It's important to keep in mind that for Schopenhauer, the will as thing in itself is the closest approximation to the thing in itself "unaltered" as it were, it's the closest approximation we have of it, but it's not the actual thing in itself - though he should be much more explicit than he was on this point, he does state this quite clearly in Volume 2, though the specific essay's title is currently eluding me.

The so called "referent" would be the simple act of will - energy in today's term - which can be felt all the time, made more explicit when, say, we move our arms or legs and focus on the act of moving it. Or if we attend to it by being observant of our breathing, and so on.

But, again, this is not exactly the thing in itself, just its closest approximation.

thanks for the reply! I know what you mean, but it seems Schopenhauer is a bit ambivalent about whether it is an "approximation"...i know the volume 2 statements he makes, but in other texts he seems to say, "yes will is thing-in-itself" (not as an approx)....
the act of will.... when we are not in an act of will (of, say, moving to a ice cream stand to by an ice cream), we would still be willing, right? I have never cleared up the distinction between "just" willing and the ACT of willing....

It's important to keep in mind that for Schopenhauer, the will as thing in itself is the closest approximation to the thing in itself "unaltered" as it were, it's the closest approximation we have of it, but it's not the actual thing in itself - though he should be much more explicit than he was on this point, he does state this quite clearly in Volume 2, though the specific essay's title is currently eluding me.

The so called "referent" would be the simple act of will - energy in today's term - which can be felt all the time, made more explicit when, say, we move our arms or legs and focus on the act of moving it. Or if we attend to it by being observant of our breathing, and so on.

But, again, this is not exactly the thing in itself, just its closest approximation. — Manuel

:up: I think that's what's often missed about Schopenhauer's idea of will. You may think of it as your own, but it's something you share with Everything. I read that later in life he decided that the thing-in-itself is unknowable. Is that your understanding?

It's important to keep in mind that for Schopenhauer, the will as thing in itself is the closest approximation to the thing in itself. . . . . what could this REFERENT be?? — Manuel

I've never read any of Schopenhauer's works, but my superficial understanding of his notion of Universal Will, sounds similar to a scientist's concept of causal Energy. He seemed to replace the personal Soul with an impersonal Drive or Motivation to work for life & survival. In other words, a human being is merely a robotic machine programmed (by evolution?) to do whatever is necessary to propagate its core program (seed) into the future --- to what end? But if invisible intangible abstract Energy is the universal ding-an-sich, it must also take on the causal, material & mental forms that we observe in the world.

That notion is similar to the 21st century concept of Information*1 as the ubiquitous shape-shifting "substance" that exists in the various forms of Energy & Matter & Mind*2. Hence, the evolutionary offspring of the Prime Mover (power to create & animate Forms) is the essence of all things in the world. In that case, our perceptions of mind, matter & energy may be the "approximations" (representations) that Schop was referring to. Could universal generic Information be the referent of Will? Does that make sense to someone more familiar with his publications? :smile:


*1. Information :
Knowledge and the ability to know. Technically, it's the abstract mathematical ratio of order to disorder, of positive to negative, of knowledge to ignorance. It's measured in degrees of uncertainty. Those ratios are also called "differences". So Gregory Bateson* defined Information as "the difference that makes a difference". The latter distinction refers to "value" or "meaning". Babbage called his prototype computer a "difference engine". Difference is the cause or agent of Change. In Physics it’s called "Thermodynamics" or "Energy". In Sociology it’s called "Conflict".
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

*2. Mind as Energy :
The mind is viewed as energies of relationships, with no beginning and no end, that give rise to consciousness in an observer processing change or information from the universe.
https://researchoutreach.org/articles/mind-as-energy/

His second publishing of The World as Will and Representation, which now included Volume.2, supposedly establishes his complete view on the matter.

It's hard to say. If he believes, as he says, that will is the closest approximation to the thing in itself, how close is this approximation? Sometimes he sounds rather confident in saying that will is the ultimate stuff of the universe.

But when he discusses representations themselves, as they appear to us ordinarily, he very clearly recognizes that these appearances are rather mysterious.

So, the answer to your question depends on the problem of similarity. If will as experienced by us is a good approximation to the thing in itself, then we have a somewhat decent idea of it, if the approximation is misleading, then it's mysterious. As I read him, he tends to lean to the former view.

What he really struggled with, is with the idea of how from one thing (will), many could arise. He used to be confident about this but appears later in life to become rather troubled by this issue.

. In other words, a human being is merely a robotic machine programmed (by evolution?) to do whatever is necessary to propagate its core program (seed) into the future --- to what end? But if invisible intangible abstract Energy is the universal ding-an-sich, it must also take on the causal, material & mental forms that we observe in the world. — Gnomon

Not a machine no, a creature of nature - not his exact words, but that's what he means. He appears to have something quite similar to evolution in mind and discusses some interesting ideas associated with such concepts.

He does not deny matter, but matter for him is a representation. Which is why his book is titled "Will and Representation", sometimes alternatively translated as "Will and Idea".

That notion is similar to the 21st century concept of Information*1 as the ubiquitous shape-shifting "substance" that exists in the various forms of Energy & Matter & Mind*2. Hence, the evolutionary offspring of the Prime Mover (power to create & animate Forms) is the essence of all things in the world. In that case, our perceptions of mind, matter & energy may be the "approximations" (representations) that Schop was referring to. Could universal generic Information be the referent of Will? Does that make sense to someone more familiar with his publications? — Gnomon

I think he would have some issues with the term "information", as it comes loaded with many ideas that are quite the opposite of his elaboration of "will". The will is a blind striving, with no goal in mind. While there are several elaborations of "information" theory that are clear that information is meant in a technical sense, it becomes very slippery very quickly.

The second option of mind as energy would likely be less problematic to him.

What he really struggled with, is with the idea of how from one thing (will), many could arise. He used to be confident about this but appears later in life to become rather troubled by this issue. — Manuel

What I took away from it was an image of a diamond with many faces. Each face thinks it's unique, but logic leads to a collapse of the whole thing into a monolith. That's a side effect of determinism.

Unity and disunity are two sides of the same coin, though. It's mystical.

The so called "referent" would be the simple act of will - energy in today's term - — Manuel

the concept of "energy" is an empirical one, a concept derived from the empirical world. this is consistent with Schop's concept empiricism (all concepts must trace back to representation), yet
contradicts his notion of will as thing-in-itself. will as thing-in-itself is beyond all representation.

I've never read any of Schopenhauer's works, but [ ... ] — Gnomon

:smirk:

“…. All that in any way belongs or can belong to the world is inevitably thus conditioned through the subject, and exists only for the subject. The world is idea….”

Even if it could be said “conditioned through the subject”, does it follow that all “…exists only for the subject…”?

I don’t see how that which belongs to this, can exist only for that.

What say you?

I agree, it need not follow and is false as can be appreciated just by merely looking at how other organisms interact with the world.

Unless he has in mind existence in a special sense of the word, that supposition is difficult to defend.

Again, will as the closest approximation we have of the "thing in itself".

Willed actions, as felt phenomenologically, could be labeled representations, though they surely feel immediate in a way nothing else in the world does. So here it's tricky.

But I don't see a contradiction. In so far as we have to conceptualize the idea of the will in order to talk about it to others, we proceed to do so.

Yeah, my take as well.

Thanks.

Not a machine no, a creature of nature - not his exact words, but that's what he means. He appears to have something quite similar to evolution in mind and discusses some interesting ideas associated with such concepts. — Manuel

I got the idea that Schop thought of humans as mechanisms from the Wiki & JSTOR articles*1, which said he denied the existence of a Soul (immaterial essence, animating principle, spirit), perhaps due to the religious baggage attached to the notion of immortal spirits. But the most general meaning of "Soul" has been the rational powers that distinguish god-like humans from mere mechanical animals. Did I get the wrong impression of Schop's contrast of Will vs Soul?

The article also uses the term "possessed" to describe the activity of Will within a human. Is that not similar to the notion of Spirit possession? :smile:

*1. Soul vs Will :
Arthur Schopenhauer did not believe in soul. However, he explained that every living thing is possessed by a will.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/janimalethics.8.1.0012

I think he would have some issues with the term "information", as it comes loaded with many ideas that are quite the opposite of his elaboration of "will". The will is a blind striving, with no goal in mind. While there are several elaborations of "information" theory that are clear that information is meant in a technical sense, it becomes very slippery very quickly. — Manuel

"Blind striving" sounds very much like the common notion of physical Energy/Force. But, as the driving impetus behind Evolution, that cosmic Will-Power seems to have some direction (e.g. toward complexity & organization against impossible odds); especially here on Earth. That may be one reason some scientists are beginning to view physical Energy as a specific form of generic (multi-form) Information*2.

The original referent of the term "Information" was the immaterial contents of a Mind : Ideas, Facts, Intentions. Some of those enformed concepts seem to be the motivators & shapers of human goals. For example, the idea of a canal across the mountain ridge of Panama was so rationally & emotionally powerful, for economic & socio-cultural reasons, that it motivated the expenditure of decades of Time, and millions of money investments to overcome impossible odds*3. In a very real sense, Information (ideas) was transformed into Energy to "strive" for very focused goals. You might say that the idea of a short canal across forbidding mountains was the ding an sich (ideal referent) of the man-made watercourse we have today. Is the visionary concept of a future state merely a poetic metaphor, or also a causal force? :smile:


*2. Information transformed into Energy to do work :
Physicists in Japan have shown experimentally that a particle can be made to do work simply by receiving information, rather than energy.
https://physicsworld.com/a/information-converted-to-energy/

*3. Man behind the Panama Canal :
French engineer Bunau-Varilla energetically promoted a canal in Panama.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippe_Bunau-Varilla
Note --- Was he "possessed" by "blind striving" Will, or by a goal-oriented idea/emotion/will.?

I got the idea that Schop thought of humans as mechanisms from the Wiki & JSTOR articles*1, which said he denied the existence of a Soul (immaterial essence, animating principle, spirit), perhaps due to the religious baggage attached to the notion of immortal spirits. But the most general meaning of "Soul" has been the rational powers that distinguish god-like humans from mere mechanical animals. Did I get the wrong impression of Schop's contrast of Will vs Soul? — Gnomon

I recommend a recent (2014) book, Schopenhauer’s Compass, Urs App. This book draws extensively on Schopenhauer’s notes, manuscripts and correspondence, and also situates him very nicely in his historical context. You could say that Schopenhauer was a kind of religious dissident - he was very much influenced by the mystics (particularly the German Jacob Boehme) and, as is well known, by early translations of the Upaniṣads. His idea of spiritual liberation was much nearer the Hindu mokṣa than conventional religious tropes, as he proclaimed himself atheist (and the fact that he could hold the views he had, which held religious asceticism in high esteem, and still be regarded atheist says something interesting in my view. )

I agree, it need not follow and is false as can be appreciated just by merely looking at how other organisms interact with the world. — Manuel

The first sentence of World as Will and Representation: '“The world is my idea:”—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness.'

Isn't that somewhat validated by the later idea of the 'lebenswelt' or 'umwelt' of animals? As you know, this was originally conceived by phenomenology, but was then adapted by biologists. Jakob von Uexküll introduced the idea of the "Umwelt," which can be translated as "environment" or "surrounding world" (precisely the element which is said to be excluded by natural science.) The Umwelt is the subjective, experiential world of an organism – its unique perception and interpretation of its surroundings. Uexküll's concept was derived from Husserl's notion of Lebenswelt, emphasizing the organism's active and meaningful engagement with its environment. Charles Peirce's semiotic theories also explore the ways in which signs and symbols are used to create meaning in the broader organic domain. (Peirce himself is often categorised as an objective idealist.)

Unless he has in mind existence in a special sense of the word, that supposition is difficult to defend. — Manuel

He does call into question what we think we understand about the meaning of 'to exist'. But then, he is a philosopher :-)

what could this REFERENT be? — KantDane21

You yourself as subject, as the one who is wondering 'what is this referent?', the immediate first-person sense of being. That doesn't need an external referent, although it only ever gains its bearings with reference to them.

the immediate first-person sense of being. — Quixodian

Yep.

Schulze’s critique of Kant is essentially the following: it is incoherent to posit as a matter of philosophical knowledge – as Kant seems to have done – a mind-independent object that is beyond all human experience, and that serves as the primary cause of our sensory experience. — SEP: Schopenhauer’s Critique of Kant

Schopenhauer does not believe, then, that Will causes our representations. His position is that Will and representations are one and the same reality, regarded from different perspectives. They stand in relationship to each other in a way that compares to the relationship between a force and its manifestation (e.g., as exemplified in the relationship between electricity and a spark, where the spark “is” electricity). This is opposed to saying that the thing-in-itself causes our sensations, as if we were referring to one domino striking another. — op.cit.

Trouble is, reality does not care what you will, inflicting itself on you without regard for you desires. In that way it's not unlike like Schop's mum.

Or the appallingly poor thinking on display in parts of this thread.

Trouble is, reality does not care what you will, — Banno

Did you think Schopenhauer thought otherwise?

the immediate first-person sense of being. — Quixodian

Or the appallingly poor thinking on display in parts of this thread. — Banno

Oh no! Another outbreak of idealism. (Clutches pearls.)

:chin:

Echoing the voice of Dasein.

the immediate first-person sense of being. — Quixodian

No, it's first person.

Yes, it's no first person.

Heidegger's perspective suggests that Dasein is specific to humans and their mode of being. He argues that humans possess a distinct form of self-awareness, consciousness, and that the ability to question the nature of existence sets them apart from other animals. While animals also have their own ways of interacting with their environments and responding to stimuli, Heidegger's focus on Dasein highlights the distinctiveness, and the plight, of human existence.

Yes, it's no first person. — Janus

If you check out Schopenhauer's description, he's clearly referring to the first person experience.

:grin: I don't much care what he thought.

The simple point is that the world is often other than what one might have willed.

That sometimes the direction of fit is the reverse of will-to-world.

More another outbreak of solipsism.

:grin: I don't much care what he thought.

The simple point is that the world is often other than what one might have willed. — Banno

Ok. I don't think that insight, awesome as it is, has anything to do with the OP.

No, you wouldn't.

Having a referent occurs in language, and so is public. Hence of course a purely subjective approach - such as "will" - cannot explain it.

But yes, I'm pointing out what Schop did wrong, and what the OP asks for is how that wrong-headed stuff can be made coherent.

So I'll leave it there.

So I'll leave it there. — Banno

:up: