I think Schopenhauer too optimistic. There is no blissful escape. But more interestingly, the fact that there are schools of thought regarding "escaping from life's suffering/Suffering (western/Eastern sense of the word), is telling about life in the first place and should be a warning about putting more people into it in the first place. — schopenhauer1

But there’s no use denying the fact that we exist in the first place. A coherent response to the human condition amounts to more than regret for being part of it. As I said before, it could be said that Schopenhauer and others recognise the cogency of the ‘first noble truth’, that to live is to suffer, but don’t grasp the further truth, ‘that there is an end to suffering’. In the parable of the snake, the Buddha says that grasping his teaching correctly is like taking hold of a snake the right way, otherwise it will turn and kill you.

I know the question I have for Schopenhauer - if will is blind, and the origin of everything, then how to account for mind? In Neoplatonism, nous is seen as a universal, but Schopenhauer seems to expunge it of actual intelligence, leaving only ‘striving’ or ‘energy’. So where in his scheme to mind/nous/intelligence originate?

I was not aiming for a pessimistic characterization of human life in toto, but rather in general. I think some individuals can accept their mortality and find peace and be sensible enough to be overall happy with their life onon Earth; I know I am. — Janus

Lame-duck sauce response, but at least it's not snide. That is to say, it really didn't address much of what I wrote.

Others are able to have unshakeable faith in eternal life, or in the possibility of progress towards enlightenment. I don't claim those things can be logically or empirically justified, but that doesn't seem to matter to some. Others, perhaps a majority, don't seem to be interested in thinking about such things at all. I don't draw any conclusions or make any judgements about such matters: I am agnostic. — Janus

Eek. You think I am simply "judging people" like procreation is a fashion trend that I find repulsive? You negate the very reason for the judgement (and not the 'judging'- there is a difference).

But there’s no use denying the fact that we exist in the first place. — Quixodian

Oddly enough, isn't that the kind of thing the ascetics question? Bundle theory and all that.

A coherent response to the human condition amounts to more than regret for being part of it. — Quixodian

Communal catharsis. It's right understanding.

I know the question I have for Schopenhauer - if will is blind, and the origin of everything, then how to account for mind? In Neoplatonism, nous is seen as a universal, but Schopenhauer seems to expunge it of actual intelligence, leaving only ‘striving’ or ‘energy’. So where in his scheme to mind/nous/intelligence originate? — Quixodian

Yep. My question too.

Lame-duck sauce response, but at least it's not snide. That is to say, it really didn't address much of what I wrote. — schopenhauer1

That which I didn't address was off-topic in this thread, and I have no interest in going over your anti-natalism arguments again.

Eek. You think I am simply "judging people" like procreation is a fashion trend that I find repulsive? You negate the very reason for the judgement (and not the 'judging'- there is a difference). — schopenhauer1

Did I say you are judging people? I understand you are against procreation, and you are entitled to your opinion. I know all the arguments, and I am not convinced by them. Not everyone must think as you do.

That which I didn't address was off-topic in this thread, and I have no interest in going over you anti-natalism arguments again. — Janus

It's very much on topic. Here were the steps of this conversation. Schopenhauer's Thing Itself > Escape from it possible? (Quixodian yes/ schopenhaer1 no) > If we can't escape then don't start in the first place. Wasn't far off really but a dialectical conversation that leads to ethics. Conversations aren't completely static and Schop's Thing-Itself bereft of Pessimism would be completely off.

Did I say you are judging people? I understand you are against procreation, and you are entitled to your opinion. I know all the arguments, and I am not convinced by them. Not everyone must think as you do. — Janus

You said,

I've told you before that I have never had a desire to reproduce, but I don't sit in judgement on those who do. — Janus

I understood this thread to be about whether we can know the nature of the in-itself not about whether we can "escape" from it. Presuming we can or cannot escape would be to already presuppose that we know what it is.

You said,
I've told you before that I have never had a desire to reproduce, but I don't sit in judgement on those who do. — schopenhauer1

Does that sentence state that you sit in judgement on procreators? Do you sit in judgement on them?

I understood this thread to be about whether we can know the nature of the in-itself — Janus

More precisely, it was questioning if the Thing Itself can be referred to as a referent, as if it was a phenomenal thing. That being said, you can't just talk about this stuff in isolation. Schop's ideas were a system infused with pessimism. The Thing Itself is ultimately striving nature of existence and if you weren't following the whole thread, I can see how you would think it was out of left field, but it comes more from my conversation with Quixodian. I think I picked up on something you said and kind of wrapped you up in that conversation too.. So, I can see your confusion perhaps. I invite you to look back at the full conversation I was having in the thread though if you did want to meet me back here, which I am sure you are not inclined to do, so carry on.

Does that sentence state that you sit in judgement on procreators? Do you sit in judgement on them? — Janus

It seemed to imply you don't judge procreation, people, but I do.. Like I was judging someone's clothes or trying to make someone feel bad or something else of a negative connotation of how "judging others" is used.

But there’s no use denying the fact that we exist in the first place.
— Quixodian

Oddly enough, isn't that the kind of thing the ascetics question? Bundle theory and all that. — schopenhauer1

I see what you’re getting at, but the reality of there being an enduring self is not the same as reality of the plight of existence, even if they’re closely intertwined. (That is one of the main preoccupations of the Buddhist/Hindu dialectic.) The next chapter (6) of Schopenhauer’s Compass is about the genesis of the edition of the Upaniṣads that he had access to, which was a compendium put together by the brother of the Prince who had the Taj Mahal built (if memory serves). The compendium contained additions and interpolations by the translator from a variety of sources (including Yogācāra Buddhism). In any case, the key point as always is that the illusory realm of māyā is ‘seen through’ by the liberated ‘mukti’.

That being said, you can't just talk about this stuff in isolation. Schop's ideas were a system infused with pessimism. The Thing Itself is ultimately striving nature of existence — schopenhauer1

The OP says nothing about Schopenhauer's pessimism. The fact that Schopenhauer thinks we can know something about the thing in itself by introspection, that it is blind will or striving, says nothing at all about whether the thing in itself is good, bad or neutral.

Nietzsche accepted the will but for him it is a good thing, the source of everything truly beautiful, interesting and alive.

It seemed to imply you don't judge procreation, people, but I do.. Like I was judging someone's clothes or trying to make someone feel bad or something else of a negative connotation of how "judging others" is used. — schopenhauer1

I know you judge procreation, I don't know if you judge people for procreating. I imagine you must judge that they are at least ignorant if not culpable. I should have been clearer and added that I judge neither procreation nor procreators, beyond thinking that it is not such a good idea when the world is already over-populated. I certainly don't see life as an inherent negative, as you apparently do. All I can think about that is that your experience must be very different than mine. I love life and have never regreted being born. If I could choose to come back again and again I would.

If instead of saying ‘the thing in itself’, you were to say ‘the world as it is in itself’ or ‘reality as it is in itself’ or even ‘reality as it truly is’, I think it would convey the gist better. In Buddhist philosophy, one of the attributes of the Buddha is ‘yathābhūtaṃ’ which means ‘to see the world as it truly is’.

The OP says nothing about Schopenhauer's pessimism. The fact that Schopenhauer thinks we can know something about the thing in itself by introspection, that i it is blind will or striving, says nothing at all about whether the thing in itself is good, bad or neutral. — Janus

If we discussed Kant's notion of Transcendental Idealism and then I ventured into his ideas that surround that, I believe I would be justified.

If we discussed Schop's notion of "thing in itself" and we discussed what that meant for Schopenhauer we would be justified. It means for him, a blind striving Will. And it was discussed at length as to how Will can form Representation and Objects and the PSR. How is All Will if Will is also Representation? Whence this Representation? That was all discussed previously and more than tangentially touch on the idea of Thing Itself and how it becomes "known to itself" (through Representation). So I would kindly just end this little line of bullshit because it is fruitless to the topic. I get it, you don't want to talk about other stuff related to Schop's idea of Will and my general conclusions from his ideas etc. etc.. GOT IT! So you can drop it if you want as I don't care to discuss why were are discussing what we are discussing and the boundaries of if we can or cannot discuss what we are discussing. I find that pedantic and exhausting.

All I can think about that is that your experience must be very different than mine. I love life and have never regreted being born. If I could choose to come back again and again I would. — Janus

But you don't choose, and you can't. And if you didn't come back, no one would lose out. There is no ghost version that is deprived or in regret or is distraught over non-spilled milk.

If suffering counts for anything, it is not up to us to determine if other people should be burdened with it. And on and on. You know the arguments, you said. They have nothing to do with personal preferences. Personal preferences should not be the determinate for what others should have to endure. If I like football, that doesn't mean football players should be forced to play so I can be entertained.

If there are levels: intellect, reason, understanding, subconscious, then unconsious, Schop's knowledge of Will would come more from the Unconcious then from any experience of "free will". Some type of compatabilism is needed to reconcile fate and freedom. When Kant said that the thing in itself causes phenomena, he knew already that he placed causality within phenomena; so it's only by analogy that we speak of Will's action. There is no "why" to pure will. It's fated freedom. Schopenhauer called his dog Atman and so presumably Schop was the Brahmin in that context. Schop wrote a lot about body and physical things. But ultimately he wasn't an atheist, or a Hindu perhaps, but more likely Buddhist. Will is not a person or a substance. It's too free to be either. And this is very consistant with Buddhism.

The compendium contained additions and interpolations by the translator from a variety of sources (including Yogācāra Buddhism). In any case, the key point as always is that the illusory realm of māyā is ‘seen through’ by the liberated ‘mukti’. — Quixodian

Yes that does seem to be the thrust of Schop's idea of the ascetic in book 4.

If instead of saying ‘the thing in itself’, you were to say ‘the world as it is in itself’ or ‘reality as it is in itself’ or even ‘reality as it truly is’, I think it would convey the gist better. In Buddhist philosophy, one of the attributes of the Buddha is ‘yathābhūtaṃ’ which means ‘to see the world as it truly is’. — Quixodian

Good point, but I get stuck on "truly is" because either Will is magically asserted or Maya is magically asserted. However, we "know" Maya (e.g. the cogito).

Here is a question.. What does it even mean once you are enlightened? How can you say that it is anything but a dispositional state (tranquility/calmness)? But Buddha felt pain after his enlightenment. You can say that he experienced some sort of ego-death. He no longer cared if he got something or didn't get something, etc. Besides that being unproven (that he truly achieved that throughout his post-enlightenment), nothing can be proved about that state of affairs other than it is a state of affairs about someone in the world. That this meant something like a mystical/spiritual thing, can always be questioned and never proven. Why is that even attached to it other than cultural traditions of the Vedic/Hindu contingent traditions from which it sprang. Perhaps Greeks had a similar notion, maybe even some sort of Indo origin to both of them that was in the cultural substrate. Perhaps it evolved in both cultures convergently like a bat and a bird evolved wings, but not from the same origin.

If instead of saying ‘the thing in itself’, you were to say ‘the world as it is in itself’ or ‘reality as it is in itself’ or even ‘reality as it truly is’, I think it would convey the gist better. — Quixodian

Sure, but presuming holism the thing in itself would presumably be the same as things in themselves, the world in itself or reality in itself.

If we discussed Kant's notion of Transcendental Idealism and then I ventured into his ideas that surround that, I believe I would be justified. — schopenhauer1

I don't think so. Kant was no anti-natalist afaik (although he failed to procreate afaik). I see Kant's project as determining the limits of reason to make way for faith. he didn't want to, couldn't, say what the thing in itself is.

You know the arguments, you said. They have nothing to do with personal preferences. Personal preferences should not be the determinate for what others should have to endure. — schopenhauer1

I wonder how many people see life as something to be endured as opposed to something to be enjoyed, and birth as being a gift rather than a burden. Anyway, it has everything to do with personal preferences, or if nothing to do with personal preference then people will do as they are determined to do and that's the end of it, and I am not going to be drawn any further into these futile under-determined arguments.

When Kant said that the thing in itself causes phenomena, he knew already that he placed causality within phenomena; so it's only by analogy that we speak of Will's action. There is no "why" to pure will. — Gregory

I just find this to be pretty uninteresting. "There is no why". The end. It just doesn't have the philosophical heft to explain the systems it relies upon. That is to say, how is it that Will "objectifies" itself? What can that mean if all is a unitary one? Why objectification from a unitary being? Why space/time, etc? Whether it's illusory or not, it's still something that is there in the picture.

I don't think so. Kant was no anti-natalist afaik (although he failed to procreate afaik). I see Kant's project as determining the limits of reason to make way for faith. he didn't want to, couldn't, say what the thing in itself is. — Janus

No I wasn't talking directly about Kant, I was using that as analogy of what I was doing with Schopenhauer.. I was saying that my discussion was fair game regarding the Thing Itself as Schopenhauer saw. If this was a discussion about Kant's Transcendental Idealism, and I touched upon various topics surrounding that, it would be analogous to discussing Schopenhauer's Will and Thing Itself and various topics surrounding that. I was not trying to actually discuss Kant's Transcendental Idealism.

Anyway, it has everything to do with personal preferences, or if nothing to do with personal preference then people will do as they are determined to do and that's the end of it, and I am not going to be drawn any further into these futile under-determined arguments. — Janus

You make an argument and then walk away. Then don't make the argument. don't argue about it. Let it go as I was trying to do.. but you went on despite saying you don't want to...

So I will respond in kind as I am not going to let wrong-headedness just slip by in a reply to my statement. And you called it "under-determined" which of course will drag this argument further being you tried to negatively characterize it, so that's on you for throwing the punches.....I have no sympathy for you now regarding this discussion and you can't play the "I'm a victim of your moralizing" when you do shit like that. If you are going to metaphorically punch someone in the face, get ready for a counter-punch.

People are going to do what they decide to do. Determined is a loaded word and is smuggled in via debates about free will. Such meta-ethics doesn't need to be brought in. People have reasons, and sometimes "accidents" (or "don't care about the consequences" which is still a stance) for why they procreate or not procreate. To play stupid and pretend that no one has reasons for anything and it's all blind robots is more than wrong, it's intellectually dishonest.

As to your idea of "it has everything to do with preferences", you are pretending that the issue of whether or not other people should be born is not a moral issue at all. It's just another action in the world. Well many behaviors have a moral element to them and this is one of them. Life entails suffering/Suffering (western/Eastern notions of), and this would be something a person born would have to deal with. Is it okay to cause this for another person to deal with? You can't hide behind "good experiences". No one is denying that. It is only questioning whether causing the conditions for negative experiences is a morally justified action.

It's not about condemning or judging people. It's about reasoning about if we should impose suffering onto others which seems to violate rules of non-malfeasance, and autonomy when carried out.

That this meant something like a mystical/spiritual thing, can always be questioned and never proven. — schopenhauer1

It can be validated first person. The stages and states of realization can be verified inter-subjectively. The Eastern Gatehouse sutta is a dialogue between Buddha and Sariputta about ‘the Deathless’ and its attainment - that it can be ‘seen and known’ directly but that until it is seen thus it has to be ‘taken on faith’. But in western culture, a hard and fast division has emerged between what is categorized as faith and what is categorized as scientific knowledge. There’s nothing corresponding to ‘jñāna’ in our lexicon, so all that can be said (usually dismissively) is that it’s something ‘spiritual or mystical’.

I find the idea of will instead of substance causing reality very interesting because it's so abstract

What do you think about "something from nothing" in terms of physics?

But in western culture, a hard and fast division has emerged between what is categorized as faith and what is categorized as scientific knowledge. There’s nothing corresponding to ‘jñāna’ in our lexicon, so all that can be said (usually dismissively) is that it’s something ‘spiritual or mystical’. — Quixodian

The way I look at there is direct observation which can be personally inter-experentially and publicly intersubjectevly confirmed. such as there is a tree next to the end of the shed, water boils at 100 degrees C, it is raining here and now and countless other examples of observation of the phenomenal world which yield all our discursive or propositional knowledge.

Then there is mathematics and logic.

Then there are beliefs about what cannot be confirmed by observation, mathematics or logic; that is those things we take just on faith.

Then there are altered states of consciousness which may be temporary or permanent. I don't seee how a claim that either faith or altered states of consciousness yield discursive or propositional knowledge can be justified. I've never seen any argument that could convince me of that. On the other hand although they cannot be classed as forms of "knowing that", they could be classed as knowledge in the sense of "know-how".

Now, I could be convinced by my own experience that such states do yield quasi-discursive knowledge, in the sense of my own discourse just with myself, but how could I ever demonstrate that to another who was not already convinced of the same? And how could I ever be sure, as opposed to merely feeling sure, that I was not deceiving myself?

All that said I have faith in certain "intimations" I have gained from such altered states, and form creative work, but I find I cannot clearly articulate them, and I would never count the fact of my having such intimations as justification for anyone else to believe anything.

So when you say

The stages and states of realization can be verified inter-subjectively. — Quixodian

I don't believe the kind of inter-subjective verification at work in such contexts is in the same class as the inter-subjective verification that operates in empirical observations, mathematical proofs and logic, because the latter kind of verification is such that it will definitely convince any suitably unbiased and competent agent, and the competency itself can also be publicly demonstrated. The same lack of public demonstrability applies to aesthetics; it can never be definitively shown that a creative work is great for example.

The way I look at there is direct observation which can be personally inter-experentially and publicly intersubjectevly confirmed. — Janus

Which is what is generally regarded as empiricism. You commonly cite that position in these arguments, yet when you're challenged on it, you deny it:

I am not an Empiricist philosopher... — Janus

You're appealing to sense-experience, empirical observation, or whatever you want to call it. At least be clear about that.

Then there are beliefs about what cannot be confirmed by observation, mathematics or logic; that is those things we take just on faith. — Janus

But if you associate 'taking on faith' with religion, then you fall back on the faith/reason dichotomy which is writ large in our culture and which I say which leads to stereotyping. I think the way you're evaluating it is like this: that Buddhism is a religion; religion is not something that can be validated empirically; therefore it's a matter of faith.

But there are all kinds of things we know, without knowing precisely how we know them, or being able to demonstrate them empirically. Michael Polanyi, philosopher of science, spent his career teasing out such implicit or tacit knowledge - things that you know which cannot be easily explained because it's tied to your way of being in the world. For example, a skilled musician may have a deep understanding of how to play a complex piece of music which they can't explain, but only enact. Scientists have a great deal of performative knowledge and starting assumptions which are often not disclosed in their eventual writings. Much knowledge is rooted in our ability to recognize patterns, make judgments, and engage in practical activities without necessarily being able to provide a step-by-step, explicit account of how we do it. We often rely on tacit knowledge in everyday tasks without consciously thinking about it. Does all of that fall under the umbrella term of 'faith'? I think not. (Although, interestingly, one of the terms for spiritual practices in the Eastern lexicon is 'bhavana', which means, literally, 'becoming' - something along the lines of 'habits becoming character', I think it means.)

the inter-subjective verification that operates in empirical observations, mathematical proofs and logic — Janus

That is the so-called 'public square of the secular state'. It has its own criteria for what constitutes knowledge, but there are also historical and social factors behind that, in the vexed relationship between religion and science in Western culture. The reason/faith dichotomy is a strong undercurrent in all these debates, we see it here every day. But there are other domains of discourse - cultures which judge the matter by different standards, within which inter-subjective verification of such matters is intelligible. I'm not trying to persuade you to believe anything but trying to flush out the implicit basis, or maybe even bias, in such judgements. Notice how generally any assertion of 'higher knowledge' (jñāna) is categorised as 'mystical' or 'spiritual', which kicks it into the long grass, so to speak. But really in those cultures to which it is endogenous, such an understanding is quite prosaic. There is a cultural milieu in which it is intelligible, navigable and communicable - precisely what our culture is lacking.

And I don't intend to mount one. — Quixodian

I don't believe you have one to mount, or you would have done so by now...it's been years...

Which is what is generally regarded as empiricism. You commonly cite that position in these arguments, yet when you're challenged on it, you deny it: — Quixodian

LOL, I was simply outlining the different kinds of knowledge as I see them. If you think that picture is wrong, you are free to critique it.

You're appealing to sense-experience, empirical observation, or whatever you want to call it. At least be clear about that. — Quixodian

I am not appealing to anything, rather I'm just saying that what is usually counted as knowable in the intersubjective sense is what is confirmable by publicly available observations, mathematics or logic. If you can come up with another category of knowledge that is definitely intersubjectively confirmable then present the case for it or admit you cannot.

For example, you apparently think enlightenment is intersubjectively confirmable: well, a great number of people thought and still think Osho was enlightened, but I bet you think he was a fraud. How do you establish the truth in cases like that, eh? How do you know Gotama was enlightened? The authority of tradition?

But if you then associate 'taking on faith' with religion, then you fall back on the faith/reason dichotomy which is writ large in our culture and which I say which leads to stereotyping. I think the way you're evaluating it is like this: that Buddhism is a religion; religion is not something that can be validated empirically; therefore it's a matter of faith. — Quixodian

So, you are saying that because stereotyping is socially undesirable, assuming for the sake of the argument that the faith/reason dichotomy does lead to it, that we should not accept any distinction between faith and reason?

In any case I see the dichotomy as being between belief and knowledge, not faith and reason. belief operates as much in science as anywhere else, or at least provisionally accepted hypotheses do. When we can directly observe something, prove it mathematically or logically, then we know it, all the rest is provisional acceptance or committed acceptance (faith).

For example, a skilled musician may have a deep understanding of how to play a complex piece of music which they can't explain, but only enact. — Quixodian

I have in my last post acknowledged the difference between knowing how and knowing that, as I have done many times on these forums, so this is a strawman. If musicians cannot explain how they are able to play complex pieces of music, then it is precisely "knowing that" that is lacking. They can't explain it, but they can do it. It is the same with altered states of consciousness; how they are possible, metaphysically speaking, what the implications of them are, is not known, but how to attain them may be.

Notice how generally any assertion of 'higher knowledge' (Jñāna) is categorised as 'mystical' or 'spiritual', which kicks it into the long grass, so to speak. But really in those cultures to which it is endogenous, such an understanding is quite prosaic. There is a cultural milieu in which it is intelligible, navigable and communicable. Precisely what our culture is lacking. — Quixodian

Other cultures do have different understandings of what constitutes knowledge. For example, the Chinese traditionally believed that acupuncture works by dissolving blockages in the channels, called meridians, through which the vital energy, called Ch'i was believed to flow. None of this is intersubjectively confirmable; you either believe or you don't, or you reserve judgement because there is no evidence for it either way; how acupuncture really works is not known. On the other hand, the flow of blood through veins and arteries or lymph through the lymphatic system can be confirmed by observation; how it works is known.

So, the fact that other cultures have their different faiths and beliefs does not entail that those faiths and beliefs are true or not true. We simply don't and cannot know, because they are not susceptible of publicly available evidence.

I'm not saying it is wrong for people to believe in Ch'i; if it feels right to them then I see no problem with it, but intellectual honesty demands that it be acknowledged that the belief is not grounded on empirical evidence, mathematics or logic, the only methods we have for intersubjective demonstration or proof.

You seem to want to have your cake and eat it too.

.

You obviously have no counter-argument. I've laid out my argument in good faith and all you can apparently do is attempt to dismiss it by labelling it "empiricism". Empirical knowledge is part of our knowledge, we also have purely rational knowledge so characterizing me as an empirical philosopher is a strawman, and a clutching at straws.

Even if my argument were empiricist, it still warrants a decent counter-argument; mere dismissal by fiat or characterization does not amount to participating in discussion. Critique my arguments as hard as you like, if you come up with a decent critique; I might learn something. A disappointing response, as usual!

OK but I will try and keep it brief.

You're appealing to sense-experience, empirical observation, or whatever you want to call it. At least be clear about that.
— Quixodian

I am not appealing to anything, rather I'm just saying that what is usually counted as knowable in the intersubjective sense is what is confirmable by publicly available observations, mathematics or logic — Janus

You're appealing to empiricism, even if you say you're not. It is not an accusation, it's a description.

For example, you apparently think enlightenment is intersubjectively confirmable: well, a great number of people thought and still think Osho was enlightened, but I bet you think he was a fraud. How do you establish the truth in cases like that, eh? How do you know Gotama was enlightened? The authority of tradition? — Janus

Consider the provenance of the word 'enlightenment' that is used in respect of Eastern religious practices. It had its origin with a British translator of Buddhist texts, who used it to translate the term 'bodhi', motivated by his belief that Pali Buddhism was compatible with the outlook of the European Enlightenment. He was late Victorian, and they had the belief back then that Buddhism was a 'scientific religion', which I don't think is held any more. I suppose it is not necessarily a poor choice of words, but it has unfortunately become somewhat commoditized, as something to buy, sell, or somehow get, which plays right into consumer economics. I perfectly agree that as a consequence, there are lot of bogus gurus and enlightenment scams in the marketplace. There are many traps, pitfalls and delusions associated with the entire quest. But your objection simply reinforces what I said about stereotyping, about your customary view of anything you categorise under that umbrella. As the aphorism has it, there would be no fool's gold if there were no actual gold.

how acupuncture really works is not known — Janus

It's nevertheless claimable under Medicare.

the fact that other cultures have their different faiths and beliefs does not entail that those faiths and beliefs are true or not true. We simply don't and cannot know, because they are not susceptible of publicly available evidence. — Janus

But the subject can be and has been rigourously investigated, so there are those who can and do know. There's a 'mindfulness training centre' at Oxford, for heaven's sake. This is an epistemological question - the question of whether the subject has a factual core, or whether it's simply conjecture, custom, or pious belief.

intellectual honesty demands that it be acknowledged that the belief is not grounded on empirical evidence, mathematics or logic, the only methods we have for intersubjective demonstration or proof. — Janus

Intellectual honesty demands no such thing. Or maybe it requires acknowledgement that this assertion is also culturally-situated and conditioned. It is what our culture takes as a criterion for 'valid knowledge' - as I already said. There are hundreds, or is it thousands, of generations of devotees and disciples across many cultures who have practiced these paths and discipines, producing works of sacred literature and art. These can be studied, interpreted, practiced, and the results ascertained for oneself. One of the attributes of Buddhist praxis is 'ehi-passiko', which means, basically, 'come and see for yourself'. Although, of course, that's all just religion....

What do you think about "something from nothing" in terms of physics? — Gregory

I don't think much of it. There have been ideas from people like Lawrence Krauss'A Universe from Nothing that posits just that. I think it's plausible, but look at the explanation:

KRAUSS: That's exactly right. Empty space is a boiling, bubbling brew of virtual particles that pop in and out of existence in a time scale so short that you can't even measure them. Now, that sounds of course like counting angels on the head of a pin; if you can't measure them, then it doesn't sound like it's science, but in fact you can't measure them directly.

But we can measure their effects indirectly. These particles that are popping in and out of existence actually affect the properties of atoms and nuclei and actually are responsible for most of the mass inside your body. And in fact, really one of the things that motivated this book was the most profound discovery in recent times, and you even alluded to it in the last segment, the discovery that most of the energy of the universe actually resides in empty space.

You take space, get rid of all the particles, all the radiation, and it actually carries energy, and that notion that in fact empty space - once you allow gravity into the game, what seems impossible is possible. It sounds like it would violate the conservation of energy for you to start with nothing and end up with lots of stuff, but the great thing about gravity is it's a little trickier.

Gravity allows positive energy and negative energy, and out of nothing you can create positive energy particles, and as long as a gravitational attraction produces enough negative energy, the sum of their energy can be zero. And in fact when we look out at the universe and try and measure its total energy, we come up with zero.

I like to think of it as the difference between, say, a savvy stockbroker and an embezzler. The savvy stockbroker will buy stocks on margin with more money than they have, and as long as they get that money back in there before anyone notices, and in fact if the stocks go up, they end with money where they didn't have any before, whereas the embezzler, of course, is discovered.

Well, the universe is a savvy stockbroker. It can borrow energy, and if there's no gravity, it gets rid of it back before anyone notices. But if gravity is there, it can actually create stuff where there was none before. And you can actually create enough stuff to account for everything we see in the universe.

But, you know, it's more than that because some people would say, and I've had this discussion with theologians and others, well, you know, just empty space isn't nothing. You know, there's space. How did the space get there? But the amazing thing is, once you apply in fact quantum mechanics to gravity, as you were beginning to allude again in the last segment, then it's possible, in fact it's implied, that space itself can be created where there was nothing before, that literally whole universes can pop out of nothing by the laws of quantum mechanics.

And in fact the question why is there something rather than nothing then becomes sort of trite because nothing is unstable. It will always produce something. The more interesting or surprising question might be why is there nothing. But of course if we ask that question, well, we wouldn't be here if that was true. — NPR Interview with Lawrence Krauss

I'm not sure if that really is in favor of anything like Will being omnipresent.

You're appealing to empiricism, even if you say you're not. It is not an accusation, it's a description. — Quixodian

"Appealing" is an attitude; don't presume to tell me what I'm appealing to.

Consider the provenance of the word 'enlightenment' that is used in respect of Eastern religious practices. — Quixodian

The provenance of the word, which I am amply familiar with, does not constitute an argument, nor is it relevant to what I've been saying.

I perfectly agree that as a consequence, there are lot of bogus gurus and enlightenment scams in the marketplace. There are many traps, pitfalls and delusions associated with the entire quest. — Quixodian

Right, so how do you know which is fake and which is real? And even if you believe that you do know, how can you demonstrate to others that you do know? You can't, therwise you would, and that's the point I'm making. If you know some mathematical or logical truth, you can demonstrate it. If you have made some empirical observation, you can demonstrate it, but who is enlightened and who isn't, just like which creative works are great and which are not, cannot be definitively demonstrated, and that's all I've been trying to get you to see, or if think it is wrong to make an actual argument that sets out just why you believe it is wrong. that demonstrates it to be wrong.

It's nevertheless claimable under Medicare. — Quixodian

I know that, but it is irrelevant. We know how western medicine works, or at least we have very good theories grounded in observation and experiment. The same cannot be said about acupuncture, which is not to say it doesn't work. I don't know whether it works or not, do you?

But the subject can be and has been rigourously investigated, so there are those who can and do know. There's a 'mindfulness training centre' at Oxford, for heaven's sake. This is an epistemological question - the question of whether the subject has a factual core, or whether it's simply conjecture, custom, or pious belief. — Quixodian

What are seeking to appeal to here? Authority? Or tradition? Sure, it's a kind of epistemological question, but it's also a semantic question because the referents of "subject", "factual", "core" are not clear in this context. So, I'm not even sure what you think the question means.

Intellectual honesty demands no such thing. It requires that this assertion is also culturally-situated and conditioned. It is what our culture takes as a criterion for 'valid knowledge' - as I already said. — Quixodian

No, if you cannot say how the belief in Ch'i is grounded in empirical evidence, mathematics or logic, then you should admit that. If it is only grounded in intuition, it may or may not be true, but how would you go about determining that, or demonstrating its truth or falsity? That is what you need to show.

That is what you need to show. — Janus

I don't need to 'show' anything, especially as your only interest is polemical. I should have kept mum the first time around.

What do you think about "something from nothing" in terms of physics?
— Gregory

I don't think much of it. There have been ideas from people like Lawrence Krauss 'A Universe from Nothing that posits just that. — schopenhauer1

Do you know the well-known story of David Albert's scathing review of Universe from Nothing and what happened afterwards? Apparently Krauss was absolutely enraged by it and fired off angry missives to the editors, before being gently advised by some of his professional peers to cool it. The offending paragraph:

The particular, eternally persisting, elementary physical stuff of the world, according to the standard presentations of relativistic quantum field theories, consists (unsurprisingly) of relativistic quantum fields. And the fundamental laws of this theory take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of those fields are physically possible and which aren’t, and rules connecting the arrangements of those fields at later times to their arrangements at earlier times, and so on — and they have nothing whatsoever to say on the subject of where those fields came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular kinds of fields it does, or of why it should have consisted of fields at all, or of why there should have been a world in the first place. Period. Case closed. End of story. — David Albert

Oh, and the closing para was pretty good, too (in light of the fact that Krauss' book was hailed a 'hammer-blow against Religion' by none other than Richard Dawkins):

I guess it ought to be mentioned, quite apart from the question of whether anything Krauss says turns out to be true or false, that the whole business of approaching the struggle with religion as if it were a card game, or a horse race, or some kind of battle of wits, just feels all wrong — or it does, at any rate, to me. When I was growing up, where I was growing up, there was a critique of religion according to which religion was cruel, and a lie, and a mechanism of enslavement, and something full of loathing and contempt for every­thing essentially human. Maybe that was true and maybe it wasn’t, but it had to do with important things — it had to do, that is, with history, and with suffering, and with the hope of a better world — and it seems like a pity, and more than a pity, and worse than a pity, with all that in the back of one’s head, to think that all that gets offered to us now, by guys like these, in books like this, is the pale, small, silly, nerdy accusation that religion is, I don’t know, dumb.

You seem to me to be uninterested in good faith discussoion. I don't expect you to agree with my views, but if you want to discuss our differences then you should be prepared to argue for your position. Your behavior seems to be more that of a politician than a philosopher. You seem to be incapable of understanding that I honestly disagree with you; and that I'm not being polemical for the sake of it.