https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/#TheComActAccording to the core principle of his pragmatic theory of meaning, “we understand a speech act when we know the kinds of reasons that a speaker could provide in order to convince a hearer that he is entitled in the given circumstances to claim validity for his utterance—in short, when we know what makes it acceptable” (1998b, 232). With this principle, Habermas ties the meaning of speech acts to the practice of reason giving: speech acts inherently involve claims that are in need of reasons—claims that are open to both criticism and justification. In our everyday speech (and in much of our action), speakers tacitly commit themselves to explaining and justifying themselves, if necessary. To understand what one is doing in making a speech act, therefore, one must have some sense of the appropriate response that would justify one's speech act, were one challenged to do so. A speech act succeeds in reaching understanding when the hearer takes up “an affirmative position” toward the claim made by the speaker (TCA 1: 95–97; 282; 297). In doing so, the hearer presumes that the claims in the speech act could be supported by good reasons (even if she has not asked for them). When the offer made by the speaker fails to receive uptake, speaker and hearer may shift reflexive levels, from ordinary speech to “discourse”—processes of argumentation and dialogue in which the claims implicit in the speech act are tested for their rational justifiability as true, correct or authentic.
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/apel-karl-otto-1922...a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification
My concern is that rationality itself is fundamentally ethical.
...in which the claims implicit in the speech act are tested for their rational justifiability as true, correct or authentic.
It seems to me that being rational can be utilized for good or evil; so it can't be fundamentally ethical. — Bob Ross
Secondly, "rationality" itself,I would argue, is normatively loaded; and is itself rooted, just like morals, in a taste (as its fundamentally obligation). — Bob Ross
For example, perhaps you think that what is rational is to be logically consistent, internally/externally coherent, to have intuitions which seem to correspond to reality, etc.: why should one be logically consistent, etc.? — Bob Ross
This is readily seen by asking the simple and obvious question: “why is one obliged to the moral facts?”. — Bob Ross
https://writing.upenn.edu/library/Tzara_Dada-Manifesto_1918.pdI write this manifesto to show that people can perform contrary actions together while taking one fresh gulp of air; I am against action; for continuous contradiction, for affirmation too, I am neither for nor against and I do not explain because I hate common sense.
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We have thrown out the cry-baby in us. Any infiltration of this kind is candied diarrhea.
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I am speaking of a paper flower for the buttonholes of the gentlemen who frequent the ball of masked life, the kitchen of grace, white cousins lithe or fat.
Without reference to the truthity of either, moral realism tends to be posited as better than anti-realism if it were true; for, in a moral realist world, there would be facts of the matter about morality that society could strive towards independently of tastes (i.e., non-facts). However, I have begun to be suspicious of the benefits of moral realism—to the point of outright claiming it is useless to the normative discussion even if it is true. Let me briefly explain why. — Bob Ross
thusly submit to the reader that if moral realism is true, then it is useless for deriving morals, since the best (and most rational) course of action is to figure out what one is fundamentally obligated to (which is a taste) and derive what the consequences are of holding that hypothetical imperative. — Bob Ross
De gustibus non est disputandum
A moral realist says that people are dependent on external rules for guidance. There is benefit to seeing things this way because people are vile, and hard rules draw them toward something better. We should encourage people to ignore their instincts and follow the rules.
The thing is: somebody is picking those rules. That somebody is human. How did they pick the right rules if they were born vile and have no innate sense of rightness?
Yes, so it appears we do claim for humanity the ability to choose the right path, it's just that some people have this special talent and everybody else just needs to follow them.
The most fundamental Christian view, like from the gospels, is that Jesus says you do have an innate knowledge of right and wrong. You have the whole of the law in your heart, since the fundamental rule is to love others as you love yourself. As Augustine said, "Love, and do as you will." In heavily mythical language, Christianity says you were not born vile. You were born innocent.
I don't mean simple instrumental rationality.
Respectfully, you are appealing to rational norms as you attack them.
The alternative is that your are a cynical manipulator beyond good and evil, just trolling us. I of course think you are sincerely seeking truth here.
You seem to assume that norms are Real unless they exist like stones.
If semantics is even partially explained by inferentialism, you can't even think without real norms.
You'd need the reality of those norms in order to intelligibly and paradoxically deny them.
Any statement that can be understood is apriori false.
This questioning itself is an expression of the autonomy norm that makes philosophy intelligible
Why should I regard @Bob Ross as more than a monkey using instrumental reason to try to get a banana
Because philosophy is founded on a deeper, ethical rationality
Do we not apriori seek knowledge...justified true belief ?
I agree that Christianity does advocate that we have the moral code written on our hearts, — Bob Ross
Also, I don’t think Christianity argues that we are innocent, as most Christians believe in innate sin. — Bob Ross
Then what do you mean? Can you please define “rationality” for me (in the sense that you are using it)? — Bob Ross
That’s fine. I am appealing to epistemic norms, fundamentally, to demonstrate how those epistemic norms are either (1) not fundamental or (2) are tastes. What is wrong with that? — Bob Ross
Not at all. I am saying that one’s fundamental obligation is always a taste (and not objective): it is mind dependent (and more specifically will dependent). — Bob Ross
So you do think rationality somehow produces objective norms, correct? — Bob Ross
Yes. Norms are “real” irregardless of whether they are objective or not; but that’s not what “real” means in the metaethical debate: it means something which exists mind-independently. — Bob Ross
Not everyone. — Bob Ross
Sure. But I already did. Maybe you missed it ? I gave a nice, long quotation above.
If they aren't fundamental, your own claims about them lack leverage or 'force.' It's like going before the court to argue that argument itself is not to be trusted.
But the problem is the status of that claim itself. It suits you (it's pleases your taste) to believe that it's all just taste
I think you are imagining a kind of logic that is untainted by normativity
so that you can get logical leverage on normativity itself
Only 'ethical' rationality (the essence of science) can do this.
The philosopher as such can't earnestly question the reality of normativity.
Like I said, respectfully, magic stones in a hidden dimension, assumed to be cognitively inaccessible from the very beginning
It's (nonobviously) mystic talk about a round square.
What does the world look like from no perspective at all ?
I am more than happy to discuss Christianity if you find it relevant to the OP: can you tie it back to the OP so I understand where we are headed with this? — Bob Ross
I have not been able to penetrate into what you mean by “rationality”, as it seems to be some sort of logos, so please give me clear and concise definition (so that I can assess). — Bob Ross
...a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification
I think that there is a way to do radical relativism without contradiction, but it requires irony and disclaimers.I am saying that we use norms as the bedrock to what we do, which includes epistemology, and that, yes, my assessment of norms is contingent on what norms I used to assess them: I don’t see any logical contradiction nor internal/external incoherency with that position. — Bob Ross
I’ve already clarified this, so I am confused why you are still straw manning moral realism: the idea is that there are true mind-independent moral judgments, which do not necessarily have to be tangible. — Bob Ross
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right.
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While moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true.
Just because one must use norms to perform logic does make those norms objective. — Bob Ross
I partially disagree: most people have false beliefs about their own tastes, so moral discourse is helpful for really honing in on what one truly wants. — Bob Ross
I think your point is that moral realism is associated with a conundrum: it assumes that we don't know right from wrong innately, so we need an external set of rules. But how do we know which rules to embrace if we're morally vacuous to begin with?
I was looking at the cultural roots of the conundrum, as opposed to trying to resolve it. I don't think it has a resolution. :razz:
I have not been able to penetrate into what you mean by “rationality”, as it seems to be some sort of logos, so please give me clear and concise definition (so that I can assess). — Bob Ross
...a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification
It's not so unlike a demystified version of logos in the sense that science and philosophy dialectically and autonomously determine / reveal / establish / revise the conceptual aspect of our shared reality.
If it's only a private logic in which you prove the unreality of norms, your 'conclusion' is a personal 'superstition,'
an opinion that doesn't aspire to any 'justification' beyond effective sophistry.
The rational community is founded on (is structure by) communication norms
Claims are justified within a 'public' logic which members, as members, take for granted willingly [ autonomy ] as an authority.
A 'mind-independent judgment' sounds like a judge-independent judgment --- indeed an absurdity
The same style of argument reveals 'mind-independent reality' to be absurd in the same way, since the world, so far as we know from experience, is only given to subjects [who are themselves within this same world that is given to them, a strange loop.]
Facticity is mind-independent existence. Moral realism is the idea that there are objective moral judgments, according to standard definitions, like the one you quoted, whereof ‘objective’ is mind-independent (sometimes called stance-independent) existence. Another simple reference is Wiki:Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right.
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While moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/
Notice the lack of mention of mind-independence.
Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion)
I don’t think this is true: this presupposes that what is objective is only worthy of any moral force, which just begs the question (as I am literally arguing against that). I am saying that subjective norms are significant, and that objective norms are the insignificant ones (truly).The point is just that those logical norms themselves must be real in order for you to appeal to them as authoritative, therefore making your own conclusions significant
For we can never get out of our physical, cultural, and social choices that were already laid out for us. Every birth is a political move. This world is supposed to mean something. Otherwise, why would you bring more people into it? Can you imagine if people brought people into a world and thought it a useless endeavor?
I take it you don't mean what one should want. If that's the case, though, I'm not sure how helpful "moral discourse" would be.
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