But if you don't admit the existence of real definitions (or at least essences) then you cannot say that A is a better X than B — Leontiskos

Why not?

Seems that "real definitions" are mere stipulations. Is it a better pair of scissors because it is sharp, or because it is harder to cut yourself with them?

So what counts as better depends on what one is doing.

But there is a bigger issue here, in that what you mean by "essence" is unclear. If not what is had by the thing in quesTion in every possible case, then what?

And isn't that what kit fine is doing by relying on definitions - stipulation - rather than necessity?

I dunno. I find this all a bit too fumbling to be getting on with.

On the issue of Davidson, I just came across this approach that follows Davidson's program by replacing first-order logic with lambda calculus.

http://lambdacalculator.com/#

So it seems Davidson's program is still active.

Why not? — Banno

Well when you or Searle say that, "A is a better X than B," you could either be stipulating that it is better or asserting that it is better. If you are stipulating then you are apparently claiming that it is better according to some arbitrary standard that you have chosen. If you are asserting then you are doing something more, and you are making a claim that could be right or wrong, true or false.

As I have pointed out numerous times, the reason we know Searle is not merely stipulating is because of what he says about his claim:

It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions. — John Searle

Seems that "real definitions" are mere stipulations. Is it a better pair of scissors because it is sharp, or because it is harder to cut yourself with them? — Banno

This is the elementary difference between a substance and an artifact. According to Aristotle, artifacts have no essence, although they can be usefully imagined to have quasi-essences in various ways. "Sharpness," for example, has a determinate and normative notion that is not merely stipulative, and we can assess artifacts according to this notion.


I think my previous posts are clear enough, but to try once more: when Searle says that his conception of belief is better than the prevailing conception, and that his own conception avoids the great "damage done to philosophy and cognitive science," he is not making a merely stipulative claim.

A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition. That there is much more to be said about belief is not in contention; this is just a place to start. This is set as a falsifiable proposition. — Banno

Let’s continue on then to see if there are different senses of belief. Provisionally (subject to assent), there at least appear to be different kinds of propositions to believe in. A proposition that can be false is, yes, an assertion that the proposition is true. And here is there actually a difference between the belief that an assertion is true, and an assertion being true? Are not “I believe the earth is flat” and “The earth is flat” both assertions? We might say one is me making a claim (say, not on behalf of you) and the other is a claim for a larger group (everyone?), but then, as you note, why stake an individual claim to a fact?

Maybe at times I am not asserting that the proposition is true, but I am predicting that something might be true (hypothesizing, Wittgenstein says, p. 162 3rd). If I believe it is raining (per Moore), then, when it is not, it is more than that my claim is false, I am said to be wrong (or correct). And we can now understand “I believe the earth is flat” as a prediction, though it makes more sense in examples such as: “I believe Mount McKinley is the capital of Vermont” or I believe 134x23=3082, in which cases we can look it up and find out—not if the assertion is true (though we do just that), but whether I was right or wrong, in the sense of guessing.

But we also propose to believe some things that cannot be looked up. “(I believe) The right thing to do is apologize.” Now the personal claim of belief makes more sense here. The proposition is not true or false, nor can we be “wrong” about this proposition; or, only in so much as misguided, foolish, appeasing, etc. depending on the claim and the situation. We can be said to stand for its truth, prepared to defend it, make ourselves intelligible, give reasons in favor, die before renouncing, etc. I believe this would be, as Wittgenstein puts it, a “tone” of belief, as conviction (#187)—though we need not be “convinced” to make a personal claim (as if it were necessarily rational; that it must be to be part of this category, this sense of belief). And maybe this is the same sense of belief as “I believe in God”, and here we may substitute for God: in the power of absolution, or in eating an apple a day, etc. And maybe we would say that belief here is faith, as “I trust in”, say, the promises of God’s scripture, or that I give control of myself over to God, or my future health over to fruit.

I am not looking for an ultimate, correct and complete interpretation of belief in some formal language.

And I don't think Searle is, either. — Banno

To "It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions" I might append "...in that they find themselves searching for that relation as if it were a thing in the mind, or worse, in the brain". — Banno

You seem to be making use of some as yet unstated transcendental argument, along the lines of the only way one account is better than another is if it is closer to the essence... — Banno

...what he says about his claim — Leontiskos

I've explained, a few times, I think, how it seems to me that you misinterpret this.

I must be misunderstanding you. You seem to be implying that the only way that something can be "better" than another thing is if it is closer in some ideal, essential characteristic. But we do judge one thing to be better than another without having in mind some ideal.

And all of this seems so obtuse, given the topic at hand.

So I must admit to being somewhat nonplussed.

“(I believe) The right thing to do is apologize.” Now the personal claim of belief makes more sense here. The proposition is not true or false, nor can we be “wrong” about this proposition; — Antony Nickles

This is very interesting. I find myself wondering why "The right thing to do is apologise" should not have a truth-value. And so I find myself here somewhat at odds with Wittgenstein, and leaning towards Davidson.

"The right thing to do is apologize", claimed Antony
"That's true", replied Banno.

Nothing seems amiss here.

But we do judge one thing to be better than another without having in mind some ideal. — Banno

Such as...? Do you have any arguments or examples to give? You are remarkably tight-lipped for someone who is "nonplussed."

I've explained, a few times, I think, how it seems to me that you misinterpret this. — Banno

But your appendix doesn't affect my argument. You merely explained the manner in which the view is mistaken.

So taking your appendix:

I might append "...in that they find themselves searching for that relation as if it were a thing in the mind, or worse, in the brain". — Banno

The idea here is:

• P1: "Ceteris paribus, a construal of the belief-relation as a thing in the mind or brain is inferior to a construal of the belief-relation as a thing that is not in the mind or brain."

Now your ideal belief-relation here—whatever else we want to say about it—must not be a thing in the mind or brain. This characteristic is part of your own definition of the belief-relation, and it is a characteristic which must be in place in order for you to implicitly assert P1. If there is no such thing as a belief-relation (and it has no essence), then neither P1 nor Searle's claim can hold. If the belief-relation you have in mind is not a determinate and normative concept, then the "inferior" of P1 falls to pieces.

And all of this seems so obtuse, given the topic at hand.

So I must admit to being somewhat nonplussed. — Banno

Well so am I. What I am saying seems the most obvious thing in the world. But at least I am providing arguments for my position, even though I think it is the most obvious thing in the world.

(As I said earlier, this tangent is closer to your thread about definitions, for I am focusing on the definition of belief that underlies your claims about belief.)

Such as...? — Leontiskos

Well, I gave the example of scissors before, and you met it with some irrelevancies.

I made the point that what counts as "better" depends on what one is doing. Whether blunt scissors are better than sharp scissors depends on the task at hand, not on some ideal essence of scissor.

I suppose someone might reply that implicit in what one is doing is an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task... seems a bit far fetched. I don't need a clear definition of the perfect screwdriver to choose between a Philips and a flat.

What I am saying seems the most obvious thing in the world. — Leontiskos

I dunno. It seems to me you simply misunderstood Searle, and double down when this is pointed out. Meh.

...your ideal belief-relation... — Leontiskos

Not a notion of which I have made use. I try not to deal in ideals...

I find myself wondering why "The right thing to do is apologise" should not have a truth-value…

"The right thing to do is apologize", claimed Antony
"That's true", replied Banno. — Banno

Well if you said “I agree” it might mean you intend to apologize. If you say “You’re right” it maybe means you are giving your assent to my analysis of the situation. And you could say “That is right” if you were teaching me about apologizing. If we look at saying, as Austin might, “That is false”, it is unclear what the implications would be (but something is amiss). This problem is not the same as a math problem or a fact (we can’t look it up). We can argue about what should be done, but neither of us has any inherent claim to what is right, and, as well, we may not reach a point where we agree, and so what is at stake is more than what is right, it is also our relationship, our community; I may shun you for refusing to acknowledge or do what I see as correct. In fact, you might say “That is true” if you agree that it is the right thing to do but you aren’t going to do it and don’t what to offend me.

p.s. Even though this situation does not value certainty, we nevertheless have a way of discussing what would matter in deciding what the right thing to do is. Does it matter if you feel remorseless? Do you intend to keep the relationship or is it more important to hold to the action or words that hurt the other? Can you fulfill the expectation of a promise to act differently?

I find myself here somewhat at odds with Wittgenstein, and leaning towards Davidson. — Banno

I only have a passing familiarity with Davidson, but, if my understanding is correct, the structure of a separate discussion of the workings of a concept are similar to both. Wittgenstein would call it the grammar of the criteria of a concept where Davidson’s talks of a meta-discussion of an object-language. If this is a similarity, where is the space between them?

Well, I gave the example of scissors before, and you met it with some irrelevancies.

I made the point that what counts as "better" depends on what one is doing. Whether blunt scissors are better than sharp scissors depends on the task at hand, not on some ideal essence of scissor.

I suppose someone might reply that implicit in what one is doing is an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task... seems a bit far fetched. I don't need a clear definition of the perfect screwdriver to choose between a Philips and a flat. — Banno

Well, do you think the scissors analogy maps to Searle's claim? Do you imagine that Searle might be caught saying something like, "It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by [the mistaken view that scissors ought to be dull rather than sharp]"?

If someone wants to make a bold and striking claim they can't immediately fall back into a kind of nominalism. To do so is, in effect, to say, "It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that X is Y. Also, it makes no difference whether philosophers and cognitive scientists believe X is Y. It's merely a matter of perspective."

If someone makes a substantial mistake then there must be some matter of the fact that they are mistaken about. To say that they have made a mistake and then to simultaneously hold that there is ultimately nothing to be mistaken about is to contradict oneself. Searle's claim is normative, not merely hypothetical.

I think you are the one misrepresenting Searle, here. Suppose you write Searle a letter asking, "Are there certain facts about what belief is, such that some construals of belief are more accurate than others?" I think he would write back, "Yes, of course there are real facts about what belief is and what belief is not. The people who are mixed up about these facts are more mistaken than those who are not mixed up about them."

I suppose someone might reply that implicit in what one is doing is an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task... seems a bit far fetched. — Banno

But when Aristotelians see people saying things like this, we can only wonder what sort of bizarre strawman is at play. When you look at a screw and decide to use a Phillips rather than a flathead screwdriver, you are inevitably appealing to "an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task."

I don't need a clear definition of the perfect screwdriver to choose between a Philips and a flat. — Banno

You need a clear definition of a Phillips screwdriver and a clear definition of a flathead screwdriver if you are to choose between them. When you look at a screw and think, "A Phillips will be better than a flathead for this screw," you have already appealed to the ideal screwdriver for this job. This is all the argument requires.

When you look at a screw and decide to use a Phillips rather than a flathead screwdriver, you are inevitably appealing to "an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task." — Leontiskos

No. You are not appealing to any such thing by choosing a Philips head. One does not need a clear definition of a Philips head screwdriver in order to use one to remove a screw.

The Aristotelian view is really quite odd.

Images of a builder calling "Slab" and the assistant saying "...not until you set out the essence of slabbness".

"It's the slabby one. The one with the essence of slab"

If we look at saying, as Austin might, “That is false”, it is unclear what the implications would be (but something is amiss). — Antony Nickles

That's a very good point.

S0 we have:

"The right thing to do is apologize", claimed Antony
"That's false", replied Banno.

It's an unusual phrasing, but isn't it clear enough? "That's not true" would be a happier wording.

Interesting.

Davidson would have us translate such things into truth-functional first-order sentences. No easy task here.

No. You are not appealing to any such thing by choosing a Philips head. One does not need a clear definition of a Philips head screwdriver in order to use one to remove a screw. — Banno

In order to pick out a screwdriver you need to know what it is, and in order to know what it is you need to have an internalized definition of it. That's what a definition is. An understanding or concept of what something is. If you claim to know what something is then you have at least a nominal definition of it, and if you have a definition then you claim to know what it is.

What sort of strange misunderstandings are you laboring under? What do you imagine an Aristotelian (or an average person) means when they talk about the definition of some thing?

Continuing where I left of in my quote from <this post>:

The second objection, that definitions cannot express real essences, is mere trifling. The suggestion that the word "definition" be restricted to statements of meaning is purely stipulative: if the stipulation is accepted, as a convenient way of avoiding ambiguity, nothing need happen to Aristotle's theory beyond a change of name; and until one is proposed, we may either follow ordinary usage, which surely allows us to apply the word "definition" to statements of essence, or else avail ourselves of the scholastic distinction between 'real' and 'nominal' definition. The whole question is insignificant. — Introduction to Posterior Analytics, by Jonathan Barnes, p. xiii-xiv

A modal definition - it's a slab if it has slabbyness in every possible world? Or is it enough for it to have slabbiness in this possible world? Or it's a slab IFF it's width is greater than it's height...

Or it's a slab if the builder places it horizontally, a block if he places it vertically...

In order to pick out a screwdriver you need to know what it is... — Leontiskos

And what could "know what it is..." mean, apart from being able to pick the driver from the chisel, the flat from the Phillips? Knowing what screwdriver is, is exactly being able to make use of it, and not understanding what it's essence is.

And what's an "internalised definition"? One that is not explicit? One that cannot be made explicit? Could such a thing count as a definition?

In order to pick out a screwdriver you need to know what it is, and in order to know what it is you need to have an internalized definition of it. — Leontiskos

Does a dog have an internalized definition of her food bowl when she "picks it out"?

And what could "know what it is..." mean, apart from being able to pick the driver from the chisel, the flat from the Phillips? Knowing what screwdriver is, is exactly being able to make use of it, and not understanding what it's essence is.

And what's an "internalised definition"? One that is not explicit? One that cannot be made explicit? Could such a thing count as a definition? — Banno

Practical knowledge bears on the essence of a thing, yes. In the case of practical knowledge one does not need to be able to communicate their knowledge to others in order to possess it. A mechanic who can fix anything in the world but can't explain the mechanics of mechanic-ing to another person still knows the essence of a screwdriver. Whether he knows the definition of a screwdriver is perhaps arguable, but I would say that he does.

Incidentally, this bears on your thread about definitions. Definitions are about things, not words, and so circularity of words (description) does not undermine the notion of definitions. When we teach children by pointing, "dog," "grandpa," we are teaching them how to name things and take the first step towards definitions. The words are never ultimately about words. They are about things. The one who understands the thing possesses the definition, not the one who possesses mere words. ...Of course words are rarely "mere," for they themselves tell us about things.

---



I rather doubt that dogs make choices with regard to their food bowl in the way that we make choices between screwdrivers. I see this as association vs. use.

In order to pick out a screwdriver you need to know what it is, and in order to know what it is you need to have an internalized definition of it. That's what a definition is. An understanding or concept of what something is. If you claim to know what something is then you have at least a nominal definition of it, and if you have a definition then you claim to know what it is. — Leontiskos

How broadly are you defining definition?

I'd suggest that rather than a definition or an essence, you have pattern recognition which occurs in your brain.

How broadly are you defining definition? — wonderer1

Mmm, Banno has shifted this discussion quite far from its origin, which was not focused on practical knowledge or artifacts. My claim has been <If you want to say that X is a better understanding of belief than Y, then there must be some real definition of belief that X better approximates>. Banno's position seems to be <X is a better understanding of belief than Y, and there is no real definition of belief that X better approximates>.

His justification has to do with scissors and screwdrivers. Apparently the idea is that if one does not need an ideal conception of scissors or screwdrivers, then they do not need an ideal conception of belief (in order to make the claim that X is a better understanding of belief than Y).

The point was that dogs can recognize their food bowls and know what to do with them, just as we can recognize screwdrivers, once we are familiar with them. Of course, the dog cannot be reflectively aware of this recognition post hoc, as we can, because this would seem to require language.

It would be nice if there were a thread where random tangents could be taken...

I think a dog associates its bowl with the act of eating, and conditioning occurs, but it does not use the bowl as a tool (like a screwdriver). Thus the mode of recognition would seem to be quite different.

Getting back towards the topic, if someone says, "A is a better X than B," then they must have at least some vague notion of what the best X looks like. If they say, "The Phillips is a better screwdriver than a flathead for this screw," then they must understand the shape of the screw as well as the proper screwdriver needed to drive it, and that the Phillips is closer to the proper choice than the flathead. Or perhaps the Phillips simply is the proper or best conceivable tool for the job. Either way, they have a definition of "the right screwdriver for the job."

The dog doesn't have that definition, because they do not use things as means to ends in that way.

It would be nice if there were a thread where random tangents could be taken... — Leontiskos

I think tangents are fine if they are relevant and I think this one is. We come to understand what screwdrivers are used for by association I would say, that is by seeing them used and by using them. The use of a Phillip's head driver is associated with the recognition of the configuration of a Phillip's head screw, and likewise with the standard screw.

The scissors example, the understanding of which pair of scissors is the better, is determined by seeing which one cuts more quickly, straightly and cleanly; I think this is all empirically observable and has nothing to do with essences per se, although we can think about it in those terms on reflection.

Seems that "real definitions" are mere stipulations. Is it a better pair of scissors because it is sharp, or because it is harder to cut yourself with them?
— Banno

This is the elementary difference between a substance and an artifact. According to Aristotle, artifacts have no essence, although they can be usefully imagined to have quasi-essences in various ways. "Sharpness," for example, has a determinate and normative notion that is not merely stipulative, and we can assess artifacts according to this notion. — Leontiskos

The missing premise is that belief names a substance, in the sense indicated here, which I suppose means something like "part of the natural world," and thus its essence can be sought by means of natural science, where we might expect theories ("only") to approximate that essence.

But that may be false. "Belief" is a category from folk psychology, which means it is just as likely to turn out to be defined only as well as "hammer" or "chair" or "government." You may disagree, and consider "belief" to name a natural kind, but you ought to recognize that in doing so you are relying on, if not advancing, very strong claims about psychology. Is that what you want to do?

It would be nice if there were a thread where random tangents could be taken... — Leontiskos

It's all of them.

Also: every thread turns into the same thread eventually, about the nature and status of concepts in general, as this one has.

The scissors example, the understanding of which pair of scissors is the better, is determined by seeing which one cuts more quickly, straightly and cleanly; I think this is all empirically observable and has nothing to with essences, although we can think about it in those terms on reflection. — Janus

I agree, and I would say that the essence of a scissors includes sharpness. Banno apparently disagrees, and thinks the essence of a scissors is neither sharp nor dull. Of course we are talking about artifacts, but we can still think of them as having quasi-essences.

So the best scissors cuts most quickly, straightly, and cleanly, and we will compare any two scissors according to this ideal. That's basically what a (quasi-) definition is: that conceptual ideal that you have in your mind when you compare or assess scissors. Or if we want to be precise we could call it a nominal definition. Really it doesn't matter what we call it. It's the thing that matters. If someone is superstitious about the words 'essence' or 'definition', we can go with something else. It seems to me that to deny the existence of such things is mistaken and also very odd.

The missing premise is that belief names a substance, in the sense indicated here, which I suppose means something like "part of the natural world," and thus its essence can be sought by means of natural science, where we might expect theories ("only") to approximate that essence.

But that may be false. "Belief" is a category from folk psychology, which means it is just as likely to turn out to be defined only as well as "hammer" or "chair" or "government." You may disagree, and consider "belief" to name a natural kind, but you ought to recognize that in doing so you are relying on, if not advancing, very strong claims about psychology. Is that what you want to do? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, you are right to point out that there is enthymeme at work, but I would express it a bit differently. (I would say that belief is not an artifact, but it is also not a substance. It is an accident. Let that pass for now.)

Yes, I would want to say that 'belief' is a natural kind, found among humans and accessible to natural science. Banno gave a <quote from John Searle>. Specifically, my claim has been that the final sentence of that quote commits Searle to the view that the notion of belief is both determinate and normative, and to the view that there exists a real definition of belief that the "mistaken view" has gotten wrong.

(This twofold point is getting at the same thing, but I broke it up at some point to try to help the argument along.)

Also: every thread turns into the same thread eventually, about the nature and status of concepts in general, as this one has. — Srap Tasmaner

Ah, how soon you forget about the threads which end in us calling one another "Hitler"! :razz:

(In fact when I began pressing Banno on his claim, found elsewhere, that definitions do not exist, I admitted that my line was tangential.)

I began pressing Banno on his claim, found elsewhere, that definitions do not exist... — Leontiskos

I don't think I said that - anywhere.

Banno... thinks the essence of a scissors is neither sharp nor dull. — Leontiskos

No, he doesn't. He thinks that we would be better served considering use rather than essence. Hence sharp scissors are ill-advised in kindergarten. In that situation the better scissors are blunt.

my claim has been that the final sentence of that quote commits Searle to the view that the notion of belief is both determinate and normative, and to the view that there exists a real definition of belief that the "mistaken view" has gotten wrong. — Leontiskos

From the paragraph:

The proposition is the content of the belief, not the object of the belief. In this case, the object of the belief is Washington. It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions. — Searle, my bolding

He's saying hat the structure of beliefs is not well reflected in the predicate form B(a,p).

Nothing here supports your claims. He's saying belief is not a relation. He doesn't appear to be saying anything about normativity, determinism or "real" definitions, whatever they are and whatever they might mean in this context.

And nothing about essences.

This discussion isn't going anywhere.

A belief is simply information/data that has found a place in the mind where it is rarely, if ever, deliberately, consciously questioned, scrutinized, evaluated, etc. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Really? I thought belief is like an experiment. You do your research, act upon it, modify it and then see if it stands still and you repeat the process.

A modal definition - it's a slab if it has slabbyness in every possible world? Or is it enough for it to have slabbiness in this possible world? Or it's a slab IFF it's width is greater than it's height...

Or it's a slab if the builder places it horizontally, a block if he places it vertically... — Banno

Heh. I thought my response clever but upon inspection, not so much. I think the act of pointing has a place in the definition of "slab!", for the initiate. Or the act of the other builder bringing a slab such that the initiate sees what a slab is without an essence.

How it happens, so I'd maintain @Leontiskos, is not known to the Aristotelian, though the Aristotelian could probably derive a complicated enough description to satisfy the definition of "slab" that fits for all cases thus far seen.

But then I might give you a slab of steak.