Hanover
Davidson, I think, would tend to say that mental state A is the result of brain state B, but that it might also be the result of brain states C and D. Hence mental state A is not dependent on brain state B; and the need for a novel term. — Banno

So you take it that supervenience means a cause but a non-essential cause? My hand pain supervenes with a splinter being in it, but it could also supervene with a hammer hitting it?

Me, or Davidson? I've not thought about it, and I'd have to go back and re-read Mental Events to set out Davidson's approach. Probably "mental event" would have been better than "mental state".

Why? Have you a direction for this thread?

Have you a direction for this thread? — Banno

As the whole discussion about 'supervenience' centres the argument that 'mental states supervene on physical states', then it is at least germane to say what is covered by the term 'mental state'.

My direction, I've already given. It's a variation on multiple realizability which was Putnam's argument against supervenience.

Yeah, but a good rendering of Davidson would have to go back to his work on the logic of action, and there's large, but perhaps not insurmountable - problems in all that. For Davidson, flicking the switch is the same as alerting the burglar, if you recall that argument. I think there's a lot of merit in it, but as much to do with Russell's view of Logical Nihilism as with Davidson's logic of action.

And "essence" seems to be creeping back into the discussions here, a problem in itself.

non-essential cause — Hanover

What's that, then?

Too much for a sleepy Saturday afternoon.


I think the text pretty clear and am not sure what I might say to elucidate it further. But see .

We've discussed the relationship between physical causation and logical necessity. I think the consensus is that these are different in kind. But if you say that mental acts supervene on physical (i.e brain) states then you're saying that logical propositions, insofar as these are grasped in mental acts, supervene on physical states, i.e., are instances of physical causation. Which seems just obviously wrong to me.

So you take it that supervenience means a cause but a non-essential cause? — Hanover

Relevant excerpt:

Grounding and ontological dependence are distinct from each other. The simplest way to see this is by means of the kinds of case that revealed to David Lewis that causation is distinct from causal dependence (1973): preemption and overdetermination. Just as cases of causal overdetermination and preemption involve causation without causal dependence, so too do cases of ‘grounding overdetermination’ and ‘grounding preemption’ involve grounding without ontological dependence. For example, the fact that I exist grounds the fact that something exists, but the obtaining of the latter fact does not depend upon the obtaining of the former; the fact that something exists is massively overgrounded. — SEP | Supervenience, Grounding, and Ontological Depdendence

So when you say that, "Without B there is no A," you seem to be positing an ontological dependence which overlooks the possibility of grounding overdetermination. Nevertheless, ontological dependence and grounding are both separate from supervenience.

Regarding the relation of entailment to supervenience:

Nonetheless, that B-properties entail A-properties is neither necessary nor sufficient for A-properties to supervene on B-properties. (The notion of property entailment in play is this: property P entails property Q just in case it is metaphysically necessary that anything that possesses P also possesses Q.) To see that such entailments do not suffice for supervenience, consider the properties being a brother and being a sibling. [...]

To see that supervenience does not suffice for entailment, recall that supervenience can hold with only nomological necessity. In such cases, there is no entailment; thermal conductivity properties do not entail electrical conductivity properties, for example.

But what about supervenience with metaphysical or logical necessity? Even that does not in general guarantee that there are B-properties that entail the A-properties. At best, the logical supervenience of A on B means that how something is B-wise entails how it is A-wise. But it does not follow that every A-property is entailed by a B-property, or even that some A-property is entailed by a B-property. Consider two examples... — SEP | Supervenience and Entailment

i.e., are instances of physical causation — Wayfarer

I don't see how that follows.


Emphasis on the word Physical.

I don't see how that follows. — Banno

Because if the mental act of grasping a logical truth supervenes on a physical state, then there is a causal relationship between the former and the latter, isn’t there? How can it not follow?

@Leontiskos - can you throw any light on my query? It seems related to the last paragraph you quote from the SEP entry but I’m struggling with putting it together.

How can it not follow? — Wayfarer

Well, given Davidson treats reasons as causes, that's no small question.

But do you think I’m barking up the wrong tree? //Actually I see that Davidson has an article called Reasons, Actions and Causes - I suppose I should try and find a copy.//

Have a quick look at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/#ReasCaus first.

It's a really pivotal question, not something with a quick answer. At least, not from me.

And that is the article I was contemplating as the first in a mooted series on Davidson, just for amusement.

But small steps.

Thanks. You might help me unpack this paragraph:

Understood as rational, the connection between reason and action cannot be described in terms of any strict law. Yet inasmuch as the connection is also a causal connection, so there must exist some law-like regularity, though not describable in the language of rationality, under which the events in question fall (an explanation can be causal, then, even though it does not specify any strict law).

What kinds of 'law' do you think this is referring to here? I presume the laws which govern causal relationships. So supervenience has to obtain here, so that 'mental events' can be said to be causally efficacious and so as to avoid any implication of dualism.

What kinds of 'law'... — Wayfarer

Well, a regularity along the lines of "A whenever B".

So a mass experiencing an action will always result in a reaction.

Yet wanting a beer and believing there is some in the fridge need not always result in one gong to the fridge.

Two rational explanations, one with law-like characteristics, the other, not so much.

And yet it is not beyond the pale to say that you went to the fridge because you wanted a beer.

Is that a causal explanation for your going to the fridge?

All very rough. Dibs you can't hold me to any of this.

https://bibliotecamathom.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/actions-reasons-and-causes.pdf

thanks. I’m definitely sympathetic to ‘reasons as causes’. I remember an anecdote, can’t remember who by, in answer to the question ‘why is the water boiling?’ To which both the answers ‘because it has reached 100 degrees Celsius’ and ‘I’m making a cup of tea’ are valid answers. However I took the anecdote as a comment on the distinction between material causation and the Aristotelian final causation. Pierre Normand also mentioned a book which seems related, Rational Causation, Eric Marcus, albeit with a different kind of slant on the question. It is however firmly within the bounds of analytic philosophy I think. Seems there is a lot of scope in questions about causation.

The literature around this topic is more than extensive. That's one of the reasons for my caution. Also we are a bit off topic here.

But more reason to consider a thread, or threads, on Davidson.

Suppose we defer consideration of a law of identity, and consider two identical beings in different possible worlds, with the difference between the two worlds being of negligible relevance to the two beings. — wonderer1

The point is, that to be two beings there must be something which distinguishes them as one different from the other. If what distinguishes them one from the other, is "being in different possible words" then we cannot say that the difference between the two worlds is of negligible relevance, because we've already propositioned that this difference is what distinguishes them one from the other. Since being two distinct things rather than one and the same thing is fundamentally a significant difference, then it's necessarily of very significant relevance.

The only way which I see to proceed is to employ the proposition that the difference which makes two things distinct, instead of one and the same thing, is not a significant difference. But that is just asking for all sorts of logical dilemmas because that premise would annihilate our capacity to analyze differences, by saying that differences in general are insignificant. But that makes all things the same, and whatever means we might employ to distinguish one thing from another would be completely arbitrary.

And yet it is not beyond the pale to say that you went to the fridge because you wanted a beer. — Banno

You got me thirsty already, and it's not even 7:00 AM: https://btpshop.ca/

However I took the anecdote as a comment on the distinction between material causation and the Aristotelian final causation. — Wayfarer

When thoroughly analyzed there is very little difference in the application of Aristotle's final cause and material cause, in the sense that they can each be applied toward the very same effects. The most significant difference though is that material cause is potential while final cause can be understood as actual. Because of this "material cause" is inadequate for understanding many of the things it is applied toward, as it cannot account for agency. So "the reason for", and "the cause of" are very distinct in the way that they do, or do not, account for agency.

In Banno's example, if I say wanting a beer "caused me to go" to the fridge (final cause), it is also necessarily the reason why I went to the fridge. Agency is accounted for as an act of the will. But if I say wanting a beer "was the reason why I went" to the fridge, there is no agency implied, causation is therefore not accounted for, and we are left uninformed as to the cause. Then one might look to the brain, or some other factor as the cause.

I think I have it straight now. To some extent supervenience is intuitive. The music created by an orchestra supervenes on the actions of the players. You could also say the music entails these actions.

Or what if orchestral music evolves in so that it becomes more AI driven. That fact would supervene in all sorts of activities at lower levels.

If we think of supervenience as pertaining to propositions, the truth of "Orchestral music evolved" is true IFF statements about required activities at the lower level are true.

So it has to do with intuitions about emergent events, that they necessarily track events at the lower level.

As applied to the mind body problem, a neophyte might think the debate is about whether the mental supervenes on the physical. Generally speaking, that's not the debate because we already know that pain emerges from nociceptors, and so on.

But I think an eliminativist would deny that the mental supervenes on the physical just because she denies that there's any such thing as a separation between mental and physical. There has to be some kind of distinction.

Next: supervenience and normativity, otherwise known as the is-ought problem.

The point is, that to be two beings there must be something which distinguishes them as one different from the other. If what distinguishes them one from the other, is "being in different possible words" then we cannot say that the difference between the two worlds is of negligible relevance, because we've already propositioned that this difference is what distinguishes them one from the other. Since being two distinct things rather than one and the same thing is fundamentally a significant difference, then it's necessarily of very significant relevance. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was thinking I might be able to help you out of that logical straitjacket keeping you from productively considering the thought experiment. Perhaps another time.

Here is an excerpt on dependence: — Leontiskos

Yes, I see your point.

Leontiskos - can you throw any light on my query? It seems related to the last paragraph you quote from the SEP entry but I’m struggling with putting it together. — Wayfarer

As I understand it, supervenience and causation are two different things:

Neither of these property realization relations is the supervenience relation. A property can supervene on other properties even when it is not the kind of property that has a causal role associated with it, as is the case with pure mathematical properties, for instance. Nor is property supervenience required for property realization in either of the above senses. — SEP | Supervenience and Realization

The concrete point here is that just because a mental act supervenes on a physical state, it does not follow that it is caused by that physical state. I think someone could even hold to the supervenience while also maintaining that the mental state causes the physical state, for example.

Reason/explanation is also a bit different from supervenience:

Supervenience claims, by themselves, do nothing more than state that certain patterns of property (or fact) variation hold. They are silent about why those patterns hold, and about the precise nature of the dependency involved. — SEP | Supervenience and Explanation

See also, "Supervenience as a philosophical term of art."

I am glad that you two are sussing out some of the ambiguity between supervenience, cause, reason, etc. Much of the language in this thread is being used too loosely.


Sidenote: I did not receive a notification that you mentioned me, which is why I am late to this. I think it might be because you added the mention in an edit. If so, I think this is a quasi-bug that would be good for the forum wish list.

I am glad that you two are sussing out some of the ambiguity between supervenience, cause, reason, etc. Much of the language in this thread is being used too loosely. — Leontiskos

There is a fair amount of overlap though. The nature of a supervenience relation is formally stipulated. That's what's helpful about it. But there's no exclusion of causality, entailment, or dependency.

But there is also no inclusion of those notions, and so the overlap is accidental. In this thread we often see overlap mistaken for identity. For example, in your previous post you incorrectly imply that logical supervenience guarantees entailment (via your 'if-an-only-if' definition). For the most part supervenience brings with it entailment, but entailment does not suffice for supervenience.

. . .The upshot is that the logical supervenience of property set A on property set B will only guarantee that each A-property is entailed by some B-property if A and B are closed under both infinitary Boolean operations and property-forming operations involving quantification. — SEP | Supervenience and Entailment

an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect — Davidson

This definitely reminds me of cartesian dualism. :smile:

Just about everybody agrees that the mental supervenes on the physical, which means that the only way for a mental state to change is for something physical to change. Disagreements arise regarding the form of necessity here. — frank

As a philosophical Iayman, I don't often use the technical jargon "supervene" (to come after) in brain/mind discussions. Instead, I merely note that Mind (latin : mens, to think ; anim, life ; spirit) is the function (operation ; performance) of Brain. Hence, Mind is simply what a Brain does. In mathematics, a function is an input/output relationship : this follows logically from that. Thus sensory inputs, processed in the Brain, result in the Mental product that we call Ideas & Meanings.

Today, we would more likely say that both Life & Mind are the results of processed "Energy" inputs, instead of Spiritual influences. For example, a lifeless rock might seem to be momentarily animated when it is acted upon by gravity or impetus. But animation (self-moving) & mentation (mind function) requires a much more complex structure (logical path), such as a neural network, to channel energy inputs into computations that convert raw causation into conception.

For a Change of Mind though, there is no need for the physical structure of the Brain to change. That's because its labyrinthine convoluted construction inherently allows for feedback loops that result in the self-reflexive interactions that we call "awareness" or "consciousness". Those higher brain "functions" add the internal self-image to the inputs of incoming information, thus putting the self into a larger context : a self-other interrelationship.

The causal Necessity for Physical matter to produce Mental thoughts may be due to the information processing that we know as "computation" or "calculation", which are merely variations on logical operations such as "And, Or, Not" or "Add, Subtract, Divide". By such material means, the logical structure of the universe is expressed in the reasoning of brains. Cosmic Logic is simply how the world works, and brains are merely local processors of Energy in the form of meaningful information. :smile:

For example, in your previous post you incorrectly imply that logical supervenience guarantees entailment (via your 'if-an-only-if' definition). — Leontiskos

Could you be more specific?

Some quotes:

To some extent supervenience is intuitive. The music created by an orchestra supervenes on the actions of the players. You could also say the music entails these actions. — frank

I think this direction of entailment is necessary but not sufficient for supervenience. This is because A can entail B without "exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantee[ing] exact similarity with respect to A-properties."

If we think of supervenience as pertaining to propositions, the truth of "Orchestral music evolved" is true IFF statements about required activities at the lower level are true. — frank

Given the differences between entailment and supervenience, I am not convinced this sort of IFF correctly represents supervenience. But I suppose I would need more clarity on what you are saying here.

I think this direction of entailment is necessary but not sufficient for supervenience. This is because A can entail B without "exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantee[ing] exact similarity with respect to A-properties — Leontiskos

I don't know what you're saying here. Are you suggesting that supervenience is "exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantee[ing] exact similarity with respect to A-properties"?

That quoted words do not describe supervenience.

I think someone could even hold to the [mental supervening on the physical] while also maintaining that the mental state causes the physical state. — Leontiskos

@Wayfarer - If I am right about this then it constitutes a stark example of the way that supervenience as a philosophical term of art differs from the colloquial or etymological meaning of supervenience. This may be part of the reason why the mental/physical debate gets so tricky. Another reason is probably that there are so many interrelated notions of supervenience, even in the philosophical sphere.

Effectively, the distance between the philosophical meaning of the term and the colloquial and etymological meaning biases the debate.

---

That quoted words do not describe supervenience. — frank

It was a quote from the SEP definition of supervenience, in the introduction of the article you quoted from in your OP:

A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if a difference in A-properties requires a difference in B-properties—or, equivalently, if and only if exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantees exact similarity with respect to A-properties. — SEP | Supervenience Introduction

That quoted words do not describe supervenience.
— frank

It was a quote from the SEP definition of supervenience, in the introduction of the article you quoted from in your OP:

A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if a difference in A-properties requires a difference in B-properties—or, equivalently, if and only if exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantees exact similarity with respect to A-properties.
— SEP | Supervenience Introduction — Leontiskos

It makes more sense in context.

The properties of a production of Beethoven's 7th supervene on the properties of the orchestra involved.

The second part starting with "equivalently," is saying that the only way to have an exact duplicate of a musical production would be to exactly duplicate the actions of the orchestra playing it. That's a convoluted way to get the idea across, but it's true. That does describe the kind of relation we're specifying with supervenience. It's definitely an IFF kind of relation.