you should be prepared to argue for your position. — Janus

I tried, no joy. Past a certain point it becomes futile. Life's short, let's move on. ‘Intellectual honesty demands that valid knowledge be what I declare it to be’ :roll:

The poster asked if I was aware of something from nothing in physics and I gave him the main example I knew from the popular science book. Yes, I am aware of the scientism of many scientists. The context of the debate often revolves around the use of words and the misguided acknowledgment of what these terms mean for each side.

For physicists, "nothing" has a different connotation than the classic philosophical notions of nothing. It just needs zero energy to be considered "nothing" in physics I guess. And of course, that is unsatisfying in a philosophical sense that the theoretical principles and laws and fields that underlie this "nothing" still need to be accounted for.

This looks to be a decent explanation of "nothing" in physics.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/how-the-physics-of-nothing-underlies-everything-20220809/#:~:text=Quantum%20Nothingness&text=In%20classical%20physics%2C%20a%20field's,%E2%80%9CNothing%20is%20happening.%E2%80%9D

What Krauss provided was a modern physical description of creation. Creation is seen as something supernatural in the religions. But what do they mean when they say God has the "power" to create from nothing. What does power mean but "from itself". But what is God? The MIND asks this. Or maybe this God can't produce from himself because he can not be imitated. This is the God that the atheists fight against. Then this God's action of creation was truly magic

What does power mean but "from itself". But what is God? The MIND asks this. Or maybe this God can't produce from himself because he can not be imitated. — Gregory

I see these are words, but they don't mean much. I'm in a conversation with @frank about language use, and this is an example of a language game where terms are so vague that we are going to keep talking over each other.

I don't believe the kind of inter-subjective verification at work in such contexts is in the same class as the inter-subjective verification that operates in empirical observations, mathematical proofs and logic, because the latter kind of verification is such that it will definitely convince any suitably unbiased and competent agent, and the competency itself can also be publicly demonstrated. The same lack of public demonstrability applies to aesthetics; it can never be definitively shown that a creative work is great for example. — Janus

I think 's post was accurate. You seem to be taking a least-common-denominator approach. "If the hoi polloi cannot verify a claim, then it doesn't possess intersubjective agreement."

For example, we could limit intersubjective agreement to empirical realities that can be seen and touched (by even a 5 year-old). I don't think anyone would object to the claim that such realities are objects of intersubjective agreement, but there are other intersubjective domains that transcend the capacity of 5 year-olds. Mathematics and physics are two that come to mind.

Now when the Buddha exposits the different forms of jñāna and claims that they are accessible, he is not saying that they are accessible to the hoi polloi in their current state. Just as geometry is not accessible to the 5 year-old and differential equations are not accessible to the average adult, so too the states that Quixodian was referring to are not accessible to the average person. So what? What does this have to do with intersubjective verification?

Note too, that faith is the reason the 5 year-old believes in geometry and the average adult believes in calculus. The vast majority of our scientific knowledge and beliefs are faith-based. The percentage of people who have first-hand knowledge or understanding of any given scientific theory is slim to none, and yet these same people will often know the names and the gist of these theories and will assent to them as being true.

Thank you Leontiskos, you said it better than I did, that's what I was getting at.

The vast majority of our scientific knowledge and beliefs are faith-based. The percentage of people who have first-hand knowledge or understanding of any given scientific theory is slim to none, and yet these same people will often know the names and the gist of these theories and will assent to them as being true. — Leontiskos

I can see this argument. Nevertheless, unlike faith based entities (such as gods), there is evidence available for scientific knowledge which people who have education can access and verify and demonstrate to work. I suspect that aligning this testable, demonstrable, if arcane knowledge with faith can lead to conceptual problems elsewhere. Thoughts?

When I catch a plane, a Christian apologist might argue that I have faith the plane will fly. It's true I know little about the engineering or piloting component of flight. However I would say this is having a reasonable confidence the plane will fly. I know planes fly. The evidence is overwhelming that most do so safely. I know there are engineers and pilots and that they have training etc. I don't see this as a matter of faith.

I think ↪Quixodian's post was accurate. You seem to be taking a least-common-denominator approach. "If the hoi polloi cannot verify a claim, then it doesn't possess intersubjective agreement." — Leontiskos

I haven't said there is no intersubjective agreement amongst the religious faithful, I have said there is no definitive intersubjective testability when it comes to religious or metaphysical claims, and I include in that all metaphysical claims including materialism.

My argument is that the only definitive intersubjective testability we have of human knowledge is in relation to empirical observations, mathematical results and logic. This has nothing at all to do with the "hoi polloi".

Also, I don't claim that scientific theories, as opposed to observations, are definitively testable beyond determining whether what they predict is observed. I don't claim that if a scientific theory is predictively accurate that this proves that it is true in any absolute sense.

It is clear how phenomenal observations can be confirmed, how mathematical results can be rigorously tested and how logical claims can be definitively assessed as to their validity (not truth, mind). If you want to claim that it is possible to definitively determine whether or not Osho or the Buddha were enlightened, or whether there is a God or resurrection or karma or rebirth, or whether certain creative works are great and others not, then please present your case.

:up:

No problem! This is such a recurring difficulty in our scientific culture that I was sure I would get pulled into these sorts of discussions eventually. :razz:

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Quixodian's post was about Buddhism, not Christianity, and I think Buddhism provides the easier case. As far as the Buddha is concerned, 'the deathless' can be seen and known by those who have been properly initiated, just as is the case with scientific knowledge. So I think there is parity here. I grant that your belief that planes fly is not a matter of faith, but of knowledge. But I am not going to enter into the question of Christian faith at this point, in large part because I will be out for the next four or five days.

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My claim is that the only definitive intersubjective testability we have of human knowledge is in relation to empirical observations, mathematical results and logic. This has nothing at all to do with the "hoi polloi". — Janus

It has everything to do with the hoi polloi. When you say that a scientific claim is testable you mean that you would subject it to the scientific expert for confirmation. You don't mean that you would find the average guy on the street and ask him if it is true. Yet when it comes to the Buddha's claim you are apparently content with the average guy on the street.

Much of it will come down to this claim of yours:

...and the competency itself can also be publicly demonstrated. — Janus

As Quixodian has pointed out, this sort of claim is circular. It is only demonstrable to those with the relevant presuppositions and training, and whether such presuppositions and training count as competence merely depends on who you ask.

If you are concerned with intersubjective agreement, then there can be little question that there is significant intersubjective agreement among Buddhists about the various states of consciousness, and that this is based on independent 'experimentation'. Or in other words, I don't think you will be able to sustain a coherent account of your, "definitive intersubjective testability." What you are reaching for is something beyond intersubjectivity.

As Quixodian has pointed out, this sort of claim is circular. It is only demonstrable to those with the relevant presuppositions and training, and whether such presuppositions and training count as competence merely depends on who you ask. — Leontiskos

While I think this is largely true is it not problematic? Clearly presuppositions are shared by everyone from Nazi's to Jehovah's Witnesses. Are all presuppositions equal just because they may be believed in with equal confidence?

Nevertheless, unlike faith based entities (such as gods), there is evidence available for scientific knowledge which people who have education can access and verify and demonstrate to work. I suspect that aligning this testable, demonstrable, if arcane knowledge with faith can lead to conceptual problems elsewhere. Thoughts? — Tom Storm

That, again, this is based on a culturally-conditioned or stereotyped depiction of what such claims entail. Firstly, in current science, there are many huge interpretive conundrums, for instance the debates about string theory and the multiverse, and whether theories of same ought to be testable in principle. Then there's all the many debates about interpretations of physics, which I won't open up here other than by way of mention.

There is a kind of 'secular consensus' as to what amounts to common-sense knowledge, which underwrites a great deal of this commentary. What really irked me was the demand that 'intellectual honesty dictates' that I acknowledge that common-sense attitude as the arbiter for the truth or otherwise of Buddhist epistemology- exactly as @Leontiskos described. What came to mind is Heidegger's remarks about 'das mann'.

This has now drifted a long way from the intention of the OP, something for which I admit some responsibility. What actually caused me to venture into the field of the Buddhist epistemology was the discussion about the sense in which Schopenhauer's philosophy is 'soteriological', i.e. encompassing the possibility of release (mokṣa, as it is called in the Upaniṣad). To which the reply was

I think Schopenhauer too optimistic. There is no blissful escape. — schopenhauer1

So basically, I am asking, 'says who?' The nihilistic philosophers that @schopenhauer1 quotes from would naturally say that, but then, they're nihilists! All they demonstrate is regret for having been born. So I brought up that discussion of 'the Deathless' in one of the Buddhist suttas (here, for those interested) to make the case for there being, actually, 'blissful escape' (although it sounds a rather facile way of putting it.)

No, they are not equal, but they are equally intersubjective. We have been talking about intersubjectivity, not knowledge, and I suspect that is because the parties involved are wary of making knowledge claims. The appeal to "competence" is likely a quasi-knowledge claim.

No, they are not equal, but they are equally intersubjective. — Leontiskos

Agree.

The appeal to "competence" is likely a quasi-knowledge claim. — Leontiskos

Yes, we seem to dip in and out of various epistemologies.

Firstly, in current science, there are many huge interpretive conundrums, for instance the debates about string theory and the multiverse, and whether theories of same ought to be testable in principle — Quixodian

Sure. Aspects of science are also speculative and theoretical.

What really irked me was the demand that 'intellectual honesty dictates' that I acknowledge that common-sense attitude as the arbiter for the truth or otherwise of Buddhist epistemology- exactly as Leontiskos described — Quixodian

Got ya.

It has everything to do with the hoi polloi. When you say that a scientific claim is testable you mean that you would subject it to the scientific expert for confirmation. You don't mean that you would find the average guy on the street and ask him if it is true. Yet when it comes to the Buddha's claim you are apparently content with the average guy on the street. — Leontiskos

Scientific observations are really only augmented empirical observations. Even the "hoi polloi" know how to test claims like "it is raining" or "there is a tree growing three meters from the shed" or :"the surf today is bigger than it was yesterday" and even they can look up tabulated information to determine whether it is true that there is currently global warming. There are countless such truths about the world we share that even the poor moronic hoi polloi can test.

You cannot demonstrate that it is possible to see "the deathless". You might be one hundred percent convinced that you have seen it, just as I might be one hundred percent convinced I have seen a unicorn; my conviction is not intersubjective verification for anyone else that I have in fact seen it, even if there might be those of like mind who agree that I have.

So again this

If you are concerned with intersubjective agreement, then there can be little question that there is significant intersubjective agreement among Buddhists about the various states of consciousness, and that this is based on independent 'experimentation'. — Leontiskos

Is a strawman. I haven't claimed there is no intersubjective agreement and experimentation does not prove a metaphysical claim in the Buddhist context any more than it proves scientific theories in the context of science. That said, at least in science the results of predictions are publicly observable.

That altered states of consciousness happen and that they may sometimes be achievable via certain disciplines is not in question, but even if those states were reliably achievable that does not prove anything metaphysical and it is not even possible for anyone to know with certainty that any particular claim to have achieved such a state is even true; they might be lying about it.

This brings us back to the question as to how you would determine whether Osho was enlightened; there was enormous intersubjective agreement that he was and yet Quixodian thinks he was a charlatan. How does he know he is right, and all Osho's followers were wrong?

And now we come to the Buddha: how do we know he was enlightened when we don't even possess a single word written by him, and we don't know except via historical documents how much intersubjective agreement there was about his enlightenment when he was alive?

Boy, you posit some provocative and interesting questions. :up:

As do you Tom.

How does he know he is right, and all Osho's followers were wrong? — Janus

As I am the 'he' in question, I'll refer to my previous response. It's a fact that vast populations can become victims of delusion - witness the Trump cult. But the fact that there are such delusions doesn't mean that effective political leadership is not possible. The constant complaint 'well, all religions disagree with each other, how can they all be right?' likewise. Agree that today's world is confused, chaotic, and full of contradictions. But that is not a philosophical argument, again it's just an appeal to common sense.

To round off my thoughts, difficulties of epistemology lead people to fall back from talking about knowledge to talking about intersubjective agreement. But intersubjective agreement is a very weak criterion, and it does not satisfy the belief that some intersubjective agreements are better than others. The quality of intersubjective agreement, taken in itself, can only be a matter of quantity (i.e. how many people agree). Once we begin to vet the subjects, we have introduced a second notion (expertise) that really goes beyond the simple idea of intersubjective agreement.

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Scientific observations are really only augmented empirical observations. Even the "hoi polloi" know how to test claims like "it is raining" or "there is a tree growing three meters from the shed" or :"the surf today is bigger than it was yesterday" and even they can look up tabulated information to determine whether it is true that there is currently global warming. There are countless such truths about the world we share that even the poor moronic hoi polloi can test.

You cannot deomstrate that it is possible to see "the deathless". You might be one hundred perecent convinced that you have seen it, just as I might be onehundred percent convinced I have seen a unicorn; my conviction is not intersubjective verification for anyone esles that I have seen it, even if there might be those of like mind who agree. — Janus

The intersubjective agreement will be wider when it comes to obvious realities that are immediately accessible to everyone. Are you saying anything more than this?

That altered states of consciousness happen and that they may sometimes be achievable via certain disciplines is not in question, but even if those states were reliably achievable that does not prove anything metaphysical speaking... — Janus

It proves that they exist and that they are achievable, which are metaphysical truths and are the point in question.

...it is not even possible for anyone to know with certainty that any particular claim to have achieved such a state is even true; they might be lying about it. — Janus

The subjects of your intersubjective agreements may all be lying too. Who cares? How does this cut against Buddhism any more than science?

You wish to talk about "certainty" but you won't venture beyond intersubjective agreement. Intersubjective agreement about a claim does not produce certainty about a claim. You continue to equivocate between intersubjective agreement and stronger claims, akin to knowledge.

This brings us back to the question as to how you would determine whether Osho was enlightened... — Janus

No, we are talking about Quixodian's claim about the Eastern Gatehouse sutta (link). Maybe you were talking about Osho with someone else. I am not him, and I am not interested in ad hoc tangents. Let's stay on topic.

(Note I've reverted back to my previous username)

But intersubjective agreement is a very weak criterion, and it does not satisfy the belief that some intersubjective agreements are better than others. The quality of intersubjective agreement, taken in itself, can only be a matter of quantity (i.e. how many people agree). Once we begin to vet the subjects, we have introduced a second notion (expertise) that really goes beyond the simple idea of intersubjective agreement. — Leontiskos

This would be rich material for its own thread. Perhaps when you get back. What we also need is someone properly steeped in post-structuralist thinking to unpack the intersubjective and the idea of knowledge and expertise.

(Note I've reverted back to my previous username) — Wayfarer

Noted. In my mind you were always Wayfarer... however I am partial to the novel Don Quixote.

I kept the icon :-)

You haven't answered the question. The point was that it is not possible to publicly demonstrate whether Osho or Gautama were or were not enlightened.

The intersubjective agreement will be wider when it comes to obvious realities that are accessible to everyone. Are you saying anything more than this? — Leontiskos

Yes, I am saying that some claims can be definitively confirmed by empirical observation and others cannot. That's really all I've been saying all along.

It proves that they exist and that they are achievable, which is a metaphysical truth and is the point in question. — Leontiskos

I would not count that as a metaphysical truth, but as a phenomenological truth. Whatever the metaphysical implications of that truth are cannot be determined but remain purely a matter of faith.

And note I have not said I think people should not have faith, whether Christian, Buddhist or whatever, provided they acknowledge that what they have is faith not knowledge. I have my own articles of faith, which I don't share on here because I don't believe they are philosophically arguable. The problem with thinking that faith is knowledge is that it leads to fundamentalism and that can be very socially dangerous and detrimental.

You wish to talk about "certainty" but you won't venture beyond intersubjective agreement. Intersubjective agreement about a claim does not produce certainty about a claim. You continue to equivocate between intersubjective agreement and stronger claims, akin to knowledge. — Leontiskos

I do venture beyond intersubjective agreement in my own life. We can be certain of intersubjectvely testable claims, barring extreme skepticism, such claims constitute public knowledge. We can feel certain of what our own experience tells us, but what our own experience tells us is true is not knowledge in the intersubjective sense, it is merely personal conviction.

You've obviously made up your own mind, I'm not going to engage in the probably futile task of argument about it. — Wayfarer

I haven't made up my own mind about whether Osho or Gautama were enlightened; I reserve judgement on that question due to lack of evidence, same as I do on the question of whether or not there is a God. I don't even know what it means to be enlightened. Do you? Do you think you know whether or not Osho and Gautama were enlightened, or if you believe Gautama was and Osho was not, do you admit this is a personal conviction and not knowledge? The philosopher in you should admit that, but I suspect the politician in you will not give a straight answer.

I see you quoted and mentioned me. Did you want me to add anything or was it just a reference?

I think you mischaracterize the move to prevent suffering above and beyond dealing with it. It's ok though, it's not just you. I think it is telling in Buddhism that you have to be born so you can escape the burden. Here we have a clear and decisive path (don't procreate), and the other is an arduous one that can be questioned and even if true is only had by the ones who have "reincarnated" to such a position to reach nirvana.

Here is maybe where we can both agree:

It is about right understanding.
I bet you there are people, right here on this forum, who have lived a relatively charmed life. That is so far, they haven't felt they had major negative setbacks, or ones that have "broken their spirit" and thus, LIFE MUST NOT BE SUFFERING. I don't agree with this. Certainly most Buddhists don't agree with this. This kind of Western notion of hedonic calculus for determining life's goodness is not quite the kind of "suffering" Buddha had in mind.

However, even in terms of this Westernized version of suffering (i.e. the hedonic calculus), at one moment, someone can beat the shit out of you and leave you for dead, you can get into a near-fatal car crash, you can encounter X, Y, Z, and then your former stance is fucked, and you were wrong by way of a new experience.

That is to say, suffering definitely does (in the case of Buddhist notions of the pervasiveness of suffering to existence) or certainly can be suffering (in the duller common, everyday sense of the word). In the Western's case, the potential for suffering itself is the kicker. Not necessarily the "thus lived experience". That is to say, this isn't a game where anything is guaranteed.

Not to mention, I do think there is a sense that someone can have very negative moments and after-the-fact assessments of life that can differ. Being in an awkward, deadly, annoying, and frustrating situation tends to look different than not being in one.

Anyways, this is all to say life has suffering, and this cannot be denied. Both the Pessimist and the Buddhist can agree with this.

What I would call for is a sort of Communal Catharsis. That is to say, like Buddhism, there needs to be appropriate understanding that suffering exists(!). If we don't even acknowledge this, we can't even get past square 1. So, if this is acknowledged, and that this world is not only not a utopia, but not even close to one, then we have some thinking to do about that...

Well, what is it then? All is vanity is a good ole place to start. But what does that mean? Empathy should come by way of tragic comedy. We need to understand all the nuanced ways we are all fucked, and if we understand this, then we can be on the same page about not wanting to continue it for others. We might also take things less seriously, and cope with negative situations a bit less harshly. It's not any grand metaphysical apotheosis, but it is simply a socially recognized realization. That is to say, the Pessimism is right in your face and not hidden by myths, or only whispered to therapists or your best friend. Everyone acknowledges it, understands it and kind of breath a collective sigh at dealing with the collective burdens and the individual burdens we all must deal with.

The point was that it is not possible to publicly demonstrate whether... — Janus

In general I am doubtful of whether your views on this subject are particularly rigorous, and this is because you are uncritically shifting between all sorts of different terms and concepts. Some include: intersubjective agreement, public demonstration, intersubjective testability, and empirical verification. These are all very different concepts, and the slipping back and forth from one to another will tend to preclude rigorous philosophical investigation.

Yes, I am saying that some claims can be definitively confirmed by empirical observation and others cannot. — Janus

I should think this is an uncontroversial claim, although "definitively confirmed" is another of those slippery concepts that you are shifting between. But in fact the claim in question is about a subjective state, and subjective states are empirical. Buddhism is, in fact, a highly empirical religion, and this is why it fits well in the West. The whole point of the original post was that, "It can be validated first person," and this is because it is based on a reproducible (and empirical) experience.

I would not count that as a metaphysical truth, but as a phenomenological truth. — Janus

Okay, fair enough.

We can be certain of intersubjectvely testable claims, barring extreme skepticism, such claims constitute public knowledge. — Janus

Well we can test testable claims and verify verifiable claims, and we are also capable of according a high degree of certitude to our own personal tests. But again, the Buddha's claim is verifiable. That's the whole point. So according to your own reasoning the Buddha's claim is something we can be certain of, and it "constitutes public knowledge."

But of course your assertion that "intersubjectively testable claims" constitute public knowledge is false, and furthermore I would be surprised if you yourself have any rigorous idea of what you mean by public knowledge.

I think it is telling in Buddhism that you have to be born so you can escape the burden. — schopenhauer1

I was responding to the point you made about Schopenhauer being 'overly optimistic'. What you see as his 'optimism', I see as the whole point of his philosophy (as I think he did too.) Also I think you've really got the wrong end of the shtick. The 'clear and decisive path' you speak of would not constitute a release from the cycle of re-birth. I think the Buddhist view would be that even if you don't procreate, you will be re-born in a future existence in accordance with your karma. I suppose in the absence of a belief in re-birth, it seems like escaping the cycle - but again, that is a nihilistic view. (Important distinction: there's a world of difference in religious philosophies between 'nothing' and 'no-thing-ness'. The former is mere absence, or the negation of the existence of some particular; the latter is the absence of specificity of the unmanifest/unborn/uncreated. It is not 'a thing' - neither this nor that ('neti, neti') but is also not mere absence or non-existence. This is at the basis of apophatic mysticism and 'the negative way' which occurs in all religious cultures. The inability to make this distinction is one of the root causes of nihilism. See The Cult of Nothingness, Roger Pol-Droit.)

I think the Buddhist view would be that even if you don't procreate, you will be re-born in a future existence in accordance with your karma — Wayfarer

But isn't that convenient...

I suppose in the absence of a belief in re-birth, it seems like escaping the cycle - but again, that is a nihilistic view. (Important distinction: there's a world of difference in religious philosophies between 'nothing' and 'no-thing-ness'. T — Wayfarer

Saying something is "nihilistic" doesn't impute anything other than it's a term you use for X.

Also I wrote more in that post if you want to reply to that or not.

isn't that convenient... — schopenhauer1

Or not - it might amount to a very 'inconvenient truth' indeed.

Saying something is "nihilistic" doesn't impute anything other than it's a term you use for X. — schopenhauer1

Nihilism is the description of various schools of philosophy which hold that nothing is real, or that nothing has any ultimate moral or ethical principle or implication. It is often associated (per Nietszche) with the 'death of God' signifiying the collapse of belief in religious ethical systems.

Or not - it might amount to a very 'inconvenient truth' indeed. — Wayfarer

It's convenient in that it justifies procreation now doesn't it? Odd. Fuck it (literally), it's inevitable anyways.. If literally everyone stopped procreating, there is no guarantee any new evolution repeats to consciousness. That is not determined. In fact, perhaps it is an interesting feature, not a bug. Perhaps, when all animal entities get to a certain level of awareness, they stop procreating. Anyways, I am just trying to give understanding that there is a sort of hand-waving assertion that the inevitability of more humans (to thus be enlightened) must be the case.

And oddly enough, I think that not procreating also helps the Buddhist cause. As this actually promotes the wider soteriological end goal, not just the individual. Afterall, it would be better if there were no cycle not just that some can escape it.