The art -- also betrays some of what I think of philosophy, that it is more an art than a science. Which is why I think it's a social activity found with others. The art is made between artist and audience, and in theatre this is particularly so as even having the same actors and the same audience on a different night gives a different performance.

I think of philosophy as a kind of art, though it's a unique one worth distinguishing.

My philosophical methods has changed recently. Before I tried to read the classic text books as much as possible, and tried to understand them as much as possible quoting and using them where and when relevant in discussions or thinkings. It was hard work, and didn't work out well for me.

Now I stopped reading books. I still do some reading, but it is really too little amount compared to past. I try to avoid complicated concepts, theories and systems.

I try to look at the problems from my own point view, my own reasoning and thinking, and compare with other peoples arguments, points and reasonings. So dialogues and discussions are always helpful.
Mostly my arguments tends to sound grotesque, simple and basic, but that is what I seem to be doing with philosophy recently.

Gentlemen, ladies!

in another place, we are having some dialogue about a book that is concerned with foundations, which I suspect is part of what philosophy is concerned with. I quote below the two axioms on which the formal system of the book is constructed.

Axiom 1. The law of calling
The value of a call made again si the value of the call.
That is to say, if a name is called and then is called again, the value indicated by the two calls taken together is the value indicated by one of them.
That is to say, for any name, to recall is to call.
ThE FORM
Equally, if the content is of value, a motive or an intention or instruction to cross the boundary into the content can be taken to indicate this value.
Thus, also, the crossing of the boundary can be identified with the value of the content.
Axiom 2. The law of crossing
The value of a crossing made again is not the value of the crossing.
That is to say, fi it is intended to cross a boundary and then it is intended to cross it again, the value indicated by the two intentions taken together isthe value indicated by none of them.
That si to say, for any boundary, to recross is not to cross.

George Spencer-Brown, The Laws of Form.

I make an illustrative implementation of these axioms in the following form, which is particularly relevant to your discussion.

Axiom 1. Philosophy[of science] and philosophy[of religion] are philosophy.
Axiom 2. Philosophy of philosophy is not philosophy.

So in the philosophy of science one asks 'what is science' and tries to answer, and in the philosophy of religion, one asks , what is religion, and tries to answer, but in the philosophy of philosophy, if one asks what is philosophy, one has put into question the process of putting things into question, and silence is the best one can hope for. — unenlightened

I have to suggest that silence might at least be as good as declarations of not needing to convince, and so on, back and forth, and that this application might go some way to explaining the frustration that is commonly the result of enquiries into the nature and definition of philosophy.

One of the advantages of method is that it's something written down which allows others to test it. And then the method can be refined by others. — Moliere

What is an example of such a method? Socratic? Phenomenological? Seems that a method is like a recipe by way of presuppositions.

I have to suggest that silence might at least be as good as declarations of not needing to convince, and so on, back and forth, and that this application might go some way to explaining the frustration that is commonly the result of enquiries into the nature and definition of philosophy. — unenlightened

Fair point. You hooked me with your application of the book to this problem ;)

And yup I don't think we're disagreeing. Maybe that's what's hard about distinguishing philosophy, too -- we're so used to the engine being disagreement that continual agreement upon things that look disparate seems to run counter to what we usually call philosophy, and it may just be a case of the snake eating its own tail and becoming incoherent.

I'd say any of the offered lists here, and even the reactions to the lists, could be considered methods of the sort I'm thinking. There are philosophical methods, like the Socratic and the Phenomenological method, but I was thinking more pedagogically -- how to learn philosophy at all?

Which I hadn't thought about until now -- but the question "How to learn philosophy at all?" is not innocent specifically because Plato continued the project of Socrates to corrupt the youth by the powers of reason, but more safely than him. So teaching has kind of always been a part of philosophy's practice.

Agree. And the issue with having a 'how to' is that it already presupposes an approach and set of beliefs/answers which in turn implies a bracketing or dismissal of other approaches. There seems to be an arrogance implicit in teaching, in as much as it rests upon, 'I know something valuable others should know and I have a useful way of sharing this knowledge.' I'm not sure there is a way around this.

The anarchist in me is determined :D.

...the dialogic nature of philosophy means that one should... remain open to what they might teach us, and to the possibility that there may be questions without answers and problems without solutions. — Fooloso4

Please forgive the requote, but I think this a sound bit of advice worth highlighting. "Remaining open" is key!

The philosophy learning guru. It's really interesting and enlightening what you wrote.

Thanks Hailey, that is nice to hear! :)