Define ‘good’. It may seem pedantic to insist on ‘intra-action’, but for me it’s about being honest, acknowledging the involvement and variability of all aspects of the measurement setup in the process. The measurement process is an internal configuration, not an activity occurring between individual, pre-existing entities - despite what Newton assumes to be the case. — Possibility

The explanation of intra-action provided for me, by you from Barad, was incoherent by self-contradiction, as I explained. If agents emerge from their "intra-action" then the intra-action must be prior to, and cause the existence of the agents. This leaves the problem of what is acting in the intra-action. Barad called it "their" intra-action, but the activity cannot be "theirs" because it is prior to their existence.

What you describe here is nothing but interaction between the people measuring and the thing being measured, and is not representative of what Barad was referring to in the quote you produced for me. So I am beginning to think that your understanding of "intra-action" is not the same as Barad's

You cannot tell time from the spatial presence of a quartz crystal. Each of these three ‘objects’ provides a different set of values as its relative temporal stability, and where the quartz crystal and caesium electron differ from the sun is that there is no human being ‘doing the measurement’ at the level of the ‘object’. Once the timepiece is set up, we ignore the fact that we have created elaborate conditions for a particular, stable and recurring temporal measurement. — Possibility

I don't see you point. Even with the atomic clock, someone still has to read the clock, just like someone has to read the sun, in order that the passage of time is actually measured. There is no such difference as you claim. The parts of the clock must be precisely arranged in order that it can properly "keep time", but so must the sun and the earth be "precisely arranged" in order to keep time. But the "keeping of time" is not really done by the precisely arranged parts, it is done by the person who observes them.

We call these measurements of ‘time’ by ignoring the variability inherent within the measurement process, including the variability of the very ‘object’ being used to provide temporal stability. — Possibility

All you are saying is that measurements of time are inevitably imprecise. You and I agree here, and it appears that the reason for this imprecision is that the stability of the object, is not as perfect or ideal as we assume it to be. We ought to take this as an indication that Newton's first law, which takes the stability of the object for granted is fundamentally flawed. Therefore, "the variability inherent within the measurement process" is a feature of the principles , the theory, being applied in the measurement process. There is a model of the world, a representation, or map, the Newtonian representation which assumes as a fundamental principle the stability of an object, but this model is fundamentally flawed. However, our measurements of time are based in the Newtonian representation.

But it does allow for it. Spacetime fuses the three dimensions of space and one of time, not into a 3+1 structure, but into a four-dimensional continuum. — Possibility

Any sort of "dimensional continuum" is problematic from the outset. From what it means to be continuous, a continuum cannot have distinct dimensions. So the dimensions of space are arbitrary to begin with. And that this dimensional model cannot adequately represent space is indicated by the irrational nature of pi and of the square root of two. It appears like it might require an infinite number of spatial dimensions to properly represent space as dimensional, but this would be equally problematic. Making time another dimension just magnifies the failures of the dimensional model.

So there is no set or assumed configuration of dimensional structure in spacetime, and that’s the point. — Possibility

This is exactly why the dimensional representation fails. It is completely arbitrary, therefore it is based on nothing real. It is not based in, or does not start in any real aspects of space or time. And of course, space and time must have very real properties as quantum physics demonstrates. So this type of dimensional representation is not based in anything real, and does not capture the real nature of space and time.

Except that mass is not really as stable or inert as it appears. Look closer, and you’ll find activity. The capacity to measure time with a caesium electron is dependent on measuring momentum regardless of its position (as above). Yet the macroscopic state of an atomic clock presents as apparent inertia, with one particular variable having the characteristics of time. — Possibility

Momentum is a Newtonian principle, tied up with mass and inertia. This is why our measurements of time are based in Newtonian physics, which assumes the continuous existence of the massive object, as per the first law.

To emerge’ means to become apparent or visible - there is no temporal order or actual separation implied. It is entirely possible for the emergence, the ‘object’, and the activity to BE or even become simultaneously. — Possibility

This cannot be true. "To become" implies a coming into being, which is a temporal order of not being then being. If the object emerges from the activity, as described by Barad, then there is activity temporally prior to the being of the object, as it becomes during the activity.

We speak about ‘generations’ as events in time, but there is no point in time where one generation ends and another begins for everyone - only between two family members. — Possibility

A generality is not an event, which is a particular. When you refer to "generations" here, you are not referring to events, but to a generalized notion of "a generation". When we speak of the relations between family members we speak of events.

An event, by definition, is something that occurs in time - has temporality - but that doesn’t mean all events fit into some universal linear order. It seems nice and logical, but doesn’t correspond to reality. — Possibility

No, your use of "generations" as if "generation X" is an event, is what does not correspond with reality. This is very similar to the issue above with four dimensional spacetime. It's a useful principle, but its usefulness is derived from the fact that it may be arbitrarily applied, and this is what means that it does not correspond with reality.

Define ‘good’. It may seem pedantic to insist on ‘intra-action’, but for me it’s about being honest, acknowledging the involvement and variability of all aspects of the measurement setup in the process. The measurement process is an internal configuration, not an activity occurring between individual, pre-existing entities - despite what Newton assumes to be the case.
— Possibility

The explanation of intra-action provided for me, by you from Barad, was incoherent by self-contradiction, as I explained. If agents emerge from their "intra-action" then the intra-action must be prior to, and cause the existence of the agents. This leaves the problem of what is acting in the intra-action. Barad called it "their" intra-action, but the activity cannot be "theirs" because it is prior to their existence.

What you describe here is nothing but interaction between the people measuring and the thing being measured, and is not representative of what Barad was referring to in the quote you produced for me. So I am beginning to think that your understanding of "intra-action" is not the same as Barad's — Metaphysician Undercover

First of all, you are reading more into what I describe than what is here. Read it again. There is nothing in what I’ve written that deviates from Barad’s explanation - except that my word choice has maybe opened the door for you to insert your own assumptions. Unless you somehow missed my use of ‘not’ in what I described…?

Where do you get this assumption that an emergence must exist prior to what emerges? Why does there need to be a what is acting? And don’t say because Newton said so - let’s not try to flog that dead horse again. Quantum mechanics has proven over and over again that ‘objects’ emerge through (not from) activity, with boundaries and properties that are materially relative to that activity. I would say that what exists prior to intra-action is a variability of values in potentiality - but that’s really only one possible way to describe it.

Barad calls it ‘their’ intra-action because everything that ‘they’ become within that intra-action is involved in the activity, and nothing else. There is no creator, no first cause, no ‘external’ forces. Materialisation is an intra-action - an internal configuration - of variable values, from potentiality to actuality.

I don't see you point. Even with the atomic clock, someone still has to read the clock, just like someone has to read the sun, in order that the passage of time is actually measured. There is no such difference as you claim. The parts of the clock must be precisely arranged in order that it can properly "keep time", but so must the sun and the earth be "precisely arranged" in order to keep time. But the "keeping of time" is not really done by the precisely arranged parts, it is done by the person who observes them. — Metaphysician Undercover

The difference is between internal and external arrangement. Someone is observing the changing position of the sun relative to themselves. But in the case of the clock, ‘someone’ is not observing the position of the quartz crystal relative to themselves. We cannot observe the change that ‘keeps time’. We can only read changes in the apparatuses: the original frequency is amplified to generate an electric pulse which is digitally ‘counted’. To say that we are the only ones keeping time is hubris: denying agency to this internal material arrangement of the timepiece.

When we ‘keep time’ with the quartz clock we are part of a cascade of internal configurations - within phenomena - that necessarily involve all of the precisely arranged parts, in a ‘clock’ body, keeping time for us through various prostheses. And we are materially entangled with these internal arrangements - the digital count reading the electric pulse reading the amplifier reading the vibrating crystal - whenever we ‘read’ the time as marks on the clock face. And each of these measurement ‘events’ is not ordered in time but roughly simultaneous and NOT identical.

There is a model of the world, a representation, or map, the Newtonian representation which assumes as a fundamental principle the stability of an object, but this model is fundamentally flawed. However, our measurements of time are based in the Newtonian representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we agree here - EXCEPT that it is not necessarily our measurements of time, but the material-discursive practice by which we describe this measurement, that is based in the flawed Newtonian representation.

But it does allow for it. Spacetime fuses the three dimensions of space and one of time, not into a 3+1 structure, but into a four-dimensional continuum.
— Possibility

Any sort of "dimensional continuum" is problematic from the outset. From what it means to be continuous, a continuum cannot have distinct dimensions. So the dimensions of space are arbitrary to begin with. And that this dimensional model cannot adequately represent space is indicated by the irrational nature of pi and of the square root of two. It appears like it might require an infinite number of spatial dimensions to properly represent space as dimensional, but this would be equally problematic. Making time another dimension just magnifies the failures of the dimensional model. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m not trying to represent space here. Spacetime is a mathematical structure of non-commutative relations. Any continuum is just a continuous series of variability, the logical structure of which is that the extremes are vastly different from each other. A one-dimensional or linear continuum is a single variation that continues in a series. This, for me, can only be time, as no other variable can logically exist - without relation to another variable - as anything other than variability itself, which is time for us.

A two-dimensional continuum is a variable plane - but not necessarily a geometrical one. It’s just describing a relation between two variables. And now either of those variables could exist as time, or distance, or direction, or energy, etc. And the universe begins to take shape, as it were.

It’s not that dimensions are arbitrary, but that values seem to be. Dimensions are a method of describing the non-commutative quality of relations between certain values in reality.

FWIW, I have found that the logical structure of reality as a multi-dimensional continuum (a qualitative relational structure between variabilities) maxes out at just six dimensions. At that point, it is pure relation. Which is to say that if absolutely everything matters, then nothing does.

So there is no set or assumed configuration of dimensional structure in spacetime, and that’s the point.
— Possibility

This is exactly why the dimensional representation fails. It is completely arbitrary, therefore it is based on nothing real. It is not based in, or does not start in any real aspects of space or time. And of course, space and time must have very real properties as quantum physics demonstrates. So this type of dimensional representation is not based in anything real, and does not capture the real nature of space and time. — Metaphysician Undercover

In quantum physics, real properties are measurable, as variable values. Dimensionality describes the non-commutative quality of their relational structure - that some measurement values are not interchangeable, like position and momentum. It is the only model that does capture the nature of reality in this sense. It is the values that are arbitrary - measuring/observing a different variable produces a different configuration - like measuring the frequency of electron spin instead of quartz crystal oscillations. You’re still measuring the same dimensional quality: time.

Momentum is a Newtonian principle, tied up with mass and inertia. This is why our measurements of time are based in Newtonian physics, which assumes the continuous existence of the massive object, as per the first law. — Metaphysician Undercover

Momentum is tied to mass and velocity, not inertia. This is post-Einstein physics - basic stuff, really. Forget Newton - his assumptions regarding inertia are fundamentally wrong.

This cannot be true. "To become" implies a coming into being, which is a temporal order of not being then being. If the object emerges from the activity, as described by Barad, then there is activity temporally prior to the being of the object, as it becomes during the activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read what you wrote. You are arguing that an activity of ‘not being’ must precede the being of an object. Time prior to space.

A generality is not an event, which is a particular. When you refer to "generations" here, you are not referring to events, but to a generalized notion of "a generation". When we speak of the relations between family members we speak of events. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying that no event can occur within another event? That a music festival, in which a number of acts perform, is not an event because it contains events within it? And a single instrument being played during one of those acts is or is not an event? And a chord being struck? I want to be clear on what you’re arguing here…

First of all, you are reading more into what I describe than what is here. Read it again. There is nothing in what I’ve written that deviates from Barad’s explanation - except that my word choice has maybe opened the door for you to insert your own assumptions. Unless you somehow missed my use of ‘not’ in what I described…? — Possibility

Look what your quote from Barad said though:

In contrast to the usual ‘interaction’, which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. — Karen Barad

Notice that the distinct agencies are said to emerge through "their" intra-action. This is what is incoherent. "Emerge" means to come into being. So if the agencies emerge trough this activity, the activity must precede the agencies in time. But "their" intra-action implies that the intra-action is a property of the agencies which emerge. Therefore the sentence quoted implies that the activities which are the properties of the agencies precedes the existence of the agencies. How is this logically possible, that a thing's actions precede the existence of the thing?

You say "The measurement process is an internal configuration, not an activity occurring between individual, pre-existing entities", but I have no idea what this means. If it's not "internal" to pre-existing entities, then what's it internal to? It appears to me, that instead of facing Barad's incoherency you try to obscure the meaning by saying that the intra-action is "internal" without indicating a type of thing which it is internal to.

Where do you get this assumption that an emergence must exist prior to what emerges? — Possibility

"Emerge" means to become, to come into being. And becoming implies a cause, therefore something from which the emerging thing emerges from, whether or not you use the term "from" or "through". You can insist that something can come into being without a cause if you like, but that's just the unacceptable notion of something coming from nothing.

When we ‘keep time’ with the quartz clock we are part of a cascade of internal configurations - within phenomena - that necessarily involve all of the precisely arranged parts, in a ‘clock’ body, keeping time for us through various prostheses. And we are materially entangled with these internal arrangements - the digital count reading the electric pulse reading the amplifier reading the vibrating crystal - whenever we ‘read’ the time as marks on the clock face. And each of these measurement ‘events’ is not ordered in time but roughly simultaneous and NOT identical. — Possibility

This is your obscure notion again, of "internal configurations". Now you say that the configuration is internal to phenomena. "Phenomena" is just a generalization, a universal, a conception. So now, if we are talking about an internal arrangement of parts, we are talking about a logical arrangement, a conceptual structure, conceptual parts arranged by a logical priority. We are not talking about an arrangement of physical parts. "Phenomena" refers to what appears to the senses, and we sense the external of things, not the internally arranged parts. We use logic to model internal arrangements, but then this is not what is actually internal to the phenomena, if "phenomena" is supposed to represent real physical events or objects, but a logically produced model of the "internal" of such.

A two-dimensional continuum is a variable plane - but not necessarily a geometrical one. It’s just describing a relation between two variables. And now either of those variables could exist as time, or distance, or direction, or energy, etc. And the universe begins to take shape, as it were. — Possibility

There is no universe here beginning to take shape, because you have only presented ideals, a two dimensional plane. There is no substance here, nor is there any activity here because there is nothing to be active, no agency. All you have is two ideal dimensions, and nothing taking any shape whatsoever, just the basis for a conceptual model.

Read what you wrote. You are arguing that an activity of ‘not being’ must precede the being of an object. Time prior to space. — Possibility

Exactly. That's what I am arguing for, time must be understood as prior to space if our intention is to understand the nature of reality.

Are you saying that no event can occur within another event? That a music festival, in which a number of acts perform, is not an event because it contains events within it? And a single instrument being played during one of those acts is or is not an event? And a chord being struck? I want to be clear on what you’re arguing here… — Possibility

What I am saying is that "a music festival" refers to something general, a universal, a concept or ideal, and therefore not any particular real event. Likewise for "a generation". To refer to an event, we need to specify a particular music event, or a particular family relation.

This has nothing to do with "events within", it's a matter of the difference between talking about a general idea (a concept or universal), and a particular event. You agreed that any particular event must have a temporal order. Then you went on to say that it is not necessary that all events have a temporal order.

To judge the truth or falsity of this, we must determine what "all events" refers to. Your example, "a generation", indicates that it refers to a generalization, a universal, and not anything real in the physical universe, just an ideal. But I do not think that this is what you had in mind. I think you want "all events" to refer to a compilation of all real physical events, rather than to a concept or ideal. If so, then aren't you just treating all real physical events as a single event, and therefore this particular event must follow the rule that all events have a temporal order?

And if you are treating the compilation of all real physical events as something other than a single particular event, then you need to explain what type of a thing this is, which you are referring to, and how it is possible that all events could exist together as something other than an event. Normally, when we talk about a bunch of events existing together as a single unit, we are just speaking about a bigger event, as your example of music festivals shows. And in the same way that the small event (a chord being struck), has a temporal order, the big event (the specified music event itself) must also have a temporal order, as all events have a temporal order.

Notice that the distinct agencies are said to emerge through "their" intra-action. This is what is incoherent. "Emerge" means to come into being. So if the agencies emerge trough this activity, the activity must precede the agencies in time. But "their" intra-action implies that the intra-action is a property of the agencies which emerge. Therefore the sentence quoted implies that the activities which are the properties of the agencies precedes the existence of the agencies. How is this logically possible, that a thing's actions precede the existence of the thing? — Metaphysician Undercover

The agencies are differentiating, not distinct. Distinct implies separation, which Barad is very careful NOT to imply. There is a lot of Newtonian assumption built into our use of language, and you’re displaying it here. Agency is not a thing, but activity. Agencies emerge through differentiating, which is intra-action. Just as the particular striking of a chord emerges though a particular song performance, emerging through a particular set emerging through a particular music festival. These are not things but events. So we’re not talking about properties of things, but involvement in events. You can assume that a song existed prior to the festival, but we both agree that we’re talking about particular events, not generalities. We’re talking about a particular performance - one that did not exist, with these boundaries and properties, until it was actually happening.

You say "The measurement process is an internal configuration, not an activity occurring between individual, pre-existing entities", but I have no idea what this means. If it's not "internal" to pre-existing entities, then what's it internal to? It appears to me, that instead of facing Barad's incoherency you try to obscure the meaning by saying that the intra-action is "internal" without indicating a type of thing which it is internal to. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m not trying to obscure anything. I can’t force a paradigm shift on you, but we are not talking about ‘things’ at all. Language convention leads you to assume that ‘agency’, ‘intra-action’ or ‘event’ in a position of noun means they are individual, pre-existing things or entities. But we’re talking about events within events within events. As Barad says, it matters whether you are talking about an event from inside (in which you are necessarily involved), or from ‘outside’ (where the ‘event’ is internally configured, and treated quantum mechanically).

What I am saying is that "a music festival" refers to something general, a universal, a concept or ideal, and therefore not any particular real event. Likewise for "a generation". To refer to an event, we need to specify a particular music event, or a particular family relation.

This has nothing to do with "events within", it's a matter of the difference between talking about a general idea (a concept or universal), and a particular event. You agreed that any particular event must have a temporal order. Then you went on to say that it is not necessary that all events have a temporal order.

To judge the truth or falsity of this, we must determine what "all events" refers to. Your example, "a generation", indicates that it refers to a generalization, a universal, and not anything real in the physical universe, just an ideal. But I do not think that this is what you had in mind. I think you want "all events" to refer to a compilation of all real physical events, rather than to a concept or ideal. If so, then aren't you just treating all real physical events as a single event, and therefore this particular event must follow the rule that all events have a temporal order?

And if you are treating the compilation of all real physical events as something other than a single particular event, then you need to explain what type of a thing this is, which you are referring to, and how it is possible that all events could exist together as something other than an event. Normally, when we talk about a bunch of events existing together as a single unit, we are just speaking about a bigger event, as your example of music festivals shows. And in the same way that the small event (a chord being struck), has a temporal order, the big event (the specified music event itself) must also have a temporal order, as all events have a temporal order. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I said was that each event has a temporal structure, which can appear linear from within it. When you perceive a particular event from outside it, however, it has to include the other three dimensions, and so is structurally similar to spacetime, which it seems you assume to be something external to or other than the ‘physical’ universe. I am saying there is no ‘external’ perspective of reality - the dimensional perspective here is of an internal configuration to the event, and this is where quantum mechanics comes in. Because if we are observing the internal structure of an event, then we are necessarily involved, and if we are outside, then its internal configuration is unobservable, and must be treated quantum mechanically (ie. like spacetime).

A paradigm shift is required here that inverts our understanding of reality from the traditional one in which we assume that objects precede activity. Without this inversion, we will always assume duality. Because we understand that thinking precedes thought.

There is no universe here beginning to take shape, because you have only presented ideals, a two dimensional plane. There is no substance here, nor is there any activity here because there is nothing to be active, no agency. All you have is two ideal dimensions, and nothing taking any shape whatsoever, just the basis for a conceptual model.

Read what you wrote. You are arguing that an activity of ‘not being’ must precede the being of an object. Time prior to space.
— Possibility

Exactly. That's what I am arguing for, time must be understood as prior to space if our intention is to understand the nature of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with your last statement here, and I think this is important. QM demonstrates that time is prior to space. So why do you keep bringing Newton into the discussion and insisting on ‘substance’ by way of ‘things’? Are you suggesting that objects exist prior to space? That time is not activity? Or that activity is not agency? This is what baffles me about your approach.

—-

I’m starting to work out where we seem to be talking across purposes. So I want to go right back to your first comment on this thread in order to try and clarify, before I run out of steam on this discussion:

I, am an impenetrable fortress. Nothing, I repeat nothing, from that "external world" can infiltrate my defenses, and move me. All which exists within my mind comes from the inside. Thus is my reality.

There is however, a sense in which ideas come to my mind from somewhere other than my mind. Since they cannot penetrate through my fortress, and enter from the external, and "ghostly phenomena" is silly talk, I conclude that they enter my mind through "inner space". And since the ideas which enter my mind through inner space seem to be very similar to the ideas which enter your mind through inner space, I can conclude that we are very well connected through inner space…it's good to understand "inner space" in terms of disembodiment because there cannot be any spatial extension, which is a requirement for bodies, in the intensional realm. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that ‘my reality’ can only ever be internally structured, but I disagree that ‘I am an impenetrable fortress’. Rather, I am an event, a spacetime structure of particular and ongoing internal reconfiguration, entangled with all of reality in our mutual becoming, with which I collaborate to enact an agential cut with every intra-action, every material-discursive practice, marking boundaries and properties that, despite my best intentions, are continually changing. When we invert our understanding of reality from space/objects as prior to time/activity, to time/activity prior to space/objects, then disembodiment is not a question of ‘spatial extension’ to a body, but of arbitrarily differentiating the ‘body’ from being.

The agencies are differentiating, not distinct. Distinct implies separation, which Barad is very careful NOT to imply. There is a lot of Newtonian assumption built into our use of language, and you’re displaying it here. Agency is not a thing, but activity. Agencies emerge through differentiating, which is intra-action. Just as the particular striking of a chord emerges though a particular song performance, emerging through a particular set emerging through a particular music festival. These are not things but events. So we’re not talking about properties of things, but involvement in events. You can assume that a song existed prior to the festival, but we both agree that we’re talking about particular events, not generalities. We’re talking about a particular performance - one that did not exist, with these boundaries and properties, until it was actually happening. — Possibility

Again, you are hiding (obscuring) the issue through ambiguity and sloppy use of terms. "Agency" refers to the actions of an agent. So this part of what you say: " Agency is not a thing, but activity" is true. But this part of what you say: "So we’re not talking about properties of things" is false. The term used, "agency", implies necessarily that the activity referred to is the property of a thing an agent. That there are distinct agents (as distinct entities) is the only way that Barad has the capacity to speak of distinct "agencies". Otherwise we just have a whole bunch of activity, and no capacity to speak of distinct agencies within this activity.

If we respect this difference, then a number of problems become evident. First, any intra-action activity which is prior to the emergence of agents, cannot be called agency, and it then becomes fundamentally unintelligible. It is activity without anything which is active, because there is no agent, like motion without anything which is moving. This is a fundamental issue with our understanding of electromagnetic energy. Without the ether which is required to understand the waves of electromagnetism, there are waves without a substance which is undergoing the wave activity. Failure to identify the ether has rendered electromagnetic waves as unintelligible to us, motion without anything moving.

Another problem is the issue of how distinct agents could emerge. We have first, activity without any distinct agents. This is a sort of random activity which is fundamentally unintelligible because it is designated as having no agents, nothing which the activity is a property of. Then, from this emerges activity which can be attributed to distinct agents. This is a significant change of category for the proposed type of activity, "intra-action", and we need to account for how such a change could occur.

That is why "intra-action" is really a very misleading sort of proposal. It classes both these very different forms of activity, the unintelligible activity of action without any thing acting, together with intelligible activity, agency, as if the difference between these two is insignificant. In reality, it becomes fundamentally incoherent to try and conceptualize action without an agent suddenly becoming the action of an agent because we need to know where the agent popped from.

I’m not trying to obscure anything. I can’t force a paradigm shift on you, but we are not talking about ‘things’ at all. Language convention leads you to assume that ‘agency’, ‘intra-action’ or ‘event’ in a position of noun means they are individual, pre-existing things or entities. But we’re talking about events within events within events. As Barad says, it matters whether you are talking about an event from inside (in which you are necessarily involved), or from ‘outside’ (where the ‘event’ is internally configured, and treated quantum mechanically). — Possibility

The problem is that "agency" implies an agent which is active, that is how the word is commonly used. Therefore the use of this word, if what is meant is activity without an agent, is a deceptive usage. And if we look at the idea of activity without an agent which is active, then we have an unintelligible proposal. So we ought to conclude that Barad uses the term "agency", or "agencies", intentional, to obscure the fact that what is being proposed is fundamentally unintelligible.

An event without anything involved in that event is unintelligible. And event within event, within event, within event, etc., produces an infinite regress with no substance to the world. This is the very same problem as if we say that matter is infinitely divisible. Each piece of matter can be divided to smaller pieces, infinitely, and the world has no substance.

What I said was that each event has a temporal structure, which can appear linear from within it. When you perceive a particular event from outside it, however, it has to include the other three dimensions, and so is structurally similar to spacetime, which it seems you assume to be something external to or other than the ‘physical’ universe. I am saying there is no ‘external’ perspective of reality - the dimensional perspective here is of an internal configuration to the event, and this is where quantum mechanics comes in. Because if we are observing the internal structure of an event, then we are necessarily involved, and if we are outside, then its internal configuration is unobservable, and must be treated quantum mechanically (ie. like spacetime). — Possibility

If you place yourself, as the subject, within the universe, then you are the agent. "The universe" is a creation of your senses, perception, and mind. The only way to get an "internal configuration" is to understand your own mind and perceptual apparatus, as to how phenomena, and concepts are created by your mind. Otherwise, you look at the universe as something external to your mind.

To be blunt, it is impossible to observe the internal configuration of an event, unless that event is internal to your own body. That's simply the way that sense observation works, any time we make sense observations we observe from the outside inward, and it is impossible to observe the internal configuration. Therefore your portrayal of quantum mechanics as observing the internal configuration of events, is misguided, and simply wrong.

I agree with your last statement here, and I think this is important. QM demonstrates that time is prior to space. So why do you keep bringing Newton into the discussion and insisting on ‘substance’ by way of ‘things’? Are you suggesting that objects exist prior to space? That time is not activity? Or that activity is not agency? This is what baffles me about your approach. — Possibility

"Space" ought to be understood as the property of objects, I think you mentioned this already. That is how the concept has been developed. We produced a concept of space for the purpose of measuring and understanding the properties of objects, so our "space" is fundamentally derived from and therefore refers to the property of objects. Objects are logically prior to space.

This means that we need to go further than space to ground, or substantiate, the existence of objects. Traditionally this was done through concept of "matter". The Aristotelian concept of matter has matter as described in terms of "potential", which is basically possibility. So matter is the potential for change, but this potential itself needs to be grounded in something substantial, and in the Aristotelian conception, this is time. Therefore matter is represented as that which does not change through the passage of time (represented now by conservation laws, mass or energy). This is represented by Newton's first law, which even today maintains its position as the basic premise of physics. This implies that the fundamental grounding, or the fundamental substance of the universe is temporal in nature. The problem is that Newton's first law does not adequately apprehend the nature of temporal extension.

I agree that ‘my reality’ can only ever be internally structured, but I disagree that ‘I am an impenetrable fortress’. Rather, I am an event, a spacetime structure of particular and ongoing internal reconfiguration, entangled with all of reality in our mutual becoming, with which I collaborate to enact an agential cut with every intra-action, every material-discursive practice, marking boundaries and properties that, despite my best intentions, are continually changing. When we invert our understanding of reality from space/objects as prior to time/activity, to time/activity prior to space/objects, then disembodiment is not a question of ‘spatial extension’ to a body, but of arbitrarily differentiating the ‘body’ from being. — Possibility

Consider that "impenetrable fortress" refers to the outside, and nothing crosses the external boundary. Things relating to each other externally through space, is how we model things, but try for a minute to imagine all real relations as through the inside. At each moment of passing time, everything comes from the inside, moving in an outward direction (as indicated by the concept of spatial expansion). So all true relations are through the inside, in the upward direction of time, because change must be initiated prior to the material effects being instantiated at the present moment. This means that all real events, as being causal, actually occur in the inside of space, while the outward expression is just the effect of the true internal event. I used to think of the passing of time as a process which involves the inverting of space. At each moment when time passes, spatial existence inverts from inside to outside.

so our "space" is fundamentally derived from and therefore refers to the property of objects. Objects are logically prior to space — Metaphysician Undercover

Even in more abstract mathematics this is true. For example, when one describes a way to measure "distances" between finite contours in the complex plane, one begins the construction of a "metric space" for these objects.

Again, you are hiding (obscuring) the issue through ambiguity and sloppy use of terms. "Agency" refers to the actions of an agent. So this part of what you say: " Agency is not a thing, but activity" is true. But this part of what you say: "So we’re not talking about properties of things" is false. The term used, "agency", implies necessarily that the activity referred to is the property of a thing an agent. That there are distinct agents (as distinct entities) is the only way that Barad has the capacity to speak of distinct "agencies". Otherwise we just have a whole bunch of activity, and no capacity to speak of distinct agencies within this activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agency: action or intervention producing a particular effect (from Medieval Latin agent-, doing).

This definition does not imply (necessarily or otherwise) that agency is a property of a thing or agent - you are making one of those Newtonian assumptions again. And again, not ‘distinct’, but differentiating agencies. Because we DO just have a whole bunch of activity. The capacity to speak of differentiating agencies within activity is still there - we just need to shed some institutionalised assumptions.

But it seems you are so taken with beliefs in representationalism and human exceptionalism that you refuse to accept this. The notion that humanity is not so central and immovable, and that the conventions surrounding grammatical structure are insufficient to ‘represent’ reality, seem too terrifying to contemplate. But just like the work of Darwin and Copernicus before him, the evidence in quantum mechanics is irrefutable. So we must accept it, and do our best to embrace the information and move forward, rather than try to bracket it out.

If we respect this difference, then a number of problems become evident. First, any intra-action activity which is prior to the emergence of agents, cannot be called agency, and it then becomes fundamentally unintelligible. It is activity without anything which is active, because there is no agent, like motion without anything which is moving. This is a fundamental issue with our understanding of electromagnetic energy. Without the ether which is required to understand the waves of electromagnetism, there are waves without a substance which is undergoing the wave activity. Failure to identify the ether has rendered electromagnetic waves as unintelligible to us, motion without anything moving.

Another problem is the issue of how distinct agents could emerge. We have first, activity without any distinct agents. This is a sort of random activity which is fundamentally unintelligible because it is designated as having no agents, nothing which the activity is a property of. Then, from this emerges activity which can be attributed to distinct agents. This is a significant change of category for the proposed type of activity, "intra-action", and we need to account for how such a change could occur.

That is why "intra-action" is really a very misleading sort of proposal. It classes both these very different forms of activity, the unintelligible activity of action without any thing acting, together with intelligible activity, agency, as if the difference between these two is insignificant. In reality, it becomes fundamentally incoherent to try and conceptualize action without an agent suddenly becoming the action of an agent because we need to know where the agent popped from. — Metaphysician Undercover

Electromagnetic waves are not unintelligible - they’re just incompatible with representationalism. Without this and other Newtonian assumptions, there is simply no need for any of these acrobatics. The notion of an ‘ether’ is just trying to allay fears: an attempt to describe electromagnetic energy without abandoning representationalism.

If you place yourself, as the subject, within the universe, then you are the agent. "The universe" is a creation of your senses, perception, and mind. The only way to get an "internal configuration" is to understand your own mind and perceptual apparatus, as to how phenomena, and concepts are created by your mind. Otherwise, you look at the universe as something external to your mind.

To be blunt, it is impossible to observe the internal configuration of an event, unless that event is internal to your own body. That's simply the way that sense observation works, any time we make sense observations we observe from the outside inward, and it is impossible to observe the internal configuration. Therefore your portrayal of quantum mechanics as observing the internal configuration of events, is misguided, and simply wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

A couple of important points. First of all, you ARE within the universe, always - and not necessarily as the subject, let alone the agent. There is no outside to the universe. This is the irrefutable fact of quantum mechanics.

But of course, we use language to describe ‘the universe’, and it is this description that is a creation of our senses, perception and mind. And in that description, we prefer to configure ourselves as either an independent external observer or as subject/agent. So we participate in the becoming of the world accordingly, enacting exclusions through material-discursive practices, with little to no regard for what we exclude from mattering. Because we assume that ‘we’ are the only active beings (until we need to absolve ourselves of responsibility).

I want to be clear that I am not arguing that the universe is internal OR external to the mind, but that it is BOTH - and that the boundary you consider to be ‘impenetrable’ is just one more agential cut we participate in enacting. This is not an activity we accomplish alone as ‘agent’, but is necessarily an ongoing collaboration of material agency in the world, of which we are a part.

Secondly, I didn’t say quantum mechanics observes the internal configuration of events - I specifically said this is unobservable. The observations we make from inside an event enable us to perceive an internal configuration - one that necessarily incudes us. Quantum mechanics understands that specific events have specific internal configurations, but that certain measurement events follow an internal logical pattern or structure. With this understanding, we can calculate predictions for our participation in specific events, based on these patterns, by enacting certain measurements as intra-action.

"Space" ought to be understood as the property of objects, I think you mentioned this already. That is how the concept has been developed. We produced a concept of space for the purpose of measuring and understanding the properties of objects, so our "space" is fundamentally derived from and therefore refers to the property of objects. Objects are logically prior to space.

This means that we need to go further than space to ground, or substantiate, the existence of objects. Traditionally this was done through concept of "matter". The Aristotelian concept of matter has matter as described in terms of "potential", which is basically possibility. So matter is the potential for change, but this potential itself needs to be grounded in something substantial, and in the Aristotelian conception, this is time. Therefore matter is represented as that which does not change through the passage of time (represented now by conservation laws, mass or energy). This is represented by Newton's first law, which even today maintains its position as the basic premise of physics. This implies that the fundamental grounding, or the fundamental substance of the universe is temporal in nature. The problem is that Newton's first law does not adequately apprehend the nature of temporal extension. — Metaphysician Undercover

“An object at rest remains at rest, and an object in motion remains in motion at constant speed and in a straight line unless acted on by an unbalanced force.“

What Newton’s first law fails to apprehend is that the nature of ‘time’, as the substantial ground of matter, is agency. Matter is a perceived relative stability amidst that agency, and Newton’s first law is a description of that perception which brackets out the inherent variability of that ‘ground’.

This need to ground or substantiate reality is a condition of affect. To accurately substantiate reality, we must recognise not just that we unavoidably affect reality, but that we are unavoidably affected by it, to some extent. Always.

Consider that "impenetrable fortress" refers to the outside, and nothing crosses the external boundary. Things relating to each other externally through space, is how we model things, but try for a minute to imagine all real relations as through the inside. At each moment of passing time, everything comes from the inside, moving in an outward direction (as indicated by the concept of spatial expansion). So all true relations are through the inside, in the upward direction of time, because change must be initiated prior to the material effects being instantiated at the present moment. This means that all real events, as being causal, actually occur in the inside of space, while the outward expression is just the effect of the true internal event. I used to think of the passing of time as a process which involves the inverting of space. At each moment when time passes, spatial existence inverts from inside to outside. — Metaphysician Undercover

I used to think of existence as consisting of three different dimensional structures: the external universe, my constructed conceptual reality, and a biochemical construction of affect in the brain/body that enables interaction between the two. These days, I find it is all one reality, because I recognise time as more than just a linear structure. So I do follow what you’re describing here. I just think your understanding of time is based on a limited perspective, which forces you to accept a dualism. That “everything comes from the inside, moving in an outward direction” is an arbitrary description of causality based on a limited perception of time. But time and causality are not the same.

When you say that “change must be initiated prior to the material effects being instantiated at the present moment”, you’re referring to an internal configuration of the instantiated change. What is ‘occurring in the inside of space’ is simply your ongoing constructed prediction - a configuration of activity based on the information available. One that is structured more sufficiently (in terms of homeostasis) than accurately.

The thing is that our conceptual reality (inner ‘space’) is not restricted to three dimensions, or even four. It is not grounded in temporality, but in pure relation, differentiating into logical, qualitative and dynamic potential. Of course, for it to be accurate and applicable, it must adhere to the logical, qualitative and dynamic structure of ‘the outside’. We need to regularly test our models, and keep them open to adjustment and correction. So it cannot be an ‘impenetrable fortress’, except that we often strive to make it appear so.

There is no outside to the universe. This is the irrefutable fact of quantum mechanics. — Possibility

How's that? Just curious. :chin:

How's that? Just curious. :chin: — jgill

:yikes: Ok, I’ll admit that it’s a matter of interpretation. Let’s strike that emotional outburst from the argument, and put it down to frustration…

I entered this discussion in response to the question of whether it’s even possible to avoid dualism. But I’ve waded in well past my comfortable depth (and I appreciate the lifeline). I continue to stand by my argument that treating time quantum mechanically is an important step in eliminating dualism. But I will endeavour to be more careful in making claims about QM.

I continue to stand by my argument that treating time quantum mechanically is an important step in eliminating dualism — Possibility

No problem. But, could you summerize what you are saying here about time?

Agency: action or intervention producing a particular effect (from Medieval Latin agent-, doing).

This definition does not imply (necessarily or otherwise) that agency is a property of a thing or agent - you are making one of those Newtonian assumptions again. And again, not ‘distinct’, but differentiating agencies. Because we DO just have a whole bunch of activity. The capacity to speak of differentiating agencies within activity is still there - we just need to shed some institutionalised assumptions. — Possibility

It has nothing to do with Newton, but Barad clearly was talking about "distinct agencies" which emerge through intra-action. So even by your definition we have the problem I mentioned of a multitude of particular agencies coming into being, from a general sort of "agency". The general sort is unintelligible as motion without anything which is moving is incoherent. And so this sort of ontology ought not be accepted, because its basic presumptions, or premises, renders the coming into being of things, objects, as unintelligible. That is the recurring problem of all sorts of materialism in general.

I do not understand why you are so obsessed with defending this position, to the point that you incessantly deny the problems which I point to.

But it seems you are so taken with beliefs in representationalism and human exceptionalism that you refuse to accept this. The notion that humanity is not so central and immovable, and that the conventions surrounding grammatical structure are insufficient to ‘represent’ reality, seem too terrifying to contemplate. But just like the work of Darwin and Copernicus before him, the evidence in quantum mechanics is irrefutable. So we must accept it, and do our best to embrace the information and move forward, rather than try to bracket it out. — Possibility

You cannot circumvent the fact that your own personal mind is central, and immovable from any sort of ontology which you might believe in, or propose to others. Pretending otherwise, is self-deception, and then your proposals are attempts at deceiving others.

Yes, our current, conventional grammatical structure is insufficient to represent reality, but this is simply a reflection of a fundamental lack of understanding. Human grammatical structures evolve with human understanding, so grammatical insufficiencies are not paramount to misunderstanding, they can be overcome. Grammatical problems can be resolved in the evolution of understanding.

This underscores the need for clear and precise definitions in ontology, and demonstrates why yours and Barad's use of ambiguity in terms like "intra-action", and "agencies", is misleading, and conducive to misunderstanding. You obscure the unintelligibility and incoherency of your ontology with ambiguity, then produce definitions as required, but the definition is insufficient to account for the complete scope of the usage. This means that any usage outside the provided definition, is equivocation.

What quantum mechanics ought to indicate to you, is that we do not have the principles required for understanding the complete nature of reality. If we must accept the evidence of quantum mechanics, then we must accept this, that the theories by which we approach the foundations of the universe are faulty.

Electromagnetic waves are not unintelligible - they’re just incompatible with representationalism. Without this and other Newtonian assumptions, there is simply no need for any of these acrobatics. The notion of an ‘ether’ is just trying to allay fears: an attempt to describe electromagnetic energy without abandoning representationalism. — Possibility

That a wave only occurs in a medium, is not a "Newtonian assumption", it is simply the way that we understand the occurrence of waves. You are the one insisting that we need to talk "physics". Do you understand the physics of waves? Electromagnetic waves are unintelligible within the precepts of any theory which denies the reality of an ether, because waves without a substance, through which the waves propagate, is an incoherent notion.

I just think your understanding of time is based on a limited perspective, which forces you to accept a dualism. — Possibility

Any true account of time requires dualism because of the substantial difference between past and future. All forms of monism display a gross misunderstanding of time.

What is ‘occurring in the inside of space’ is simply your ongoing constructed prediction - a configuration of activity based on the information available. — Possibility

It is not "prediction" that I am talking about here, it is what is actually happening, as time is passing. Something must determine, or cause what will be, in existence, at each passing moment in time, because the future consists of possibilities. That, something which determines what will be, at each moment in passing time, is what I refer to as what is "occurring in the inside of space". Newton's first law simply takes for granted that the way things have been, continuously in the past, will continue to be the way that they are in the future, unless there is a force which causes things to change. But the nature of free will, and the reality of future possibilities, indicates that any existent thing could change or be changed at any moment of passing time. This tells us that the temporal continuity of existence expressed by Newton's first law is in no way necessary. Yes, things occur the way described, but this is not necessary. This is why Newton himself stated that his first law depended on the Will of God.

When we apprehend the reality, that each and every aspect of material existence could be discontinued at any moment of passing time, we are forced to conclude that the entirety of material existence must be recreated, reconstituted, at each moment of passing time. When we consider where this act occurs, this act which recreates the existence of each material thing, at each moment of passing time, it can only be the inside, or internal part of space.

The thing is that our conceptual reality (inner ‘space’) is not restricted to three dimensions, or even four. It is not grounded in temporality, but in pure relation, differentiating into logical, qualitative and dynamic potential. — Possibility

This is what I am arguing is the mistake. That the conceptual reality of inner space is not grounded in temporality is a mistake. Since what happens in inner space is activity, and activity occurs in time, then to make this "dynamic potential" logically coherent, it must be grounded in temporality. Any dynamic which is not temporal is incoherent and unintelligible. This is why I argue that time must be understood as logically prior to space. Traditional conceptions of space are of "outer space", three dimensional conceptions. "Inner space" cannot be understood through such traditional conceptions of space, because whatever this "inner space" is, it is substantially different from outer space. However, what the two have in common is activity, and what is required for all activity is time. Therefore the means for understanding the proper relationship between inner space and outer space is to understand the nature of time, it's what they both share. So, the activities of inner space are properties of time, and the activities of outer space are properties of time, and the two are related to each other by that subject, time.

I continue to stand by my argument that treating time quantum mechanically is an important step in eliminating dualism. — Possibility

Again, this is what I argue is a mistake. The goal of eliminating dualism is misguided, because it is dualism which gives us the principles which are best suited toward understanding the true nature of time. What quantum mechanics shows us is that the discipline of physics approaches the foundations of the universe with faulty principles, which render the universe as unintelligible. The appearance of unintelligibility is the consequence of faulty principles. This means that all the primary principles must be reassessed and analyzed for mistake. Dualism provides very good direction for how we ought to understand time.

I do not understand why you are so obsessed with defending this position, to the point that you incessantly deny the problems which I point to. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m defending the position because it’s the only one (so far) that enables me to consolidate all the information and understanding that I have, without ignoring, isolating or excluding. The ‘problems’ that you point to are the result of limitations that our perspective, language and assumptions impose on reality. If we’re talking about ontology, we need to get past all that - including intelligibility. I understand this makes it difficult to ‘do philosophy’ in the traditional or formal sense, because we have to allow for a certain amount of ambiguity. But I consider forums such as these to be opportunities for a ‘community of inquiry’ approach to philosophy.

If there’s one thing I learned from a qualitative understanding of quantum physics, it’s that dismissing ambiguity, uncertainty or incoherence puts limitations on the information we have access to, before we even begin. That doesn’t mean we necessarily have to use that information, but we do need to be honest about choosing to bracket it out intentionally. And when we don’t have sufficient access to information, we shouldn’t make assumptions based on our limited perspective, on conventions or traditions. What we can do instead is look for relations and patterns of logic, quality and energy in the ambiguous, uncertain and incoherent information that we do have access to.

So even by your definition we have the problem I mentioned of a multitude of particular agencies coming into being, from a general sort of "agency". The general sort is unintelligible as motion without anything which is moving is incoherent. And so this sort of ontology ought not be accepted, because its basic presumptions, or premises, renders the coming into being of things, objects, as unintelligible. That is the recurring problem of all sorts of materialism in general. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agency is not ‘motion’ - you’re swapping out terms in order to imply the necessity of a pre-existing object. But there is no such necessity. The apparent incoherence of activity without any ‘thing’ to act comes down to grammatical conventions, nothing more. We both agree that time is logically prior to space. I would say that it necessarily follows from this that time is materially prior to space (ie. activity is materially prior to objects). But you don’t seem to agree with this, and your sole argument is that it is ‘unintelligible’ or ‘incoherent’. Which is to say that we must think of time as prior to space, but for some reason that you put down to an obscure and speculative function of time, this ‘logic’ is necessarily inverted in the ‘outside’ world… and yet I’m the one whose apparently incoherent…

You keep using ‘unintelligible’ to describe something that I understand but you don’t. You dismiss it as such not because it is inherently unintelligible, but because it appears to be so in your perspective. Do you think perhaps the fact that you can’t manage to make sense of it may be due to the way you are processing it? Might there be a possible interpretation you’re dismissing/ignoring/excluding based on assumptions, convention or tradition that prevents you from recognising the information as valid? Or are you that certain as to the perfection of your own intellect, that if you can’t understand it, then it cannot possibly be understood? I’m not saying that everyone should be able to understand it the way that I’ve set it out, but I’m also not going to apply reductionist methodology that dismisses information on the grounds that it doesn’t follow grammatical convention.

You cannot circumvent the fact that your own personal mind is central, and immovable from any sort of ontology which you might believe in, or propose to others. Pretending otherwise, is self-deception, and then your proposals are attempts at deceiving others. — Metaphysician Undercover

I recognise that my perspective is limited, but that doesn’t mean my mind must be central to any proposed ontology, any more than the fact that I’m on earth means this planet must be central to the solar system. The same logical process can be employed - at a different qualitative level - to propose an ontology where my mind is understood as de-centred and variable, just as any other structure or system.

Yes, our current, conventional grammatical structure is insufficient to represent reality, but this is simply a reflection of a fundamental lack of understanding. Human grammatical structures evolve with human understanding, so grammatical insufficiencies are not paramount to misunderstanding, they can be overcome. Grammatical problems can be resolved in the evolution of understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not the grammatical structure itself but the conventions surrounding it that are insufficient. For instance, the assumption that a verb is necessarily attributed to the subject as agency, which is denied to the object, is inaccurate in relation to what we understand about reality and the structure of events. We can still structure the sentence in the same way, but we cannot assume that this attribution of agency is necessarily what it means, and to insist on this configuration of dynamics in an event for the sake of ‘intelligibility’ is to endorse a variety of material-discursive practices that perpetuate ignorance, isolation and exclusion. This is as much about the reality of that cascade of events within a musical performance or telling time by a caesium clock as it is about cultural theory.

This underscores the need for clear and precise definitions in ontology, and demonstrates why yours and Barad's use of ambiguity in terms like "intra-action", and "agencies", is misleading, and conducive to misunderstanding. You obscure the unintelligibility and incoherency of your ontology with ambiguity, then produce definitions as required, but the definition is insufficient to account for the complete scope of the usage. This means that any usage outside the provided definition, is equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

The key is not the reductive precision of definitions. Ambiguity and the potential for misunderstanding is a natural consequence of our limited perspective. Reduction only limits our capacity to understand by prioritising certainty over accuracy. I’m not saying that your usage is outside of the definition I offered, but rather that it is a reduction.

What quantum mechanics ought to indicate to you, is that we do not have the principles required for understanding the complete nature of reality. If we must accept the evidence of quantum mechanics, then we must accept this, that the theories by which we approach the foundations of the universe are faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

What quantum mechanics indicates is that understanding the complete nature of reality will take more than the principles of physics. We must accept that the theories are incomplete. Let’s not throw out the baby…

That a wave only occurs in a medium, is not a "Newtonian assumption", it is simply the way that we understand the occurrence of waves. You are the one insisting that we need to talk "physics". Do you understand the physics of waves? Electromagnetic waves are unintelligible within the precepts of any theory which denies the reality of an ether, because waves without a substance, through which the waves propagate, is an incoherent notion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I get that the classical explanation of waves is ‘disturbance through a medium’. But look up the Michelson & Morley experiment - there is no ether. So rather than dismiss electromagnetic waves as an anomaly, it makes sense to rethink the classical explanation. It is, after just an explanation.

The ‘problems’ that you point to are the result of limitations that our perspective, language and assumptions impose on reality. If we’re talking about ontology, we need to get past all that - including intelligibility. — Possibility

But why would you assume that reality, or some aspects of reality are unintelligible? That seems to be a counterproductive, self-defeating assumption. The philosophical mindset is the desire to know, and this means everything. Even if it's beyond the scope of one person, we work toward the collective knowledge. If there is something which I cannot understand, I ought not assume that it is inherently unintelligible, but that it is inherently intelligible, and I just currently have not the means to understand it. Then we keep working toward understanding it. If we assume that it is inherently unintelligible, then we give up on trying to understand it.

If there’s one thing I learned from a qualitative understanding of quantum physics, it’s that dismissing ambiguity, uncertainty or incoherence puts limitations on the information we have access to, before we even begin. That doesn’t mean we necessarily have to use that information, but we do need to be honest about choosing to bracket it out intentionally. And when we don’t have sufficient access to information, we shouldn’t make assumptions based on our limited perspective, on conventions or traditions. What we can do instead is look for relations and patterns of logic, quality and energy in the ambiguous, uncertain and incoherent information that we do have access to. — Possibility

I'm not saying that we should dismiss the ambiguity, uncertainty, and incoherence, I'm saying that we should look at it for what it is, and that is evidence that the theories which give us this are faulty. So it's not the ambiguity, uncertainty, and incoherence that we ought to dismiss, we ought to give this high regard, as evidence that the theories which produce it ought to be dismissed. That's the thing, our knowledge is only as good as the theories we apply, and when such defects enter our knowledge it's because the theories we apply are faulty.

Agency is not ‘motion’ - you’re swapping out terms in order to imply the necessity of a pre-existing object. But there is no such necessity. The apparent incoherence of activity without any ‘thing’ to act comes down to grammatical conventions, nothing more. — Possibility

I'm sorry Possibility, but I will not accept this. Not only motion, but the idea of any instance of activity, without anything acting is incoherent. This is due to the categorical distinction between a universal, type, and a particular. Any type of activity, running, jumping, etc., can be described and understood through a description of the type. The description of the type does not imply any particular object involved in the activity, and this is a concept, a universal. But if we assume a particular instance of any named type of activity, there must be something involved in that activity, or else there is no particular instance being referred to, and all you are talking about is the universal conception. To say that a particular instance of activity does not require something which is active, because the universal conception does not require a particular which is active, is to make a category mistake.

You can write this off as "grammatical conventions, nothing more", but that's all logic is, grammatical conventions and nothing more. So you can insist on accepting illogical and incoherent principles, because logic is only grammatical conventions and nothing more, but what's the point to that?

We both agree that time is logically prior to space. I would say that it necessarily follows from this that time is materially prior to space (ie. activity is materially prior to objects). But you don’t seem to agree with this, and your sole argument is that it is ‘unintelligible’ or ‘incoherent’. — Possibility

I'd say it's incoherent, because matter without objects is incoherent. Matter is that which has mass, and occupies space, and that is what defines a physical object. Having mass, and occupying space, (i.e. being matter), yet not being an object, is incoherent. So your use of "materially prior" is incoherent to me, as if there is matter which is prior to objects. But this is incoherent for the reasons above. Being a particular instance of matter, and being a physical object are one and the same thing.

. You dismiss it as such not because it is inherently unintelligible, but because it appears to be so in your perspective. — Possibility

No, it is "inherently unintelligible" as described above. The only way to make it intelligible is to start redefining terms, as you did with "agency". Now "you'll have to redefine "matter", and so on and so forth, until you have a conceptua structure which is completely inconsistent with convention, and any cross referencing would constitute equivocation. What's the point? You\d just be making up a fantasy reality which is completely distinct from grammatical conventions, i.e. logic.

The idea of a particular instance of activity, without anything which is active, is inherently unintelligible. This would be nothing but a universal, a type of activity, and not a particular instance at all. What makes it a particular instance is the particular material which is active. You might insist that it is just a type, a universal conception, and not a particular instance which you are talking about, but then it's just a fantasy in your mind, and nothing real at all.

Or are you that certain as to the perfection of your own intellect, that if you can’t understand it, then it cannot possibly be understood? I’m not saying that everyone should be able to understand it the way that I’ve set it out, but I’m also not going to apply reductionist methodology that dismisses information on the grounds that it doesn’t follow grammatical convention. — Possibility

Yes, I'm quite certain that there cannot be any particular instances of activity without anything which is acting, or active. If you really think that activity without anything acting is a coherent idea, then explain to me what would this activity consist of. What would be the substance here? And, that "it doesn't follow grammatical convention" is very good grounds for rejection, as explained above.

I recognise that my perspective is limited, but that doesn’t mean my mind must be central to any proposed ontology, any more than the fact that I’m on earth means this planet must be central to the solar system. The same logical process can be employed - at a different qualitative level - to propose an ontology where my mind is understood as de-centred and variable, just as any other structure or system. — Possibility

The solar system is not comparable to ontology. We can model, or represent all sorts of supposedly independent things, like the solar system, but ontology does not have as its purpose, to model or represent any independent thing.

It is not the grammatical structure itself but the conventions surrounding it that are insufficient. For instance, the assumption that a verb is necessarily attributed to the subject as agency, which is denied to the object, is inaccurate in relation to what we understand about reality and the structure of events. We can still structure the sentence in the same way, but we cannot assume that this attribution of agency is necessarily what it means, and to insist on this configuration of dynamics in an event for the sake of ‘intelligibility’ is to endorse a variety of material-discursive practices that perpetuate ignorance, isolation and exclusion. This is as much about the reality of that cascade of events within a musical performance or telling time by a caesium clock as it is about cultural theory. — Possibility

I do not understand what you're trying to say here. Of course we can talk about verbs, and the meaning of them, "run", "jump", etc., without implying that any particular thing or object is carrying out that activity. That is not the issue, because in this case we are talking about the conception, what it means. But if we refer to a particular instance of such an activity occurring in the physical world, then we necessarily imply that there is something engaged in that activity. Would you be talking about an instance of running, or jumping, in which there is nothing running or jumping? That's incoherent, right?

Or, are you proposing a special type of activity, in which there is nothing which is active. If so, then you ought to be able to describe this type of activity, conceptualize it. Please explain to me what this proposed type of activity is like, and how it occurs, this type of activity in which nothing is active. Can you explain what is going on when this activity occurs, without talking about something being active?

What quantum mechanics indicates is that understanding the complete nature of reality will take more than the principles of physics. We must accept that the theories are incomplete. Let’s not throw out the baby… — Possibility

Ever read read Plato's Theaetetus? There is no baby there, only flatulence.

But look up the Michelson & Morley experiment - there is no ether. — Possibility

I already have. What these experiments demonstrated is that the relationship between the ether and material objects which was assumed, that they are distinct materials or substances, was a faulty assumption. It does not prove that there is no ether, just that the hypothesis of how the ether exists was incorrect.

Not only motion, but the idea of any instance of activity, without anything acting is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have trouble with this also. But in a social, let's say feminist setting, intra-acting amongst participants can and does produce "objects" - movements - and the flux of cause and effect is cloudy.

As to the notion that time pre-exists space, that's a metaphysical stance and as such cannot promulgate conclusions about the physical world without absurdities like intra-action.

The metaphysical foundation I prefer is that, at each instant, spacetime is created. Bergson, in The Creative Mind, speaks of an instant of hesitation before Nature moves on, and it has been suggested that the collapse of the wave function marks the next step in the creation of spacetime. In a sense the wave function collapse is Bergson's instant. So there is indeed a block universe, only behind us and not in front.

This makes Schrödinger's equation a predictor of the future in a wider sense than originally thought. I have misgivings about this, however, in that it reifies mathematics beyond my comfort zone.

No problem. But, could you summerize what you are saying here about time? — jgill

Well, I can give it a go…

Time is not a linear extension - this is how time appears to us because we are perceiving events from the inside - we are involved. For an accurate understanding of an event from the ‘outside’ - that is, without being involved in it - we cannot assume that it has the same configuration (ie. of measurement-independent objects in space, interacting according to a linear temporal order) as it does when we are involved.

So, while it isn’t possible for us to get ‘outside’ of time, with the help of quantum physics we can at least understand the logic of time’s relational structure enough to recognise its ‘objective’ irreducibility, and the relativity of how we generally perceive time.

What I’m positing is that the paradigm shift suggested by Rovelli - to consider time as a ‘chaotic’ series of interrelating events - enables us to seek some kind of structure in this chaos. If reality doesn’t necessarily have a spatial or temporal order, then what kind of order does it have? How can we make sense of these interrelations, without ignoring their objective irreducibility?

I’m saying that each event (including ourselves and time) is most accurately understood (rather than described) by employing the model of a quantum mechanical system (spacetime), consisting of four qualitative dimensions (irreducible structural relations) of variable values, one of which corresponds to a classical sense of temporal ‘order’. Barad suggests that approaching our participation in reality this way prompts us to intra-act more responsibly and with accountability in material-discursive practices that enact boundaries and exclusions, recognising collaboration as more important than attributing/denying agency to subjects/objects in order to make ‘intelligible’ statements about reality.

So I’m suggesting the possibility of a synthesis between materialism and idealism, enabling us to avoid a dualistic ontology. And it starts with inverting our common understanding of reality as objects preceding activity, and the whole traditional assumption that time as the ‘fourth’ dimension is necessarily an extension of space.

But why would you assume that reality, or some aspects of reality are unintelligible? That seems to be a counterproductive, self-defeating assumption. The philosophical mindset is the desire to know, and this means everything. Even if it's beyond the scope of one person, we work toward the collective knowledge. If there is something which I cannot understand, I ought not assume that it is inherently unintelligible, but that it is inherently intelligible, and I just currently have not the means to understand it. Then we keep working toward understanding it. If we assume that it is inherently unintelligible, then we give up on trying to understand it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Despite institutional conventions, philosophy is about wisdom, which is not ‘to know’ in the sense of ‘to describe’, but to understand in the sense of being able to act correctly. Intelligibility - in the sense you are using it here - is about being able to describe this knowledge (using language) and be understood with sufficient certainty. So we’re clearly striving for different goals here. But it should be clear that understanding reality is not the same as understanding how reality is described.

I do think that reality in a complete sense IS unintelligible - this is not an assumption - but that doesn’t prevent us from striving to understand reality in order to act correctly, even if we cannot reduce that correct action to a definitive statement about reality that is true always and everywhere, ie. objective, logical. I think we need to accept the inherent ambiguity and variability of reality, and incorporate this into our use of language, if we are to make any objective statements about reality - rather than try to shoehorn (reduce) reality to conform to conventional language use and definitions.

Quantum mechanics has shown what can be achieved when we put aside the goal of intelligibility, and focus instead on developing precise and accurate intra-action. There’s no reason why we can’t apply this perspective to all our intra-actions.

No, it is "inherently unintelligible" as described above. The only way to make it intelligible is to start redefining terms, as you did with "agency". Now "you'll have to redefine "matter", and so on and so forth, until you have a conceptua structure which is completely inconsistent with convention, and any cross referencing would constitute equivocation. What's the point? You\d just be making up a fantasy reality which is completely distinct from grammatical conventions, i.e. logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did NOT redefine ‘agency’ - I took that definition straight from Google (source: Oxford Languages). Can I be clear that I am not redefining any of these terms - I am only pointing out the variability inherent in their definitions, etymology and usage. And the relation between logic and reality is not bound by grammatical convention. The fact that quantum physics makes exceptionally accurate use of a logical structure which defies grammatical conventions should prompt us to rethink these conventions in light of reality, not the other way around.

The idea of a particular instance of activity, without anything which is active, is inherently unintelligible. This would be nothing but a universal, a type of activity, and not a particular instance at all. What makes it a particular instance is the particular material which is active. You might insist that it is just a type, a universal conception, and not a particular instance which you are talking about, but then it's just a fantasy in your mind, and nothing real at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm quite certain that there cannot be any particular instances of activity without anything which is acting, or active. If you really think that activity without anything acting is a coherent idea, then explain to me what would this activity consist of. What would be the substance here? And, that "it doesn't follow grammatical convention" is very good grounds for rejection, as explained above. — Metaphysician Undercover

A photon is a particular instance of activity, but what is active here? It’s not a universal, not a type - it IS real, and yet it still has no mass. So what does this activity consist of? Energy without substance. A particle of light. A packet of electromagnetic radiation. It’s a pattern of activity without anything which is acting. So is ‘doesn’t follow grammatical convention’ alone grounds to reject the existence of a photon?

The solar system is not comparable to ontology. We can model, or represent all sorts of supposedly independent things, like the solar system, but ontology does not have as its purpose, to model or represent any independent thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, that’s not what I said (but to be fair, what I was supposed to say was cosmology rather than solar system). What I did say was that the logical process is comparable, but the qualitative structure was different. And I said nothing about representation, nor any ‘independent thing’.

Despite institutional conventions, philosophy is about wisdom, which is not ‘to know’ in the sense of ‘to describe’, but to understand in the sense of being able to act correctly. Intelligibility - in the sense you are using it here - is about being able to describe this knowledge (using language) and be understood with sufficient certainty. So we’re clearly striving for different goals here. But it should be clear that understanding reality is not the same as understanding how reality is described. — Possibility

I think for Barad philosophy, and science as well, first delineate the contours of what matters by enacting an apparatus( configuration of practices of intra-action with the world). Then, within those configurations descriptions and distinctions of intelligibility can be made ( true-false, relevant, irrelevant, etc). A particular logical grammar of propositional truth would constitute only one narrow form of intelligibility, that used by humans in a particular historical era within certain cultural domains. In its wider form, intelligibility is not limited to humans.

“There is an important sense in which practices of knowing cannot fully be claimed as human practices, not simply because we use nonhuman ele­ments in our practices but because knowing is a matter of part of the world making itself intelligible to another part.”

If reality as a whole is not intelligible it is only because reality is a becoming. To make an aspect of the world intelligible is to participate in this becoming.

I’m saying that each event (including ourselves and time) is most accurately understood (rather than described) by employing the model of a quantum mechanical system (spacetime), consisting of four qualitative dimensions (irreducible structural relations) of variable values, one of which corresponds to a classical sense of temporal ‘order’. — Possibility

Thank you for providing additional information about your ideas. Spacetime at quantum levels seems to involve non-commutative algebras and appears to be highly technical. I have enough trouble with spacetime in relativity theory, so I will pass on this. For Bohr, position and momentum of quantum particles simply do not exist before measurements. They come into existence upon the act of "observation". Extrapolating this into the larger world gives rise to intra-action I suppose. But, is this extension from one realm to another warranted?

I think for Barad philosophy, and science as well, first delineate the contours of what matters by enacting an apparatus( configuration of practices of intra-action with the world). Then, within those configurations descriptions and distinctions of intelligibility can be made ( true-false, relevant, irrelevant, etc). A particular logical grammar of propositional truth would constitute only one narrow form of intelligibility, that used by humans in a particular historical era within certain cultural domains. In its wider form, intelligibility is not limited to humans.

“There is an important sense in which practices of knowing cannot fully be claimed as human practices, not simply because we use nonhuman ele­ments in our practices but because knowing is a matter of part of the world making itself intelligible to another part.”

If reality as a whole is not intelligible it is only because reality is a becoming. To make an aspect of the world intelligible is to participate in this becoming. — Joshs

I was using ‘intelligibility’ in the narrow form that it has been presented to me here, and employed to dismiss quantum mechanics. But you and I at least are in agreement here. I keep getting accused of ‘making up’ broader definitions, as ‘using ambiguity to obscure’….

Thank you for providing additional information about your ideas. Spacetime at quantum levels seems to involve non-commutative algebras and appears to be highly technical. I have enough trouble with spacetime in relativity theory, so I will pass on this. For Bohr, position and momentum of quantum particles simply do not exist before measurements. They come into existence upon the act of "observation". Extrapolating this into the larger world gives rise to intra-action I suppose. But, is this extension from one realm to another warranted? — jgill

It is highly technical, but it’s really just that the relativity of time is in fact a relativity of all four dimensional variables - their non-commutative ‘properties’ are simply the irreducible quality of dimensionality. What Bohr is saying about measurement is that any properties of reality are, at minimum, a relation between two pairs of non-commutative variable values, one of which, for us, acts as time. So we don’t need to assume space or objects - we only need to recognise one of those values as ‘time’, and one of those pairs as our involvement - our entangled embodied subjectivity.

But I don’t agree with the notion of extension from one realm to another. If you invert this dimensionality as starting with time, then distance, then momentum and then position (which is the paradigm shift required), it’s not so much extension as differentiation. And when we talk about mathematics in relation to reality, we are naturally approaching it from a fifth-dimensional perspective: configuring reality according to relations between variable values, undifferentiated as time, distance, etc. So in my understanding, it’s not a ‘separate realm’ at all.

The metaphysical foundation I prefer is that, at each instant, spacetime is created. Bergson, in The Creative Mind, speaks of an instant of hesitation before Nature moves on, and it has been suggested that the collapse of the wave function marks the next step in the creation of spacetime. In a sense the wave function collapse is Bergson's instant. So there is indeed a block universe, only behind us and not in front.

This makes Schrödinger's equation a predictor of the future in a wider sense than originally thought. I have misgivings about this, however, in that it reifies mathematics beyond my comfort zone. — jgill

By ‘created’, as a so-called ‘collapse’ of the wave function, it seems you’re referring to an instant of differentiation - and yes, I agree that there is a spacetime structure to every instant, and that structure exists in a necessary and non-linear (multi-dimensional) variable relation with every other instant.

I get your misgivings about the reification of mathematics - the way I see it, logic is just one aspect of the ‘real’ block universe. There is also quality (the variable values or ideas themselves) and dynamics (energy, affect).

I have trouble with this also. But in a social, let's say feminist setting, intra-acting amongst participants can and does produce "objects" - movements - and the flux of cause and effect is cloudy. — jgill

Movements are categorically distinct from objects, and one cannot be reduced to the other. They are fundamentally incompatible in nature. Aristotle demonstrated this very well. We often talk about a type of movement as a concept, as if this concept is an object. But that would be a Platonic object which is categorically distinct from a material object.

As to the notion that time pre-exists space, that's a metaphysical stance and as such cannot promulgate conclusions about the physical world without absurdities like intra-action. — jgill

The absurdity is actually the product of the currently accepted notion of time, and the conceptual structure which envelops it. The problem is in the way that the concept of time is tied to the concept of change. Conventionally, logical priority is given to physical change, such that time is a property of change. But physical change requires that there is something which changes. This is what I'm talking about with the incoherency of the idea of activity without something that is active.

So if we start talking about activity, or change, without anything which is active or changing, we cross into incoherency. However, the nature of material existence indicates to us that there must be a cause of material existence, and this cause must be active. Therefore we must conclude that there is activity which is prior to material existence as cause of it.

In classical metaphysics, this activity which is prior to material existence is immaterial Forms, and this got adopted into Christian theology as a representation of God. And since the concept of time is tied to material change, then God as an active immaterial Form and cause of material activity, must be outside time, i.e., eternal. The problem is with the conventional conception of time, which ties time to material change. or activity. This renders all activity which is prior to material objects, as unintelligible, being outside of time.

So the mistake is the tying of time to material change. This is what produces the absurdities. To conceive of time as prior to space, and material existence, frees us from these absurdities, providing us with the means for understanding the cause of material existence in a coherent, logical way.

I did NOT redefine ‘agency’ - I took that definition straight from Google (source: Oxford Languages). Can I be clear that I am not redefining any of these terms - I am only pointing out the variability inherent in their definitions, etymology and usage. And the relation between logic and reality is not bound by grammatical convention. The fact that quantum physics makes exceptionally accurate use of a logical structure which defies grammatical conventions should prompt us to rethink these conventions in light of reality, not the other way around. — Possibility

Your definition though, did not solve the problem, which is how there could be activity without anything which is active, and how material objects could emerge from this activity. Dualism has already provided a systematic resolution to these problems thousands of years ago. The activity which is prior to material objects is the activity of immaterial Forms, and how material objects emerge from this activity is through an act of will (traditionally, God's will).

You ought to see, that if you just relinquish your bias against dualism, you will readily understand that classical dualism provides a far more comprehensible, intelligible, and coherent approach to this problem than quantum physics does.

Your approach is to simply deny that there is anything active, in this activity which is prior to material existence. But this renders that proposed activity as entirely unintelligible. The way of classical metaphysics is to recognize this sort of activity, which is prior to the activity of material objects, as the activity of immaterial Forms. And, as "forms" their essence is intelligibility. Therefore this activity is necessarily intelligible.

You seem to hold as a goal, the intent of reducing these two, material forms and immaterial forms, to one another, such that there would be no difference between them. This would support your bias against dualism. But then you are left with this fundamental activity, from which material objects emerge, which is completely unintelligible, because you insist that this is activity with nothing which is active. Perhaps, when you apprehend the unintelligibility of the idea, of activity with nothing which is active, you will be inclined to relinquish your bias against dualism, and accept that what is active in this activity which is prior to the emergence of material objects, is something immaterial.

A photon is a particular instance of activity, but what is active here? It’s not a universal, not a type - it IS real, and yet it still has no mass. — Possibility

The photon, as a particular instance of activity, is an incoherent concept. That's what quantum mechanics demonstrates to us. The "photon" is two completely incompatible forms of energy at the very same time, energy transmitted as wave action, and energy transmitted as a moving particle. Further the photon always has the property of "uncertainty". This is the reality of the quantum physics, and you seem to truly believe that it provides a better approach to the foundations of the universe, than dualism does, although dualism has been well thought out, to avoid such problems.

So what does this activity consist of? Energy without substance. A particle of light. A packet of electromagnetic radiation. It’s a pattern of activity without anything which is acting. So is ‘doesn’t follow grammatical convention’ alone grounds to reject the existence of a photon? — Possibility

A photon is not a packet of light. Light can be clearly observed as wave action, refraction, interference etc.. There are many different applications which make use of electromagnetic waves, and although they can be packaged they do not naturally exist as packets. Waves do not move as packets. And, there is very clearly something which is acting in the case of waves, some substance. Waves are the activity of a substance. You simply deny volumes of observational data to claim that electromagnetic radiation is activity without anything acting. This denial of the evidence plunges you into a fantasy world of incoherency.

Perhaps, when you apprehend the unintelligibility of the idea, of activity with nothing which is active, you will be inclined to relinquish your bias against dualism, and accept that what is active in this activity which is prior to the emergence of material objects, is something immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

I accept that one can describe or configure this activity as being a property of ‘something immaterial’, but I see it as an unnecessary contrivance to perpetuate dualism. I also acknowledge that many quantum physicists do prefer this configuration - not because it’s easier to do quantum physics, but because it ‘fits’ with conventions in material-cultural practices.

Having said that, what quantum physics demonstrates is that activity does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality. It only requires two non-commutative variable values, in a measurement relation (ie. one of them corresponding to ‘time’), to be intelligible as ‘real’ activity. But because quantum physicists then describe this as ‘activity’, grammatical conventions dictate that ‘something’ (NOT the activity itself), is what is active. This leads to a chicken-and-egg style dilemma.

Your definition though, did not solve the problem, which is how there could be activity without anything which is active, and how material objects could emerge from this activity. Dualism has already provided a systematic resolution to these problems thousands of years ago. The activity which is prior to material objects is the activity of immaterial Forms, and how material objects emerge from this activity is through an act of will (traditionally, God's will).

You ought to see, that if you just relinquish your bias against dualism, you will readily understand that classical dualism provides a far more comprehensible, intelligible, and coherent approach to this problem than quantum physics does.

Your approach is to simply deny that there is anything active, in this activity which is prior to material existence. But this renders that proposed activity as entirely unintelligible. The way of classical metaphysics is to recognize this sort of activity, which is prior to the activity of material objects, as the activity of immaterial Forms. And, as "forms" their essence is intelligibility. Therefore this activity is necessarily intelligible.

You seem to hold as a goal, the intent of reducing these two, material forms and immaterial forms, to one another, such that there would be no difference between them. This would support your bias against dualism. But then you are left with this fundamental activity, from which material objects emerge, which is completely unintelligible, because you insist that this is activity with nothing which is active. Perhaps, when you apprehend the unintelligibility of the idea, of activity with nothing which is active, you will be inclined to relinquish your bias against dualism, and accept that what is active in this activity which is prior to the emergence of material objects, is something immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m not denying that anything is active in activity, just any separate ‘thing’. Activity is inherently active. I’m denying this reliance on grammatical conventions for intelligibility. Your preaching here on the traditions of dualism borders on the religious, and I’m just not buying it. The original notion of ‘Form’ was just reducing activity to a proper noun, in order to talk about its variable qualities. But let’s look again at definitions:

Form(noun): 1. the visible shape or configuration of something.
2. a particular way in which a thing exists or appears.

Form is this same notion of configuration, a particular way in which something exists. And this apparent distinction between material and immaterial Form is not a binary, but an agential cut enacted between three- and four-dimensional configurations.

I don’t have a bias against dualism - I have a preference for an elegantly accurate understanding of reality. Dualism doesn’t cut it.

It is highly technical, but it’s really just that the relativity of time is in fact a relativity of all four dimensional variables - their non-commutative ‘properties’ are simply the irreducible quality of dimensionality. What Bohr is saying about measurement is that any properties of reality are, at minimum, a relation between two pairs of non-commutative variable values, one of which, for us, acts as time. So we don’t need to assume space or objects - we only need to recognise one of those values as ‘time’, and one of those pairs as our involvement - our entangled embodied subjectivity. — Possibility

When I think of non-commutative algebras I think of matrix algebras and non-commutativity of multiplication. When you speak of two pairs that takes me to linear fractional transformations, 2X2 matrices, so that time might be one entry and space three. But that isn't what is going on here. Perhaps one pair is $\left( t,t+\Delta t \right)$. The other pair - our entangled embodied subjectivity - is just plain weird. I don't know what to make of your comments, but I appreciate you making them.

Having said that, what quantum physics demonstrates is that activity does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality. It only requires two non-commutative variable values, in a measurement relation (ie. one of them corresponding to ‘time’), to be intelligible as ‘real’ activity. But because quantum physicists then describe this as ‘activity’, grammatical conventions dictate that ‘something’ (NOT the activity itself), is what is active. This leads to a chicken-and-egg style dilemma. — Possibility

We are fundamentally in agreement then. But, when you say, "activity does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality", I say that this activity is immaterial. And when you talk about what "grammatical conventions" dictate, I say that this is what "logic" dictates.

So why hold the penchant for anti-dualism? It seems to me, like dualism is very consistent with what quantum mechanics demonstrates. In fact, it appears like one has to intentionally use ambiguity and obscurity with terms like "intra-action" to hide the fact that what quantum mechanics demonstrates is that the nature of reality is very consistent with what dualism dictates. There is the activity of material things, and there is also activity which does not require materiality, therefore it is immaterial. Doesn't that sound like dualism to you?

Form is this same notion of configuration, a particular way in which something exists. And this apparent distinction between material and immaterial Form is not a binary, but an agential cut enacted between three- and four-dimensional configurations. — Possibility

Again, your reliance on "dimensional" models is misleading you. The activity which you say "does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality", cannot be "an agential cut enacted between three- and four-dimensional configurations", because this agency must be non-dimension, i.e. immaterial.

This is the ambiguity I am speaking of. You consistently argue for the reality of the immaterial, yet your anti-dualism bias (and I believe I am correct to call it that), inclines you to use obscure and ambiguous terms such as "intra-action", in an attempt to hide the obvious fact that what you are arguing for is in reality a material/immaterial dualism.

It is highly technical, but it’s really just that the relativity of time is in fact a relativity of all four dimensional variables - their non-commutative ‘properties’ are simply the irreducible quality of dimensionality. What Bohr is saying about measurement is that any properties of reality are, at minimum, a relation between two pairs of non-commutative variable values, one of which, for us, acts as time. So we don’t need to assume space or objects - we only need to recognise one of those values as ‘time’, and one of those pairs as our involvement - our entangled embodied subjectivity.

But I don’t agree with the notion of extension from one realm to another. If you invert this dimensionality as starting with time, then distance, then momentum and then position (which is the paradigm shift required), it’s not so much extension as differentiation. And when we talk about mathematics in relation to reality, we are naturally approaching it from a fifth-dimensional perspective: configuring reality according to relations between variable values, undifferentiated as time, distance, etc. So in my understanding, it’s not a ‘separate realm’ at all. — Possibility

This is why classical dualism provides a much better platform for an approach toward the understanding of reality than does the discipline of modern physics. What physicists are starting to notice is the primacy of time. This means that our understanding of reality is only as good as our understanding of time. The problem is that the temporal conventions employed by modern physics, from the continuity of Newton's first law, to Einsteinian relativity, are simply incorrect. On the other hand, traditional metaphysics provides the required principles for a true understanding of time. These principles begin with an apprehension of the substantial difference between past and future, which as I said already, renders Newton's first law without any necessity. And this duality of substance is what necessitates dualism as the true starting point toward an understanding of reality.

I have a preference for an elegantly accurate understanding of reality. Dualism doesn’t cut it — Possibility

I'm sorry that dualism doesn't seem to be capable of satisfying your desire for elegancy. I hope you will consider swapping the desire for elegancy with the need for truth. Then we may happily converse about the nature of time, but only after you put aside all those beautiful symmetries which are proper to the faulty temporal conventions.

Which do you think provides the road to truth, the grammatical conventions which we know as logic, or the temporal conventions by which we practise the manipulation of temporal objects?

We are fundamentally in agreement then. But, when you say, "activity does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality", I say that this activity is immaterial. And when you talk about what "grammatical conventions" dictate, I say that this is what "logic" dictates. — Metaphysician Undercover

The main difference is that you believe any understanding of reality must conform to grammatical conventions (which is a reduction of logic), whereas I believe any grammatical convention should adjust to accommodate a rational understanding of reality that may fall outside of its existing framework, if it is to remain accurately relevant. Regardless of how we describe it, I think this is fundamentally what we are dealing with.

A couple of points to clear up here. Firstly, there is a difference of configuration between not requiring ‘materiality’ and being ‘immaterial’. The former acknowledges a variability in the configuration of activity/being, while the latter offers only one configuration - enacting an agential cut that excludes activity sans three-dimensionality from mattering.

I did place ‘materiality’ in scare quotes deliberately because I disagree with the narrowness of its parameters as requiring three-dimensionality. I recognise that you’re uncomfortable with me broadening definitions to their qualitative notions, but it enables me to talk about the same idea accurately across different dimensional systems of logic. And I would argue that the term ‘materiality’ refers to a more variable quality of mattering: as being relevant or significant. This can pertain to 3D objects, 4D events or 5D values.

Secondly, grammatical conventions are a particular form or configuration of logic - but not the notion of ‘logic’ itself, which dictates only methodical rationality, not a particular system. Again, you are participating in a material-discursive practice, distinguishing grammatical forms of logic from alternative rational systems of understanding, such as mathematics and physics.

I want be clear at this point in saying that I’m not trying to convince you to discard grammatical forms of logic in favour of quantum physics - only to recognise the limitations of idealising one form or system over another. Your argument is that the findings of quantum physics - as a combination of mathematics and physics - is incompatible with our grammatical forms of logic, therefore we must abandon these findings. My argument is that the findings are sound, and are compatible with a broader understanding of grammatical forms.

So why hold the penchant for anti-dualism? It seems to me, like dualism is very consistent with what quantum mechanics demonstrates. In fact, it appears like one has to intentionally use ambiguity and obscurity with terms like "intra-action" to hide the fact that what quantum mechanics demonstrates is that the nature of reality is very consistent with what dualism dictates. There is the activity of material things, and there is also activity which does not require materiality, therefore it is immaterial. Doesn't that sound like dualism to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

What quantum mechanics demonstrates is that materiality extends beyond the activity of material things. Subatomic particles which lack a fundamental three-dimensional inertia are still relevant and significant (ie. material) to the study of motion, mass, acceleration and force. In quantum mechanics, activity is activity, and the distinction between material and immaterial at this level is irrelevant. So no, it doesn’t sound like dualism at all.

Again, your reliance on "dimensional" models is misleading you. The activity which you say "does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality", cannot be "an agential cut enacted between three- and four-dimensional configurations", because this agency must be non-dimension, i.e. immaterial.

This is the ambiguity I am speaking of. You consistently argue for the reality of the immaterial, yet your anti-dualism bias (and I believe I am correct to call it that), inclines you to use obscure and ambiguous terms such as "intra-action", in an attempt to hide the obvious fact that what you are arguing for is in reality a material/immaterial dualism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, you’re making great leaps of assumption here. Not requiring three-dimensionality is NOT the same as non-dimensional. Subatomic particles lack a fundamental three-dimensional inertia. At least one of their dimensional measurements is in a constant state of flux, but this doesn’t render them non-dimensional, only not fundamentally three-dimensional. They can be configured as relevant/significant (material) in a four-dimensional (active) system, but in a three-dimensional (inert) structure they are considered ‘immaterial’.

The reason I use a dimensional structure is because it retains an overall sense of logic and rationality as we move between limited systems or conventions of logic: ie. grammar, mathematics, physics. There are basic structural principles that apply to relational perspective in measuring, describing and constructing any level of dimensionality across all three systems, so I can keep straight this sense of entangled embodied subjectivity: I am never entirely outside of reality, but always involved somehow, and my relational perspective is highly variable. Without this grounding, it’s tempting to assume certainty and objectivity.

Language can obscure the fact that you’ve gone from talking about ‘material forms’ to ‘immaterial forms’ without necessarily understanding the qualitative and dynamic relational structure between them, let alone the change in your own relational perspective that enables you to do this. In this sense dualism is a cop-out: ‘they’re just different things’ is putting up a wall of ignorance and then refusing to do the work of understanding what that difference is.

Quantum physics at least recognises the limitations of classical physics as a system of logic, and intra-acts with mathematics to refine and adjust both systems for a more accurate and comprehensive logical framework. Grammatical conventions need to be in the mix, but for them to effectively intra-act we need to accept their fundamental variability and limitations. It seems you’re not prepared to do this.

I'm sorry that dualism doesn't seem to be capable of satisfying your desire for elegancy. I hope you will consider swapping the desire for elegancy with the need for truth. Then we may happily converse about the nature of time, but only after you put aside all those beautiful symmetries which are proper to the faulty temporal conventions.

Which do you think provides the road to truth, the grammatical conventions which we know as logic, or the temporal conventions by which we practise the manipulation of temporal objects? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is pure sophistry. It is not just elegance that I’m after, but elegant accuracy. Dualism is clunky and ignorant at best - its most glaring ambiguity lies in the absence of a logical, qualitative and dynamic relational structure between ‘material’ and ‘ideal’ Forms.

Grammatical conventions have logical form but are not ‘logic’ in the ideal sense. Accuracy in practise is more indicative of ‘truth’ than words systematically arranged. And the accuracy in our practise of quantum mechanics makes it very clear that the remaining ‘fault’ in temporal conventions is in our grammatical logic, not the physics or maths.

The main difference is that you believe any understanding of reality must conform to grammatical conventions (which is a reduction of logic), whereas I believe any grammatical convention should adjust to accommodate a rational understanding of reality that may fall outside of its existing framework, — Possibility

Yes, "understanding" requires consistency with grammatical conventions. And obviously, we cannot change reality to conform to our conventions, therefore the conventions must conform to reality. You and I are in complete agreement to this point.

Where we disagree is as to which conventions correspond with reality, and which do not. I believe that classical conventions of dualism correspond, and are adequate to form a solid foundation for an understanding of reality. I also believe that numerous modern conventions, of physics and mathematics, such as the dimensional representation of spacetime, and some axioms of set theory, do not correspond, and ought to be rejected. You seem to believe the opposite.

A couple of points to clear up here. Firstly, there is a difference of configuration between not requiring ‘materiality’ and being ‘immaterial’. The former acknowledges a variability in the configuration of activity/being, while the latter offers only one configuration - enacting an agential cut that excludes activity sans three-dimensionality from mattering. — Possibility

I think that this is a gross misunderstanding. "Immaterial" does not imply inactive. I think this Idea comes from a modern day misunderstanding of Plato, in which "Platonism" is represented as comprised of the assumption of eternal, inert, passive Ideas, which cannot interact with the material word according to the "interaction problem". In reality though, this is Pythagorean Idealism, which Plato demonstrated has very serious problems. Since Plato's method of dialectics is very difficult to interpret, many modern interpreters do not see beyond Plato's exposé of Pythagorean Idealism to see that Plato was demonstrating the problems with it, mot supporting it, and pointing the direction toward resolving these problems.

So in reality, Plato offered us a solution to the "interaction problem", which involved demonstrating the lack of correspondence with reality of the the theory of participation which provided the support for Pythagorean Idealism. The central problem was that the theory of participation, represents "Ideas" as passive things which material objects partake of. So for example, as described in "The Symposium", a beautiful thing is beautiful because it partakes in the Idea of Beauty. Notice that the immaterial Idea is passive, and the material object actively "partakes". Plato revealed that this is a problem for Idealism, and went on to demonstrate with "the good" (understood by Aristotle as "final cause") that ideas must be active, causal.

Aristotle's metaphysics, with the so-called "cosmological argument" firmly refutes Pythagorean Idealism. He shows that all human ideas require the human mind for actual existence. If any human ideas have any sort of reality prior to being actualized by the human mind, this would be solely as potential. Then he excludes "potential" from the category of "eternal", by showing that anything eternal must be actual. This procedure shows that it is impossible that human ideas have eternal existence, effectively refuting Pythagorean Idealism. However it also shows that it is necessary to conclude actual Forms ("form" having the category of actual, or active) which are prior to material ("matter" having the category of passive potential) forms. In Christian theology, these independent Forms, whose existence is demonstrated as logically necessary by the cosmological argument, are proper to the divine realm of God and the angels. Substance dualism is necessary to support what you might call "an agential cut" between the actual Forms (substance) of the divine realm. which are causally responsible for the activities of independent material things, and the actual forms (substance) of the living human mind, which are causally responsible for the activities of the living human beings.

Okay, you’re making great leaps of assumption here. Not requiring three-dimensionality is NOT the same as non-dimensional. Subatomic particles lack a fundamental three-dimensional inertia. At least one of their dimensional measurements is in a constant state of flux, but this doesn’t render them non-dimensional, only not fundamentally three-dimensional. They can be configured as relevant/significant (material) in a four-dimensional (active) system, but in a three-dimensional (inert) structure they are considered ‘immaterial’. — Possibility

All you are doing here is continuing to obscure the problems of your conventions, with ambiguity. The non-three-dimensional particles you speak of are understood as having an effect ("relevant/significant") in a four-dimensional model, but they clearly cannot be shown to have a position, location, or place, in such a model, so we cannot say that this model shows them to have any actual existence. This is the type of activity we've been discussing, the "four-dimensional (active) system" model is only capable of showing that there is some type of activity which is unintelligible from the precepts of that model. That is why there is a wave/particle duality, quantum uncertainty, and all the other logical problems with this type of representation of subatomic particles. What is observed is the effect of this activity, but the activity itself, as the immaterial cause of those effects cannot be observed. Theologists are very well acquainted with this principle, as God, being immaterial, is understood through His effects, the presence of material existence, rather than through direct observations of Him.

The proposed "subatomic particles" are not particles at all because they cannot be represented as having spatial location, and so are much better (more honestly) represented as immaterial activities (Forms) which have a causal influence within the four-dimensional model.

The proposed "four-dimensional (active) system" is fundamentally deceptive because it reverses the true role of time. This is what I've been trying to tell you, but you refuse to acknowledge that this is the case. The base principles are all three-dimensional geometry, arcs, circles, spheres, triangles, planes etc.. and time is layered on top, as a further spatial feature. This does not allow that time can be properly represented as prior to, and therefore independent from space.

The reason I use a dimensional structure is because it retains an overall sense of logic and rationality as we move between limited systems or conventions of logic: ie. grammar, mathematics, physics. — Possibility

Actually, what you are demonstrating is that you prefer the conventions of mathematics over the conventions grammar. We can say that grammar and mathematics are both forms of logic. And, I can show you how there is inconsistency between these two forms of logic, especially at the most fundamental level, the law of identity. In the logic of grammar, the law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Two things may be according to some stated parameter, or quality, equal to each other, but two things cannot be "the same", because only one thing can be the same as itself. Being the same is a very special sort of equality which a thing can only have with itself. In the logic of mathematics however, two equal things can be said to be the same object.

Therefore, there is great inconsistency between the logic of grammar and the logic of mathematics. You choose the logic of mathematics, most likely because it has proven itself to be very useful. So your choice is most likely guided by a form of pragmaticism. I choose the logic of grammar because it has been directed by dialectics which is aimed at aimed at correspondence with reality, truth. And the logic of grammar has proven itself to be very useful in this way. So my choice is guided by a desire for truth.

My argument is that the findings are sound, and are compatible with a broader understanding of grammatical forms. — Possibility

No, the findings of quantum mechanics may not be said to be sound, because what the findings show is that a large portion of reality is unintelligible, but this has not been proven. And your attempt to show that there may be intelligibility produced by a "broader understanding of grammatical forms" I have adequately demonstrated, is nothing other than an obscuring of this unintelligibility produced by quantum mechanics, behind ambiguity. That is sophistry

In reality, what good grammatical form (clear definitions and adherence to fundamental principles) shows, is that the reason why quantum mechanics leaves a large portion of reality as unintelligible is that the logic being employed is faulty.

What quantum mechanics demonstrates is that materiality extends beyond the activity of material things. — Possibility

Again, you continue to demonstrate the incoherency of your supposed "broader understanding of grammatical forms". "Materiality" is defined by material, and "material" is defined by matter. And "matter" by common definition, and conventional understanding is defined by the physical presence of material things. Now you propose a "matter", in the form of "a materiality", which "extends beyond material things".

By this proposal there is absolutely nothing to constrain the concept of "matter", because it could be extended to any sort of fictional idea. If the concept of "matter" is not grounded in, or substantiated by, the real existence of material things, then we allow that "matter" and consequently "materiality" may refer to any fantasy or fictitious thing. This is why Aristotle, who first defined "matter" and expressed all the limitations under which the concept was to be understood, explicitly denied the possibility of matter which extends beyond the existence of material things.

I believe it is important to recognize that "matter" is a concept. The concept was produced to assist us in understanding the existence of physical bodies. Matter, as a concept was intended to represent a property of such bodies, a property which all bodies have in common. But if we move, as you propose, and make matter something which extends further than its original concept, something other than a property of physical bodies, then we invalidate the entire concept. All the things which were said about "matter", as a property of physical bodies lose their necessity as truths, because "matter" is now something else. And there is no principle which would allow that matter can maintain its status as a property of physical bodies, and also extend beyond physical bodies. So the entire conception is undermined.

We have a very similar problem when we allow that inertia extends beyond mass. The concept of "inertia" was produced as a property of mass. Now if we allow that there is inertia which is not associated with mass we undermine the concept. Of course the argument would be that the concept of "inertia" would be grounded in something else, just like the concept of "matter" above (which extends beyond material things) would be grounded in something else, but that's not really true. The proposal to allow such changes is just carried out in an effort to make the mathematics work. Therefore there is no real grounding, just an effort to make the equations work out.

So what is really the case, is that when the grammatical logic is strictly adhered to, the mathematics which uses a different and less rigorous form of logic does not produce the desired results. The easiest solution is to compromise the grammatical logic. But this of course undermines the conceptual structure and the rigor of the grammatical logic

Grammatical conventions need to be in the mix, but for them to effectively intra-act we need to accept their fundamental variability and limitations. It seems you’re not prepared to do this. — Possibility

Grammatical conventions must be variable, that I agree with. However the process (discipline) whereby these conventions are questioned, dialectics, is completely different from the process whereby mathematical axioms are question. The former is the philosophical quest for truth, and the latter is the pragmatic quest for usefulness. The two are not incompatible, but compatibility requires a hierarchy of purpose, or intent. The pragmatic quest for usefulness must be guided by the philosophical quest for truth. In other words, the purpose or usefulness must be the quest for truth, or else there can be no compatibility.

Therefore grammatical conventions, which are variable under the auspices of dialectics and the quest for truth, must take priority over the conventions of mathematics and physics which are variable according to pragmatic inclinations. When grammatical logic is altered under the direction of good dialectics seeking truth, this can be known as the evolution of language. But when grammatical logic is altered under the direction of mathematicians and physicists who seek to support the usefulness of their own discipline, we can call this a corruption of grammatical logic.

This is pure sophistry. It is not just elegance that I’m after, but elegant accuracy. Dualism is clunky and ignorant at best - its most glaring ambiguity lies in the absence of a logical, qualitative and dynamic relational structure between ‘material’ and ‘ideal’ Forms. — Possibility

Again, this statement indicates a gross misunderstanding of dualism, which I addressed above.

Grammatical conventions have logical form but are not ‘logic’ in the ideal sense. Accuracy in practise is more indicative of ‘truth’ than words systematically arranged. And the accuracy in our practise of quantum mechanics makes it very clear that the remaining ‘fault’ in temporal conventions is in our grammatical logic, not the physics or maths. — Possibility

I really do not know what you mean by "'logic' in the ideal sense". But I think what I wrote above ought to go a long way toward dispelling this myth, that "our practise of quantum mechanics makes it very clear that the remaining ‘fault’ in temporal conventions is in our grammatical logic, not the physics or maths." It's very clear that what is the case, is that physics and mathematics, in their submission to a usefulness which has been corrupted away from the desire for truth, have succumbed to a severely compromised grammatical logic. Yes, the fault is evident in the grammatical logic, because the inclinations of mathematics and speculative physics have produced the need to compromise the grammatical logic. But this is exactly why we need to go back to the good solid principles of dualism to sort out that mess.

Yes, "understanding" requires consistency with grammatical conventions. And obviously, we cannot change reality to conform to our conventions, therefore the conventions must conform to reality. You and I are in complete agreement to this point.

Where we disagree is as to which conventions correspond with reality, and which do not. I believe that classical conventions of dualism correspond, and are adequate to form a solid foundation for an understanding of reality. I also believe that numerous modern conventions, of physics and mathematics, such as the dimensional representation of spacetime, and some axioms of set theory, do not correspond, and ought to be rejected. You seem to believe the opposite. — Metaphysician Undercover

Understanding reality is not about adequacy, but accuracy. The bible can be considered adequate to form a solid foundation for an understanding of reality, too. Fundamentalists argue that modern findings of physics and mathematics, which do not correspond with an understanding that is necessarily limited by their classical conventions, ought to be rejected.

I’m not calling for anyone to reject conventions. I don’t believe deliberate ignorance is the answer to understanding reality. What I believe is that our understanding should include a broader understanding of classical conventions, at what level of awareness they are effective, at what point they limit our accuracy, and why.

I think that this is a gross misunderstanding. "Immaterial" does not imply inactive. I think this Idea comes from a modern day misunderstanding of Plato, in which "Platonism" is represented as comprised of the assumption of eternal, inert, passive Ideas, which cannot interact with the material word according to the "interaction problem". In reality though, this is Pythagorean Idealism, which Plato demonstrated has very serious problems. Since Plato's method of dialectics is very difficult to interpret, many modern interpreters do not see beyond Plato's exposé of Pythagorean Idealism to see that Plato was demonstrating the problems with it, mot supporting it, and pointing the direction toward resolving these problems.

So in reality, Plato offered us a solution to the "interaction problem", which involved demonstrating the lack of correspondence with reality of the the theory of participation which provided the support for Pythagorean Idealism. The central problem was that the theory of participation, represents "Ideas" as passive things which material objects partake of. So for example, as described in "The Symposium", a beautiful thing is beautiful because it partakes in the Idea of Beauty. Notice that the immaterial Idea is passive, and the material object actively "partakes". Plato revealed that this is a problem for Idealism, and went on to demonstrate with "the good" (understood by Aristotle as "final cause") that ideas must be active, causal.

Aristotle's metaphysics, with the so-called "cosmological argument" firmly refutes Pythagorean Idealism. He shows that all human ideas require the human mind for actual existence. If any human ideas have any sort of reality prior to being actualized by the human mind, this would be solely as potential. Then he excludes "potential" from the category of "eternal", by showing that anything eternal must be actual. This procedure shows that it is impossible that human ideas have eternal existence, effectively refuting Pythagorean Idealism. However it also shows that it is necessary to conclude actual Forms ("form" having the category of actual, or active) which are prior to material ("matter" having the category of passive potential) forms. In Christian theology, these independent Forms, whose existence is demonstrated as logically necessary by the cosmological argument, are proper to the divine realm of God and the angels. Substance dualism is necessary to support what you might call "an agential cut" between the actual Forms (substance) of the divine realm. which are causally responsible for the activities of independent material things, and the actual forms (substance) of the living human mind, which are causally responsible for the activities of the living human beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

First of all, I didn’t say that ‘immaterial’ implies inactive. I said it implies that the activity in question doesn’t matter. What you’re arguing is that the only way this kind of activity can matter is if it actually matters to living human minds FIRST. Quantum mechanics refutes this, and so does neuroscience.

Aristotle’s understanding of the relation between actual and potential is distorted and limited by certain assumptions. The first assumption is that ‘categories’, with their determinate boundaries and properties, divide up reality with mutually exclusive accuracy. So, according to Aristotle, a particular event cannot be both potential and actual. Yet a particular (human or divine) being can, and the only distinction is an attribution of agency. Which brings me to the next assumption: that agency is an attribute of beings but not events. So, the potential of any event is assumed to be divine, unless it is in the affected interests of humans to attribute agency to particular beings. And grammatical conventions enable humans to enact this agential cut between divine and human according to localised affect, rather than logic.

What is missing from Aristotle’s metaphysics is scientific rigour. He relies on the apparent ‘logic’ of language use alone to support his claims, without taking into account empirical evidence or mathematical logic. And because grammatical logic is created by humans and for humans, the only conclusion that can be made from it is that the human mind is ‘logically’ necessary. Well, duh. But that has nothing to do with reality. It is circular reasoning at its finest.

In reality, I would argue that there is no distinction necessary between ideas as ‘human’ or ‘divine’. The differentiation is one of perspective - human minds have a variable (active) structure of potential embodiment that limits individual capacity to perceive and actualise ideas in a way that impacts homeostasis. The ‘divine mind’ has no such limitations in the variability of its potential structure (internal configuration). Human potential is therefore a localised reduction of possibility (divine potential), not an isolated category of actual forms or substance. And neither do actual Forms matter independently, except that we say they must in order for us to talk about them.

Premises:
- there exists a series of events
- the series of events exists as caused and not as uncaused(necessary)
- there must exist the necessary being that is the cause of all contingent being
Conclusion:
- there must exist the necessary being that is the cause of the whole series of beings

There’s no reason to change ‘event’ to ‘being’ here. This is based purely on grammatical logic, created by humans for humans - we cannot speak of activity without attributing it to a being who acts, and is therefore actual as well as having potential, or agency.

P3: there must exist a necessary event/activity that is the cause of all contingent events.
Conclusion: there must exist a necessary event/activity that is the cause of the whole series of events.

But that necessary event need not have become fully actual prior to all other events in the series. It only needs to have begun. In which case said necessary event - the universe itself - is being, and even now, still in the process of becoming. So there is no reason for the universe in its becoming to be denied agency, except that this affects us in a way that impacts our homeostasis.

But while we cannot individually actualise this idea, we can relate to, strive to understand and even perceive the logic, quality and energy/affect of its potential structure in the same way that we can perceive God: by acknowledging our embodied limitations and the possibility of increasing awareness of, connection and collaboration with all other aspects of the event/being in its becoming. Not by assuming it is already fully actual somewhere else.

All you are doing here is continuing to obscure the problems of your conventions, with ambiguity. The non-three-dimensional particles you speak of are understood as having an effect ("relevant/significant") in a four-dimensional model, but they clearly cannot be shown to have a position, location, or place, in such a model, so we cannot say that this model shows them to have any actual existence. This is the type of activity we've been discussing, the "four-dimensional (active) system" model is only capable of showing that there is some type of activity which is unintelligible from the precepts of that model. That is why there is a wave/particle duality, quantum uncertainty, and all the other logical problems with this type of representation of subatomic particles. What is observed is the effect of this activity, but the activity itself, as the immaterial cause of those effects cannot be observed. Theologists are very well acquainted with this principle, as God, being immaterial, is understood through His effects, the presence of material existence, rather than through direct observations of Him.

The proposed "subatomic particles" are not particles at all because they cannot be represented as having spatial location, and so are much better (more honestly) represented as immaterial activities (Forms) which have a causal influence within the four-dimensional model.

The proposed "four-dimensional (active) system" is fundamentally deceptive because it reverses the true role of time. This is what I've been trying to tell you, but you refuse to acknowledge that this is the case. The base principles are all three-dimensional geometry, arcs, circles, spheres, triangles, planes etc.. and time is layered on top, as a further spatial feature. This does not allow that time can be properly represented as prior to, and therefore independent from space. — Metaphysician Undercover

And this is why an understanding of dimensional principles (not geometric elements) is important. I didn’t say that sub-atomic particles could be shown in a four-dimensional system, and I’m not talking about dimensional models. An n dimensional model shows n-1 dimensional entities, and requires an n+1 dimensional system for intelligibility (significance).

I do agree that ‘subatomic particles’ are more honestly described as activities. But I disagree as to their immateriality, on account of their causal influence within a four-dimensional system. And while I agree that time is logically prior to ‘space’, I disagree that it is therefore independent, on account of Einstein’s gravitational field.

Einstein understands that Aristotle and Newton are both right. Newton is right in intuiting that something else exists in addition to the simple things we see moving and changing. True and mathematical Newtonian time exists; it is a real entity; it is the gravitational field…But Newton is wrong in assuming that this time is independent from things - and that it passes regularly, imperturbably, separately from everything else.
For his part, Aristotle is right to say that ‘when’ and ‘where’ are always located in relation to something. But this something can also be just the field, the spatio-temporal entity of Einstein, because this is a dynamic and concrete entity, like all those in reference to which, as Aristotle rightly observed, we are capable of locating ourselves.
All of this is perfectly coherent, and Einstein’s equations describing the distortions of the gravitational field and its effects on clocks and meters have been repeatedly verified for more than a century. But our idea of time has lost another of its constituent parts: its supposed independence from the rest of the world.
The three-handed dance of these intellectual giants - Aristotle, Newton and Einstein - has guided us to a deeper understanding of time and space. There is a structure of reality that is the gravitational field; it is not separate from the rest of physics, nor is it the stage across which the world passes. It is a dynamic component of the great dance of the world, similar to all the others, interacting with the others, determining the rhythm of those things we call meters and clocks and the rhythm of all physical phenomena. — Carlo Rovelli

Again, you continue to demonstrate the incoherency of your supposed "broader understanding of grammatical forms". "Materiality" is defined by material, and "material" is defined by matter. And "matter" by common definition, and conventional understanding is defined by the physical presence of material things. Now you propose a "matter", in the form of "a materiality", which "extends beyond material things".

By this proposal there is absolutely nothing to constrain the concept of "matter", because it could be extended to any sort of fictional idea. If the concept of "matter" is not grounded in, or substantiated by, the real existence of material things, then we allow that "matter" and consequently "materiality" may refer to any fantasy or fictitious thing. This is why Aristotle, who first defined "matter" and expressed all the limitations under which the concept was to be understood, explicitly denied the possibility of matter which extends beyond the existence of material things.

I believe it is important to recognize that "matter" is a concept. The concept was produced to assist us in understanding the existence of physical bodies. Matter, as a concept was intended to represent a property of such bodies, a property which all bodies have in common. But if we move, as you propose, and make matter something which extends further than its original concept, something other than a property of physical bodies, then we invalidate the entire concept. All the things which were said about "matter", as a property of physical bodies lose their necessity as truths, because "matter" is now something else. And there is no principle which would allow that matter can maintain its status as a property of physical bodies, and also extend beyond physical bodies. So the entire conception is undermined.

We have a very similar problem when we allow that inertia extends beyond mass. The concept of "inertia" was produced as a property of mass. Now if we allow that there is inertia which is not associated with mass we undermine the concept. Of course the argument would be that the concept of "inertia" would be grounded in something else, just like the concept of "matter" above (which extends beyond material things) would be grounded in something else, but that's not really true. The proposal to allow such changes is just carried out in an effort to make the mathematics work. Therefore there is no real grounding, just an effort to make the equations work out. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, of course - if Aristotle defined a term (in Greek), then it must be the true meaning of the idea! :chin:

I see no logical reason why the idea of ‘materiality’ must be so constrained. It could possibly refer to any fantasy or fictitious idea. But it doesn’t. Let’s look again at the dictionary definitions:

Matter (noun): 1. physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit; (in physics) that which occupies space and possesses rest mass, especially as distinct from energy.
2. a subject or situation under consideration.
(verb): 1. be important or significant.

I would say that ‘matter’ is not so much a concept as the human conceptualisation of an idea. In reference to things, matter is physical substance, but also mental substance. But in reference to activity, to matter is to be important or significant. You can’t just ignore these additional aspects of the conceptualisation of ‘matter’. And you can’t declare them ‘different substances’ without an understanding of how they relate.

As for ‘inertia’, this refers to a phenomenon - a tendency to do nothing or remain unchanged. Not an actual Form, but an apparent observation. Mass doesn’t really have inertia, it only appears to. Look closer…

Understanding is not about grounding concepts in just one ‘logical’ system - that just gives an illusion of certainty, like religion.

Grammatical conventions must be variable, that I agree with. However the process (discipline) whereby these conventions are questioned, dialectics, is completely different from the process whereby mathematical axioms are question. The former is the philosophical quest for truth, and the latter is the pragmatic quest for usefulness. The two are not incompatible, but compatibility requires a hierarchy of purpose, or intent. The pragmatic quest for usefulness must be guided by the philosophical quest for truth. In other words, the purpose or usefulness must be the quest for truth, or else there can be no compatibility.

Therefore grammatical conventions, which are variable under the auspices of dialectics and the quest for truth, must take priority over the conventions of mathematics and physics which are variable according to pragmatic inclinations. When grammatical logic is altered under the direction of good dialectics seeking truth, this can be known as the evolution of language. But when grammatical logic is altered under the direction of mathematicians and physicists who seek to support the usefulness of their own discipline, we can call this a corruption of grammatical logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a fundamental misunderstanding of mathematical logic, and the pot calling the kettle black. ‘Good dialectics seeking truth’ is just seeking to ‘support the usefulness of their own discipline’. Surely you see this? Compatibility does not require a ‘higher purpose’, only a broader understanding of each discipline. All three disciplines seek truth in their own way, and none is more significant than the others. To declare otherwise is to put your faith in a narrow ideology, to blindly follow doctrine. I honestly thought you were more intelligent than than, and I’m a little disappointed at all this pontificating. What is truth if it isn’t useful?

Matter (noun): 1. physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit; (in physics) that which occupies space and possesses rest mass, especially as distinct from energy.
2. a subject or situation under consideration.
(verb): 1. be important or significant.

I would say that ‘matter’ is not so much a concept as the human conceptualisation of an idea. In reference to things, matter is physical substance, but also mental substance. But in reference to activity, to matter is to be important or significant. You can’t just ignore these additional aspects of the conceptualisation of ‘matter’. And you can’t declare them ‘different substances’ without an understanding of how they relate. — Possibility

OK, I see how you want to define "matter". You define it as the verb in the definitions above, "to be important or significant". Do you agree, that "importance and significance" implies a judgement of value? Importance and significance only have meaning in relation to something which is valuable.

First of all, I didn’t say that ‘immaterial’ implies inactive. I said it implies that the activity in question doesn’t matter. What you’re arguing is that the only way this kind of activity can matter is if it actually matters to living human minds FIRST. Quantum mechanics refutes this, and so does neuroscience. — Possibility

So I cannot understand what you are trying to say here. What "matters" is what is important or significant, and this is only judged in relation to human minds. Why do you believe that quantum mechanics refutes this? Does it demonstrate importance and significance in relation to values which are non-human? What are you saying?

The first assumption is that ‘categories’, with their determinate boundaries and properties, divide up reality with mutually exclusive accuracy. So, according to Aristotle, a particular event cannot be both potential and actual. — Possibility

This is another bad misrepresentation. Categories are not mutually exclusive in the existence of real things, like dichotomies are. That is the whole point of using categories rather than dichotomies, to allow for the overlapping of concepts, which would not be allowed by dichotomous divisions. So in Aristotle's hylomorphism, physical objects consist of both matter (potential), and form (actual). In fact, a particular is by definition both. Yes, "potential" is distinct, as a separate category from "actual", so that one is not the other, but the categories don't serve to divide up reality, they serve to divide up the conceptual structure for the purpose of better understanding reality.

For example, we might have the categories of sight and sound, and we could divide up a conceptual structure accordingly. But this is not to divide up reality, as the same thing might be both seen and heard, though the property which is heard is distinct from the property seen, according to that conceptual structure. it is a tool to help us understand reality, but if you think that it is actually dividing up reality, that is a misunderstanding.

But that necessary event need not have become fully actual prior to all other events in the series. It only needs to have begun. In which case said necessary event - the universe itself - is being, and even now, still in the process of becoming. So there is no reason for the universe in its becoming to be denied agency, except that this affects us in a way that impacts our homeostasis. — Possibility

I do not know what you might mean by "fully actual" here. If an event has "begun", it is active, therefore actual. To suggest that there is a time when the event is partially active, yet not fully active is incoherent. Take the concept of "acceleration" for example. Suppose something is assumed to be at rest, it is not active. At some point in time it begins to move, accelerate. At that point, it is fully active, though it hasn't reached its top speed. We do not say that it is nof fully active, or not fully actual. As soon as it has motion it is active, actual, and it make no sense to say that it is partially actual, but not fully actual.

So I really don't know what you're trying to say here. If the supposed event is not occurring, not actual, then it requires a cause to become actual. That cause itself must be actual, and the cause is prior to the actuality of the event which is the effect. So if the universe is that event, then there must be something actual which is prior to it as the cause of its actuality. We cannot simply say that the potential for the universe was prior to the universe, because that pure potential could not act to cause the universe, so there must have been something more than just the potential, there must have been something actual. There must be something actual which was prior to the universe.

True and mathematical Newtonian time exists; it is a real entity; it is the gravitational field — Carlo Rovelli

Time cannot be reduced to gravitation, that is a misconception.

For his part, Aristotle is right to say that ‘when’ and ‘where’ are always located in relation to something. But this something can also be just the field, the spatio-temporal entity of Einstein, because this is a dynamic and concrete entity, like all those in reference to which, as Aristotle rightly observed, we are capable of locating ourselves. — Carlo Rovelli

And this is also a misconception, because a field must itself be a property of something. So we cannot truthfully say "this something can also be just the field", because fields are always known to be the property of something which creates the field, therefore to assume "just the field" is in violation of physical evidence and inductive reasoning.

Understanding is not about grounding concepts in just one ‘logical’ system — Possibility

Yes understanding is about having one logical system, because that is what produces consistency and coherency. To have multiple different conceptual systems which are unrelated allows for contradiction and incoherency, and this is misunderstanding. The only way to eradicate contradiction, incoherency, and misunderstanding is to have one overall system within which all the parts are coherent. To have parts out side one system, which are incoherent to that system, but are allowed to be maintained because they are coherent within a different system, is a symptom of misunderstanding.

To put this into your perspective, the perspective of "matter", or "what matters", what is required is a hierarchy of values. What is important or significant is determined relative to something valued. But when two competing values produce contradiction, or inconsistency in what is important, or not important, then we must appeal to a higher value to make the judgement as to whether the thing is important or not.

‘Good dialectics seeking truth’ is just seeking to ‘support the usefulness of their own discipline’. Surely you see this? — Possibility

Not at all, truth is sought for the sake of knowing the truth, not for some usefulness. That is why philosophy is known as being useless. Surely you must see this?

Compatibility does not require a ‘higher purpose’, only a broader understanding of each discipline. — Possibility

This is clearly not true, as explained above. There is very clear evidence of a difference between various disciplines as to what is important, what matters. When it is the case that what is important to one discipline is not important to another discipline, there is incompatibility. The "broader understanding" which you refer to is just a higher purpose, a higher value, which can arbitrate the incompatibility.

To declare otherwise is to put your faith in a narrow ideology, to blindly follow doctrine. I honestly thought you were more intelligent than than, and I’m a little disappointed at all this pontificating. What is truth if it isn’t — Possibility

To seek the truth is not to "blindly follow doctrine", in fact it is the very opposite of that.