Philosophy gets us clearer on empirical reality perhaps….
— Janus

If one holds with the position that it is we who decide what reality is, or, perhaps, how the reality that is, is to be known as such, that says more about the decision-maker than what is decided upon.

Philosophy gets us clearer as subjects, yes, regardless of that to which we as subjects direct ourselves. — Mww

I tend to think that when it comes to thinking about the empirical, about how things appear to us to be, and to work, we can get clearer and that that is not all about us, the "deciders", but also, it seems plausible to think, reflects how we are affected pre-cognitively. That said we cannot become conscious of that pre-cognitive affecting that is prior to the emergence of the shared empirical world, but it would seem to warrant being called "real" in itself, whatever it might be, even though it remains ideal, a matter of mere ideas, for our consciousness.

On the other hand, I think you are alluding to getting clearer via philosophy (critical thought) about our ideas in all domains, even the more speculative ones, and I would agree with that too.

I hear ya.

My getting us clearer as subjects, is probably more closely related to metaphysics, which in turn is closer to your mention of critical thought.

What do you mean by….what would it be like to be……affected pre-cognitively?

My getting us clearer as subjects, is probably more closely related to metaphysics, which in turn is closer to your mention of critical thought.

What do you mean by….what would it be like to be……affected pre-cognitively? — Mww

Do you mean getting clearer via critical thought as to just what can be knowable and justified metaphysically speaking?

I probably didn't express myself very clearly; don't think being affected pre-cognitively can be like anything, because we cannot be conscious of it. It seems to me that we cannot but think that we are so affected though...or in other words that there are processes that are, or "something" that is, that we cannot be aware of creating this shared world of things we inhabit.

Do you mean getting clearer via critical thought….. — Janus

I meant the curtailment the extravagances of thought without stifling it. The subject imagining freely, but understanding he can only go so far with it.

don't think being affected pre-cognitively can be like anything — Janus

Cool. Just what I was hoping to hear.

that there are processes that are, or "something" that is, that we cannot be aware of creating this shared world of things we inhabit. — Janus

There very well may be those processes. I just figure if we not only aren’t, but couldn’t possibly be, aware of them, it makes no difference to us whether there are or not. How would we ever be able to tell? Correct me if I’m off-base, but isn’t that what the doctrine of phenomenology posits? Those processes creating this shared world we may be able to know about?

I meant the curtailment the extravagances of thought without stifling it. The subject imagining freely, but understanding he can only go so far with it. — Mww

I agree with this; I am all for unfettered imagination, and the "curtailment" I advocate consists in not taking those flights of imagination as being knowledge.

There very well may be those processes. I just figure if we not only aren’t, but couldn’t possibly be, aware of them, it makes no difference to us whether there are or not. How would we ever be able to tell? Correct me if I’m off-base, but isn’t that what the doctrine of phenomenology posits? Those processes creating this shared world we may be able to know about? — Mww

I agree that such possible processes are, in the domain of what we think of as knowledge, discursively useless, but I think the very fact that we must posit an unknowable "in itself" defines our condition and is far from irrelevant.

So, I am disagreeing with those who think that either there is no unknowable, or that even if we do not only face the knowable but also the unknowable, that fact about us is irrelevant and not worth consideration. On the contrary, I think it is central to what it means to be human, and that it does, as Kant asserts, open up all the possibilities of imagination and faith.

I think the very fact that we must posit an unknowable "in itself" defines our condition and is far from irrelevant. — Janus

Oh absolutely. Simple complementarity principle: if we insist there is that which is knowable, that which is unknowable in itself is given immediately.

Yeah, that's it in a nutshell!

Question: Is the space Kant discusses in the Aesthetic the same space I experience and move through on a daily basis and is the time he discusses in the Aesthetic the same time I experience passing by on a daily basis? — charles ferraro

If my memory serves me right (often it doesn't), Kan't space and time is non-physical entities, which are the pre-condition of perception i.e. what makes perception possible.

If perception is predicated on physiology, wouldn’t perception be possible even without things to perceive? Wouldn’t the senses still work, even if there wasn’t anything to sense? Otherwise, it would have to be the case, e.g., the mechanics of sight are caused by things rather than the physical structure which makes them eyes in the first place. If it is really the various physiologies that make the various corresponding perceptions possible, space and time do not.

Might I suggest Kant meant for space and time to be the pre-condition for experience? They are that which makes experience possible?

Might I suggest Kant meant for space and time to be the pre-condition for experience? They are that which makes experience possible? — Mww

Yes, great point thanks.
It is definitely written in CPR as "precondition for experience" - Norman Kemp Smith Abridged Edition 1952 MacMillan & Co Ltd, London CPR p.44

But I am wondering if Experience is a far too wide concept even covering the other mental activities and perceptions which take place with the internal mental contents such as memories and imaginations which don't associate with space and time.

…..Experience is a far too wide concept…. — Corvus

It may be too wide for all that the human intellect can do, sure. But with respect to space and time, experience is only ever going to be whatever they allow.

It may be too wide for all that the human intellect can do, sure. But with respect to space and time, experience is only ever going to be whatever they allow. — Mww

If we think about the cases when the object of perception are the mental contents such as images in the past memories or imagination, which doesn't need space and time as precondition for the process to happen. In these cases, space and time cannot be the preconditions for the experience. Or maybe Kant said, or would say that space and time still applies to the memories or imaginations for their content? (I am not sure on this point.)

Would you not agree that space and time only applies as the precondition of perception, only when the objects of the perception are the external material objects?

My interpretation of the meaning of Kant's philosophy, in this respect, is that space and time (or extension and duration) have an inextricably subjective dimension - both require a perspective to be meaningful. Otherwise, there can be no sense of scale - how near, how far, how long - without which the ideas of time and space are meaningless.

I might have pasted this in before, as I frequently refer to it. It's a Closer to Truth interview with Andrei Linde, who is one of the founders of the current model of cosmology. This particular interview is about the role of consciousness in the construction of space-time. I think it makes a similar point.

Acc. to Kant we can't have experience about ideas like "society", "freedom" etc. We can think these ideas but we don't have knowledge about them. We have "only" beliefs concerning them. "Society" can't be appearance in space and time. This means also that ideas like that are outside the realm of verification or falsification. The idea of freedom can't be verified or _falsified_ scientifically.

My interpretation of the meaning of Kant's philosophy, in this respect, is that space and time (or extension and duration) have an inextricably subjective dimension — Wayfarer

Very interesting point. I had been thinking that way at one point, but was wondering, if I was being too idealistic.

Acc. to Kant we can't have experience about ideas like "society", "freedom" etc. We can think these ideas but we don't have knowledge about them. We have "only" beliefs concerning them. "Society" can't be appearance in space and time. This means also that ideas like that are outside the realm of verification or falsification. The idea of freedom can't be verified or _falsified_ scientifically. — waarala

Would they belong to "Ding-An-Sich"? or would they be just invention of human mind? What do we have to do or what can we do with Thing-in-itself?

Would they belong to "Ding-An-Sich"? or would they be just invention of human mind? What do we have to do or what can we do with Thing-in-itself? — Corvus

I think that the distinction between appearances and thing itself doesn't apply to them? Is the noumenon somehow beyond this distinction? Then they would be noumenons. I think Kant in fact calls ideas like that noumenons.

when the object of perception are the mental contents such as images in the past memories or imagination, which doesn't need space and time — Corvus

Every object of perception, no matter its name after its perception, is conditioned by space and time and is a mental content. Images in memory were once objects of perception, hence so conditioned. Objects of imagination may or may not be conditioned by space and time, insofar as objects of the productive imagination reside in intuition, hence are, but objects of the reproductive imagination found in understanding do not, hence are not.

Kant said, or would say that space and time still applies to the memories or imaginations for their content? — Corvus

Yep. Almost just like that. Got to keep all this in relation to time. An object in memory was at one time an experience, but as a post hoc memory, it is not. In that case, it is a thought alone, the object which was an experience a posteriori is then of consciousness a priori. Imagination is quite different, as noted above.
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Would you not agree that space and time only applies as the precondition of perception, only when the objects of the perception are the external material objects? — Corvus

I see what you mean. We’re not going to perceive anything that isn’t an external material object or caused by it. But still, there are external material objects that are not objects of perception, which sort of demands they be disassociated from each other. And when connected to the strictly internal intuitions of space and time, dialectical consistency demands that to which they apply be internal as well. External material objects are not internal…..DUH!!!!!…..so the disassociation must arise somewhere else.

In Kant, then, the external material object is that which appears, and the object of perception is the sensation afforded by that which has appeared. Now perhaps it is clear space and time have nothing to do with any of this, insofar as all that has happened thus far are simply physical manifestations, not yet subjected to intelligence.

So….no, I do not agree space and time apply to the preconditions of perception, nor that the objects of perception are external material objects.

Great points, thanks. Will mull over the points with CPR.

In Kant, then, the external material object is that which appears, and the object of perception is the sensation afforded by that which has appeared. Now perhaps it is clear space and time have nothing to do with any of this, insofar as all that has happened thus far are simply physical manifestations, not yet subjected to intelligence. — Mww

Does perception not require time? Can anything happen, even a thought or image, in the absence of time?

I would read Kant as saying that space-time is unreal thus that the subject with its experiences, perceptions and sensation is unreal. At any rate, this would be the 'perennial' view. .'Unreal' here would mean ideal.and reducible.

I'm not sure it would be possible to doubt the reality of time without doubting the reality of the entire phenomenal world. Clearly it's a real appearance, but metaphysics does not endorse the idea it is any more real than this, and according to skilled meditators neither does experience. . . .

Does perception not require time? — FrancisRay

Not metaphysically, it doesn’t, with which the thread topic is concerned. We perceive a thing, or we do not. Perception requires an object, and even if the object requires time for its relations, it does not follow that the mere perception of the object does.

I'm not sure it would be possible to doubt the reality of time without doubting the reality of the entire phenomenal world. — FrancisRay

Agreed. But that doesn’t say much. We don’t doubt the world, and if time is a necessary condition for the manifold of phenomenal representations of that world, the the reality of time is given. But, real in what sense?

If one had been in a coma for a long time, and suddenly woke up, I would imagine that he wouldn't know what time it is. But he could still perceive all the material world around him without having to know what time it is, or trying to know what time is.

Not metaphysically, it doesn’t, with which the thread topic is concerned. We perceive a thing, or we do not. Perception requires an object, and even if the object requires time for its relations, it does not follow that the mere perception of the object does. — Mww

I'm not sure what it means to say that perception doesn't require time metaphorically. It seems indisputable to me that perception requires time in order in order to to happen. Are you suggesting this isn't the case? . . .

Agreed. But that doesn’t say much. We don’t doubt the world, and if time is a necessary condition for the manifold of phenomenal representations of that world, the the reality of time is given. But, real in what sense?

This is the crucial issue. I'd suggest time is real in the same sense as the phenomena in our dreams. This is what is discovered by meditators. Meister Eckhart. for instance, tells that becoming entangled in time is the source of all our problems and advises us to become disentangled. .

It's a difficult idea but as it has yet to be refuted it must be considered.

. .

It seems indisputable to me that perception requires time in order in order to to happen. — FrancisRay

Ok. What do you think perception is?

Ok. What do you think perception is? — Mww

I believe it is a process, and as such requires time. Is this arguable? . .

From some speculative points of view, it is. Objects are given to us via perception, The most we need to say, is there is a time of perception and a time of no perception, which tacitly denies time belongs to the perception itself, but rather, to that which the perception effects.

From a physical science perspective, regarding the translation of energy by the sensory apparatus, time is an element of the process, agreed. But the human intellect doesn’t perceive scientifically, but treats perception as a mere occasion for the application of a speculative metaphysical knowledge system.
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Just like that, yes.

“You think seeing something is a simple task because it happens so rapidly and automatically, but beneath the surface it is as if a thousand high-powered scientists are labouring away. What you experience is the end result of an intensive assembly line of computational processes.”

Colin McGinn
The Making of a Philosopher

If there is a time of no perception and a time of perception then would this not suggest the necessity of time? If there were no time then our perception would be fixed in the present moment and would never change. We would be permanently frozen in a single unchanging moment of perception. .

I see what you mean in saying that the actual moment of perception is timeless, but this argument would apply to all events and processes. If we look at any individual moment it is timeless.

Awareness might be said to be timeless but perception is a process. Could it be that you're talking more here about awareness than perception? Or accidentally conflating the two? .

What you experience is the end result of an intensive assembly line of computational processes.” — FrancisRay

We’re talking about perception, which is the initiation; he’s talking about experience, which is the end, of knowledge acquisition. Experience is indeed a process in which time is a necessary element; perception is not.
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If there is a time of no perception and a time of perception then would this not suggest the necessity of time? — FrancisRay

Absolutely. But the question is to whether time belongs to perception…..

Does perception not require time? — FrancisRay

…..which implies time as a condition of perception itself, rather than as a condition of that which perceives. Taken a step further, if we say perception is that which happens to us, we have no need of the time element of it, insofar as all we are concerned with, is that it did or did not happen. When taken in such sense, it is more existence than time, which holds as primary condition. Notice also, that existence is a category, by which perception of things is even possible, but time is a mere intuition, which only makes possible distinguishing the co-existent or the successive perceptual representation of things from each other, for which the existences are already affirmed.

Okay. I don't understand your point but perhaps this is my fault.

Nahhhh….not your fault, so much as a difference in conceptual domain, perhaps. I think of perception as a mere effect, without regard to a internal process of its own. For whatever it is we think of as empirical knowledge, all perception is for, is to be the occasion by which we become aware there is something lending itself to being known.

Perception doesn’t think, judge or cognize, doesn’t experience. it’s just a bridge, from the outside to the inside.

An eye doctor, or a general physicist, may beg to differ.