I would caution against any model where time "flows." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Can you elaborate? Can you give me a link to an article that elaborates?

If time is flowing, that is moving relative to different states of the universe, then it must be doing so over some sort of second time dimension. Some philosophers have accepted this and posited an infinite regress of time dimensions, but it seems unappealing to most.

Second, under special relativity, the order in which events occur can be different for different observers. This makes it unclear as to how any time flow could occur.

Gravity and acceleration-due-to-gravity are, in a certain sense, as one. They are conjoined as a unified concept: gravity-and-acceleration. Thus cause and effect are, in the same sense, as one, save one stipulation: temporal sequencing. — ucarr

I see one inconsistency and one redundancy in this argumentation:
First, there's a circularity: You take two different things, a cause and an effect, and assume that they are one thing --in a sense, or whatever. Then you conclude that cause and effect are the same, well, also in a sense.
Then you introduce the element of timing ("temporal sequencing") that refutes the above statement and which doesn't actually change anything; it's only another reason why the first statement is invalid, since cause precedes effect. Which can be also considered as a tautology.

Is it maybe the argumentation --as a whole-- not properly worded or constructed?

If time is flowing, that is moving relative to different states of the universe, then it must be doing so over some sort of second time dimension. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Does your statement above describe a situation containing two temporal progressions: a) different states of the universe; the differentials separating the states of the universe being one set of a type of time; b) time moving relative to the first set of time being the second set of a type of time?

Second, under special relativity, the order in which events occur can be different for different observers. This makes it unclear as to how any time flow could occur. — Count Timothy von Icarus

At the risk of being convoluted and opaque, "order in which events occur can be different for different observers" exemplifies time eliding even itself: that the ordering of events into a timeline is relative to the inertial frame of reference of the observer and thus there is no universal time: time penetrates its ordering of events in one locality with a different ordering of the same events in another locality.

Time is essential to location in that the structure of a location is not a separate thing apart from material things populating said location; a location is itself a material thing: spacetime. Spacetime is entangled with the material objects that seem to populate it. Entanglement ⇒ time_gravitation.

Now we come to a big question: the boundaries of consciousness: How do time and gravitation negotiate the boundaries of consciousness? Lying center to this question is how do time and gravitation negotiate recursion? Suffice it to say the result of this negotiation is the axiom.

If you propagate an infinite number of successive executions of a computational function you get as a resultant a mathematical axiom.

Time plays an essential role in negotiating recursion en route to axiomatic truth. Expressed in phenomenal terms, this is time penetrating the boundaries of consciousness.*

Aristotle's agent-intellect is propagated by recursion negotiated by time to time-approaching-time-zero. This is also dimensional expansion, viz., propagation of existence instantiated in material objects.

*What are the boundaries of consciousness? One of the boundaries of consciousness is infinite computational recursion en route to time negotiating time-approaching-time-zero. This is echo feedback looping in route to consciousness.

Gravity and acceleration-due-to-gravity are, in a certain sense, as one. They are conjoined as a unified concept: gravity-and-acceleration. Thus cause and effect are, in the same sense, as one, save one stipulation: temporal sequencing. — ucarr

I see one inconsistency and one redundancy in this argumentation:
First, there's a circularity: You take two different things, a cause and an effect, and assume that they are one thing --in a sense, or whatever. Then you conclude that cause and effect are the same, well, also in a sense.
Then you introduce the element of timing ("temporal sequencing") that refutes the above statement and which doesn't actually change anything; it's only another reason why the first statement is invalid, since cause precedes effect. Which can be also considered as a tautology. — Alkis Piskas

Is it maybe the argumentation --as a whole-- not properly worded or constructed? — Alkis Piskas

Your analysis is correct. What I'm trying to do has to be processed through the channel of truth. Think of a plumb line and how it's used to keep a building vertical all the way to its apex. If the plumb line holds to the datum at the base of the structure, we say it's true.

In our phenomenal world of everyday experience, we couldn't well navigate constant potential sensory overload if our pattern recognition of cause-and-effect didn't phrase-up to a unified concept wherein the plumb line from a to b holds true.

A and b holding true to each other is a tautology, except that we have the complication that a and b don't look like each other. That's the mysterious time element. Dispelling the seeming difference of a and b is, however, the adventure of life. We make our journeys in search of truth and, if successful, we confirm that a is really b and vice versa. The seeming endless variety of creation boils down to the ohmm of oneness the ascended spiritualists keep exposing to us.

Time, therefore, elides the multi-forms of creation into a universal oneness of blissful wholeness.

The fall from grace is the smashing up of wholeness into pieces; humans, however, cannot be happy without the adventure of reconstruction

Time, beyond water, holds top rank as the universal solvent: with enough time, drops of water pound coal into diamond.

Time, therefore, elides the multi-forms of creation into a universal oneness of blissful wholeness. — ucarr

Where do you buy your weed? A blessed product.

Does your statement above describe a situation containing two temporal progressions — ucarr

We need to define time in order to avoid confusion. Aristotle's defines time as "the measure of change according to before and after." If we accept this definition, then time is not a thing, but a measure number specified by both the change measured (say, the number of cycles of some process) and the details of the measuring process. We see this in special relativity, where time measure numbers depend on the frame of reference used in measuring change.

Given this definition, it is difficult to see how there could be more than one time dimension. Possibly a physical state could change along one time-like axis and while no change would be perceptible along another. So, we would have a universe in which different, independent, kinds of change occurred -- a continuous sequence of universes orthogonal to the base universe and its "normal" time.

Such a second time dimension might have its own laws of motion and a reason that we could not experience it. But, if we could not experience it, it would not be parsimonious to propose it.

Of course, you could change the definition of time, but then you would need to ensure that it agreed with our normal time when the new definition reduced to that case.

Also, time does not flow, because it does not exist independently of being measured. What flows is the sequence of events that change produces, and that we use to produce a time measure number.

Somewhat unconventional, but very interesting ideas! :up:
I enjoyed it. And it reminded me somehow of "The Tao of Physics" that I read about 50 years ago! :smile: And I loved it!

Time, therefore, elides the multi-forms of creation into a universal oneness of blissful wholeness. — ucarr

Where do you buy your weed? A blessed product. — jgill

In the olden days (my childhood), when we had milkmen and they delivered milk in glass bottles to our door, sometimes a bottle would lie burst on its side. Dad, looking at the bottle, would say, "Another loss from water turning into ice."

Did you not learn to navigate sequences of events in this manner?

time does not flow, because it does not exist independently of being measured. What flows is the sequence of events that change produces, and that we use to produce a time measure number. — Dfpolis

Somebody -- Was it Aristotle? -- talked about the essential importance of metaphor in the exercise of human intelligence.

I, being lazy, use "time" to signify: What flows is the sequence of events that change produces....

Getting fancy, let me add that,

syn·ec·do·che | səˈnekdəkē |
noun
a figure of speech in which a part is made to represent the whole or vice versa, as in Cleveland won by six runs (meaning “Cleveland's baseball team”).

I, being lazy, use "time" to signify: What flows is the sequence of events that change produces.... — ucarr

I have no problem with figures of speech that are recognized to such.

Aristotle's defines time as "the measure of change according to before and after." — Dfpolis

He also says, that in another sense "time" is what is measured.

Of course, you could change the definition of time, but then you would need to ensure that it agreed with our normal time when the new definition reduced to that case. — Dfpolis

"Time" as that which is measured, is completely different from "time" as "the measure of...". One's the territory, the other the map, so to speak. But, they both agree with a "normal time", to some extent. Notice though, that the definition you provided is qualified with "according to before and after". This means that we must refer to an apprehended "before and after" to be able to employ time as a measure of change. And this is where the problem which points to, lies.

Since this is a very real problem, we ought to start with the other definition, that time is what is measured. Then we can say that "before" and "after" are products of the measurement of time, and the inconsistency in before and after which ucarr points to, is attributable to the way that time is measured, distinguishing between the measure, and what is measured. And, we can say deficiencies in the way that time is measured creates the appearance of inconsistency in before and after.

That time is what is measured is more consistent with our wider range of experience with the concept of "time" anyway. For example, when someone says what time it is. And when we see the problems of measurement exposed by the relativity of simultaneity, we can start to apprehend the need for more than one dimension of time, in order to give us precise measurement.

He also says, that in another sense "time" is what is measured. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where?

"Time" as that which is measured, is completely different from "time" as "the measure of...". One's the territory, the other the map, so to speak. — Metaphysician Undercover

In Aristotle's definition, the territory is the changing world. Time is a coordinate we place on its map.

This means that we must refer to an apprehended "before and after" to be able to employ time as a measure of change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. We do this in light of the echos physical events leave in our memory. We remember what happened before now, not what will happen after now. We also see that our willed commitments can affect the future, but not the past.

we ought to start with the other definition, that time is what is measured. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not a definition because it is implicitly circular. The result of measurement is time. So, by your definition, time is both the source and result of measurement, which leaves us completely in the dark about what we are measuring. A's definition makes clear what we are measuring, viz. change, which he defines with no reference to time as "the actualization of a potency insofar as it is still in potency."

And, we can say deficiencies in the way that time is measured creates the appearance of inconsistency in before and after. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it does not. It allows us to eliminate misconceptions about spatially separate events. Some events are before or after a given event, no matter how we measure time. Others are not. If we fix upon a single place, the sequence of events is never in doubt.

That time is what is measured is more consistent with our wider range of experience with the concept of "time" anyway. For example, when someone says what time it is. — Metaphysician Undercover

I look at a changing clock to see what the measure number is. If the clock does not change, I don't trust it to indicate the time.

And when we see the problems of measurement exposed by the relativity of simultaneity, we can start to apprehend the need for more than one dimension of time, in order to give us precise measurement. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem not to understand relativity. It is all about how we measure things. As a result, Aristotle's concept of time is compatible with it, while Newton's concept of absolute time (which seems to be yours) is incompatible with it.

Where? — Dfpolis

That would be "Physics" Bk 4, Ch 11-14.

In Aristotle's definition, the territory is the changing world. Time is a coordinate we place on its map. — Dfpolis

I don't think you've read the section of the "Physics" which I refer to, if this is what you think.

219b: "Time then is a kind of number (Number, we must note, is used in two senses --- both of what is counted or the countable and also of that with which we count. Time obviously is what is counted not that with which we count: these are different kinds of thing.)"

That is not a definition because it is implicitly circular. The result of measurement is time. So, by your definition, time is both the source and result of measurement, which leaves us completely in the dark about what we are measuring. A's definition makes clear what we are measuring, viz. change, which he defines with no reference to time as "the actualization of a potency insofar as it is still in potency." — Dfpolis

It only becomes circular if you allow "time" to have both definitions, which would be equivocation anyway. So your argument that it is circular is an argument based in equivocation. The explicit equivocation is that "time" refers to both the thing measured, and what is produced by the measurement. If we adhere to the one definition, that time is what is counted, then the thing produced by the measurement is not time, but theory relating to time.

As an analogy, let "quantity" refer to the thing counted, and "number" refer to the counting theory. When a quantity is counted, the counting theory is employed to produce a theory which represents the thing counted. "There is x number of C in the lot", would be an example of such a theory produced from counting. Whether or not the theory is sound is not relevant here.

It may be the case that Aristotle in some ways establishes an equivalence between time and change, but he does qualify this by saying that time is the number of "continuous change". He defines "change" in terms of coming to be and passing away, and further with "cause". "Cause" is analyzed even further and divided into potential and actual. In a number of ways he describes how causes precede the end, and he also argues how time is a necessary condition for change. Therefore change is defined with reference to time. This is why he proceeds in the "Physics" from "change" to motion and time.

No, it does not. It allows us to eliminate misconceptions about spatially separate events. Some events are before or after a given event, no matter how we measure time. Others are not. If we fix upon a single place, the sequence of events is never in doubt. — Dfpolis

That sure looks like inconsistency to me. If one way of measuring time results in a reversal of before and after, in comparison with another, and time is defined with reference to before and after, then there is inconsistency within the way that time is measured.

That would be "Physics" Bk 4, Ch 11-14. — Metaphysician Undercover

The discussion of time begins in ch. 10. There he notes that "no part of it is" (218a6). So, we need to be aware that while it is convenient to speak of beings of reason (ens rationis) as though they exist simpliciter, they do not. Time, as a measure number, exists only in the minds contemplating it. So, you need to distinguish between what is a convenient way of speaking, and Aristotle's doctrine.

Then, in ch. 11, he says, "Time then is a kind of number. [Emphasis mine] Number, we must note, is used in two ways—both of what is counted or countable and also of that with which we count. Time, then, is what is counted, not that with which we count: these are different kinds of thing." (219b6-9) As a number, it is not something existing in nature, but a mental entity resulting from a numbering operation. We can only number something which can be numbered, ie. change, which he has already argued time depends upon. This is entirely compatible with the classic definition of time as the measure of change according to before and after.

There is no point in continuing to pile quotation on quotation. You are misinterpreting the text.

The explicit equivocation is that "time" refers to both the thing measured, and what is produced by the measurement. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no equivocation. What is measured is time potentially. The result is time actually.

That sure looks like inconsistency to me. If one way of measuring time results in a reversal of before and after, in comparison with another, and time is defined with reference to before and after, then there is inconsistency within the way that time is measured. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suggest you read about simultaneity, and the difference between the time-like and space-like separation of events in special relativity. It would take too much of my time for me to explain to you.

The discussion of time begins in ch. 10. There he notes that "no part of it is" (218a6). So, we need to be aware that while it is convenient to speak of beings of reason (ens rationis) as though they exist simpliciter, they do not. Time, as a measure number, exists only in the minds contemplating it. So, you need to distinguish between what is a convenient way of speaking, and Aristotle's doctrine. — Dfpolis

I really think you need to reread that section, you might come to a better understanding. He clearly talks about time as being measured and he describes how time exists. This is what he says at 226b, 28:

"We have stated, then, that time exists and what it is, and in how many senses we speak of the 'now', and what 'at some time', 'lately', 'presently' or 'just', 'long ago', and 'suddenly' mean."

Notice that all these terms, all these ways of speaking, are grounded in time being something real. This is not a matter of "a convenient way of speaking". What is the case, is that there must be a real difference between the time referred to as "now", and the time referred to as "before now", and "after now", or else the distinction of before and after is incoherent. In other words, if time isn't something real, before and after make no sense.

As a number, it is not something existing in nature, but a mental entity resulting from a numbering operation. — Dfpolis

Aristotle was a student, of Plato, and numbers were considered to be existent things, as well as the symbols we use to count things. That's why he says number is used in two ways, what is countable, and that with which we count. Time is what is countable, therefore the terrain, not the map.

This is entirely compatible with the classic definition of time as the measure of change according to before and after. — Dfpolis

Sure, but don't you see that in order for "before and after" to have any meaning, there must be time which is something real in nature, to give these words significance. So consider that we use time to measure change according to before and after, as you say. We can't just assign "before" and "after" arbitrarily, these designations are grounded in empirical observations, and this is the manifestation of time in its real, natural occurrence. Before and after are not mere fabrications of the mind, these words refer to a real, observed order in the physical world. The glass fell off the table before it broke on the floor. If there was no real order here, it would make just as much sense to say that the glass broke before it fell.

There is no point in continuing to pile quotation on quotation. You are misinterpreting the text. — Dfpolis

I agree there is no point in looking at quotes, or even discussing what Aristotle thought, what is important is what we believe, you and I, and what is the truth to this matter.

What is measured is time potentially. The result is time actually. — Dfpolis

I don't get this at all , maybe you could explain. Doesn't time have to actually pass before it can be measured? How could one measure the potential passing of time? It seems to me like that would be a fictional measurement. Therefore I think you might want to reconsider this, as you seem to have it backward.

In our minds, in theory, we can work with all sorts of time intervals, and time durations, these mental constructions we might call "time potentially". Also, when we hand a name to a duration, like "day", "hour", "second", these are 'time potentially", because they do not refer to any actual, specific time period. But when we use a clock to measure time, the passing of time, this is actual time, as time is actually passing. The clock provides us with a measurement, "ten seconds" for example. But this is back to a mental construction. "Ten seconds" is potential time, unless we relate this to the actual passing of time in the world, for context, and say in qualification, "the ten seconds when...".

"We have stated, then, that time exists and what it is, and in how many senses we speak of the 'now', and what 'at some time', 'lately', 'presently' or 'just', 'long ago', and 'suddenly' mean." — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, time exists, but as a measure number, a being of reason.

Notice that all these terms, all these ways of speaking, are grounded in time being something real. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, they are grounded in the reality of change.

Aristotle was a student, of Plato, and numbers were considered to be existent things, as well as the symbols we use to count things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, Aristotle was a student of Plato. He went on to reject his theory that ideas and numbers are substantial.

Sure, but don't you see that in order for "before and after" to have any meaning, there must be time which is something real in nature — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the potential and the actualized ground before and after.

I don't get this at all , maybe you could explain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Change is measurable according to before and after, say in the movement of clock hands. The act of measuring this produces time as a measure number.

How could one measure the potential passing of time? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not the potential passing of time, but the passing of potential time, stages in the process of change, that is measured.

In our minds, in theory, we can work with all sorts of time intervals, and time durations, these mental constructions we might call "time potentially". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, what is imaginary is not potential. Potencies are grounded in actual states of nature, not the mind.

I do not intend to continue explaining this to you.

No, they are grounded in the reality of change. — Dfpolis

That's not accurate, because they are grounded in before and after, which is a specific feature of change. Your definition was "according to before and after". So if time is a measure of change, it measures only this particular parameter, that which relates to "before and after".

But the problem is that these other terms such as "lately", "long ago", "suddenly", introduce another aspect of time, other than "before and after" and that is duration, temporal extension, the meantime between before and after . So temporal measurement requires not only a judgement of before and after, but also a method for measuring the time (duration) between these, the meantime.

No, the potential and the actualized ground before and after. — Dfpolis

You have this backward, before and after are used to ground potential and actual. That this is the case can be seen from what you refer to as "actualization". Actualization is the concept which establishes a relationship between potential and actual. Without that concept there is no direct relation between those two, and no way of deriving "before and after". Therefore "before and after" are not derived from potential and actual, and are not grounded in potential and actual.

Instead, "actualization" is used as a concept to relate potential to actual, by establishing the temporal relation of "before and after" between potential and actual. So, that there is a relationship between potential and actual is established with "actualization", and that this relationship is the relationship of "before and after" is established by the nature of "actualization".

"Actualization" represents the meantime, the duration between before and after. In traditional Greek terms this is "coming-to-be", the time between being not-X, and being X, in the condition of change, the act of generation. Therefore the concepts of "potential and actual" are grounded in the empirically observed reality of "coming-to-be", which occurs in the temporal duration (extension) of the meantime between before and after.

Change is measurable according to before and after, say in the movement of clock hands. The act of measuring this produces time as a measure number. — Dfpolis

Before and after set the boundaries of the parameter to be measured, which is the duration, or extension of time in between these two, the meantime. This is how we employ the "now" as Aristotle explained, we project it as a point in time, using it to establish boundaries to segregate a specific temporal duration. One instance of the projected "now" represents the before, the other represents the after, the duration between is measured.

It is necessary that "before" and "after" represent something empirically real, this grounds the projection of the now in real. And, in order that the temporal duration measured is applicable, the measured duration must also be something empirically real. Accordingly, the temporal duration measured, as the meantime between the two artificial boundaries created by the projection of the "now", is equally real and measurable and empirically verifiable, as is "before and after".

Potencies are grounded in actual states of nature, not the mind. — Dfpolis

Yes, potencies are grounded in actual states of nature, but potencies are produced by the mind. What is described by us, is what we claim as "actual", and from this we derive through the application of principles, specific potencies which are attributable to that described actuality. So potencies are grounded in actual states, but the "actual states" are descriptions which we produce, and these are themselves grounded in empirical observation.

The important point is that we cannot directly describe the world in terms of potencies, because what is derived from the activity of sensing is actualities. So it is only actualities, forms, which are grounded in the world; "grounded" meaning supported by empirical observation. From an analysis of these forms, actualities, along with the application of specific principles derived from an understanding of change, we can describe potencies. But the key point to apprehend is that there are "principles" which lie between, and separate the descriptions as actualities, and the derivative potencies. So both actualities and potencies are "grounded", but actualities are grounded directly by empirical observation, while potencies are grounded by actualities, through the means of principles which relate potencies to actualities. As described above, in Aristotle this relationship is established with the concept of "actualization", which is derived from the ancient understanding of "coming-to-be".

I was looking through my old comments, & I came across this. You replied to my first post, & I never noticed it. Pardon this extremely late reply & re-upping of an old thread, but I'd like to know what you'd say to my reply here.

The parachutist has jumped out of a plane airborne at ten thousand feet. What happens next...? — ucarr

Well, according to the O.P., he plummets.

Yet the point's that the relationship that's merely between these states of experience can be represented in terms of precession & succession, without any physical cause being required in order to do so. In other words, when the parachutist was inside of the plane that was up in the air, he wasn't plummeting, but when he was subsequently completely outside of it, at some point, he was; the former state temporally preceding, & the latter state temporally succeeding, the other; without any physical cause being required in order to represent this series of events, as I've literally just done so.

A film script is also known as a continuity. Characters behave and their behavior causes reactions in other characters. Action with emotional impact drives the story forward. As the story moves forward, characters change. This is the arc of the story. As we watch a film continuity, we feel and know the middle of the story is not the same as the beginning of the story because things have happened that have brought us to a new place in the story of people's lives. What Joey did to Cathy last night has made her become a more confident woman next morning. — ucarr

Continuity isn't causality. A thing may be the former without being the latter. For example, one point in space can be represented as being continuous with another, & yet neither depends on or is the "effect" of the other in existence. Therefore, continuity isn't causality.

The "middle" & the "beginning" of the story are temporal determinations, not causal. The "beginning" & the "middle" of the day may be lit out, with the "end" of it being dark at night, & yet neither the light of the "beginning" & the "middle" our story, or day, nor the darkness at the "end" of it are either the causes or the effects of the other. Thus, just because something, like a story, can be represented with a "beginning," a "middle," & an "end" doesn't presuppose causal reality within it.

What Joey did to Cathy last night has made her become a more confident woman next morning.

What's going on inside of Cathy? — ucarr

An "effect" can't be separated from its "cause." One can witness Cathy's confidence without knowing of what "Joey did to Cathy last night." Thus, it can't be claimed that Cathy's confidence is an effect of the latter, unless you're saying that the knowledge of that "effect" can be separated from its "cause" (which is contradictory, & so a reason why this scenario can't be an example of causality). Not mentioning that "last night" & "next morning" are temporal determinations, which, as I've just pointed out above, aren't inherently causal.

For example, one point in space can be represented as being continuous with another — ItIsWhatItIs

I'm curious how you can do that. :chin:

I'm curious how you can do that. :chin: — jgill

Well, seeing as, at https://www.dictionary.com/browse/continuous, "continuous" is definable as "being in immediate connection or spatial relationship," it should seem quite distinctly. :cool:

An "effect" can't be separated from its "cause." — ItIsWhatItIs

Can you take your above quote and apply it to your below quote?

The "beginning" & the "middle" of the day may be lit out, with the "end" of it being dark at night, & yet neither the light of the "beginning" & the "middle" our story, or day, nor the darkness at the "end" of it are either the causes or the effects of the other. — ItIsWhatItIs

Can you take your above quote and apply it to your below quote? — ucarr

I can't 'cause I neither observe causes nor effects within it. Although, honestly, I'm not sure that I get what it's that you're asking. So, if you just happen to elucidate it, that won't be a bad thing.

A thing may be the former without being the latter. — ItIsWhatItIs

One thing may precede another thing without the preceding thing being the cause of the succeeding thing.

Is my above interpretation of your quote correct?

Continuity isn't causality. — ItIsWhatItIs

Continuity alone does not imply causality.

Is my interpretation of your above quote correct?

Can you cite an example of causality without continuity?

One thing may precede another thing without the preceding thing being the cause of the succeeding thing.

Is my above interpretation of your quote correct? — ucarr

My quote that you're referencing there, when I say that "a thing may be the former without being the latter," isn't about precession & succession. So, it's a "no" as to the interpretation, but, yeah, I've said that before & hold it still.

Continuity alone does not imply causality.

Is my interpretation of your above quote correct?

Can you cite an example of causality without continuity? — ucarr

Yeah, your "interpretation" is correct. As to an example: firstly, my assertion was that continuity isn't causality, i.e., not conversely, & so I can't be asked to cite an example of there being causality without continuity, because I've never claimed that. Secondly, I've already provided an example of that assertion in my post before last, as well as a definition of "continuity" in the latter. Yet that's a better way to approach this one point, that is, to settle on its definition before I restate my given example. So, before I give you an example of continuity without causality, please tell me: how do you understand that term?

A line through space is continuous in the common sense of the word and exists without causality. But I can interpret the line as a contour "caused by" a function f(t).

A thing may be the former without being the latter. — ItIsWhatItIs

One thing may precede another thing without the preceding thing being the cause of the succeeding thing.

Is my above interpretation of your quote correct?
— ucarr

My quote that you're referencing there, when I say that "a thing may be the former without being the latter," isn't about precession & succession. So, it's a "no" to the interpretation... — ItIsWhatItIs

I claim a correct interpretation of a claim isn't limited to covering the meaning intentionally expressed by the writer of the claim; it can also cover the syntactical meaning of the claim, even if it's not an expression of the writer's intention.

What do you say in reaction to this?

Can you cite an example of causality without continuity? — ucarr

As to an example: firstly, my assertion was that continuity isn't causality, i.e., not conversely, & so I can't be asked to cite an example of there being causality without continuity, because I've never claimed that. — ItIsWhatItIs

Are you claiming my question is illegal because it asks you to respond to a claim you haven't made?

Secondly, I've already provided an example of that assertion in my post before last, — ItIsWhatItIs

An "effect" can't be separated from its "cause." — ItIsWhatItIs

Assuming the above is the quote, is this a correct interpretation: causal relationships imply continuity?

My conclusion: The reverse-ordered statement: "Continuity implies causality" is incorrect.

A line through space is continuous in the common sense of the word and exists without causality. But I can interpret the line as a contour "caused by" a function f(t). — jgill

You are claiming a line through space is and isn't the effect of a cause?

Are you claiming my question is (somehow) illegal because it asks you to respond to a claim you haven't made? — ucarr

"Illegal"? No. Yet I don't have the burden of proof by an example for something I that didn't assert. So, to be sure, not "illegal," but illogical.

Assuming the above is the quote, is this a correct interpretation: causal relationships are always continuities? — ucarr

I'd like you to ask my previous question first: how do you define the word "continuity" or "continuous"? Besides, even if I'd affirm it, that still wouldn't undermine my point. For, given that all "xs" are "ys" doesn't necessarily mean that all "ys" are "xs."

Do you agree that the above quote allows that continuities can sometimes also be causal? — ucarr

Still, even if I did, that wouldn't defeat my point, & would rather support it. For, that some "xs" are "ys" precisely means that all "xs" aren't, & therefore "x" can be without "y"; in other words, "continuity, i.e., 'x,'" can be without "causality, i.e., 'y'"; which was precisely the point that was to be proven.

how do you define the word "continuity" or "continuous"? — ItIsWhatItIs

How to define "continuity" is what I'm attempting to examine. If something is continuous, such as the lifespan of an individual human, how to we correctly understand the changes that reshape the identity of this human over time? Specifically, how do we correctly assess the consequences of the individual's behavior? Typically, we say our actions have consequences. For this reason, we're concerned about doing the right thing so as to avoid negative consequences. Actions with consequences is the foundation for viewing and judging the moral success or failure of an individual's life. I think the implication of moral judgment is that choices and behavior are causal; they have effects.

Is it wrong to think of the lifespan of an individual as a continuity through time if continuity precludes causal relationships between choices, behavior and consequences?