Nihilism is the description of various schools of philosophy which hold that nothing is real, or that nothing has any ultimate moral or ethical principle or implication. It is often associated (per Nietszche) with the 'death of God' signifiying the collapse of belief in religious ethical systems. — Wayfarer

And none of this seems to characterize my thoughts.

But I think it is a fair description of anti-natalism.

But I think it is a fair description of anti-natalism. — Wayfarer

No it is not.
Antinatalism is an ethical principle so clearly violates your definition of nihilism as

nothing has any ultimate moral — Wayfarer

.

In that sense, many people have "nihilistic ideas", not just antinatalism.. That is to say, no belief in an afterlife. And even then, some antinatalists might even believe in such and have reasons related to that for their belief. Anyways, go back to that post as I went more in depth.

This is textbook nihilism:

Because of this, Mainländer can claim that once an "individual will" is silenced and dies, it achieves absolute nothingness and not the relative nothingness we find in Schopenhauer. By recognizing death as salvation and by giving nothingness an absolute quality, Mainländer's system manages to offer "wider" means for redemption. — Mainlander Wiki

And also conflates 'nothing' and 'no-thing-ness' as I said in this post.

In general I am doubtful of whether your views on this subject are particularly rigorous, and this is because you are uncritically shifting between all sorts of different terms and concepts. Some include: intersubjective agreement, public demonstration, intersubjective testability, and empirical verification. These are all very different concepts, and the slipping back and forth from one to another will tend to preclude rigorous philosophical investigation. — Leontiskos

The possibility for public demonstration is the same as intersubjective testability and emprical verifiability. If I claim that it is raining, right here, right now the truth of that is publicly demonstrable, intersubjectively testable and empirically verifiable to those who are able to come and see. The same goes for any claim about observable phenomena.

Insinuating that my views are not rigorous is a suspect move. Attempt instead to address the arguments I make with rigorous counterarguments and then you will be attempting rigorous philosophical investigation.

I should think this is an uncontroversial claim, although "definitively confirmed" is another of those slippery concepts that you are shifting between. But in fact the claim in question is about a subjective state, and subjective states are empirical. Buddhism is, in fact, a highly empirical religion, and this is why it fits well in the West. The whole point of the original post was that, "It can be validated first person," and this is because it is based on a reproducible (and empirical) experience. — Leontiskos

The "definitive" in "definitively confirmed" is only there for emphasis. Confirmation is confirmation. Subjective states are not empirical in the sense of being publicly observable. I can observe only your behavior, not your subjective state, whatever that term might be understood to mean. Only you are privy to that. Buddhism claims that the altered states of consciousness that are called "jñāna", understood as 'direct knowing' may be achieved through practice, and I beleive this is true having experienced such states myself. Tell me, though, what do you think is known in such states?

Christian mystics think they know God, know that God exists. Some Buddhists claim to remember their past lives. None of this can be confirmed, the possibility of self-delusion is always present I believe. But even if it is accepted that it is possible to know such things, it is not possible to demonstrate that they are known. It is also not possible to demonstrate that someone is in such a state; they might be faking it. If you think I am wrong, then explain how such things could be known to be known.

But again, the Buddha's claim is verifiable. That's the whole point. So according to your own reasoning the Buddha's claim is something we can be certain of, and it "constitutes public knowledge." — Leontiskos

This is simply not true, and certainly not according to my own reasoning; how could anyone possibly know the truth of the Buddha's claim, unless they were in the same state as the Buddha. How could they know they were in the same state, and how could they possibly prove to the public that they were? Do you claim to be enlightened? Do you think Osho was enlightened? The foremost living German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk does; he spent a couple of years with Osho at Poona, although what he means by 'enlightenment' may be very different than what you mean. I am not using this as an appeal to authority by the way, because I acknowledge that Sloterdijk might be wrong, but it just shows that anyone could be wrong about any claim that someone, including themselves, is enlightened.

But of course your assertion that "intersubjectively testable claims" constitute public knowledge is false, and furthermore I would be surprised if you yourself have any rigorous idea of what you mean by public knowledge. — Leontiskos

Are you going to give some actual argument or counterexamples or are you just going to leave your statement that my assertion that intersubjectively testable claims (I should add "if true" of course) constitute (I should add "actual or potential" of course) public knowledge. Obviously, a claim must be actually tested and proven true to become actual public knowledge, and I took that as read.

And again, you try to use aspersion instead of argument; "I would be surprised if you yourself have any rigorous idea of what you mean by public knowledge". :roll:

No I get the way Buddhist concepts are about the idea that this is an "illusion" etc. It's doublespeak.

What if there were no living things in the world, and evolution never created any new form of consciousness?

You would have to say in your belief system that this is an impossibility. Is that correct? Let us say Earth is the only life with consciousness and the asteroid that killed the dinosaurs, killed all life as well. What would you have to say based on your belief system?

The possibility for public demonstration is the same as intersubjective testability and emprical verifiability. If I claim that it is raining, right here, right now the truth of that is publicly demonstrable, intersubjectively testable and empirically verifiable to those who are able to come and see. The same goes for any claim about observable phenomena. — Janus

Why don't you go ahead and try to actually define what you mean by these terms, and in the process show us that the various claims you are making are not tautological?

To take one of the claims, it seems fairly clear that not everything that can be tested by other subjects admits of the possibility for public demonstration (i.e. the possibility for public demonstration is not the same as intersubjective testability). This is because public demonstration is apparently premised on a shared (publicly available) object of inquiry, such as a single thermometer that everyone present can simultaneously read. But intersubjective testability in no way requires this shared object. The Buddha's claim can be tested by other subjects, but it cannot be a public object of simultaneous inquiry. Of course these arguments are based on my own understandings of the concepts, for you have provided no definitions for these terms you keep bandying about.

Insinuating that my views are not rigorous is a suspect move. Attempt instead to address the arguments I make with rigorous counterarguments and then you will be attempting rigorous philosophical investigation. — Janus

The point is that not everyone is equally worth talking to, and not everyone is equally capable of discussing certain subjects. Quixodian was right in implying such a truth, hard as it may be.

Subjective states are not empirical in the sense of being publicly observable. — Janus

But "empirical" does not mean "publicly observable." You are mushing together terms again. A state of consciousness is an empirical reality, but it is not publicly observable.

Buddhism claims that the altered states of consciousness that are called "jñāna", understood as 'direct knowing' may be achieved through practice, and I beleive this is true having experienced such states myself. — Janus

Then you have successfully tested the empirical claim. Therefore you know it to be both testable and empirical.

None of this can be confirmed, the possibility of self-delusion is always present I believe. But even if it is accepted that it is possible to know such things, it is not possible to demonstrate that they are known. It is also not possible to demonstrate that someone is in such a state; they might be faking it. If you think I am wrong, then explain how such things could be known to be known. — Janus

These are vacuous objections, just like your earlier objection that the participants in my putative intersubjective agreement "Could be lying." They are vacuous because they equally apply to your own claims and theories, and to level them at me or Quixodian requires a double standard. My answer is therefore simple: tu quoque.

The other problem is that you are uncritically conflating different topics. We began talking about intersubjective agreement, and then we moved on to intersubjective confirmability, and now you have flown to another new topic of "demonstrating that someone is in such a [subjective] state." What does this have to do with intersubjective agreement or intersubjective confirmability? Gish gallop is not something that I entertain for overly long.

This is simply not true, and certainly not according to my own reasoning; how could anyone possibly know the truth of the Buddha's claim, unless they were in the same state as the Buddha. — Janus

Right, they enter the same state, just like you did when you said, "I beleive this is true having experienced such states myself."

How could they know they were in the same state, and how could they possibly prove to the public that they were? — Janus

Again, these are two different topics that you keep conflating. To the first: the same way you did when you confirmed the existence of such states. If you did it, it must be possible. To the second: the same way the astrophysicist proves his theory to the hoi polloi (or doesn't). As I said earlier, if "the public" doesn't possess the requisite capacity to confirm a claim, then they will not be capable of confirming it. It is the same for scientific claims, and Arhats are as unconcerned to prove their claims to the hoi polloi as astrophysicists are.

Are you going to give some actual argument or counterexamples or are you just going to leave your statement that my assertion that intersubjectively testable claims (I should add "if true" of course) constitute (I should add "actual or potential" of course) public knowledge. Obviously, a claim must be actually tested and proven true to become actual public knowledge, and I took that as read. — Janus

You have just admitted that the claim was false by redacting it from (1) to (2):

1. ...Intersubjectvely testable claims [...] constitute public knowledge.
2. Intersubjectively testable claims, if true, constitute actual or potential public knowledge.

(1) is substantially false, and it seems that you now recognize this. The reason (1) and (2) are drastically different is because public knowledge and potential public knowledge are two very different things. Intersubjective testability does not get you to public knowledge. It gets you to potential public knowledge, but that is a long ways from public knowledge! So this is another example of the way you are conflating these terms.

And again, you try to use aspersion instead of argument; "I would be surprised if you yourself have any rigorous idea of what you mean by public knowledge". — Janus

Well, go ahead and tell us what you mean by it.


(Out for a few days... Your next reply might be the last word on this.)

What if there were no living things in the world, and evolution never created any new form of consciousness? — schopenhauer1

'What if you weren't here to ask me a question, and I weren't here to answer it?' :roll:

It's not even a hypothetical.

Don’t play stupid. I’m pretty sure you know what I’m asking. It has to do with Thing in itself. If there are no animals…what is the implication for Buddhism? What is the implication for how Buddhism views existing itself?

Don’t play stupid. — schopenhauer1

Well, ask a stupid question....

Anyway, what was it that prompted that question? You said:

I get the way Buddhist concepts are about the idea that this is an "illusion" etc. It's doublespeak. — schopenhauer1

What does that refer to? If you explain that, I might understand what you were asking.

The dispute about intersubjective validation started when I made the claim that what Buddhists call 'higher states' can be validated inter-subjectively, i.e. if you're part of a community of discourse in which such states are understood, then there will be others who know what you mean, and also spiritual elders who understand the stages and so on - as @Leontiskos eloquently re-stated in a later post.

I was intending to point out that such forms of understanding are not just to be dismissed as 'mystical or spiritual', a categorisation which I claim is a cultural bias. It's due to the way we as a culture 'divide up' or understand experience.

Janus' response was:

The way I look at there is direct observation which can be personally inter-experentially and publicly intersubjectevly confirmed. such as there is a tree next to the end of the shed, water boils at 100 degrees C, it is raining here and now and countless other examples of observation of the phenomenal world which yield all our discursive or propositional knowledge.

Then there is mathematics and logic.

Then there are beliefs about what cannot be confirmed by observation, mathematics or logic; that is those things we take just on faith. — Janus

Then I said, this is basically empiricism (or scientific empiricism):

You're appealing to sense-experience, empirical observation, or whatever you want to call it. At least be clear about that.
— Wayfarer

I am not appealing to anything, rather I'm just saying that what is usually counted as knowable in the intersubjective sense is what is confirmable by publicly available observations, mathematics or logic. — Janus

So, Janus denies appealing to empiricist principles while at the same time insisting on empiricist principles. That's where the confusion lies.

The point is that not everyone is equally worth talking to, and not everyone is equally capable of discussing certain subjects. — Leontiskos

Yes, you're right and it seems you are one of those.

So, Janus denies appealing to empiricist principles while at the same time insisting on empiricist principles. That's where the confusion lies. — Wayfarer

I've outlined the ways that knowledge claims may be tested, by observation, mathematical operations and logic. Can you think of any others? How shall we test the claim that the Buddha was enlightened; just outline the methodology. I believe you know you can't and you just don't want to admit it.

I'm rapidly losing interest in trying to engage with those who are intellectually dishonest and can't see past their own agendas.

I'm rapidly losing interest in trying to engage with those who are intellectually dishonest and can't see past their own agendas. — Janus

More ad hominems, then.

How shall we test the claim that the Buddha was enlightened; just outline the methodology. I believe you know you can't and you just don't want to admit it. — Janus

I’ll put that aside, to venture an answer: learning by doing. But I don’t think the question ‘was the Buddha enlightened?’ is really at issue in the debate. The question is epistemological, what are valid means of knowledge, and my claim was simply that the Buddhist tradition, as an example, does provide a means of testing, finding out, exploring the validity of its methods and claims, which shouldn’t be dismissed simply as ‘mystical and spiritual’. Why not? Well, I know that Stephen Bachelor, a well-known proponent of secular Buddhism, denies that the Buddha was a mystic at all, and I also know that the term ‘spiritual’ is alien to the Buddhist tradition. I’m attempting to establish the theoretically factual basis for there being ‘a blissful escape’, which is the point at issue.

I’ll put that aside, to venture an answer: learning by doing. But I don’t think the question ‘was the Buddha enlightened?’ is really at issue in the debate. The question is epistemological, what are valid means of knowledge, and my claim was simply that the Buddhist tradition, as an example, does provide a means of testing, finding out, exploring the validity of its methods and claims, which shouldn’t be dismissed simply as ‘mystical and spiritual’. Why not? Well, I know that Stephen Bachelor, a well-known proponent of secular Buddhism, denies that the Buddha was a mystic at all, and I also know that the term ‘spiritual’ is alien to the Buddhist tradition. I’m attempting to establish the theoretically factual basis for there being ‘a blissful escape’, which is the point at issue. — Wayfarer

As you should know from past exchanges, I am well familiar with Stephen Bachelor's secular Buddhism, having read several of his books, and as I have said at least a few times to you, I agree with his approach. So, I have no issue with the idea that through certain practices altered states can be realized; I said as much a few posts ago, when I highlighted the distinction between knowing that and knowing how.

Of course, if you learn to alter your consciousness through meditation then you have acquired know-how, but my point has been all along that on account of an altered state of consciousness you cannot claim to know any metaphysical truth.

As I see it "a blissful escape" can be attained via several means: activities that might lead to flow states, to present centered awareness, the eternity of the now. You should know well enough by now I have no argument with any of that. I have never said that states of consciousness are matters of faith, but that any metaphysical conclusions you might draw from them are.

After all this time I still have no idea what exactly it is about my position that you actually disagree with.

As I see it "a blissful escape" can be attained via several means: activities that might lead to flow states, to present centered awareness… — Janus

It is, perhaps, an infelicitous term. I don’t think the goal of either Buddhism or Schopenhauer is being ‘blissed out’ or attaining a ‘meditative high’. What is at issue is not just subjective, even if it is something that can only be known first-person. But you willl say, sure, you can have great feelings, you can ‘alter your consciousness’ - but it can’t amount to knowledge, as it doesn’t meet empirical standards. Is that right?

It is, perhaps, an infelicitous term. I don’t think the goal of either Buddhism or Schopenhauer is being ‘blissed out’ or attaining a ‘meditative high’. What is at issue is not just subjective, even if it is something that can only be known first-person. But you willl say, sure, you can have great feelings, you can ‘alter your consciousness’ - but it can’t amount to knowledge, as it doesn’t meet empirical standards. Is that right? — Wayfarer

I don't think of it in terms of having "blissful feelings" but in terms of being at peace, in a state of acceptance, not anxious about imagined possibilities, being present, not thinking about the past or the future, or about death, being free to create or just to be, however the spirit moves: so, simply in a state where things flow smoothly.

Of course, this can only be known "first person" but it is really, for me at least, when the sense of the "person' is not there at all. The sense of the person is always 'me in relation to others'; this is what I want to be free from. Not free from caring about others, but free from what I might imagine others think of me. I think the unfreedom of such egoic concerns is what Sartre meant when he wrote: "Hell is other people".

This can be cultivated, but it is not a matter of knowing that anything is the case; rather it is knowing how to be, of accepting that I do not really know what the case is. So it does "amount to knowledge" in that sense, and empirical standards have nothing to do with it. I just don't believe that metaphysical claims that the nature of reality can be known in these states are valid. I might feel like I know the nature of reality, but I think that is just an idea that accompanies a profound sense of insight, the details or implications of which I really don't know or understand.

Put another way, experience, even ordinary everyday experience is really ineffable, all our words and thoughts are a kind of overlay' so not to be taken too seriously. We are not going to be able to think ourselves there. There is nothing more important than how we live this life. That's my take anyway.

:up:

I might feel like I know the nature of reality, but I think that is just an idea that accompanies a profound sense of insight, the details or implications of which I really don't know or understand. — Janus

:pray: I respect your honesty in grappling with these questions. What it seems to me that you're saying that you have intuitive insights that the ego/self can't deal with.

Last night I watched a presentation on Lacan which featured this slide:



I think in these kinds of debates, we're coming up against that 'invisible order' and that this influences what you're saying about what does and what doesn't constitute valid philosophical insight. The examples you gave of what you call 'direct observation' all refer to sense-able phenomena, things that can be objectively seen and measured, and then maths and logic. You're appealing to those as rules - that's the 'network of rules and meanings'. But there's also an insight, which is neither strictly empirical nor mathematical, which you first acknowledge but then appear to deny. As I said, I get it. Hard questions. Schopenhauer himself spent considerably time and energy grappling with them.

If it is only grounded in intuition, it may or may not be true, but how would you go about determining that, or demonstrating its truth or falsity? That is what you need to show. — Janus

I think a leap of faith is required. There is no external guarantee - I can't show it.* There are many risks, and there is plenty of potential for self-delusion. Comes with the territory. Krishnamurti's 'pathless land' is often quoted but few mention the final sentence of the leading paragraph - 'If you would attain to the mountain-top you must pass through the valley, climb the steeps, unafraid of the dangerous precipices.'

--------

* There's another unspoken factor here. The term for the Hindu philosophical systems is 'darshana', meaning 'a seeing'. An audience with a sage/teacher/guru is a darshan. A meeting with a great teacher may convey an understanding impossible to put into words. That would be a 'showing' or 'seeing' which might convey the gist. A canonical example from Buddhism would be the Flower Sermon. Of course, all of this is in the domain of revealed religion, so properly speaking taboo on this forum.

I think in these kinds of debates, we're coming up against that 'invisible order' and that this influences what you're saying about what does and what doesn't constitute valid philosophical insight. The examples you gave of what you call 'direct observation' all refer to sense-able phenomena, things that can be objectively seen and measured, and then maths and logic. You're appealing to those as rules - that's the 'network of rules and meanings'. But there's also an insight, which is neither strictly empirical nor mathematical, which you first acknowledge but then appear to deny. As I said, I get it. Hard questions. Schopenhauer himself spent considerably time and energy grappling with them. — Wayfarer

I think this is right. I don't see the "invisible order" as being the "symbolic dimension", though, as Zizek , following Lacan, seems to be saying. I don't think reality, what we see as reality, is socially constructed, but rather socially mediated. As I've said more than a few times, I think animals "see as" just as we do. and I don't think primal language, and its later transformation into written, pictographic and symbolic language as well as visual representation, would have been possible without the seminal "seeing as". Of course, all of this is just my opinion, what seems most plausible to me, my personal faith: I can't prove any of it is so.

I also agree with you about what you seem to be implying: the wordless insight. So, I do acknowledge it and only deny its literal word aptitude. Evocation, invocation, metaphor, parable in art, poetry, literature and scripture I don't deny but revere most of all.

I think a leap of faith is required. There is no external guarantee - I can't show it.* There are many risks, and there is plenty of potential for self-delusion. Comes with the territory. Krishnamurti's 'pathless land' is often quoted but few mention the final sentence of the leading paragraph - 'If you would attain to the mountain-top you must pass through the valley, climb the steeps, unafraid of the dangerous precipices.' — Wayfarer

Exactly, the leap of faith...nothing creative can be done without that most important element. "Though I walk in the valley of the shadow of death, I shall fear no evil".

There's another unspoken factor here. The terms for all the Indian philosophical systems are 'darshana', meaning 'a seeing'. An audience with a sage/teacher/guru is a darshan. A meeting with a great teacher may convey an understanding impossible to put into words. That would be a 'showing' or 'seeing' which might convey the gist. A canonical example from Buddhism would be the Flower Sermon. Of course, all of this is in the domain of revealed religion, so properly speaking taboo on this forum. — Wayfarer

As I think you know, I have always been drawn to Zen and I think showing what cannot be said is its essence, with the Flower Sermon being understood as its seminal moment. In terms of poetry, the great Haikus of Basho, Buson and Issa (as translated and commented on by R H Blyth) have been a lasting influence.

I don't think you and I are as far apart as it may sometimes seem. :smile:

What does that refer to? If you explain that, I might understand what you were asking. — Wayfarer

You need a consciousness. No animals, no consciousness. Whence consciousness? This is that paradox of the first mind and ancestral statements, etc. The idealist always needs this in the equation.

There is no need for escape if there's no consciousness to escape with/from. But the doublespeak is saying that there never was a time without mind. This is the doublespeak I guess:

The former is mere absence, or the negation of the existence of some particular; the latter is the absence of specificity of the unmanifest/unborn/uncreated. It is not 'a thing' - neither this nor that ('neti, neti') but is also not mere absence or non-existence. — Wayfarer

It speaks of being "uncreated/unborn", but the way through this understanding is through physically "being born". You can say that I take a naive view of "born" then, but there is the doublespeak.

You hold onto nirvana itself as a desire, you desire enough that you will let the suffering continue so you can have nirvana. But the wrong-headed thinking you accuse me of, I can say back at what you are saying. That is to say, you need to have the "problem" to "fix the problem". And of course, for your philosophy to work, there can be no other way to solve "the problem" than your solution. And your solution needs people to be born so they can solve the problem with your solution.

But here there is an escape. Don't start the problem. The end. There is no, "But wait!.. You aren't getting rid of the unborn cycles of karmic blah blah and such and such". That is post-facto defense to keep the desire for the solution relevant and necessary.

It reminds me of this simple answer to a supposedly hard haiku-type question:

Added more to the above.

I don't think you and I are as far apart as it may sometimes seem — Janus

We get along fine when you don't pull your A J Ayer shtick :razz:

That is post-facto defense — schopenhauer1

The reality of existence is not a word game or polemical gambit.

The reality of existence is not a word game or polemical gambit. — Wayfarer

But I am refuting the metaphysical premise that there will always be representation. Representation without animal minds is not possible. So your move is to say mind is somewhere not in animals. This is always the paradox Schopenhauer and idealists and perhaps Buddhists must contend with. Otherwise, the “nihilistic” solution of passively not procreating would technically end suffering within a generation for the animal who has self awareness about this. That is to say, the unborn truly is being never born. That ends the cycle.

But this is too physiological an answer. You need it to be something that can’t be solved in such a straightforward way. So bring on ideas of karmic eternal recurrence and all that.

We get along fine when you don't pull your A J Ayer shtick :razz: — Wayfarer

I think the problem is more that you misunderstand what I say and accuse me of being either an empiricist or a positivist. An empiricist believes that all knowledge comes from the senses; I don't believe that. A positivist thinks all metaphysical statements are worthless or meaningless; I don't believe that either.

Did you stop responding? Just to go over where I left off:

But I am refuting the metaphysical premise that there will always be representation. Representation without animal minds is not possible. So your move is to say mind is somewhere not in animals. This is always the paradox Schopenhauer and idealists and perhaps Buddhists must contend with. Otherwise, the “nihilistic” solution of passively not procreating would technically end suffering within a generation for the animal who has self awareness about this. That is to say, the unborn truly is being never born. That ends the cycle.

But this is too physiological an answer. You need it to be something that can’t be solved in such a straightforward way. So bring on ideas of karmic eternal recurrence and all that. — schopenhauer1

To provide some alternative, there is the notion of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) that Tononi worked on. So according to him, he says that it is possible to measure a system's "consciousness" by a function called "phi" that he derived. These systems may be non-animal. Even a thermostat, according to this theory may have some degree of "phi" I guess.

I am not sure how that answers the question any better than other materialist answers that have a hidden dualism or fall into the homunculus fallacy.

That is to say, just because I criticize idealism, doesn't mean I don't criticize materialist approaches.

I think the problem is more that you misunderstand what I say and accuse me of being either an empiricist or a positivist. — Janus

Only based on your statements which frequently suggest those associations. Seems more likely to me that you are not aware of those own tendencies in your own statements.

I’m away from desk, I am intending to reply

Only based on your statements which frequently suggest those associations. Seems more likely to me that you are not aware of those own tendencies in your own statements. — Wayfarer

Those associations are yours, not mine; I am well familiar with both empiricism and positivism and although I think there is some truth in both of those positions I don't think they are the whole story.

For example, both Wittgenstein and Popper were associated with and admired by the logical positivists, but both distanced themselves from the Vienna Circle. As I remember Wittgenstein of the Tractatus period rejected the idea that everything that is worth knowing can be explained by science and although he agreed that metaphysical propositions are literally nonsense, in the sense of being non-sense, he saw the arts and literature as being infused with the spirit that animates the questions of metaphysics.

Popper disagreed with the idea that metaphysical speculation is of no use to scientific practice, and he believed, rightly, I think and as history itself attests, that metaphysical ideas may stimulate interest which opens up new avenues of scientific investigation. Think Newton and Kepler for examples.

Also, I don't believe all knowledge comes from the senses, I think we also know things simply on account of being embodied within a world, and also language itself vastly opens up the scope of what can be known. Another point is that we can know in new ways, via thinking through novel concepts, and these new ways of knowing may not be falsifiable or consist in knowing that anything is the case, but they are forms of know-how akin to knowing how to play music, paint or write poetry.

But I am refuting the metaphysical premise that there will always be representation. Representation without animal minds is not possible. So your move is to say mind is somewhere not in animals. This is always the paradox Schopenhauer and idealists and perhaps Buddhists must contend with. Otherwise, the “nihilistic” solution of passively not procreating would technically end suffering within a generation for the animal who has self awareness about this. That is to say, the unborn truly is being never born. That ends the cycle. — schopenhauer1

1. My take is that Zapfe and Benatar (not sure I've spelled them correctly) are materialist philosophers - and if you're nothing other than a physical body, then when the body dies it's all over, that is the end of it. If nonbeing or nonexistence is the final end, then that is all there is to it. There is no 'problem of existence' to solve if you don't exist!

I don't know where Schopenhauer stood on the question of life after death, but I'm sure he would not envisage any such state as 'eternal life' or an immortal soul. But he also hints that the attempt to escape from the sufferings of life through suicide cannot be successful. The relevant passage is

someone who is oppressed by the burdens of life, who certainly desires life and affirms it, but detests its sufferings and in particular does not want to put up with the difficult lot that has fallen to him any longer: a person like this cannot hope for liberation in death, and cannot save himself through suicide; the temptation of cool, dark Orcus (i.e. 'underworld' in Roman mythology) as a haven of peace is just a false illusion. The earth turns from day into night; the individual dies: but the sun itself burns its eternal noontime without pause. For the will to life, life is a certainty: the form of life is the endless present; it does not matter how individuals, appearances of the Idea, come into existence in time and pass away like fleeting dreams. — WWR§54

As the will is what is eternal, I guess this means that it will always find a way to be born, and, insofar as we identify with it, we will be carried along with the tide. Unless you're truly de-coupled from that urge - which S. says is the aim of asceticism - then you haven't succeeded in any real liberation.

2. As far as Buddhism is concerned, the two 'erroneous views' of life are nihilism, on the one side, and eternalism, on the other. Nihilism is not hard to explain - it's the view of materialists, for whom there are no consequences ('fruits') of actions after this life, the 'body returns to the elements'. There are many variations of nihilism given in the texts (Buddhists love lists and compendiums) which include the 'belief that life is due to fortuitous causes', for instance. (From the Buddhist point of view, many modern people are nihilist.) 'Eternalism' is a rather more difficult idea to convey, but my interpretation (and I did do a postgrad thesis on it) is that it is the idea that through meritorious actions, one can be reborn in fortuitous circumstances forever - that is, always continue to enjoy fortunate rebirths. (In the social context in which the Buddha lived and taught, there was an existing acceptance of re-birth, and also, it is said, ascetics who were able to recall previous lives.) 'Eternalism' is also associated with the idea of there being an unchanging essence (often described as 'soul', although I question that), whereas everything knowable is always subject to change (the well-known impermanence, anicca, of Buddhism.) So eternalism is the idea that there is an always-existing entity that can go on forever.

But nibbana (Nirvāṇa) is neither ceasing to exist, nor continuing to exist. Both of those, at root, are desires - the desire not to be (because of the burdensome nature of life) or the desire to continue to be (because of the pleasurable nature of life). So those drives are, at root, hatred or aversion, and desire or attachment (two of the 'three poisons', the third being stupidity or delusion. However, it should be mentioned that the canonical text which describes all this is the longest text in the Pali canon and these are obviously deep and recondite matters of Buddhist doctrine.)

3. As for the nature of mind - this is obviously a very deep philosophical question. But overall, this is where I find myself most in agreement with Schopenhauer - that objects exists for subjects. I've thrashed it out in any number of thread here over many years, so I'll just try and present a very short version. You will object, 'but surely this entails that the Universe didn't exist before living subjects. How can you justify that, when we know that living organisms, especially sentient organisms, are very recent arrivals?'

My answer to that is that: no, the world does not exist outside our perception of it - but neither does it not exist. 'Existence' is a compounded or complex term, describing that which comprises objects of perception and also our cognitive systems which assimilate information from the environment and generate our sense of the world, and which provides the cognitive framework within which the very idea of existence is meaningful. (Hence, 'world as Idea'.) That sense of the world is the world. It's no use asking, 'what happens to it, if we don't exist', because we cannot but conceive of it, or of anything, in the absence of that, nor can we really get outside of that to see it as it would be with no observer whatever. None of which negates the empirical fact that your or my consciousness only came into existence in very recent times. (I know this is a right can'o'worms, but there it is.)