Sounds nice, but is problematic. If you don't know what you are looking for, it will "find" you eventually and is necessary in so far as you have questions that seek elucidation.

Even if you know what you are looking for, you may not know what about it is making you curious.

And where are such principles to be sought? — Quixodian

You have the searchable CPR, so for your own sake, check out “Of Reason in General”, around A299/B356 or so. For your own sake because I probably won’t explain it worth a damn.

Briefly and hopefully somewhat coherently, principles are to be sought in reason rather than understanding, because principles, while synthetic cognitions a priori, do not apply directly to experience as understanding does in the unity of phenomena according to rules. The point being to distinguish a cognition employed as a principle, which understanding can do, from a cognition that is a principle, which it cannot. In the Kantian tripartite logical system, sequentially understanding, judgement, reason, and, synthetic a priori cognitions barred from either of the first two, and at the same time being absolutely necessary for syllogistic reasoning, reason is the only faculty capable of them, and makes them the criteria for being principles.

Thanks for not asking what they are. Dodged a serious bullet right there, no doubt.

:up: :clap:

So we likely have different cognitive faculties working in different domains of life, with one that overlaps on both of them, the notion of "truth". — Manuel

I can see that. Technically, we might say one is the aesthetic domain, one is the discursive domain, truth overlapping both, from pure practical reason in the first, pure speculative reason in the second. In the first, the truth is in the form of subjective principles called maxims, in accordance with laws of the will, in the second truth is the correspondence of cognition with its object in accordance with mere rules of the understanding.

General Relativity is, once established, considerably easier to verify. — Manuel

Considerably easier to verify, but not going to be ever entirely proven by direct experience. I mean….what’s the chance of attaining the SOL or entering a black hole? That’s where the equations lead, right? Gotta do the extremes in order to nullify the principle of induction. The Twins Paradox, however, witnessing that is within reach here pretty soon, I bet.

Tell me a little about Sellar’s Images? And how it relates?

Fun times at ridgemont high.

That's an enticing frame. It would seem, however that when it comes to a simple object like a stick this could make sense. But how does one apply this to more complex notions of truth in human life - morality, politics, art? Is it possible to see every possible perspective and how does one unify this, or not? How many possible perspectives are there and does truth become meaningless when it is prodigiously multifaceted? Thoughts? — Tom Storm

Yes you ask some probing questions. I might reply in more depth when I have the time to think it over, but a quick reply to one of the question you asked.

In terms of morality, this could be seen as a an extension to Rawl's veil of ignorance. Instead of not knowing your place in society, you have the perspective of every place in society. That which you would do if you had the combined perspective of everyone in society, is the moral thing to do. Just food for thought.

So, I've read most if not all of your comments. Thank you for interacting & communicating.

To me, it seems that truth is a human phenomenon. It is something created by human brains and therefore linked to human experiences. Without humans no truth.

Any thoughts?

That which you would do if you had the combined perspective of everyone in society, is the moral thing to do. Just food for thought. — PhilosophyRunner

I think there's merit in Rawls thought experiment. The only thing I wonder about it is that it doesn't teach morality so much as use self-interest as an organising principle.

if "truth" can be taken as "that which exists" the fiction, imagination, creativity, objectivity and subjectivity and fact are all subsets of that which is true - that whuhc exists as a concept and or physical thing/property in some form of relationship to one another. Relationships and associations also exist - and thus are also subsets of the truth (the sum total of all that can and or does/did/ ever will, exist.

Actually, it's not making the mistake, so much as pointing out the mistake. I think the same can be said with the other passages I mentioned (although of course to really verify that would mean going back and looking at them in context.) I agree with every word in your cited text, but then it does capture the critical Kantian point. (I also note how thoroughly the phrase 'the view from nowhere' has become part of the lexicon, thanks to Thomas Nagel, I think.)

Makes sense to me. Context is tricky in that way.

So when you say 'there is no reason to think that objectivity is actually equivalent with truth', then you're articulating the critical attitude, not the attitude of those for whom there is no criterion of truth other than objectivity - that being the naive realist!

Well this is the other tricky part. The direct realist is not necessarily the naive realist. My biggest gripe with many versions of indirect realism is that they seem to assume that "we" exist, sitting somewhere inside our heads, to view images created by some sort of unconscious "representation creation apparatus." But cognitive science doesn't favor such a homuncular explanation; there is no "consciousness center" that has all sensory information flowing to it. Rather, there is a lot of parallel processing and interconnectedness at every step of perception. Moreover, what we're consciously aware of depends heavily on what we're paying attention too, so the elements of incoming sensory data that gets "represented to" consciousness varies quite a bit. This makes it seem more like we are the representation more than being something that observes it.

And I can see an argument for a more direct form of realism that says that, while of course one doesn't think without a mind of see without eyes, what we experience is nature, of which we are a part. Indirect realism then draws a false distinction between representation and the "I" that experiences the representation on the one hand, and the mind and nature on the other.

Plus, if things exist through their interactions with other things, relationally, then our knowledge of a thing is part of its being (and ours).

As Big Heg puts it:

Suppose we call knowledge the notion, and the essence or truth “being” or the object, then the examination consists in seeing whether the notion corresponds with the object. But if we call the inner nature of the object, or what it is in itself, the notion, and, on the other side, understand by object the notion qua object, i.e. the way the notion is for an other, then the examination consists in our seeing whether the object corresponds to its own notion. It is clear, of course, that both of these processes are the same. The essential fact, however, to be borne in mind throughout the whole inquiry is that both these moments, notion and object, “being for another” and “being in itself”, themselves fall within that knowledge which we are examining...

But not only in this respect, that notion and object, the criterion and what is to be tested, are ready to hand in consciousness itself, is any addition of ours superfluous, but we are also spared the trouble of comparing these two and of making an examination in the strict sense of the term; so that in this respect, too, since consciousness tests and examines itself, all we are left to do is simply and solely to look on. For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what to it is true, and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth. Since both are for the same consciousness, it is itself their comparison; it is the same consciousness that decides and knows whether its knowledge of the object corresponds with this object or not. The object, it is true, appears only to be in such wise for consciousness as consciousness knows it. Consciousness does not seem able to get, so to say, behind it as it is, not for consciousness, but in itself, and consequently seems also unable to test knowledge by it. But just because consciousness has, in general, knowledge of an object, there is already present the distinction that the inherent nature, what the object is in itself, is one thing to consciousness, while knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness, is another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examination turns. Should both, when thus compared, not correspond, consciousness seems bound to alter its knowledge, in order to make it fit the object. But in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself also, in point of fact, is altered; for the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object; with change in the knowledge, the object also becomes different, since it belonged essentially to this knowledge.

Or as Harris puts it more readably:

The truth of absolute cognition is rather that "experience" is actual and objective, while the unchangeable absolute object is the concept of subjective rationality; and since it is absolute and unchangeable this truth of absolute cognition enforces itself in the obstinately inverted concept that natural consciousness has of its cognition, by continually driving it to despair, and so to the experience of self-inversion. Only when the identity of the actual and the rational is fully grasped--only when we finally see that "experience" is objective and the "object" is our subjective concept--only then will the concept of truth as experience, and experience as truth, finally comprehend itself.


Thus the seemingly insoluble difficulty created by the fact that consciousness cannot "get behind the object as it is for consciousness" and test its knowledge of the object by the standard of "how the object is in itself" is a pseudo-problem created by our looking at things the wrong way round. Knowledge of the object is "for us" another moment.

" there is no "consciousness center" that has all sensory information flowing to it. Rather, there is a lot of parallel processing and interconnectedness at every step of perception."

But there is still an overarching mind that makes judgements about what constitutes truth or not.

Which points towards coherence, rather than correspondence. — Wayfarer

I think it would be both coherence and correspondence within our experience. It seems to me that if by 'the world' is meant 'the world as experienced' then there is no problem with correspondence. To claim that what we say could correspond to something not within our experience seems somewhat strange to say the least.

On the other hand, I think we can safely say that our actual or possible experience does not encompass all that is or was, without making any claims about what is or was not included in our experience.

1. All we ever have is beliefs. — plaque flag

Ha, is that so? Is it true? Or is it just your belief? And if it is just a belief of yours, why should we pay it any attention? And if you believe it, don't you by that very fact believe that it is true?

We do differentiate between what folk believe and what is true. A pragmatic account such as you present loses this distinction.

What is truth (and what isn't?) — Kevin Tan

I suggest you already have quite a good understanding of how to use the word "true" correctly but that you begin to have trouble when you try to articulate rules for using "true".

You might forgive me for being somewhat formal, but one way to set out what "...is true" does is found in a very simple construction, the T-sentence. Take an arbitrary sentence, say "The beans are cooking". That sentence will be true precisely in the case that the beans are indeed cooking. We can write:

"The beans are cooking" is true if and only if the beans are cooking.

Notice that on the left hand side, the sentence "The beans are cooking" is being talked about, but on the right hand side it is being used.

Pick another sentence, this time one that is false: "London is the capital of France". We can write

"London is the capital of France" is true if and only if London is the capital of France.

It looks odd, but consider it careful, and you will see that it is true. London is not the capital of France, but if it where, then "London is the capital of France" would be true.

Generalising this, for any sentence you might choose - let's call it "p" - we can write what's called a "T-sentence":

"p" is true if and only if p

...where what we do is write any sentence we like in to the place occupied by p.

A couple of other points. Notice that this works for sentences, and not for other uses of "...is true" like "The bench top is true" or "Jeff is true to his friends". And notice also how little this tells us about truth. Other definitions will say that truth is this or that, and provide profound expositions - philosophers call these the classical or sometimes the substantive theories. What these have in common is that they are wrong. The T-sentence approach, and others related to it, downplay the import of "truth", saying it is a performance or it is redundant or that it needs to be deflated.

One final point. Notice the difference between "what is truth?" and "which sentences are true?" Your OP asked the former. The latter is much harder, and there is good reason to think no general answer can be given.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/#TarTheTru
And yes, to those who have been here before, there are complications, but the first step is to move away from substantive approaches to the issue. Lies to children.

I do not totally buy into a deflationary account of truth. However, I do think our epistemology must necessarily be fallibilist (we may always be mistaken, even seemingly secure truths may look different when seen from another light) and circular (we must base our knowledge claims on other knowledge claims, there is no way to build an absolute foundation for knowledge). — Count Timothy von Icarus

A good series of posts.

But I'll take issue with this bit. It's what I do. Don't feel obligated to reply.

I gave a brief intro to deflation above. I think these the most useful accounts of truth.

I think that an over reliance on fallibilism comes about from considering too few examples. Usually those from the sciences.

First, it's true that the bishop stays on her own colour squares on the chessboard. There - there are truths. One can deduce that she stays on her own colour squares from her initial position and the rules of chess.

Suppose that you got half way through a game, and you protest when your opponent moved the Red Bishop to a black square. "But," your fallibilist opponent says, "Your theory that the Bishop always stays on her own colour is subject to fallibility; indeed, my move disproves that theory!"

Would you acquiesce? I think not. Fallibilism has little to do in this situation.

Sure, but I'm not sure what that has to do with the homuncular elements of indirect realism, i.e., the conception that we experience the world by "watching, hearing, etc." representations and thinking about them. Of course we have an experience of an overarching mind. Then again, a lot of evidence suggests this "unified whole," is a lot less unified than we suppose, the result of cognitive blind spots. This idea has been around in philosophy for a while too: Hume's "bundle of sensations," Nietzsche's "congress of souls," Buddhist anattā, Blind Brain Theory, and is built off experiments with split brained individuals, blindsight, etc.

The second side of arguments against indirect realism argue that they simply throw up a false dichotomy between experience nature. Nature is "out there," while representation is "in here," and representation is directly accessible. It's the old Kantian dualism, perhaps now framed as only an epistemic dualism. But where is the delineating line here? Does representation start at the retina? But photoreceptors do their thing the same way even if they have been removed from the animal they are a part of or are grown in isolation.

So the renewed view on direct realism mostly is about whether the indirect part of indirect realism is actually useful for understanding sensory systems at all. While at the same time there is the question "in what way does it make sense to attempt to separate things in this way in the first place."

What Hegel is saying in the quotes is that, the very idea that "here is my image of the tree, and out there is the tree in itself," is a moment, a representation, that occurs within consciousness, for consciousness. There is no such divide outside consciousness. If you look at mechanistic accounts of neuroscience for instance, you're seeing the same causal processes and information flowing in the same ways "inside" and "outside." That the brain is "doing information processing," is completely unexceptional in the information theoretic conceptions of physics, and neither is the essentially relational nature of the interactions; these principles show up everywhere.

While I absolutely agree with your example being a sort of special case, I think it is special for different reasons. It is a case where we can say "given A, B, C, D... Z," where that gives us a fully enumerated set of rules, the game works like "this." But that's because we are taking the rules as axiomatic, infallible to change or challenge regardless of changing states of affairs in the world.

Since, in any deduction, the information in the conclusion must be in the premises, these sorts of special cases amount to cases where: "given X is true, x must be true."

But of course some Chess rules do vairy by locale, the 3/6 rule, the hand-piece move, etc., because Chess is an actual game in the world.

Since Chess has had its rules radically changed over the centuries, I don't think it's impossible that they'll keep changing, but the game will still be Chess, just like basketball will still be basketball if they ever add the four point line they have tested.

We can be fallible about Chess because people might play differently in different areas. This happens all the time with Monopoly, which I feel like everyone plays slightly different. When I was a kid we used to play Chess in school, but we had it so you could capture the king if someone neglected to move out of check. I told them this wasn't legal, but no one liked victory by checkmate because it made games last too long. So local Chess there involved capturing the king (which Chess used to allow anyhow).

USCF actually does have slightly different rules than FIDE, and FIDE has found itself forced to do moratoriums on changing the rules of Chess as recently as the 80s and rules do still change, although these tend to be not very important for low level players. FIDE actually tried and gave up on developing a universal set of rules that wouldn't vary by region and interpretation of translations of their rules.

Division by zero flipping from being infinite to undefined, while still remaining infinite in some use cases and coding languages is another such a example where the formalism seems rigid until it isn't.

I think there's merit in Rawls thought experiment. The only thing I wonder about it is that it doesn't teach morality so much as use self-interest as an organising principle. — Tom Storm

I see a similarity between the physical and moral example I gave, in terms of how we go about learning abut the world. I stand on the side of a pond, looking at a partially submerged stick. It appears to me the stick is bent. I come up with a theory that water bends sticks - a theory that explains what I perceive.

However I can do better. I can move around and look at the stick from many different angles, from under water, I can feel the stick with my hands, etc. I can then come up with a theory that explains what I perceive from all these views, which is refraction.

I would say the theory I came up with from many views (refraction) is superior to that I came up with from one view (water bent the stick).

Similarly, I can consider whether an action is moral from my viewpoint, and come up with a moral theory to explain this. However, if I were to consider the same action from everyone's viewpoint, then I would come up with a superior moral theory that just my viewpoint.

In both cases, perhaps the view from many viewpoints is a superior view to that from only one viewpoint.

In neither case am I teaching physical or moral behavior, rather in both I'm trying to understand physical and moral behavior.

Interesting topic.

There's no single thing that can be called "truth". There are different kinds of "truths" depending on what you are examining and from what aspect you are examining and wish to find if it is true or not. And the best way to get an idea about the concept of truth is to start with how the terms "true" and "truth" are applied to situations in life and compare it with its opposite, which is "false", "lie", etc. From there one can generalize to have a better idea of the concept of truth.

So, e.g. if I say "My name is Alkis Piskas", this can be true from one aspect and false from another. It is true that it is my name in this place --I have registered to TPF with that name. Everyone knows and agrees with that. It is a fact. What it might not be true and a fact, though, would be the case that this is not my real name, i.e. in life, the name one can see in my ID card, etc., but it is only an alias name that I use in TPF.
So, we can see already that "truth" is contextual.

Now, if I say "I am not young", it will be true but it won't show my age. Neither would, if I say "I am old", which is also true. What age must one have to be considered "old"? So, another characteristic of "truth" is that it can be relative. I might also specify that my age is between 62 and 68, which may be true but it would still leave out my exact age. Then I could say that my age is 66, which may be true, but it still does not indicate my exact age which can be any of the 365 days of the year I was born in. And then we have the hour of the day and so on.
So, another characteristic of "truth" is precision.

Then, I may suppose that I know well my exact age, the day and hour I was born. This would me that I know the truth about my age, wouldn't it? Well, what if I am too old or my memory fails me for one or the other reason? Even if I feel I know the truth, I'm actually deceiving myself; I have an illusion about my own age. (Of course I could check my ID card or passport or other pertinent document and find out my exact day of birth, but why should I do that, since I "know" my age? :smile:)
So another characteristic of "truth" is that it is subjective.

And I will stay on this last point, asking a question that we often meet in philosophical discussions: "Is there an objective truth?" (Or some version of it.) Maybe, a more common question is "Is there an objective reality?" Because we often see the terms "reality and "truth" be used alternatively to mean about the same thing. And this brings me closer to the question "What is reality?" For me, reality is what we agree to exist or have happened or is happening. Reality is agreement. It is true and real to me what I consider as true and real. The same thing applies to you. And if we both have the same or a similar viewpoint about something, it means we have the same or a similar reality about it and we more or less agree regarding that something. And on the contrary, if we have a different viewpoint about something, it means that we have a different reality and we disagree about it. This of course is too simple for most people to grasp! :smile: Joking, I mean, to accept.

I could go on, but I think I have covered the subject. Don't you?

Similarly, I can consider whether an action is moral from my viewpoint, and come up with a moral theory to explain this. However, if I were to consider the same action from everyone's viewpoint, then I would come up with a superior moral theory that just my viewpoint.

In both cases, perhaps the view from many viewpoints is a superior view to that from only one viewpoint. — PhilosophyRunner

I'd actually need to see an example of how such a superior moral theory arises in practice to accept this. To me this looks like you are just obtaining a range of perspectives and what's missing is how this leads to an overarching and still coherent moral position. Perhaps you could demonstrate the model in action with an example, say euthanasia?

I would also think that many acts can be called immoral without the need to consult other perspectives. (Although post-modernists might disagree). Take ethnic cleansing. We can say this is morally wrong. But the people who conduct the ethnic cleansing probably think they are doing 'difficult' work that will ultimately improve the world. Would we incorporate this perspective in any final formulation?

You might forgive me for being somewhat formal, but one way to set out what "...is true" does is found in a very simple construction, the T-sentence. Take an arbitrary sentence, say "The beans are cooking". That sentence will be true precisely in the case that the beans are indeed cooking. We can write:
"The beans are cooking" is true if and only if the beans are cooking.
Notice that on the left hand side, the sentence "The beans are cooking" is being talked about, but on the right hand side it is being used.

Pick another sentence, this time one that is false: "London is the capital of France". We can write
"London is the capital of France" is true if and only if London is the capital of France.
It looks odd, but consider it careful, and you will see that it is true. London is not the capital of France, but if it where, then "London is the capital of France" would be true.

Generalising this, for any sentence you might choose - let's call it "p" - we can write what's called a "T-sentence":
"p" is true if and only if p
...where what we do is write any sentence we like in to the place occupied by p.

A couple of other points. Notice that this works for sentences, and not for other uses of "...is true" like "The bench top is true" or "Jeff is true to his friends". And notice also how little this tells us about truth. Other definitions will say that truth is this or that, and provide profound expositions - philosophers call these the classical or sometimes the substantive theories. What these have in common is that they are wrong. The T-sentence approach, and others related to it, downplay the import of "truth", saying it is a performance or it is redundant or that it needs to be deflated.

One final point. Notice the difference between "what is truth?" and "which sentences are true?" Your OP asked the former. The latter is much harder, and there is good reason to think no general answer can be given.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/#TarTheTru
And yes, to those who have been here before, there are complications, but the first step is to move away from substantive approaches to the issue. Lies to children. — Banno

That's helpful and succinctly written. Appreciate it. I read a paper and saw a lecture by Simon Blackburn on the deflationary account of truth and was immediately interested in this approach. Seems to arrest endless theoretical postulations about the 'nature' of truth and gets to the practical business end.

So this approach seems to combine a linguistic account with an empirical account of matters. Is that fair?

How does this apply to claims like, 'it is true that Jesus rose from the dead'? The approach would seem to say this fact is true, if it is true (that JC rose from the dead). But establishing the truth of some claims is fraught. We have no way to verify such a claim. Uses of the word true are all over the place in our culture. Would you say that deflationary truth relies upon an evidentiary approach?

Good questions.

Yeah, I think the deflationary approach tells us a lot about how "truth" works. But what it doesn't do, and what folk want, is not what truth is, but which sentences are true and which are false. As if philosophers could tell us such things.

Philosophers don't know anything that non-philosophers don't know.

But they might help you ask better questions.

So yes, "JC rose from the dead" will be true if and only if JC rose from the dead. This tells you exactly what you need to know in order to know that "JC rose from the dead"; is true; but it does not tell you if JC rose from the dead.

And for that some empirical information would be needed - like seeing Jesus rise from the dead.

But not every such question relies on empirical information. See the chess example above. where it's shown not to be an empirical issue that the Bishop stays on her own colour. Or consider 7+3=9; "7+3=9" is true only if 7+3=9. That's not an empirical fact, but it is true.

And half of the folk who read that will be thinking "But 7+3 isn't 9, so Banno is wrong".

So not evidentiary, so much as truth-conditional. That is, what is on the right hand side sets out the circumstances in which (...exactly when...) the sentence is true. And so if it is true only when certain things are evident, it will be evidentiary.

I think the really important part here is the way this account shows the other accounts hereabouts to be erroneous. So far I've tried to show that for the pragmatic account, but it should also show how the idea that we can throw out truth and just have belief is flawed; or that it's just a feeling; or reality; or some evolved reaction; and so on, through pretty much the whole gamete of BS hereabouts.

But @Frank made another good point, that truth is very basic; so basic that most folk have trouble seeing how basic it is and insist on more complex explanations.

So I'm sorry, but good philosophy will not tell you if Jesus rose from the dead. But I think you knew that.

Cheers.

What is truth (and what isn't?)

Is truth everything objective? Or can subjective things such as memories be truth as well?

Does truth have to be factual or could it be (partially) fictional as well? — Kevin Tan

Truth is judgement about something - proposition, knowledge on facts or situations.
What truth is not, is it is not some solid material object such as drinks or food. That's what I used think. but I was wrong. In some culture, people say truth to mean solutions to their needs or problems. They say, on hot days like this, cold beer is truth.

When one says "Tell me the truth", one is demanding the fact or situation as happened, not distorting it or adding lies or exaggerations into it. You can tell the truth from your knowledge, but whether the other party would accept it as truth, is up to his judgement.

Your past memories can be true to you, if it is vivid and certain. You only know it is truth, and all memories are subjective.
Is truths objective? Can you define what "objective" is?

Well, thanks for the info about Chess. I wasn't aware that Chess.com was not compliant with FIDE.

And so long as we agree that fallibilism is not the whole of epistemology, we have some progress.

I think the really important part here is the way this account shows the other accounts hereabouts to be erroneous. So far I've tried to show that for the pragmatic account, but it should also show how the idea that we can throw out truth and just have belief is flawed; or that it's just a feeling; or reality; or some evolved reaction; and so on, through pretty much the whole gamete of BS hereabouts.

But Frank made another good point, that truth is very basic; so basic that most folk have trouble seeing how basic it is and insist on more complex explanations. — Banno

Nice! Thank you again.

Now, if I say "I am not young", it will be true but it won't show my age. Neither would, if I say "I am old", which is also true. What age must one have to be considered "old"? So, another characteristic of "truth" is that it can be relative. I might also specify that my age is between 62 and 68, which may be true but it would still leave out my exact age. Then I could say that my age is 66, which may be true, but it still does not indicate my exact age which can be any of the 365 days of the year I was born in. And then we have the hour of the day and so on.

So, another characteristic of "truth" is precision..

Interesting. I think a lot of theories of truth tend to deny this to some degree. A proposition is true or it is false. A proposition cannot be neither, and it can't be more of less true, unless we're talking about complex propositions where some percent of the atomic propositions that compose it are true and some false.

I have never liked this explanations though. You can have sets of propositions that are both true, and both describing the same phenomena, but one can have more precision and detail. We could think about this in terms of the more detailed description eliminating more "possible worlds," or in terms of our getting closer to "complete information," about the phenomena, i.e., the point where no future observation of or information about that thing will ever surprise us. This would be a more "the truth is the whole view."

But of course, a good critique of this "holistic" definition is that, because everything is interconnected, the whole truth about anything seems to require the whole truth about everything. Granted, this sort of argument is more often leveled against the idea of causation, but then the "truth is the whole," tends to imply that the cause of a thing is part of the truth of it.

On the other hand you have paraconsistent logics that allow for propositions not to be true or false, which I find enticing as well. After all, does any proposition about who will win the 2024 election actually have a truth value yet? This is going to depend partly on metaphysics and one's philosophy of time. This is fine, but I don't like to see concerns over logical system's rigor driving decisions about metaphysics, which is what I've always felt I was seeing when Russell starts making neo-Eleatic arguments against the reality of change and cause (i.e., he goes after a specific view because it saves the logical project).

Then, I may suppose that I know well my exact age, the day and hour I was born. This would me that I know the truth about my age, wouldn't it? Well, what if I am too old or my memory fails me for one or the other reason? Even if I feel I know the truth, I'm actually deceiving myself; I have an illusion about my own age. (Of course I could check my ID card or passport or other pertinent document and find out my exact day of birth, but why should I do that, since I "know" my age? :smile:)

So another characteristic of "truth" is that it is subjective.

I don't know if I would go along with this, but I would agree that a useful definition of truth requires subjectivity. After all, what does it mean for something to be true as opposed to false outside the context of beliefs? Non-beliefs don't seem like they can be false, and something's being true without falsity being an option seems to make truth a superfluous concept.

And so long as we agree that fallibilism is not the whole of epistemology, we have some progress.

Right. It seems to me outside of radical skepticism on the lines of "maybe I'm having a stroke and my reasoning abilities have gone totally belly up," we can be absolutely confident about the truths of certain things provided we are willing to hold some things constant. I mean, I suppose we could always be afraid of evil demons forcing us to hallucinate certainty, but that seems like a little much.

A proposition is true or it is false. A proposition cannot be neither, and it can't be more of less true, unless we're talking about complex propositions where some percent of the atomic propositions that compose it are true and some false. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Normally, this is true. But there may be cases that a proposition is ambiguous, or incomplete in some way, as I explained. So in these cases --and in general, if a proposition is ambiguous-- we cannot decide about its truth or falsety. I didn't say that a proposition must be always absolute (i.e. non-relative) or precise. Indeed, in philosophy, logical statements is not as precise as in Math.

The following examples will maybe make my point more clear:

• Is the statement "Scorpions have a sting" true? You will most probably answer "Yes". Wrong! "I mean Scorpions the band!" :smile: (Contextual characteristic)
• Me: "I am older than you." You: "But we have the same age!" Me: "Well, I am born one month erlier than you!" (Precision characteristic)

I have never liked this explanations though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I know. Most people don't, as I have mentioned at the end of my message. :smile:
I like to give as many examples as possible (w/o tiring the other person.) The prove points better than staying with abstract ideas and theories. People rarely do the first; they usually do the second. As if it is "safer" that way.

After all, does any proposition about who will win the 2024 election actually have a truth value yet? — Count Timothy von Icarus

A prognostic cannot be true or false. Only what exists or has happened or is happening can. A prognostic is about possibilities and probabilities. It's a guess. One has to wait the situation that is prognosed become an actuality --i.e. true-- or not. Isn't that right?

This is a good opportunity for me to mention what I thought I should, which is, that philosophy does not actually deal with "truths" as an end product, even if truth is considered a central element in philosophy (according to SEP and other). This might shock a lot, but I believe they have to consider the following:
A truth is a fact or something in accordance with fact. A truth can and sometimes has to be proven. Philosophy does not actually prove anything. And when the words "proof" is used, it is used figuratively rather than literally. Philosophy proposes, positions itself and it shows (explains, describes) why things are what they seem to be and how they work. Take e.g. Descartes' "Cogito, ergo sum". He didn't prove the truth of this proposition, he describes why this is so. If he did provide a proof, then there would be no ground for doubt or negation about it. In their turn, those who object to that proposition could not and didn't prove it is false. They also provide explainations and arguments why this proposition does not work. The don't and cannot provide a proof that will render this proposition false.
Proofs belong to Science. Philosophy uses Logic --which does involve truth-- but only as a means. Not as an end.

In fact, all the examples I provided in my previous message where based on logic but they actually didn't have anything to do with philosophy or --if uou like-- they didn't refer esp. to philosophy! :smile:

I don't follow that, TIm.

...we can be absolutely confident about the truths of certain things provided we are willing to hold some things constant. I — Count Timothy von Icarus

You can be absolutely certain that you are a cat, if you like. That doesn't make it true. But the bishop stays on it's own colour, or we cease to be playing chess.

Foundationalist approaches to truth might be seen to work along those lines: by holding certain things to only be true if some "hinge" propositions are held true.

One of the problems with pragmatism might be characterised as a failure to acknowledge the hinges on which it hangs.

The entire idea behind the the radical skeptic's demon though is that they have manipulated you such that you are certain the bishop doesn't change its color, but the bishop actually does change its color. That is, your faculties of deduction have been manipulated.

I don't find this impossible to imagine as I have definitely written code that I'm 100% certain should do one thing based on the rules that are in place, and then, turned out to be doing another thing. Being sure of an answer to a mathematical equation that you actually have wrong would be another such example.

As for Chess, in some article, R. Scott Bakker uses the example of the fact that there can only be one line parallel to another line. This was considered as solid of a fact as the idea that the bishop never moves off its own color. Then we got new forms of geometry.

So, my point would be that we can say "in this specific form of Chess, as defined by these rules/axioms, X is always true," just like we can say that, "given Euclid's axioms, there is only one line parallel to any other line." But in the real world stuff is always more complicated. You could promote a pawn, and your opponent could throw the previously captured black bishop onto a white spot for you, because we reuse pieces in the real world.

The truths we can be sure of are a particular type of truth where all the information about what we can deduce is already included in our premises. But when we move to the real world, we see Chess has a set of rules that are decided socially and which have changed a great deal over time. So our absolute certainty gets relegated to a closed version of the game where the rules don't change.

But when we move to the real world — Count Timothy von Icarus

As if triangles, parallel lines and chess were not real.

There are profound difficulties with approaches that include words such as "absolute". What's the clear distinction between certainty and absolute certainty, between truth and absolute truth? Folk stick words together but that doesn't necessitate meaning. What's the difference between certainty and green certainty? Between truth and pentagonal truth? At the least, if these notions are introduced they had best be given a role to play, one on which we might agree. But the game so often is first to invent the term then look for it's place in the game, and the result is an interminable dialogue - as seen in these forums.

There's also profound problems with the level of scepticism that relies on demons. It's worth pointing out again that doubt requires certainty – doubting that the bishop stays on her own colour relies on colours and bishops and chess and so on; doubting a piece of code relies on code and an expected outcome; doubting the number of sides of a triangle relies on sides.

The demons also indicate an irrational level of solipsism. We will check if your faculties have been compromised by comparing them with our own and those of others. It's not just Chess that has a set of rules that are decidedly social. The whole enterprise is social.

Again, I'd be happy if these considerations induce a small doubt as to the ubiquity of pragmatic epistemology.

I'd be happy if these considerations induce a small doubt as to the ubiquity of pragmatic epistemology. — Banno

I agree.

With your bolded bits too. But that should not be a surprise.

Mostly using this as an opportunity to say that in spite of my various misgivings I'm not a pragmatist, and not even tempted by it.

Cheers.

Again, it's perhaps the problem of considering too few examples that leads our engineering friends to conclude that pragmatism is the whole answer to issues of truth. It underpins their ubiquitous scientism. They come at philosophy from far to narrow a background.

So the task for us might be to get them to see beyond cantilevers and databases.