I think the act of pointing has a place in the definition of "slab!", for the initiate. — Moliere

:up:

In 'straylian, "slab" is a carton of beer. 24 tinnies.

I wonder what Aristotle would make of that? A nice derangement of epitaphs?

The upshot being that essences introduces more issues than it solves.

[ Your assessment that apologizing is the right thing to do is false ] is an unusual phrasing, but isn't it clear enough? "That's not true" would be a happier wording. — Banno

But “phrasing” and “clarity” do not take seriously a claim about the workings of our concepts (like belief, or apologizing). The method of looking at what we say when something is the case is to make explicit the implications of our acts—that our phrases are evidence (philosophical data) of the way the world works. “That’s false” sounds forced in this case (is “unhappy”) because it is an attempt to impose the criteria for truth onto a concept that has its own rationale. True or false just do not apply in a case of right and wrong in a moral sense (or correct or felicitous); in this case, the criteria of when an apology applies or is warranted, etc. The point being that the concept of believing has different senses (uses) which employ different criteria, not all of which are truth.

Somethings are understood, yet are hard to define or explain. I think "belief" is one of those things.

Or the act of the other builder bringing a slab such that the initiate sees what a slab is without an essence. — Moliere

I'm not sure what it would mean to know something without knowing the essence, and I am not sure what people have in mind when they talk about knowing something without an essence. Hume ridiculed the idea of essences, but Hume hardly read any Aristotle. I think most moderns are following Hume in ridiculing something they do not understand.

Here is one possible introduction: Essential vs. Accidental Properties (SEP)

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No, he doesn't. He thinks that we would be better served considering use rather than essence. — Banno

You will have to say what you mean by 'essence' at some point. At this point I'm not convinced you have the slightest idea of what you mean by it.

It's almost exactly like when you <dismiss the logic of the middle ages>, yet clearly know absolutely nothing about the practice of logic in the middle ages. It doesn't often go well when one criticizes things they are perfectly ignorant of.

He's saying hat the structure of beliefs is not well reflected in the predicate form B(a,p).

Nothing here supports your claims. He's saying belief is not a relation. He doesn't appear to be saying anything about normativity, determinism or "real" definitions, whatever they are and whatever they might mean in this context. — Banno

I have already addressed this <here>, and you continue to ignore the points at hand. "If there is no such thing as a belief-relation (and it has no essence), then neither P1 nor Searle's claim can hold. If the belief-relation you have in mind is not a determinate and normative concept, then the 'inferior' of P1 falls to pieces," etc.

Searle makes strong claims about what belief is and what belief is not. He is clearly committed to the position that there is a definition of belief and an essence of belief. If there were neither then such claims would be nonsense. If beliefs had no more of an essence than an artifact like a scissors then Searle wouldn't be able to make sweeping claims about the damage done to philosophy.

(NB: To say, "they are mistaken about X," is to imply that there is something normative about X. If there were nothing normative about X then one could not be mistaken with respect to it.)

You will have to say what you mean by 'essence' at some point. At this point I'm not convinced you have the slightest idea of what you mean by it. — Leontiskos

That you ask this perhaps shows how badly we are talking past each other. I am happy to agree that I do not have a clear idea of what an essence is. But I don't think you do, either. I do not think that the notion can be made sufficiently clear. I'm pretty sure that is s thread that runs through my responses to you.

I'm not sure what it would mean to know something without knowing the essence, and I am not sure what people have in mind when they talk about knowing something without an essence — Leontiskos

I had a tree fern in the front garden... and my apologies to those who have heard this story. Now you suppose that knowing how to correctly use the word "tree" requires that one knows what a tree is
That's just not true. We use words correctly without ever setting out exact definitions.

I might not know if the tree fern outside my window is actually a tree, nor if that shrub over there should really be called a "tree". That does not mean I do not know how to use "tree". Famously, there is nothing that is common to all, and only, fish; and yet, we use the word. That is, it is not possible to set out the essence of "tree" or "fish", and yet the words are used successfully.

Moreover, when an essence is set out it often lead to risibility; so if berries are simple fruits stemming from one flower with one ovary and typically have several seeds, then strawberries are not berries.

Learning what a tree is, is no more than learning how to use the word "tree".

Now, if you have a definition of "essence" that gets around the issues spoken of hereabouts, please set it out.

I have already addressed this <here>, and you continue to ignore the points at hand. "If there is no such thing as a belief-relation (and it has no essence), then neither P1 nor Searle's claim can hold. — Leontiskos

I've addressed this multiple times. Your conclusion does not follow. And further, you've misunderstood Searle.

That you ask this perhaps shows how badly we are talking past each other. — Banno

Okay, that seems probable.

I had a tree fern in the front garden... and my apologies to those who have heard this story. Now you suppose that knowing how to correctly use the word "tree" requires that one knows what a tree is
That's just not true. We use words correctly without ever setting out exact definitions. — Banno

The problem with this argument is that, just because one uses a word without setting out an exact definition, does not mean that they use the word without knowing what a tree is.

Learning what a tree is, is no more than learning how to use the word "tree". — Banno

If the word didn't signify any determinate thing then it wouldn't be useful to us. For Aristotelians words are primarily about things, and things have a determinate form. To talk about the difference between two things, such as zebras and horses, is just to talk about the difference between the essence of a zebra and the essence of a horse. The reason we don't use the word 'essence' is because we are Aristotle's children, and it is implied. We believe there are real substances with stable, determinate forms, or at the very least this is the received view. There aren't many heirs of Parmenides or Heraclitus running around.

Fuzzy borders, such as those between trees and shrubs, reminds me of the Sorites paradox, and I don't see it as a debilitating difficulty. You would have to flesh out your argument if you think it presents a true problem for the Aristotelian.

Now, if you have a definition of "essence" that gets around the issues spoken of hereabouts, please set it out. — Banno

I think this is a good place to start:

"what belongs to a thing in respect of itself belongs to it in its essence (en tôi ti esti)" — SEP | Substance and Essence

The first argument is that some properties are not essential. The color brown does not belong to the essence of 'horse', because not all horses are brown, and a thing need not be brown in order to be a horse.

A second argument relates to the Humean notion of contiguity. Just because two things are contiguous does not mean that one enters into the definition of the other. That you were born in Pisces does not mean that the celestial bodies entered into the definition of your birth, nor that they bear some essential relation to your being.

You must be familiar with Kripke's point, that we do not need to know the essence of some individual in order to refer to that individual?

Perhaps this discussion should go back to the Essence and Modality: Kit Fine rather than in a thread on Belief? We seem to be heading back to that discussion of modal and definitional notions of essence.

- Sure thing: <link to new post in other thread>.

It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions. — Searle, my bolding

You believe, arguably, that I am not writing this while floating in space in the orbit of Jupiter, yet until now that belief had not been explicated. — Banno

:brow:

...not all our beliefs are explicit. You believe, arguably, that I am not writing this while floating in space in the orbit of Jupiter, yet until now that belief had not been explicated. — Banno

That's supposed to be a belief we already had that was not yet explicated

We could neither assent nor agree with Banno's report until he penned the words. We could not have possibly believed anything at all regarding his whereabouts while he writing his report until we were aware that he had written one. His claim is that we had unexplicated belief regarding his whereabouts while he was writing despite the fact that none of us, aside from him, had any idea that he was writing such a report, and thus no one could possibly have any belief at all regarding his whereabouts while he was writing.

He claimed we had belief that had not been explicated, then explicated what we did not believe.

:meh:

We cannot believe Banno's report of what we did not believe at time t1 is true until we read it. He says we did not believe he was in Jupiter's orbit at time t1. He's right. We didn't. So...

Where is the belief that had not been explicated? He offered up something we did not believe.

His claim is that we had belief at time t1 about his whereabouts at time t1 that had not been explicated, but he then sets out what we did not believe about his whereabouts at time t1.

Am I the only one who finds this odd?

Am I the only one who finds this odd? — creativesoul

No:

This is a bit tricky. I would want to say that it is something I do not believe, but not something I do believe. Or rather, it was. Now that you have brought it to my attention I have assented to it and I believe it. That I believe you are sitting at a computer on Earth explains why I would assent to any entailed propositions that are brought to my attention, or which become generally relevant. — Leontiskos

So your idea is that the proposition does not exist at all until voiced?

That is, you are not supposing the antirealist view that "Banno is floating in space in the orbit of Jupiter" was not false before being written in that post, nor was it true, and nor was it some other, third truth option, but that it didn't exist at all, and therefore was ineligible for any truth value?

So your idea is that the proposition does not exist at all until voiced? — Banno

With enough specificity, even you'll agree.

Call me whatever you'd like.

This is a bit tricky. I would want to say that it is something I do not believe, but not something I do believe. Or rather, it was. Now that you have brought it to my attention I have assented to it and I believe it. That I believe you are sitting at a computer on Earth explains why I would assent to any entailed propositions that are brought to my attention, or which become generally relevant. — Leontiskos

I find timestamps clear up a few things... no need to rely on the 'rules of logical entailment'(scarequotes intentional)
.

Ok, cut off the conversation even as it begins.

You might be claiming that belief statements are not bivalent - that "Banno is floating in space in the orbit of Jupiter" is now false, but before being considered, was neither true nor false. An antirealism towards belief.

Or, and this seems to be closer to what you are claiming, you might be saying that the belief did not exist in the time before being considered, and so is not the sort of thing that has a truth value. But the upshot of that might be interesting.

I've tried here to defend a view of belief roughly in line with mainstream analytic thinking, and you've been helpful in challenging that. It might be that I need to adjust my view somewhat. The view I was defending is that not all our beliefs are explicit. I find it puzzling, given our previous interaction, that you choose this with which to disagree.

I place considerable value on bivalence. I'm not claiming "belief statements are not bivalent."

I can't make sense of your use of the term belief.

Your statement at time t1 is not equivalent to my belief at time t2 after agreeing with it. <-----that's the gist of it.

That is, you are not supposing... ..."Banno is floating in space in the orbit of Jupiter" was not false before being written in that post, nor was it true, and nor was it some other, third truth option, but that it didn't exist at all, and therefore was ineligible for any truth value? — Banno

I'm saying that it was never a belief of mine to begin with.

Ok, cut off the conversation even as it begins. — Banno

Not my intention...

I've tried here to defend a view of belief roughly in line with mainstream analytic thinking, and you've been helpful in challenging that. It might be that I need to adjust my view somewhat. The view I was defending is that not all our beliefs are explicit. I find it puzzling, given our previous interaction, that you choose this with which to disagree. — Banno

I agree that "Not all our beliefs are explicit". I disagree with your example which was basically a report of all readers' belief. At time t1, you claimed we already believed a statement made by you at time t1. I didn't then, and I don't now.

At time t1, you misattributed belief to me.

When an infant goes in search of its pacifier, he/she/they already believe that there is one to be found. That's an implicit belief that is not always made explicit. Note the infant has no language. So, not all belief is equivalent to belief statements, nor propositional attitudes.

I place considerable value on bivalence. I'm not claiming "belief statements are not bivalent." — creativesoul

Ok, so no antirealism towards belief. Good.

Then I don't understand your use of "belief". But we knew that.

Because you perhaps believe that I am in Australia, and hence that I am on Earth, and hence that I am not in orbit around Jupiter. Or are we not to make such deductions?

"The infant believes there is a dummy" is a statement of the infant's belief. All beliefs can be put into the form "M believes that p". This, I think, is merely a statement of the grammatical structure of belief.

Again, the core function of attributing beliefs is to explain actions. That the infant cannot indulge in such explanations is irrelevant.

All beliefs can be put into the form "M believes that p". — Banno

Sure, we can say stuff about other creatures' belief(s) using that form. Not so much the grammar of belief, but rather the grammar of our report.

We can believe that a broken clock is working. No one believes that "a broken clock is working" is true.

If at time t1 someone believes that a particular broken clock is working, they would not say so.

All of these things point out problems with belief as propositional attitude as well as the common malpractice of treating all belief as equivalent to statements and/or propositions.

What?

creativesoul What? — Banno

Sorry about that... accidental post. Corrected now.

Because you perhaps believe that I am in Australia, and hence that I am on Earth, and hence that I am not in orbit around Jupiter. Or are we not to make such deductions? — Banno

Entailment has issues. See my recent stuff on Gettier.

You're trying to make a point that is something to do with de re and de dicto interpretations? Or substitution?

Sure, substitution into such contexts is illicit. Substitution within the context, not so much.

See my recent stuff on Gettier — creativesoul

Not without a link.

My only point about de re and de dicto would be that they too fail to take proper account of someone's belief at time t1, when - at that time - they believe that a particular broken clock is working. As before...

If at time t1 someone believes that a particular broken clock is working, they would not say so. — creativesoul

And this counts somehow against treating beliefs as propositional attitudes? How?