https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PerspectivismPerspectivism (German: Perspektivismus; also called perspectivalism) is the epistemological principle that perception of and knowledge of something are always bound to the interpretive perspectives of those observing it. While perspectivism does not regard all perspectives and interpretations as being of equal truth or value, it holds that no one has access to an absolute view of the world cut off from perspective.[1] Instead, all such viewing occurs from some point of view which in turn affects how things are perceived. Rather than attempt to determine truth by correspondence to things outside any perspective, perspectivism thus generally seeks to determine truth by comparing and evaluating perspectives among themselves.
In short, pain is more than the inferential aspect of its concept. — plaque flag
246. … Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour — for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them…
304. “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” -- Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. We’ve only rejected the grammar which tends to force itself on us here.
The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts — which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or whatever.
305. “But you surely can’t deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place.” — What gives the impression that we want to deny anything? When one says, “Still, an inner process does take place here” — one wants to go on: “After all, you see it.” And it is this inner process that one means by the word “remembering”. — The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our face against the picture of an ‘inner process’. What we deny is that the picture of an inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word “remember”. Indeed, we’re saying that this picture, with its ramifications, stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is.
306. Why ever should I deny that there is a mental process? It is only that “There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering . . .” means nothing more than “I have just remembered . . .” To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that anyone ever remembers anything.
307. “Aren’t you nevertheless a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you nevertheless basically saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” — If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction. — Philosophical Investigations
I understand why someone would claim this, and I readily agree that the social aspect is necessary. But I don't think it's exhaustive. Ought we deny our experience of intending an object ? Or intending a state of affairs ? Something like the direct experience of meaning ? I think training is crucial for the linguistic version of this, but once trained we have a certain independence and ability to introspect. — plaque flag
What give "introspection" meanings is not what lies hidden within the self, but what is expressed and understood between others. — Richard B
If you want to dig into this, I started a thread on it. — plaque flag
However, I'm not sure whether there is much left to say if W is correct in saying that the private sensation is "not a Nothing", but "a Something about which nothing could be said." — Luke
but didn't want to interrupt — Luke
Did you ever check out Husserl ? — plaque flag
I hope you stop in and help us get on track. — plaque flag
No, I haven't read any. — Luke
Zahavi's brief book is dense with great stuff. — plaque flag
We learn what “red” is by being expose to red objects and judging similarly. What goes on inside is irrelevant to the meaning of the concept “red”. Private experiences of “blue” and “red”? No. — Richard B
Could it be that I have no experience of what we would call “color” but some other experience of a “private” kind? But what could that be and could it ever be communicated? — Richard B
This idea of “private meaning” is tempting but ultimately vacuous compared to where that idea of “meaning” has its life, among a group of language users talking about a shared reality. — Richard B
You talk of wavelengths a moment ago, and I presume you rely on the public inferential aspect of the concept. But it's hard to imagine how you could have a private sense of wavelengths without being immersed in a culture that uses this meaningful token in inferences (explanations.) — plaque flag
The nearsighted person sees the same ball as the colorblind person with 20/20 vision. And this is the same ball that the blind person can talk about. — plaque flag
When you see a "red" object your private subjective experience may be of the colour blue. — RussellA
However, I'm not sure whether there is much left to say if W is correct in saying that the private sensation is "not a Nothing", but "a Something about which nothing could be said." — Luke
For simplicity sake let us assume we are in a world with just two colors, red and blue. In my tribe, we learned when we see a red object we call it “red” and when we see a blue object, we call it “blue”. One day we travel to an island and we meet another tribe that surprisingly has a very similar language like ours with the exception that when they see a red object they call it “blue” and when they see a blue object they call it “red”. — Richard B
No-one knows the true colours of these two objects. — RussellA
At the very least I can say they are private experiences/sensations, and we often do describe such sensations accurately. — Sam26
What could “accurately” mean in such a case of private experiences/sensations. — Richard B
What accurately means depends on context. So if we give people the same color patches and they describe them using the same I words I use, then what more is needed to say they've described the colors accurately, and that they are seeing what I see? For all practical purposed their descriptions are accurate. There's no good reason to think they are seeing different colors. It's a problem without a difference. — Sam26
As Wittgenstein pointed out in PI 258, there is a problem talking about the accuracy of private sensations, he says towards the end, “But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’. — Richard B
What goes wrong with some much talk of private sensations is it borrows so much from the language of the public shared reality that words begin to loose their sense, like “right” “accurate”, “judgment”, “remember”, “something” etc… How much do you cut off a tree where it is no longer a tree but a stump? — Richard B
What could “accurately” mean in such a case of private experiences/sensations. — Richard B
Notice that it's trivially true that feeling just is not concept. — plaque flag
What could “accurately” mean in such a case of private experiences/sensations. — Richard B
it's trivially true that feeling just is not concept. A sentence is not really a painting. We include feelings in our 'inferential ontology' all the time. We can be more or less confident that someone 'gets it.' — plaque flag
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an "objective correlative"; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked — plaque flag
We need words associated with particular circumstances; we need a common language to understand those circumstances; we need our fellow human being to react similarly to those circumstances — Richard B
but what can true color even mean here ? — plaque flag
his is where I disagree with Wittgenstein. I agree that meaning doesn't reside as a thing in the mind/brain, but I disagree that it's a "something about which nothing can be said." — Sam26
At the very least I can say they are private experiences/sensations, and we often do describe such sensations accurately. — Sam26
244. How do words refer to sensations? — There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day, and name them? But how is the connection between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: How does a human being learn the meaning of names of sensations? For example, of the word “pain”. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.
“So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?” — On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying, it does not describe it.
245. How can I even attempt to interpose language between the expression of pain and the pain? — Wittgenstein
Moreover, when talking about, for e.g., the taste of wine, some people who are in the business of describing such tastes, can do it in a way that others can clearly understand. They understand because they too are able to recognize the descriptions. — Sam26
Again, recognising the private sensation will help one to use the language appropriately, but language does not describe one person's private sensation. — Luke
another.
Wittgenstein's Beetle in the Box is an argument against Direct Realism. — RussellA
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.