1) Let's suppose it is: truth is an ideal. Whence ideals? Which came first, the horse or the ideal (of a ) horse? I think the real horse came first. But what would be the real truth that is prior to the ideal? If this question is legitimate, then it follows that truth is not originally or entirely an ideal. Further, it can reasonably be asked what property the ideal has that is not already manifest in its instances. What property does the ideal horse have that is not already manifest in one or another real horse? (Assuming that the ideal horse is not an unnatural or super-natural horse, although it's fair to include in the one ideal horse all the perfections of many real horses and none of their imperfections.) — tim wood
2) Let's assume that truth is not just an ideal. It follows immediately, then, that there's more to truth than just being an ideal. Where else would that be but in the real, in praxis. — tim wood
As an ideal, truth is a universal. — tim wood
Truth, then, becomes the possibility that we trust, or at least can hope for, that is realized in the true. The ideas of truth and true are in part just as MU claims. But as part of being in the world, they extend beyond the idea into that which makes them truth, or true. — tim wood
I believe you're thinking temporal priority, when it really is logical priority, and that in thought, as an idea. And even that is arguable. As to coming into existence, I think you're shorting the notions of telos and nisus. The telos of a cat is to be(come) a cat; the kitten's nisus is to realize its telos. While not yet a cat, it is exactly not a cat. But that just means that it is exactly something else, which is a very clumsy pseudo-philosophical way of saying that the kitten grows into a cat, that is, is continually changing.it has been well proven by Plato and Aristotle, that the form of the thing is prior in existence, to the particular thing itself. — MU
Let's assume that truth is not just an ideal. It follows immediately, then, that there's more to truth than just being an ideal. Where else would that be but in the real, in praxis. — timw
You always fall back on this, or a similar position, that truth is not in the mind, that it is not an ideal, seemingly not willing to follow where the investigation leads. — MU
I believe you're thinking temporal priority, when it really is logical priority, and that in thought, as an idea. And even that is arguable. As to coming into existence, I think you're shorting the notions of telos and nisus. The telos of a cat is to be(come) a cat; the kitten's nisus is to realize its telos. While not yet a cat, it is exactly not a cat. But that just means that it is exactly something else, which is a very clumsy pseudo-philosophical way of saying that the kitten grows into a cat, that is, is continually changing. — tim wood
And you always are completely correct in this criticism. But the criticism is too narrow and reductionist. All right, truth is in the mind, but not as an ideal. Perhaps as a kind of judgment. Maybe that's it. Truth is the mind's judgment as to whether certain propositions are true. As such it has nothing to do with the particular trueness of any proposition, and is not even in itself a guarantee that the proposition is true. It is just a judgment (Insert Gurugeorge, here). — tim wood
Anyway, can you go with this: that truth is a kind of judgment that invokes the world and the being in the world of the person making the judgment. (And has nothing to do with the trueness of any proposition, except through hope (trust, honesty, etc.). Please feel obliged to clean this up, if you think it needs it. — tim wood
I'd have to think through this. My preliminary answer would be something like "Truth is a concept that denotes the reality of a particular proposition, belief, or statement." — Brian
Or perhaps truth is the property a proposition has when it is in fact true. We say things like "Statement X is the truth." In other words, Statement X has the property of being a true statement. — Brian
The point is that the logic demonstrates that a sort of "Idea" of each particular, individual thing, precedes in time, the material existence of that thing. Of course, we believe that there have been things long before there were human beings, so these "Ideas" are not human ideas. This is why Neo-Platonism was so well received by Christian theologians, because they designated these Ideas as divine. — MU
As you observe below, we part company here. This is at best a kind of theory You're free to have it. But you need something more for it to be true (and not merely consistent).[L]et's just call these "natural Ideas", or "forms", as Aristotle did. It is very important to notice that these Forms, (I'll use the capital F to distinguish the natural Ideas from the human ideas), are of particular things, rather than universals which human ideas are. So each particular, individual thing, has a Form which precedes in time, its material existence — MU
"True" within a theory, an account, sure. I am not attacking - not even thinking about - your argument as theory. For present purpose I acknowledge and concede it, as (a) theory. But not as an account of reality. For that, more evidence, please.I don't believe that you completely followed the last passage which I just I wrote. And if you could follow it, you most likely dismissed it as "untrue", from the opening premise, that the Form of each individual thing is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing, so it makes no sense to you anyway. If you've dismissed this as untrue, then we need to go back to the argument from Aristotle, which I presented, and hash this out, because either the premise is wrong or it is right, and what I say about "judgement" now, will be based in the assumption that the premise is correct. — MU
I'm thinking by "correspondence" you mean the correspondence theory of truth (CTT). From a reasonable distaste for CTT, one widely shared, I believe, you introduce an alternate reality, in which immaterial Forms exist - and presumably Truth has a form? As theory, why not? As real, untenable.The reason why I insist that we not allow truth out of the ideal realm, is to avoid the notion of truth being a correspondence between human ideas, and material existence. So now I've introduced Forms, which are separate from material existence, and also separate from human ideas. I propose that material existence is a medium between human ideas, and the Forms. Truth, as correspondence, is a correspondence between human ideas, and the separate Forms. — MU, slightly edited
Exacty, and it is not a problem; it is a fact! The fallibility of truth, here, is resolved in whether the truth in question, which (I argue) is necessarily some kind of proposition, is true, or not. Just here is exactly where truth reveals itself as contingent, as possibility - but possibility of a certain kind (what kind a separate discussion). One criterium that suggest itself to me, is "moral certainty."The problem with judgement now, is that the human mind is fallible, and cannot be trusted to accurately judge truth. — MU
Nope, we're on separate, different paths, here.Judgement is an act of will, a passing of judgement. Many times we judge something as true, when it is false. So if we are to assume that truth is a judgement, then this judgement must be an action carried out not by the human mind.... — MU
Well, I'd argue that we don't judge truth, rather truth is the judgment, subsequently settled in the adjudication of whether the thing taken as truth is actually true, or not.In the old days, "truth" would be the judgement of God. The human mind is fallible, and judges truth incorrectly quite often, so truth cannot be a judgement of human beings. — MU
Concepts are left hanging, willy-nilly, all the time. Beyond the inconvenience, so what? And certainly it is a very good thing that some concepts are not just left hanging, but positively hanged!Our society has grown up as a religious society, where... many of the foundational concepts like "truth", are supported by the assumption of God. For instance, notice that it is common to say there is an "objective" truth or falsity to every proposition regardless of whether it is believed by some (my insert) human beings to be true. This invokes the "God's eye view". Now we tend to dismiss the reality of God, so concepts such as these, concepts which are foundational within our society, are left hanging. — MU
Wrong, actually. No doubt new knowledge does lead to new understandings, new truth, if you will. But underlying are what are called absolute presuppositions. And these do change, but as a result of a logical process. Temporality is merely incidental.This is the evolutionary cycle of the progression of knowledge. The foundational concepts of a society are the oldest, well established principles, but ancient. As time passes knowledge progresses and we learn vast new fields. The vast new expansions of extended knowledge will inevitably undermine the ancient principles, which were developed from the full extent of the restricted capacities of ancient people. Consider something like what Wittgenstein says, we cannot doubt these foundational, bedrock concepts. In actuality, what he does is question them, cast doubt on them, exposing the reality that we must doubt them. When we subject these bedrock principles to a complete system of skepticism, it becomes evident just how much modern knowledge has undermined fundamental principles. — MU
Well, this is a program, to be sure! I don't know about altering "foundational concepts," though. How do you intend to accomplish that?So this is the importance of human judgement. Each foundational concept, being a fundamental premise, must be analyzed and judged by a system of skepticism. If the concept has been undermined by modern knowledge, as is the case with the foundational concept of "truth", we must determine the premises which have been added at a higher level, which contradict the foundational concept. The foundational concept, as well as the contradictory concepts, must be analyzed together, and they must be altered to be made consistent. — MU
When we judge a particular collection of words as true, we claim that it has the property of truth. The problem is that truth is not attributed to the physical existence of the words, it is not something which is sensed in the words, it is attributed to the meaning of the words. The meaning is interpretive, and truth is attributed to the meaning, so this makes truth subjective.
Please show how logic "demonstrates." — tim wood
It is best laid out in this way, by Aristotle. Anything which exists is necessarily the thing which it is, or else it would not be the thing that it is, it would be something different. And it is impossible by way of contradiction that a thing is something other than the thing it is. So when a thing comes into existence, it must already be pre-determined what that thing will be, or else that thing might be something other than the thing that it is, and this is impossible according to the above statement. Therefore we must assume that the "form" of the thing, the "whatness" of the thing is prior to the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
I believe, you introduce an alternate reality, in which immaterial Forms exist - and presumably Truth has a form? As theory, why not? As real, untenable. — tim wood
Exacty, and it is not a problem; it is a fact! The fallibility of truth, here, is resolved in whether the truth in question, which (I argue) is necessarily some kind of proposition, is true, or not. Just here is exactly where truth reveals itself as contingent, as possibility - but possibility of a certain kind (what kind a separate discussion). One criterium that suggest itself to me, is "moral certainty." — tim wood
Concepts are left hanging, willy-nilly, all the time. Beyond the inconvenience, so what? — tim wood
Wrong, actually. No doubt new knowledge does lead to new understandings, new truth, if you will. But underlying are what are called absolute presuppositions. And these do change, but as a result of a logical process. Temporality is merely incidental. — tim wood
No, it doesn't. It makes the attribution of truth subjective. The objective/subjective dichotomy cannot take an account of that which requires both and is thus neither. — creativesoul
You're conflating being true with being called true. Sure, we could say that we attribute truth. However, that isn't said by someone coherently arguing for correspondence. — creativesoul
What I am referring to is the thing which is said to be true. It is not a collection of physically existing words which is said to be true, it is the interpretation of these which is said to be true. But unless you can demonstrate how an interpretation can be objective, I assume that any interpretation is subjective.
You laid out an argument regarding how "truth" is attributed to the meaning of words, and then erroneously concluded that that is ground for further claiming that truth is subjective. It is no such thing. What follows is that the attribution of "truth" is subjective. — creativesoul
That is one objection left neglected. The other involved the invocation of the subjective/objective dichotomy. While it is a very very popular one, it is inherently incapable of taking an account of that which is neither and/or requires both. All thought/belief is existentially contingent upon subjective and objective things. Correspondence is a relationship 'between' the two. Thus, it requires both and yet is - itself - neither of those. Meaning is in the same boat. — creativesoul
There is no justificatory ground for positing the form of A prior to the existence of A. — creativesoul
Interpretation requires the attribution of meaning by one speaker to another speaker's language use. If the interpeter get's it right, then s/he understands the speaker. That says nothing at all with regard to the truth of the speaker's use. Rather, if both draw the same or similar enough correlations, then they have a shared understanding/meaning. It is when different correlations are drawn that misunderstanding takes place. — creativesoul
Allow me to clarify the point. Assume any statement, like "a cow is in the barn". In order that this statement may be true or false, there must be an interpretation of its meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
Also, there must be an interpretation of the physical state of the world. — Metaphysician Undercover
If truth is correspondence, then these two interpretations must correspond in order that there is truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
I clarified by saying that truth is attributed to an interpretation of meaning. Since the interpretation is subjective, then the thing which is attributed is subjective as well, as a property of that subjective thing. You haven't yet addressed my clarification.
Allow me to clarify the point. Assume any statement, like "a cow is in the barn". In order that this statement may be true or false, there must be an interpretation of its meaning.
I'm not sure I agree that there must be an interpretation of its meaning. Rather, I think it would be more precise to say there must be an understanding of its meaning. "Understanding" is something like a mental grasp or comprehension. I often like to refer to understanding as "getting it." When something like "a cow is in the barn" is uttered in relation to a set of particulars like, for instance, a particular cow and a particular barn, we must grasp the meaning of the utterance. In this case, the meaning of the sentence is that there is a particular animal, a cow, spatially located in a particular building, the barn. I think as long as we have something like "understanding" we don't need something like "interpretation" here to do any heavy lifting. — Brian
The fact is certainly objective. Regardless of what we think about the situation, the cow (Betsy, let's name her), is either in or not in the barn owned by Old McDonald, who has a farm. The fact of the matter is the objective state of affairs. In this particular instance, let's say that Betsy is NOT in Old McDonald's barn; rather, she is actually grazing in Old McDonald's field at Time T. — Brian
It was addressed. The attribution of truth is not truth. We can mistakenly attribute truth just as we can mistakenly presuppose it. — creativesoul
That is false. Interpretation of a claim is not a truth condition for the claim. You're conflating conditions of shared meaning with truth conditions. They're very closely related but not the same thing.
It must be meaningful, but there is no need for an interpretation of it's meaning in order for it to be true/false. In order to be understood, meaning must be shared.
"A cow is in the barn" is true if a cow is in the barn. The cow's being in the barn is what makes the statement true. The absence of a cow in the barn is what makes the statement false. So, the statement could be made, misunderstood, and yet still be true/false. It could also be made, understood, and yet still be true/false. — creativesoul
Seems to me that the notion of interpretation has caused confusion for you Meta. — creativesoul
So, the statement could be made, misunderstood, and yet still be true/false. It could also be made, understood, and yet still be true/false. — creativesoul
The issue is, that since each of these things which are being related to each other, are "understandings", and these are within the mind of the subject, how is it possible to get beyond subjectivity, to assume an objective truth? — Metaphysician Undercover
I suppose the best thing for me to do is ask if you acknowledge and agree with this very rough summary of our exchange? — creativesoul
Notably, you asserted that certain things needed to be explained by one arguing for correspondence. I explained to you how that was not the case based upon other aspects of my own position. — creativesoul
1. The first is the kind of radical (just meaning to the root of things) subjectivism that I think you are proffering. Everything I perceive around me is in some way mind-dependent. I think this is in essence an idealist view. The objects surrounding me are products of my mind, and my beliefs about those objects relate various products of mine mind to each other and to me. — Brian
2. The second possibility is more of a radical objectivism. I am amidst a world of things that are external to and independent of my mind, that would still be there even if I were not there perceiving them. My beliefs about the world are beliefs about these objects that are external to my mind.and how they relate to each other and to me. In this case, the objects or contents of my beliefs are about objective things - things that are not mind-dependent. — Brian
My intuition is on the side of objectivity. — Brian
This is a good start, but let me qualify this. I am not arguing that "the objects surrounding me are products of my mind", I accept that there is something independent. What I am arguing is that the way I perceive, apprehend, and understand what's surrounding me is a product of my mind. This I called "interpretation", you prefer "understand". — Metaphysician Undercover
I say, "the sky is blue", I attribute "blue" to "the sky". Does this mean to you that I am claiming that the attribution of "blue" is blue? I don't think it should, and it sure doesn't to me. So why, when I say that truth is attributed to an interpretation of a statement, do you reply with "the attribution of truth is not truth"?(emphasis mine)
If you happen to believe that truth can exist somewhere else, other than as a property of interpretation, or as Brian would prefer, as a property of understanding, just like blue exists in places other than as a property of the sky, then I hope you will show me where. Otherwise I will continue to believe that truth only exists as a property of understanding, and is therefore completely subjective, and disregard your irrelevant comments.
That's completely ridiculous. To say "the cow's being in the barn" is what makes "a cow is in the barn" true is simply begging the question. You are saying nothing more than "a cow is in the barn" is true because it is true that there is a cow in the barn. That's udder (pun) nonsense.
What makes that statement true, is that there is a situation in the world which a human being would apprehend as a building there, which is properly called a "barn" in English, and there is an animal which is properly called a "cow", in a specific spatial relationship with that building which is properly referred to as "in".
Suppose a statement is made which is not understood by anyone. You seem to be claiming that the statement is still true or false. Now let's proceed by clarifying this problem, and making it a condition of "a statement", that it is intelligible, in principle it may be understood. This way we don't even have to consider that unintelligible gibberish is a statement. Tell me how this statement could actually be true or false without actually being understood. Of course a conditional such as "if it corresponds" will not suffice, because it is the act of understanding which fulfills that condition.
I guess I'm just not seeing the next step of how that makes everything subjective and contradicts correspondence theory though. — Brian
I guess what I would say is, well, all of our perception of the external world is perspectival - from our own subjective perspective but OF objective things. But I still don't really see the leap to your conclusions from that. — Brian
Thought/belief formation happens prior to language acquisition. Some of those thought/belief are true. — creativesoul
Contrary to talking about truth being a property, on my view, truth is correspondence and correspondence is much better understood as a kind of relationship that is necessarily presupposed within all thought/belief formation(and statements thereof). — creativesoul
That is, if I may paraphrase, that truth is in a mind (and not out there). — tim wood
MU consistently confuses me at one point: he doesn't hold that ideas are real things; he maintains ideas (concepts) are real as concepts; this from above, and I agree. Where I get tossed is where he seems to argue that Forms are real things, and some ideas are real things, without the qualification. — tim wood
I reject the whole super-naturalization of ideas - of any ideas. In brief, there is no Form of a perfect circle. There is a worked out idea of a what a circle is, and it's simple enough for most folks to grasp it. And that's the secret. Truth isn't in your mind or my mind; it "dwells" in collective mind, worked out over a long time. Just as circle is in collective mind. No Form needed; only the collective understanding. To be sure, that understanding is subject to evolution and refinement - it had better be! - which means that while the truth (collective "wisdom") is true, it could also be in a much larger sense false. — tim wood
Contrary to talking about truth being a property, on my view, truth is correspondence and correspondence is much better understood as a kind of relationship that is necessarily presupposed within all thought/belief formation(and statements thereof). Relationships are not properties and they certainly cannot be sensibly said to have a spatiotemporal location. Relationships are best understood in terms of understanding their necessary elemental constituents. — creativesoul
truth is attributed to the meaning of the statement, it is not attributed to the physical words themselves. The meaning must be interpreted before truth can be attributed, and this interpretation is subjective. So truth is attributed to the interpretation, and any interpretation is subjective. It is not the act of attribution which I am claiming is subjective, but the thing, the interpretation, which truth is being attributed to, which I am claiming is subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover
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