Gilbert Ryle...'ghost in the machine' seems relevant.. Just stumbled across it.. A physicalist might dismiss it but that might be a mistake..

His thinking is in reference to Descartes.
I'm just referencing it, not endorsing it.

I mean do you want to explain how you want to use Ryle? He’s an early eliminitavist who seems to skirt the hard problem by way of saying that red is a public event. It’s a kind if intersubjective behaviorism whereby we can’t understand red in private way. I think it confuses concepts for the qualia of them. The eliminitavists need there to be a false assigning of origins but they don’t account for the actual phenomena. They replace origin with experience in itself.

I was thinking that hidden dualism and ghost in the machine are the same problem.

For a physicalist, thoughts, ideas, concepts (and possibly qualia) would have their neural correlates. So they exist in a physical state of a dynamic neural configuration. Is that right?

The problem is how do ideas transfer person to person. That suggests some ghostly part that doesn't have a physical basis.

For a physicalist, thoughts, ideas, concepts (and possibly qualia) would have their neural correlates. So they exist in a physical state of a dynamic neural configuration. Is that right? — Mark Nyquist

You actually seem to make a hidden dualism error here.
Part 1: thoughts, ideas, concepts (and possibly qualia) would have their neural correlates.
Part 2: So they exist in a physical state of a dynamic neural configuration. Is that right?[/quote]

You are making it seem like the concepts exist in these states, as if, you were to examine the physical state long enough you will find "thoughts ideas, concepts (and possibly qualia).

No errors on my part. Do you have a reading comprehension problem?? Get up to speed or I won't talk to you.

Ha wild reaction man. If you want to correct me, go ahead.

Okay, just rhetorical,
Here's the issue.
I'm giving the physicalist perspective that I have a problem with.
And sorry for the delayed response because I have other obligations..
I've written quite a bit on information theory in philosophy and the problem comes up of how to deal with anything non-physical, like zero or time outside the present moment. Since non-physical by definition doesn't exist, the rational alternative is that the non-physical exists as a physically contained non-physical. Basically, neurons have the ability to contain the non-physical. Sorry, running out of time but if you go back in the archives of my comments you will get the jist of the problem.

non-physical by definition doesn't exist — Mark Nyquist

But

neurons have the ability to contain the non-physical — Mark Nyquist

If puzzled

go back in the archives of my comments — Mark Nyquist

:chin:

Perhaps he means that non-physical things do not exist but may be real nonetheless. :wink:

I think he's on the verge of saying that, thought a nudge might help ;-)

Actually, I could say that if a physical chain of control is fundamental to the process. Sure, but not based on abstract concepts.

If you say mental is same as the physical bodily process, then you fall into meaningless reductionism of blind science. If you say, mental is separate entity from physical bodily entity, then you are a dualist, and fall into occultism and religious opinion.

You could say mental is functions of physical states (functionalism), or phenomenon of physical states (epiphenomenalism), and I feel this makes more sense.

You can imagine a body without mental (e.g. person in comma state - when the physical is in some compromised state), but you cannot imagine mental without body. Well you could, but you would sound like an occultist hiding the confusion.

Here's my take on monism, physicalism vs. dualism... The people who are monists will eventually realize there is something emergent that is non-physical. At that point the people who are dualists will say I told you so. But I think the physicalist may have the better understanding.

It is a mistake for a physicalist to exclude the non-physical. The ones that include it will get it right.

It is a mistake for a physicalist to excuse the non-physical. The ones that include it will get it right. — Mark Nyquist

You know this how?

Sorry, typo...exclude, not excuse.
Still have a problem with it?

The sun is in the sky... physical.

The sun is not in the sky... non-physical.

Physical and non-physical are embedded in our mental realities.

The sun is in the sky... physical.

The sun is not in the sky... non-physical.

Physical and non-physical are embedded in our mental realities. — Mark Nyquist

I'm afraid I don't know how to interpret your statements regarding physical and non-physical.

Suppose I suggest alternatives for your first two sentence.

1. It is 12:00 noon and the sun is in the sky above me.

2. It is 12:00 midnight and sun is in the sky above someone on the other side of the world, but not above me.

Is there a reason to make a physical/non-physical distinction between the two sentences?

Your example shows how our minds can travel time and space in a way that is non-physical.

Your side of the planet, 12 noon, sun visible
Your side of the planet, 12 midnight, sun not visible.
The other side of the planet, your midnight, there 12 noon, sun visible.

So you have sorted out the physical using your brains non-physical abilities.

It still seems to me that there is a need to deal with non-physicals. Because we can't avoid using them.

Our brains don't even depend or the subject matter being physical or non-physical. Both are handled with the same physical process and biology.

Our brains don't even depend or the subject matter being physical or non-physical. Both are handled with the same physical process and biology. — Mark Nyquist

Tell you a big difference between physical and biological processes.

Physical processes don't rely on context. The equations of physics treat objects as idealised entities, which act in accordance with the laws of motion, disregarding external or extraneous factors, including goals, intentionality, and so on. (Of course, this has been called into question by the observer problem in quantum physics, in which the way the experimenter sets up the experiment will have a role in what is observed, but that can be left aside.)

Organisms, however, are completely different to that. Whereas the motions of physical objects are fully determined by physical laws, the processes involved in biology are described in terms that go far beyond the language of physics and chemistry. Words like “stimulus”, “response”, “signal”, “adapt”, “inherit”, and “communicate” are routinely used, not only for organisms, but also for organic molecules. And all of it takes place in a context, namely, 'the environment', which can be simply disregarded as far as classical physics is concerned.

The allure of physical reductionism is precisely that we can apply the kind of certainty that physics exhibits across the whole range of phenomena, living things included, leaving no ambiguity and allowing for the complete prediction and control we can obtain in physical systems. That is what physicalism means. But right from the outset, organic life introduces degrees of complexity and kinds of organisation that are completely outside the scope of physics as such. Believing that it can all be explained by physics or in physical terms is one of the reigning myths of today's culture. But that's all it is.

So for me, the non-physical comes in at a secondary level. You have brains that have the ability to hold mental content and that content is what is non-physical. If you argue that mental content is only its neural correlates then you miss the important fact that the content itself precedes the form of the the neural solution. It really is that the non-physical drives the physical.

But

the non-physical comes in at a secondary level. — Mark Nyquist

is in conflict with

It really is that the non-physical drives the physical. — Mark Nyquist

I'm just thinking this through...
Maybe nested non-physicals, which do have a physical form in their neural correlates, proceed to new content.

I'm just thinking this through... — Mark Nyquist

I appreciate that, I can see you're wrestling with the problem. You mentioned here or some other thread you don't much like reading philosophy, but I think you're going to have to do some more research on it (although nowadays video and audio materials are viable options to reading).

Have you run across Terence Deacon? He's mentioned from time to time on this forum.

Terrence Deacon. I'll go look.

I looked.
Still think I'm on the right track.

I think you are also but you must admit, it needs considerable elaboration before it becomes a coherent idea. :wink:

I watched part of a Terrence Deacon video.
Just my perspective, but I think he is strong on brain anatomy and monkey to human comparisons but weak on his theory of information and theory of language.

I like defining information as brain state only (because that's how it can exist in physical reality) and language should be a subcategory of our ability to manipulate mental content, as I described it.

So I maybe have a habit of cherry picking what I like and don't like but I try learning new things.
Usually takes a couple times for me.

What I think you're struggling with is, how to think of anything in non-physical terms. You want to equate 'what is real' with 'the physical' but at the same time, you recognise that there are things about mind, language, life, etc, that can't be explained solely in physical terms. But you want that alternative not to be given in terms of traditional metaphysics as that is equated with outmoded ways of thinking. That's what I think you're grappling with.

For argument's sake, I solicited a summary of Deacon's idea of 'incomplete nature' from ChatGPT:

In his book "Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter," Deacon argues that there are certain fundamental aspects of life and cognition that cannot be fully explained by the laws of physics and chemistry alone. He contends that there are specific properties and phenomena associated with life and mind, such as purpose, meaning, and consciousness, that cannot be reduced to, or derived from, the physical and chemical properties of the underlying components.

Deacon suggests that nature is "incomplete" in the sense that it contains a fundamental absence or lack of something that needs to be accounted for in our scientific understanding. He argues that there are emergent properties in complex systems that cannot be predicted or explained solely by examining the components at a lower level of organization. Instead, these emergent properties require a different kind of explanation, one that considers the organization and relationships within the system as a whole.

Deacon's ideas on incompleteness challenge reductionist approaches to understanding life and cognition and call for a more holistic and integrative perspective that takes into account the unique features of complex systems. His work has generated considerable discussion and debate in the fields of biology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind, as it challenges conventional notions of causality and reductionism in science.

I would say, rather than nature being incomplete, that it's naturalism as currently understood that is incomplete. (But then if he called his book Incomplete Naturalism, probably nobody would have looked at it ;-) )So, it's a critique of naturalism insofar as that is reductionist. Perhaps you could say he's wanting to extend the scope of naturalism beyond the fundamental physical categories that hitherto have defined it.