So that even while you recognise something like the 'explanatory gap' or 'the hard problem of consciousness', you think physicalism is a pretty safe bet regardless
I think what should be abandoned is the metaphysical assumption of some kind of dualism where over here sits physical things and over there sits mental things and they are totally separable. In that regard, the idea that matter generates consciousness is based on a faulty assumption. — Apustimelogist
explaining how it happens
reducing it to brain states
arguing successfully it doesn't exist at all
The problem is that this implies that not everything can be explained in physical terms. So, this cuts against many common formulations of physicalism, such that "a complete physics can, in principle, explain everything."
But then what exactly is it that makes nature "physical?"
If physical facts can only describe one set of things in the world, then it seems like "physical" is a subordinate category, and that a higher category should subsume both the physical and the mental aspects of reality...
The question then becomes: what does physicalism explain that other ontologies cannot and how does it differentiate itself from objective idealism aside from a bald posit that nature is essentially "physical?"...
The dividing line would seem to be the claim that there is something that is ontologically distinct, a substance or process that is "physical," and that this physical substance/process somehow supervenes on all that is mental in a way that is relevant enough to be worth positing. That is, physicalism has to have some sort of extra explanatory value to it after we allow that it cannot explain/describe all aspects mental phenomena. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So maybe the lesson is just to abandon "physicalism" and embrace "naturalism, monism, and realism?"
Why resist the idea of "meaning" as an idea (ideal) instead of an object (real) --- an abstract symbol rather than the concrete thing symbolized? If Meaning was a material object we would be able to see & touch it. AFAIK, there is no Meaning apart from a conscious observer. Likewise, Consciousness is not a thing, but a process of constructing meanings relevant to the observer.Only I would resist the idea of meaning being immaterial. I'm sympathetic to view that kind of deflate the status of meaning as a thing. — Apustimelogist
Yes, but as Pinter himself says on page 148 : "a symbol is a placeholder". So, we need to avoid confusing the material Symbol (reference ; pointer) with the meaning symbolized (referent). Some BS researchers seem to equate the brain terrain with the mind map. Semiotics is relevant to my own philosophical notion of Enformationism ; but as a science, it tends to equate Mind with Matter, and biological code (cypher) with the chemical carrier. :smile:Symbolic systems are among the oldest inventions of nature. Evolution could never have gotten off the ground without the molecular genetic system, which is a paradigm example of a symbolic scheme. The double helix is a symbolic structure, essentially an extended proposition, which contains the description of an organism’s entire body plan. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 150). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.
He doesn't really develop the idea, but it converges well with biosemiotics. — Wayfarer
I am not sure I totally agree. In the OP I suggest that irreducibility is a natural consequence of the fact that experiences are representational. I then don't think that it is coherent for a representation to be reducible to things that cannot be identified with what is being represented, like with the photo example: a photograph of Everest contains information about everest, it does not contain information about the medium the photo is on, how the photo got there, what physical processes enable us to see the information in the photo etc.
how the photo got there
As you say, the idea of a physical substance is ill-defined and vague; however, the models that have emerged in the natural sciences seem to be successful and I think that is what we should follow when trying to decide the best way to describe things that actually exist.
The photograph absolutely does have information about the medium that it is made of. I can subject a photo to all sorts of chemical tests. I can identify what it is made out of, what it dissolves in, etc. I can discover fingerprints and DNA on the photograph, which will help me determine its history.
how the photo got there
The film itself will tell me what type of device was used to take the picture and I can then use my computer, a physical device, to find all sorts of information on the exact physics that would allow a person with a camera to create such a picture.
You seem to be setting up some sort of dichotomy between the "image" on the photograph and the physical photograph. But physicalism is an ontology that explicitly denies that any such dichotomy exists except in our minds. Film is physical. It encodes information about the pictures taken with it by virtue of physical processes. And, in comparison to how minds are generated, the physical processes involved in photography are very well understood in physical terms and arguably already reducible to them.
When physicists do make ontological claims, they increasingly seem to be embracing various forms of immaterialism, mostly ontic structural realism, rather than physicalism
I can produce the same image on different paper or have it on a digital screen and identify the contents of the image; those contents are not directly related to the physical composition of a photograph you can hold in your hand and cannot be reduced to it, which is the main point...it is still information of the image which is independent of the physical medium — Apustimelogist
I don't think Dualism is a "faulty assumption" for dealing with complex reality (Epistemology). But I can agree with your implicit criticism of the common "metaphysical assumption" of a Matter/Mind partition, imagined as the ultimate & final fact of reality (Ontology). That binary perspective is prevalent because it's just commonsense to view a material object (Brain) and its metaphysical function (Mind) as two separate classes of things. Those discrete conceptual categories are also where Science (matter ; mode) and Philosophy (mind ; essence) divide and conquer.I think what should be abandoned is the metaphysical assumption of some kind of dualism where over here sits physical things and over there sits mental things and they are totally separable. In that regard, the idea that matter generates consciousness is based on a faulty assumption. — Apustimelogist
I would expect that in principle we can derive Mary's reaction of "aha, now I know what it is like to see red" from a complete physical description of her brain processing. — Apustimelogist
depends on a brain able to generate it. — hypericin
Instead, it is of an epistemic nature in the context of information processing in the brain/mind; she has physical and mental concepts which are constructed in a certain way, but these are concepts created effectively through statistical machine learning in her brain to understand what she perceives; they don't necessarily reflect the actual intrinsic nature of the world. She cannot perceive the intrinsic nature of the world that is independent of the particular structure of her senses or the brain/mind she that receives information from it. — Apustimelogist
This just restates the problem that is supposed to be revealed. — schopenhauer1
And let's not dwell on Mary, I just mean the implications of any of these thought experiments. That is to say, it's not about the information processing, but why it is that the information processing is accompanied by "what it's like" qualities. That is to say, a zombie is basically behaving internally (neuronally) and externally (outward movements) just like a normal human, except there is no visuals, hearing, etc. — schopenhauer1
But I am talking about the information contents of the actual image, you are talking about features of the physical object the image has been projected on. I can produce the same image on different paper or have it on a digital screen and identify the contents of the image; those contents are not directly related to the physical composition of a photograph you can hold in your hand and cannot be reduced to it, which is the main point.
Yes, it's true that that image is not totally independent of other factors; after all, the type of camera and resolution etc will have an effect on the image but these largely still come from the same interactions during the photo-taking process by which the image of Everest was stored - it is still information of the image which is independent of the physical medium an image is projected on and so cannot be reduced to it.
The simplest solution is that the separation between "what it's like" and information processing doesn't really exist - there is no duality. — Apustimelogist
The question then becomes: what does physicalism explain that other ontologies cannot and how does it differentiate itself from objective idealism aside from a bald posit that nature is essentially "physical?" Objective idealism can be as naturalistic as physicalism, so that cannot be the relevant dividing line. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.