As the will is what is eternal, I guess this means that it will always find a way to be born, and, insofar as we identify with it, we will be carried along with the tide. Unless you're truly de-coupled from that urge - which S. says is the aim of asceticism - then you haven't succeeded in any real liberation. — Wayfarer

Yes, that is Schop's interpretation more-or-less. Every subject is a manifestation of Will. Even if your subjectivity is gone, subjectivity en toto is still there, striving for its objects in space and time.

But this is where I asked at the beginning what Schop's take is on solipsism. That is to say, if one achieves "nirvana" and quiets the Will for good in oneself, is that quieting the whole Will? That seems to be at odds. That is to say, the reason suicide is no good is because Will Proper still remains even if your will ceases. However, he seems to be saying that with Nirvana, one Will Proper will cease. How is that so? It contradicts his prior point that suicide is not a valid way of ceasing Will Proper because it is only an individual will. So which is it for Schopenhauer?

But nibbana (Nirvāṇa) is neither ceasing to exist, nor continuing to exist. Both of those, at root, are desires - the desire not to be (because of the burdensome nature of life) or the desire to continue to be (because of the pleasurable nature of life). So those drives are, at root, hatred or aversion, and desire or attachment (two of the 'three poisons', the third being stupidity or delusion. However, it should be mentioned that the canonical text which describes all this is the longest text in the Pali canon and these are obviously deep and recondite matters of Buddhist doctrine.) — Wayfarer

But you need a life to exist in order for you to have desire or suffering or dissatisfaction. The problem exists prior to finding a solution out of it. And this is where we disagree most as far as what to do. That is, I think it cannot be denied that we exist first before we desire some sort of sublime state of "unborn" or whatever paradoxical state you want to ascribe to Nirvana. And because you cannot accept ancestrality as legitimate (that there was a time before animals and consciousness), you will say that mind was always in the equation and it is our job to calm it.

But here I can form a more materialistic version of Schopenhauer. That is to say, clearly this seeking Nirvana is always going to be the case. However, there was a time when it wasn't necessary, and presumably there will be a time when it is unnecessary. That is to say, there was a time before humans/animals and a time when humans/animals will go extinct. That negates this "ever present mind" idea that is necessary so that materialist solutions will always be invalid. However, it seems to me that there is a solution. It starts with the already-born recognizing the suffering and simply not starting new individual experiences of that suffering.

Also, the Sangha in Buddhism isn't just utilitarian to get to Nirvana. I see it as like group therapy, or even going to a comedy show, as a cathartic communal endeavor. That is why I advocate for "communal catharsis". That is to say, we understand the plight and recognize it in each other and our situations to help relieve some of the pain and stress. In this conception, it is the idea akin to Hartmann that one can understand about the human condition.

That is to say things like "science, pleasure, tradition, and achievements" are somehow the hopeful carrot-stick that make it all worthwhile. You cannot impute all materialists (so-called "nihilists") with the same brush. In fact, most "nihilists" (as you call them) are more-or-less optimists. Look at Dawkins and all the rest of the popular atheists. They are optimistic about scientific innovation being the height of human achievement and thus a sort of "reason" to exist.. presumably, to have more children, even though we suffer, because "it's worth it" to see these advancements play out and do more research. In other words, Pessimists (like Benatar, Zapffe, Cioran, etc.) are very much out of favor and in the minority, even in the "nihilistic" camp.

That sense of the world is the world. It's no use asking, 'what happens to it, if we don't exist', because we cannot but conceive of it, or of anything, in the absence of that, nor can we really get outside of that to see it as it would be with no observer whatever. None of which negates the empirical fact that your or my consciousness only came into existence in very recent times. (I know this is a right can'o'worms, but there it is.) — Wayfarer

Indeed, and this is a whole philosophy of mind debate in itself.

There may be a view from nowhere without consciousness, because there seems to be an aspect where subject/object is always in the picture. What is a planet "in-itself"? What is a universe "in-itself"? What is a sub-atomic particle "in-itself"? What is a process "in-itself" even?

However, the exact answers for that don't necessarily mean that thus, everything is an eternal X (Will, subjective being, etc.). Rather, it just means, idealism might not be an answer. Also, it seems that it's a necessary component so that Buddhism doesn't collapse into Pessimism. Something like Will needs to be there and thus a solution will always be by way of this special technique that Buddha or the myth of Buddha has shared through the writings and lineage of sages. However, this goes back to what I am saying earlier. Suffering only exists when there are beings that suffer. If being is not ever-present but of a particular time and place, then this idea of an eternal struggle is moot. But also, if it is an eternal struggle, then the escape from it seems to not do much for anything as it doesn't solve the cycle of suffering, just one instance of it. Clearly, Buddha's enlightenment (or whatever word you want to use), did not negate the cycle of suffering itself.

They're pretty clever observations, but I think we're talking at cross-purposes. To me, none of these questions are only hypothetical - there is something real at stake, but it's also very difficult to discern or fathom (and I won't for a minute claim to have done so.)

Look at Dawkins and all the rest of the popular atheists. They are optimistic about scientific innovation being the height of human achievement and thus a sort of "reason" to exist.. presumably, to have more children, even though we suffer, because "it's worth it" to see these advancements play out and do more research. — schopenhauer1

Well, yes, but as many have pointed out, Dawkins and Dennett have kind of appropriated many of the tropes of Christian humanism, but then wrapped them around the idea scientific progress. But there's a clear conflict in their philosophy, in that both of them see humans as basically gene machines or robots, but then don't seem to have the philosophical persipecuity to understand the inherent conflict in their worldviews.

this special technique that Buddha or the myth of Buddha has shared through the writings and lineage of sages. — schopenhauer1

I don't think the idea of a 'technique' or a 'method' does justice to it. It's far more radical than that. I take the major implication to be that we ourselves, insofar as we're 'normal human beings', have a defective understanding of the nature of reality. That is the meaning of avidya.

There's a school of Buddhist philosophy called Yogācāra which is often said to be idealist, although scholars point out that there are very important differences between Indian and Western idealism. It's sometimes been translated as 'cognition-only'. You can see the ChatGPT summary here. I'm interested in the common boundaries between these schools and the German idealists.

But nibbana (Nirvāṇa) is neither ceasing to exist, nor continuing to exist. — Wayfarer

That sounds exactly like what happens when the body dies and its constituent particles continue to exist while the form is consumed and (mostly) disappears into the matrix.

However, it seems to me that there is a solution. It starts with the already-born recognizing the suffering and simply not starting new individual experiences of that suffering. — schopenhauer1

Animals will not do that, they will continue breeding as usual, which means there will always be suffering as long as there are animals to suffer.

I think both of you guys have a rather surprisingly dim view of the value of this life considered just in itself. I can see that life has its dark moments and aspects, but I certainly don't count it as an overall net negative, and I would venture to guess that many, perhaps most, people do not have such a view either. Perhaps it comes down to brain chemistry; some are just cursed with a dearth of serotonin or whatever.

They're pretty clever observations, but I think we're talking at cross-purposes. To me, none of these questions are only hypothetical - there is something real at stake, but it's also very difficult to discern or fathom (and I won't for a minute claim to have done so.) — Wayfarer

Ok thanks, but what of the questions. Do you have any hypothesis or inking of an answer from a Schopenhauerian perspective? Here they are again:

But this is where I asked at the beginning what Schop's take is on solipsism. That is to say, if one achieves "nirvana" and quiets the Will for good in oneself, is that quieting the whole Will? That seems to be at odds. That is to say, the reason suicide is no good is because Will Proper still remains even if your will ceases. However, he seems to be saying that with Nirvana, one Will Proper will cease. How is that so? It contradicts his prior point that suicide is not a valid way of ceasing Will Proper because it is only an individual will. So which is it for Schopenhauer? — schopenhauer1

And I also brought up this:

But you need a life to exist in order for you to have desire or suffering or dissatisfaction. The problem exists prior to finding a solution out of it. And this is where we disagree most as far as what to do. That is, I think it cannot be denied that we exist first before we desire some sort of sublime state of "unborn" or whatever paradoxical state you want to ascribe to Nirvana. And because you cannot accept ancestrality as legitimate (that there was a time before animals and consciousness), you will say that mind was always in the equation and it is our job to calm it.

But here I can form a more materialistic version of Schopenhauer. That is to say, clearly this seeking Nirvana is always going to be the case. However, there was a time when it wasn't necessary, and presumably there will be a time when it is unnecessary. That is to say, there was a time before humans/animals and a time when humans/animals will go extinct. That negates this "ever present mind" idea that is necessary so that materialist solutions will always be invalid. However, it seems to me that there is a solution. It starts with the already-born recognizing the suffering and simply not starting new individual experiences of that suffering. — schopenhauer1

Do you have anything to speak to that?

Well, yes, but as many have pointed out, Dawkins and Dennett have kind of appropriated many of the tropes of Christian humanism, but then wrapped them around the idea scientific progress. But there's a clear conflict in their philosophy, in that both of them see humans as basically gene machines or robots, but then don't seem to have the philosophical persipecuity to understand the inherent conflict in their worldviews. — Wayfarer

There's a school of Buddhist philosophy called Yogācāra which is often said to be idealist, although scholars point out that there are very important differences between Indian and Western idealism. It's sometimes been translated as 'cognition-only'. You can see the ChatGPT summary here. I'm interested in the common boundaries between these schools and the German idealists. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure it's a conflict so much, if I am reading this right. Rather, it's simply a downplaying of forms of suffering. It's the usual tropes of the rest of humanity. As Zapffe laid out, it's a mechanism of defense- anchoring (Science and Progress and Humanism), isolation (what suffering?), and distraction (pleasures of any kind). These help mitigate any ethical/political stance against the other side of the coin regarding the human condition.

All this emphasis on individuals finding enlightenment, and nothing about the karmic cycle itself. Communal catharsis. Right understanding.

Animals will not do that, they will continue breeding as usual, which means there will always be suffering as long as there are animals to suffer. — Janus

I don't pretend to speak on behalf of other animal species. If they eventually evolve into self-aware beings who can deliberate, they too can decide to prevent suffering. I see them, however, as suffering less because of not having the level of self-awareness as humans. We have overshot Eden and fell into time.

I don't see forms of suffering as some sort of aggregated thing. I see it as morality at the margins. You don't not save a life because you can't save everyone's life.

I think both of you guys have a rather surprisingly dim view of the value of this life considered just in itself. I can see that life has its dark moments and aspects, but I certainly don't count it as an overall net negative, and I would venture to guess that many, perhaps most, people do not have such a view either. Perhaps it comes down to brain chemistry; some are just cursed with a dearth of serotonin or whatever. — Janus

Well, I think it's a political and ethical question. When someone decides to birth another person, they are deciding for that person, in an aggressively paternalistic fashion, that this life's spectrum of experiences and limited choices (culturally and physically), as well as the suffering that is inevitable and incumbent with life is ok to impose on another person. If carried out, it becomes a gross violation of principles of autonomy and non-malfeasance. Starting someone else's suffering, with the justification of "but there could be good experiences" or "I have a hunch because ad populum" doesn't justify going ahead and violating these kinds of principles.

Also, coupled with these principles, the logic makes sense that "not starting good experiences" (i.e. not depriving already existing person, but rather starting it de novo), is neutral whilst "starting bad experiences" (i.e. starting suffering de novo, not mitigating a person who is already suffering) is morally bad. It is suffering that is the basis of the ethics and is the morally relevant aspect, not any other contingencies. Certainly using people because "Science" or "Discovery" or "Pleasure" or "Self-Actualization" (none of which matters for the non-existent) or so you can bullshit on a philosophy forum, or so you can tinker in your garden on your retirement plan, or anything else is not a justification.

Couple the violation of autonomy, non-malfeasance, and asymmetry of starting suffering versus starting good experiences, and the case is pretty strong.

The political aspect is the fact that we are "pressing" people into the dictates/limits that this universe entails. People vote with their procreation "yay". That the human condition is something that must be experienced by others. It's imposing not only a life, but the form of life that comes with having to survive as a human who suffers and deals with burdens in the world. As I said earlier to your inevitable comments which I predicted (because by now it's very predictable what people will say):

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/831573

So which is it for Schopenhauer? — schopenhauer1

I would really have to read a whole bunch more of Schopenhauer to take a stab at that. So far, I'm pretty well on board with 'World as Idea', but I still have both gaps and doubts about 'world as will'. Hopefully some of the next chapters of Urs Apps' book might touch on that.

I think, from the perspective of Indian philosophies generally, that the 'price of ignorance' is that we have some really fundamental and basic misconception about the nature of existence. Like, we have tinted glasses on, which influence everything we see, but which we're accustomed to, so that we don't notice we're wearing them. I suppose all philosophy is like that, in a way, but I don't think there are many Western equivalents, outside Schopenhauer and the German idealists, that share that kind of understanding with Indian philosophy.

That is to say, there was a time before humans/animals and a time when humans/animals will go extinct. — schopenhauer1

Well, I might venture is that this is still implicitly naturalistic, in that it takes the empirical/sensable/phenomenal domain as primary and mind as secondary or a product of that. Indeed it doesn't seem there could be any alternative, given that the most primitive life forms are understood as the most primitive instances of mind, and that the mind evolved along with the increasing complexity of organisms over the hundreds of millions of years since. (although).

But from the perspectives of the cosmic philosophies, mind is more like the organising intelligence which gives rise to organisms in the first place (which doesn't necessarily mean theistic creation as this kind of general understanding is characteristic of e.g. neoplatonism.) So from a cosmic perspective, our embodiment in material form might be what is ultimately transient. I attended lectures by an esteemed prof of Hindu philosophy, who used to intone, in that lilting Indian school-teacherly way, that evolution was the process by which 'what is latent becomes patent' - that the whole Universe is a way for Brahman to explore horizons of being. Within that explanatory framework, mokṣa is the point where the devotee realises his/her true nature or 'supreme identity' in Watts' terms.

I think, from the perspective of Indian philosophies generally, that the 'price of ignorance' is that we have some really fundamental and basic misconception about the nature of existence. Like, we have tinted glasses on, which influence everything we see, but which we're accustomed to, so that we don't notice we're wearing them. I suppose all philosophy is like that, in a way, but I don't think there are many Western equivalents, outside Schopenhauer and the German idealists, that share that kind of understanding with Indian philosophy. — Wayfarer

Without biasing the metaphysics, what would a non-idealist Schopenhauer look like in your estimation?

But from the perspectives of the cosmic philosophies, mind is more like the organising intelligence which gives rise to organisms in the first place (which doesn't necessarily mean theistic creation as this kind of general understanding is characteristic of e.g. neoplatonism.) So from a cosmic perspective, our embodiment in material form might be what is ultimately transient. I attended lectures by an esteemed prof of Hindu philosophy, who used to intone, in that lilting Indian school-teacherly way, that evolution was the process by which 'what is latent becomes patent' - that the whole Universe is a way for Brahman to explore horizons of being. Within that explanatory framework, mokṣa is the point where the devotee realises his/her true nature or 'supreme identity' in Watts' terms. — Wayfarer

At the end of the day, philosophy-of-mind is either a mind-is-already-present or an emergent phenomenon. Those are the two broad categories. Most idealists take the first. Most materialists take the second. Both have their glaring problems. Materialists must ignore qualities and then insert it in after the fact. They also must contend with the problem of a view from nowhere. The idealists have to deal with the incredulity that mind is universal in some sense, being that it seems to be empirically the case at least, that mind accompanies some sort of cellular/nervous system.

Certainly the "hard problemers" have put the focus on the "hard" part so that either can't skirt to their preferred tenets and not address the elephant in the room. One simply can't just ignore qualia for example, or wave it away as illusion without accounting for the illusion. Idealists also can't deny things like ancestrality and extinction, and a universe without animal consciousness (or perhaps just "consciousness" or at least a "point of view").

Clearly humans can detect regularities in nature. One can say this was devised by the ancient Greeks, but certainly catapulted to greater heights with Galileo and the Renaissance thinkers. John Locke proposed that there are primary or secondary qualities. Unofficially, this is the stance when observing natural physical properties like mass, spin, charge, and such. The valence electrons and their quantifiable properties allow for chemical properties, whose molecular properties create the topology that allows for biological processes, etc. These primary properties are "out there" and we are just "observing them". The secondary qualities are simply "our qualitative perception" of them.

What does it mean when there is a view from nowhere (i.e. when there is no conscious animal / a point of view)? A realist my propose that it is the charges and spin and mass, and elementary interactions of particles/waves or something of this nature. These have existed since there was a Big Bang 13.8 billion years ago. Idealists need not postulate a world of mind. It is the interactions of particle forces that "really" exist.

But this starts a series of questions...
1) How do interactions between particles "happen"?
Realist Answer: Time and space are not mind dependent. Thus events are localized.
1a) But even if that is so, "what" is interacting?
Realist Answer: The various properties of particles are interacting.
1b) But even so, "what" does it mean to interact without a point of view?
Realist Answer: There need not be a mind for localized interaction in time/space. Wherever interaction occurs that is an event in time/space.
1c) But even so, how can we intelligebly say an event happened without a knower?
Realist Answer: You don't need a knower. Since time/space is real, these conditions allow for the event.

And on and on it goes. I guess then it becomes a question of what it means if "time/space" is real, and how that allows for existence for an event.

I think it's best to start with a series of thought exercises on these kind of things. For example:

1) What is the liminal view of an organic molecule that is the first functioning cell?
2) Look at our own wills/bodies/minds in the present. Notice there is already an MO for the human animal from the start. That is, to want/need/fill the lack. And here is Schopenhauer/Buddhism's great insights. Something about our wills reveals something about consciousness.
3) When something emerges, does there need to be a point of view prior to the emergent property? If not, how is it that emergence works from nothing to something?

I don't pretend to speak on behalf of other animal species. — schopenhauer1

And yet you speak on behalf of other species:

I see them, however, as suffering less because of not having the level of self-awareness as humans. — schopenhauer1

You may be right, or you may not be right; we simply don't and cannot, measure the suffering of other species, or even of other humans.

Starting someone else's suffering, with the justification of "but there could be good experiences" or "I have a hunch because ad populum" doesn't justify going ahead and violating these kinds of principles. — schopenhauer1

So it may seem to you, but you make the mistake of thinking there are matters of fact when it comes to whether something is moral or not. If there is any objectivity in morals it could only be the intersubjective opinion about any act you care to name that consists in the most common view. On this question your opinion is so far from the common view that it would arguably seem ridiculous to most people.

In any case, I've thought about it, I've heard all your arguments, I personally never decided to have children, which means I have no skin in the game, and yet I still disagree with you, so there is no point insistently rehearsing all the same arguments I've heard before.

Materialists must ignore qualities and then insert it in after the fact. They also must contend with the problem of a view from nowhere. — schopenhauer1

Materialists don't have to contend with the problem of "a view from nowhere". To say that the world existed prior to humanity is to express a view, a human view, but it does not follow that it entails that there must be a view from nowhere. In other words, if the world exists absent perceivers, then there is no view, but it does not follow that there is no world, just that there is no perceived world.

Also in the idealist model, if there is a universal mind or God that holds the world in view, that view would be the view from everywhere, or in other words from nowhere in particular, not from nowhere at all, just as such a God, if it existed, would not exist nowhere, but everywhere, and only nowhere in the sense of 'nowhere in particular'. If you said such a god existed nowhere at all, that would be no different than saying that it simply didn't exist.

The idealists have to deal with the incredulity that mind is universal in some sense, being that it seems to be empirically the case at least, that mind accompanies some sort of cellular/nervous system. — schopenhauer1

To address that, I'll refer to this:

John Locke proposed that there are primary or secondary qualities. — schopenhauer1

The division of 'primary and secondary', Descartes' divison of mind and matter, and science comprising the quantitative analysis of objective qualities, sets the framework for the modern weltanschauung. I'll refer to a paragraph I frequently cite from Thomas Nagel's 2012 book Mind and Cosmos:

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.

You can see how the 'problem of consciousness' arises directly out of this formulation. It's because the objective methodology of modern science deliberately excludes or attempts to 'bracket out' the subject (although this criticism can't be applied to phenomenology, which sought to remedy this.) All the 'hard problem of consciousness' argument does is point that out. And why is the mind not included? Because - and this is a deceptively simple point - mind is not an object. Here is where I find concordance with Schopenhauer:

That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject. Thus it is the supporter of the world, that condition of all phenomena, of all objects which is always pre-supposed throughout experience; for all that exists, exists only for the subject. Every one finds himself to be subject, yet only in so far as he knows, not in so far as he is an object of knowledge. ...We never know it, but it is always the knower wherever there is knowledge. — Schopenhauer, WWI

Which also finds an exact parallel in the Upaniṣads. This is from a dialogue between the sage and a questioner, with the latter asking for an explicit definition of ātman.

"Tell me directly – 'this is the ātman' – just as you say 'this is a cow, this is a horse'. Do not give an indirect definition of it as you have just done." ...Please give that description and do not simply say, 'this is that'...Yājñavalkya says: "You tell me that I have to point out the Self as if it is a cow or a horse. Not possible! It is not an object like a horse or a cow. I cannot say, 'here is the ātman; here is the Self'. It is not possible because you cannot see the seer of seeing. The seer can see that which is other than the Seer, or the act of seeing. An object outside the seer can be beheld by the seer. How can the seer see himself? How is it possible? You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the Thinker of thinking.You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. That is the ātman. Nobody can know the ātman inasmuch as the ātman is the Knower of all things. So, no question regarding the ātman can be put, such as "What is the ātman?' 'Show it to me', etc. You cannot show the ātman because the Shower is the ātman; the Experiencer is the ātman; the Seer is the ātman; the Functioner in every respect through the senses or the mind or the intellect is the ātman. As the basic Residue of Reality in every individual is the ātman, how can we go behind It and say, 'This is the ātman?' Therefore, the question is impertinent and inadmissible. The reason is clear. It is the Self. It is not an object. — Source

(In the end the questioner finally 'gets it' - and falls silent.)

And there isn't really a naturalistic response to this - not in terms of standard naturalism, anyway, as naturalism assumes the subject-object division and an objective account. It's analogical to trying to develop a two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional space.

In other words, if the world exists absent perceivers, then there is no view, but it does not follow that there is no world, just that there is no perceived world. — Janus

Um, that's what I mean it's the view from nowhere, not the view of nowhere.

Also in the idealist model, if there is a universal mind or God that holds the world in view, that view would be the view from everywhere, or in other words from nowhere in particular, not from nowhere at all, just as such a God, if it existed, would not exist nowhere, but everywhere, and only nowhere in the sense of 'nowhere in particular'. If you said such a god existed nowhere at all, that would be no different than saying that it simply didn't exist. — Janus

But that part was not about idealist views, and I explicitly said that.

You may be right, or you may not be right; we simply don't and cannot, measure the suffering of other species, or even of other humans. — Janus

Hence I said "I see them...". It's precisely because I don't know what they "think or feel" as I said.

In any case, I've thought about it, I've heard all your arguments, I personally never decided to have children, which means I have no skin in the game, and yet I still disagree with you, so there is no point insistently rehearsing all the same arguments I've heard before. — Janus

Well enough I guess. But to the claim you made about morality, I think it's more about first principles and whether one's actions accord with them. That is to say, it is akin to calling out a politician who is corrupt in the same way and degree in your party as much as in the opponent's party. That is to say, a large part of the how morality functions is simply being consistent with one's own values. More-or-less, people's values do (and we can debate the meta-ethical reasons for it but that's not the argument) care about suffering and autonomy and not causing harm. It is simply applying it to realms where people turn a blind eye to because of preference, tradition, and the like. That's not consistency in following values.

None of the context-dependent reasons to cause harm can be used in this scenario either, as you would need a person for that to matter for, so there we go.

Um, that's what I mean it's the view from nowhere, not the view of nowhere. — schopenhauer1

I'm saying that on the materialist perspective there is no view in a world lacking any percipients, whether from nowhere or of nowhere.

But that part was not about idealist views, and I explicitly said that. — schopenhauer1

I know, I just added that for a bit of extra spice.

More-or-less, people's values do (and we can debate the meta-ethical reasons for it but that's not the argument) care about suffering and autonomy and not causing harm. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but most people would not see life as a net harm although of course it is going to involve some harm. Like discipling your kids or sending them to school, the overall benefit would generally be seen as outweighing the harm, otherwise people would not have kids deliberately and thoughtfully, which no doubt many do.

Anyway, we've been over these arguments enough times and I know you are not going to agree, so I don't want to get drawn back into these arguments again.

That is to say, if one achieves "nirvana" and quiets the Will for good in oneself, is that quieting the whole Will? That seems to be at odds. ...he seems to be saying that with Nirvana, one Will Proper will cease. How is that so? — schopenhauer1

Actually, the SEP entry addresses this very question in Section 6.

This advocacy of mystical experience creates a puzzle: if everything is Will without qualification, then it is unclear where to locate the will-less mystical state of mind.

It goes on:

in terms of its degree of generality, the mystical state of mind seems to be located at a level of universality comparable to that of Will as thing-in-itself. Since he characterizes it as not being a manifestation of Will, however, it appears to be keyed into another dimension altogether, in total disconnection from Will as the thing-in-itself. This is to say that if the thing-in-itself is exactly congruent with Will, then it is difficult to accept Schopenhauer’s mystical characterizations of the ascetic consciousness, and at the same time identify a consistent place for it within Schopenhauer’s three-tiered philosophical schema of reality.

Schopenhauer’s position on whether the thing-in-itself is Will consequently presents some interpretive difficulties.

Quite so! That's where the idea of will as a kind of universal force comes unstuck in my view. It can't really account for what is other than it, as it has no intentional intelligence. But equating 'will' with 'the divine' is exactly the kind of idea he vehemently criticizes in Fichte and Schelling, saying that they are preaching religion in the guise of philosophy.

Then again, maybe his hostility to religion colors his judgement. After all,

he states explicitly that his views on morality are entirely in the spirit of Christianity, as well as being consistent with the doctrines and ethical precepts of the sacred books of India (WWR, Section 68). ...Far from being immoralistic, his moral theory is written in the same vein as those of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, that advocate principles that are in general accord with Christian precepts.

There's a saying in the NT, basic to the Christian faith 'let not my will be done but thine' which is as much a denial of will as anything Schopenhauer says. But because he denies God, that avenua does not seem to be open to him. It's puzzling. I think, maybe, it's 'churchianity' which he's so hostile to, more so that 'religion' per se.

In the very last paragraph of WWI, we read:

if we turn our glance from our own needy and embarrassed condition to those who have overcome the world, in whom the will, having attained to perfect self-knowledge, found itself again in all, and then freely denied itself, and who then merely wait to see the last trace of it vanish with the body which it animates; then, instead of the restless striving and effort, instead of the constant transition from wish to fruition, and from joy to sorrow, instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope which constitutes the life of the man who wills, we shall see that peace which is above all reason, that perfect calm of the spirit, that deep rest, that inviolable confidence and serenity, the mere reflection of which in the countenance, as Raphael and Correggio have represented it, is an entire and certain gospel; only knowledge remains, the will has vanished. — Schopenhauer

He then compares this to the Prajñāpāramitā of the Buddha. We may well ask - If only knowledge remains, then what is it knowledge of? Maybe the answer is that we won't know until we reach it - and precious few are destined to do that. Until then, we'll never know.

I'm saying that on the materialist perspective there is no view in a world lacking any percipients, whether from nowhere or of nowhere. — Janus

You seem confused. That is the view from nowhere. Meaning there is a somewhere (materially ontologically speaking) but with no view of it.

Yes, but most people would see life as a net harm although of course it is going to involve some harm. Like discipling your kids or sending them to school, the overall benefit would generally be seen as outweighing the harm, otherwise people would not have kids deliberately and thoughtfully, which no doubt many do. — Janus

This doesn’t refute my claim about blind eye and I specifically mentioned this below because you would answer using these kind of non analogous examples of mitigation of already existing people:

None of the context-dependent reasons to cause harm can be used in this scenario either, as you would need a person for that to matter for, so there we go. — schopenhauer1

Actually, the SEP entry addresses this very question in Section 6. — Wayfarer

That's a really interesting section. This almost directly addresses the OP here:

In light of this, Schopenhauer sometimes expresses the view that the thing-in-itself is multidimensional, and although the thing-in-itself is not wholly identical to the world as Will, it nonetheless includes as its manifestations, the world as Will and the world as representation. This lends a panentheistic structure to Schopenhauer’s view (noted earlier in the views of K.C.F. Krause). From a scholarly standpoint, it implies that interpretations of Schopenhauer that portray him as a Kantian who believes that knowledge of the thing-in-itself is impossible, do not fit with what Schopenhauer himself believed. It also implies that interpretations that portray him as a traditional metaphysician who claims that the thing-in-itself is straightforwardly, wholly and unconditionally Will, also stand in need of qualification. — SEP

It definitely mirrors gnostic/neoplatonic (and similar) notions of the ineffable nature of the thing-itself. That is to say, Will is only Will in hindsight of Representation. However, Will without representation is ineffably more complex than simply the "striving" that it manifests in its representational form (i.e. as a referent from the point of view of a subject for an object conditioned by space, time, and causality).

But equating 'will' with 'the divine' is exactly the kind of idea he vehemently criticizes in Fichte and Schelling, saying that they are preaching religion in the guise of philosophy. — Wayfarer

Yeah, he definitely doesn't want it to be of a religious nature. From this, I can only think to mean that it should not be attached to either a 1) telos / logos or 2) dogmatic religious system of beliefs (like Christianity). Clearly he does believe in sublime states of being, so "mystical" in some sense can be applied here.

There's a saying in the NT, basic to the Christian faith 'let not my will be done but thine' which is as much a denial of will as anything Schopenhauer says. But because he denies God, that avenua does not seem to be open to him. It's puzzling. I think, maybe, it's 'churchianity' which he's so hostile to, more so that 'religion' per se. — Wayfarer

See my comment above.

He then compares this to the Prajñāpāramitā of the Buddha. We may well ask - If only knowledge remains, then what is it knowledge of? Maybe the answer is that we won't know until we reach it - and precious few are destined to do that. Until then, we'll never know. — Wayfarer

Yeah, essentially it's ineffable. I still think none of this answers my main question:

But this is where I asked at the beginning what Schop's take is on solipsism. That is to say, if one achieves "nirvana" and quiets the Will for good in oneself, is that quieting the whole Will? That seems to be at odds. That is to say, the reason suicide is no good is because Will Proper still remains even if your will ceases. However, he seems to be saying that with Nirvana, one Will Proper will cease. How is that so? It contradicts his prior point that suicide is not a valid way of ceasing Will Proper because it is only an individual will. So which is it for Schopenhauer? — schopenhauer1

In other words, is denying will, denying one's individual only or all of Will itself? If it is denying individual will only, then why is suicide not valid? If all of Will is denied/nullified, how so? What does that even mean? Pretending someone like a Buddha achieved Nirvana, the "illusion" of a representational version of Will is still here it seems in all its manifestations.

I'm glad we're on the same page.

Everyone can claim they are engaging in good faith, especially those who aren't. What we have, I believe, is not good faith argumentation but rather post hoc rationalization in support of some variety of scientism. Hence the equivocations, the goal post shifting, the vague allusions to empiricism, and finally the descent into superficial eristic with the kamikaze wielding of arguments that undermine your own position as well (e.g. “The participants in your intersubjective agreement could be lying!”). I would simply want to call such an approach unserious. Good luck.

Good finds. They are glaring.

It's even weirder when you can literally predict the next move, call it out before they do it, and then they do it anyways as if you didn't call it out. Generally, one tries to avoid what is being called out. Some people lean into it.

Some people lean into it. — schopenhauer1

Right! "Queer as folk," as the old saying goes.

But I only interjected to take exception to an unfair characterization of Wayfarer's claim. It went about as well as could be hoped for. :smile:

You seem confused. That is the view from nowhere. Meaning there is a somewhere (materially ontologically speaking) but with no view of it. — schopenhauer1

Why call it a view if there is no view? It's no view from anywhere; so obviously we cannot imagine what it is, because that would be to turn it into a view from somewhere.

There's a typo in the second passage you quoted; I left out a 'not'. I don't know if that would make any difference to your response which I couldn't make sense of.

Look, I get it that if one is entrenched in a desire for transcendent, permanent salvation then life will seem to be nothing but suffering, this is exemplified in the life of Guatama, who began life as a prince who had his every need catered to. He never experienced poverty, sickness and death until, say, early adulthood, and when he saw that and realized that it was only luck that had preserved him from these rigours, he set out on a mission to conquer the suffering they represent permanently. He abandoned his wife and child, his family and the throne, so powerful was his obsession with this mission. I have no doubt you are well familiar with the story.

It seems to me the difference between you and @Wayfarer is that he believes in the possibility of salvation, whereas you don't believe it is possible. For me, I am neither convinced it is possible nor impossible, but having been involved in the past with Gurdjieff foundations, Tibetan Buddhist practice and even a brief stint with a Bubba Free John organization, I became convinced that for everyone I met there the search was a kind of fantasy pursuit, ultimately a cult of the personality, because I never met anyone who I believed had anything like the kind of strength of commitment that is exemplified in the story of Gautama.

What I do know from experience is that it is possible to identify the kinds of habits of thought that make your life more miserable than it needs to be, and to learn to let go of those habits, and that it is possible to alter consciousness, to live in the present, to let go of concerns about the past and the future.

We are all different, so of course we are all going to see life somewhat or even very differently. That is one of the difficulties encountered on these forums; it seems the common assumption is that everyone should understand life the same way, so folk defend their own particular views and obsessions and become defensive, perhaps go into denial or double-down when they are challenged.

So, as i see it both you and Wayfarer view life through a lens that sees only suffering; without salvation or at least the possibility of salvation, of something more than just this life, this life would be unbearable. Wayfarer still hopes to find something somewhere through reading, whereas you think the only answer is to cease breeding. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that is because he believes in a life hereafter, that there is an overarching spiritual purpose, whereas you don't.

From laymen's idea of Schopenhauer, he was a staunch pessimist who used to preach that life is not worth living, and it would be better for all life not to have been born into this world, which is nothing but suffering. But once born, it would better to die as soon as possible, but I wonder why he would want to know about the world, and trying to equate his concept of Will to Kant's "Thing-in-Itself", which was to declare epistemic limitation of human mind. Any explanation? Thanks.

(Schopenhauer0 used to preach that life is not worth living, and it would be better for all life not to have been born into this world, which is nothing but suffering. — Corvus

It’s true that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is described as pessimistic, but he never said those things. And he did say that there could be freedom from suffering. Maybe a good place to start would be the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry which has been cited a number of times in this thread.

We know nothing better than we know our own will. If the world is will, then there is nothing we couldn’t know about the world. Kant’s “epistemic limitation” disappears.

While it may indeed be a credible philosophy on its own, it is an altogether illegitimate transfer of conceptual correspondence when juxtaposed to Kant.

It’s true that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is described as pessimistic, but he never said those things. And he did say that there could be freedom from suffering. Maybe a good place to start would be the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry which has been cited a number of times in this thread. — Wayfarer

Thanks for your suggestion. I find Schopenhauer a very interesting philosopher, but have not read any of his books yet. The pessimistic remarks I heard about him was from my philosophy lecturer in my 1st year in the university. We heard him saying it, and even made notes on the paper at the time I vividly recall. I cannot prove if Schopenhauer really said it, or was it just the lecturer's idea on him. I have a little book somewhere by Schopenhauer called "On The Suffering of the World". Will get it out, and start reading it. :)

It’s true that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is described as pessimistic, but he never said those things. And he did say that there could be freedom from suffering. Maybe a good place to start would be the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry which has been cited a number of times in this thread. — Wayfarer

"What does Schopenhauer say about death?
Schopenhauer interprets death as the aim and purpose of life. He maintains that to live is to suffer, that the triumph of death is inevitable, and that existence is a constant dying." - Google

He sounds awfully pessimistic even in quick Google search.

We know nothing better than we know our own will. If the world is will, then there is nothing we couldn’t know about the world. Kant’s “epistemic limitation” disappears.

While it may indeed be a credible philosophy on its own, it is an altogether illegitimate transfer of conceptual correspondence when juxtaposed to Kant. — Mww

I used to think Schopenhauer disagreed with Kant in many areas, and just mentioned Kant's "Thing-in-Itself" to criticise him, and clarify for his points.

His idealism is much more interesting than his pessimism in my view.

We know nothing better than we know our own will. — Mww

I have frequent problems understanding my will. What I want is often in conflict with what I think I should do.

His idealism is much more interesting than his pessimism in my view. — Wayfarer

Sure. But I was wondering if it would be even more interesting if his idealism and pessimism could be studied together i.e. what was the ground for his arriving at the pessimism. Could his idealism had contributed to his pessimism? or the other way around?

Do some more reading on him. That’s all I could recommend.