The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective; one man's idea is not that of another. [...] This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign's sense, which may be the common property of many people, and so is not a part or a mode of an individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another.
In light of this, one need have no scruples in speaking simply of the sense, whereas in the case of an idea one must, strictly speaking add whom it belongs to and at what time.
If other people can assent to the thought I express in the Pythagorean theorem just as I do, then it does not belong to the content of my consciousness, I am not its owner; yet I can, nevertheless, acknowledge it as true. However if what is taken to be the content of the Pythagorean theorem by me and by somebody else is not the same thought at all, we should not really say 'the Pythagorean theorem', but 'my Pythagorean theorem', 'his Pythagorean theorem', and these would be different, for the sense must go with the sentence.
First, the operation of such creatures as I have been talking about is at least in certain circumstances going to be helped and furthered if there is what one might think of as shared experience. In particular, if psychological states which initially attach to one creature can be transmitted or transferred or reproduced in another creature (a process which might be called ψ-transmission), that would be advantageous. Obviously, the production of communication devices is a resource which will help to effect such transfers.
If one accepts this idea, then one could simply accept that for the process to be intelligible, understandable, there will have to be correspondences between particular communication devices on the one hand, and psychological states on the other. [...] Whether direct or indirect, the correspondences would be between utterances or utterance-types on the one hand, and types of psychological states on the other, where these would include, for example, the belief-types to which the beliefs of particular people belong: not Jones's belief that such-and-such, but a belief that such-and-such.
If other people can assent to the thought I express in the Pythagorean theorem just as I do, then it does not belong to the content of my consciousness, I am not its owner; yet I can, nevertheless, acknowledge it as true.
Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.
As for Grice - isn't his argument a form of psychologism? — Wayfarer
I have loads to say about that one suggestive little change to Frege's account, but I'm curious to see what other people think first. — Srap Tasmaner
Grice speaks of 'the belief-types' and 'the beliefs of particular peoples'. Isn't that use of 'the' the equivalent in his nomenclature to Frege's 'the sense'? — mcdoodle
For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another.
Oh, it's not that difficult to deny that. — Terrapin Station
Whether it's difficult remains to be seen. It's clear enough what Frege gains by not denying it; what do you gain by denying it? — Srap Tasmaner
What you gain is that you say something that's true rather than something one would simply like to be true. — Terrapin Station
On your own view, you cannot tell me the truth, only your truth. No matter what I claim, my truth cannot contradict your truth. (Something happens in my brain; something happens in your brain. Period.) It is in that sense that your truth is and can be of no consequence for me. Even if you wanted to provide an argument for why I should take your truth into account, how would you proceed? We are incapable of both assenting to the same premise. — Srap Tasmaner
I have loads to say about that one suggestive little change to Frege's account, but I'm curious to see what other people think first. — Srap Tasmaner
My mind was blown the first time I came across a person who even considered the notion that an idea might be somehow owned by the stuff in an individual's skull. And Frege was part of the discussion... it was about abstract objects like numbers.
How would Frege's view fit with a platonic account? — Mongrel
All that anyone can tell you is propositions that match facts in their judgment. And that's what I did. We can and certainly do have different judgments, and we can't somehow get beyond the fact that we're making judgments about how propositions link up with facts. Propositions can't somehow match up with facts or not independent of us. Meaning is something that we do as individuals. Objectively, the sentences that we count as propositions are just text marks or sounds. — Terrapin Station
I didn't realize he was a thorough platonist. So you are as well? The image on the mirror is the sharable sense? — Mongrel
I was thinking about meaning today. I have a problem with the concept of a sign. It's supposed to be a signifier/signified combo. I don't think an isolated sign has any meaning, though. I think it has to appear in a complete thought (a complete sentence?) in order to be meaningful. Could be off topic?
It's not the object referred to but still objective. — Srap Tasmaner
Weird how?That would be a version of Frege's context principle. It can get a little weird. — Srap Tasmaner
but there's something there that has to be taken seriously. — Srap Tasmaner
It's not the object referred to but still objective.
— Srap Tasmaner
Objective? Third-person data as opposed to first-person data? — Mongrel
That would be a version of Frege's context principle. It can get a little weird.
— Srap Tasmaner
Weird how?
but there's something there that has to be taken seriously.
— Srap Tasmaner
I don't know if you've really taken it seriously unless you've pondered how it fits into the bigger picture.
If by "third-person" you mean public, then I think yes. — Srap Tasmaner
There are various ways of formulating contextualism and some of them conflict with compositionality. I can't imagine giving up compositionality. I don't even know what the alternative would be. — Srap Tasmaner
I'm not sure what this means. — Srap Tasmaner
But why go through the type business at all? Why not just say, as Frege does, that we each have the belief that such-and-such? — Srap Tasmaner
The reference of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by its means; the idea, which we have in that case, is wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself. — Frege
Scenario (1): A and B have a box of propositions, and they each have opinions about which ones are true. They take turns sorting them into boxes marked "true," "false," and "not sure." Maybe neither of them have some special status that allows them to know what is true, but they can at least see the different ways they sort the propositions. A might be surprised to see B put something in the "true" box that he wouldn't, but B might convince A that he should, because of some others he put in.
Scenario (2): A has his own box of propositions and B has his own box. They might as well sort at the same time, without paying any attention to each other, and they can even share the boxes they sort into. Doesn't matter. What difference could it make to A what B does with his box of propositions?
I took you, perhaps mistakenly, as going for scenario 2, rather than scenario 1.
A third scenario you may find more congenial is suggested to me by Grice's talk of types.
Scenario (3): It's more like kids each sorting their own collections of baseball cards. They can each have a copy of the same card-- not numerically the same, but same player, year, series-- and they can have cards that they count as the same in different ways. "Do you have a Clayton Kershaw?" can be answered "yes" whichever one of the various Clayton Kershaws that have been issued you have.
Scenario 3 is more appealing than 1 in some obvious ways, so long as we can make the type stuff work. — Srap Tasmaner
"Mind-independent" is not a phrase I have any use for, I think. — Srap Tasmaner
people think stuff out here "dodgy," but just look at what's here: meaning, information, patterns, mathematical objects, transitions, tendencies, dispositions, institutions, -- I could go on and on and on — Srap Tasmaner
"Mental object" is what math people call the "idea" Frege speaks of. That's as opposed to "abstract object" which I suppose is his "sense." — Mongrel
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