy. 'Hidden mind-matter dualism' would be sharper. I wouldn't call it hidden but just rather obvious sloppy or devious thinking. I share the view of you and Chalmers as to the amount of sleight of hand that goes on in consciousness studies. It's an epidemic. . . — FrancisRay
Perhaps, but I find the problem more one sided. The OPs position is more open minded so needs less wriggling on the hook. But I accept there's two sides to the debate. .I think many of us on the other side of the argument would agree with, obviously, different opinions about who is doing the prestidigitation.
Note please that you are assuming your own framework -- talking of 'representations' of the world -- in the presentation of the 'problem.' For various reasons, I frame awareness on terms of the direct apprehension of the world --not representation but good old fashioned seeing and smelling and ..
He's feeling no pain, because they gave him morphine.
Pain and 2–√ are just entities in a 'flat' ontology inferentially related to other entities like Paris and protons
We 'scientific' ontologists in our demand for justifications are not on the outside looking in --that's a failure of self-consciousness, an 'alienated' failure to notice our own central role.
I understand why you want to say that, but I think you are reifying the [ discursive, dramaturgical ] subject. Are we gremlins in the pineal gland ? Do you sit behind your eyes, looking out the windows ? But then the tiny actual you must also have eyes that a tinier man sits behind, ad infinitum.
Or our we always already on the 'public stage' of the rational conversation ?
Are you saying that our brains just let the data of experience 1 to 1 pass-through? — Bob Ross
Our linguistic-conceptuals selves are more like softwhere on the crowd than the lardwhere they run on.
But I am observing the number 1, right now.
Kinda sounds like a flaw in reason, I mean why should anyone take your word for it? What makes your reasoning better?
Allegedly, I get by fine without reason.
So, under your view, the brain is not representing anything? ‘Seeing’ and ‘smelling’, by my lights, are senses: are you saying we have senses without perceptions (i.e., formulations of those sensations)? — Bob Ross
as this demonstrates that ‘he’ is representing the world, and that is in the form of his conscious experience; for giving him morphine has inhibited his sensory receptors and cognitive functions and thusly he has lost his ability to represent pain (i.e., and lost his ability to have the sense of touch in general). How would you explain it if his body is not responsible for representing unpleasurable and unwanted damage to his body in the form of pain? — Bob Ross
Pain, as the qualitative sensation, is not in the world like, for mathematically realists, the square root of two is; so I don’t understand how it is ‘flat’ in that sense. — Bob Ross
No we are not gremlins in a pineal gland. No I do not sit behind my eyes. I am a collective organism that represents the world to itself via sensibility, receptivity, and the understanding. — Bob Ross
What do you mean by ‘public stage’? Rational conversation is of our representations. What else would it be? — Bob Ross
I did not understand your answer to this question: could you elaborate? I am not asking about language nor concepts (in the sense of our faculty of reason taking in our perceptions as input and derive ideas/concepts of them in our native language)—I am talking about representations (i.e., our faculty of understanding producing a filtered representation of the world). — Bob Ross
The OPs position is more open minded so needs less wriggling on the hook. — FrancisRay
there's two sides to the debate. — FrancisRay
Yes I understand the move to describe it as information processing, but does that really solve anything different for the hard problem? Searle's Chinese Room Argument provides the problem with this sort of "pat" answer. As you walk away self-assured, this beckons back out to you that you haven't solved anything. Where is the "there" in the processing in terms of mental outputs? There is a point of view somewhere, but it's not necessarily simply "processing". — schopenhauer1
Do you see yourself as particularly well qualified to judge what is science?
— wonderer1
You are getting mighty close to arguing from a place of bad faith. But please do continue...poison well commence I guess. — schopenhauer1
If you don't like the Chinese Room argument because it seems too narrow, then call my version, the "Danish Room Argument". That is to say, my point that I wanted to take away was that processing can miss the "what-it's-like" aspect of consciousness whilst still being valid for processing inputs and outputs, whether that be computationalist models, connectionis models, both, none of them or all of them. I don't think it is model-dependent in the Danish Room argument. — schopenhauer1
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Accept or lean toward: physicalism 248 / 414 (59.9%)
Accept or lean toward: non-physicalism 105 / 414 (25.4%)
Other 61 / 414 (14.7%)
I looked at the survey you referenced and don't think I could get through all the questions without a dictionary of philosophy although the questions are rather simple.
As for me, scientific understanding has proven to be of enormous explanatory value in understanding what is like to be me.
On the mind question, physicalism or non-physicalism, I would be stuck picking 'other'. — Mark Nyquist
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Accept: physicalism 180 / 414 (43.5%)
Lean toward: physicalism 68 / 414 (16.4%)
Accept: non-physicalism 61 / 414 (14.7%)
Lean toward: non-physicalism 44 / 414 (10.6%)
The question is too unclear to answer 22 / 414 (5.3%)
Accept another alternative 13 / 414 (3.1%)
Accept an intermediate view 10 / 414 (2.4%)
Agnostic/undecided 8 / 414 (1.9%)
Reject both 4 / 414 (1.0%)
There is no fact of the matter 2 / 414 (0.5%)
Skip 1 / 414 (0.2%)
Accept both 1 / 414 (0.2%)
For the majority picking physicalism how do they account for our endless mental content of non-physical subject matter? — Mark Nyquist
Voldemort, also known as Lord Voldemort, is a fictional character and the main antagonist in J.K. Rowling's "Harry Potter" series. He is a dark wizard who seeks to conquer the wizarding world and achieve immortality by any means necessary.
For example anything outside their present time and location. Of course it's done by physical means but shouldn't brains with the capability to deal with non-physicals be considered? And do the physicalists have any way of dealing with time outside the present? Past and future are non-physical to me. — Mark Nyquist
Could you give an example of this explanatory value? — FrancisRay
Physical representations of things which don't actually exist in physical reality doesn't seem problematic from my perspective. — wonderer1
There are two sides and one of them doesn't make sense. — FrancisRay
Either you (1) believe there are laws (which are inductively affirmed by science) and philosophical principles (which are presupposed in science) or (2) you don’t. Laws are not observed regularities: the latter is evidence of the former. — Bob Ross
What logically follows is what logically follows, no faith required unless we want to claim that what logically follows tells us something more than the premises, and their entailments, from which it logically follows.
This is incoherent with your belief that anything which is not directly observed (and thusly so-called ‘non-public evidence’) is not epistemically justified: laws of logic is not something you directly observe and would consequently be a ‘faith-based’ absurdity under your view. — Bob Ross
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