If we refer to Aristotelian terminology, and his effort to disambiguate the use of "cause", we'd see that the ratios would constitute the "formal cause". However, there is still a need for an "efficient cause", as the source of activity. Efficient cause is "cause" as we generally use it. We do not, in our common language use, refer to principles like ratios as causes. — Metaphysician Undercover
We should not ignore the fact that sometimes we are unaware of whether a name signifies the composite substance, or the actuality or shape, for example, whether "a house" signifies the composite, that is a covering made of bricks and stones laid in such-and-such a manner, or actuality or form, that is, a covering, whether a "line" signifies twoness in length or twoness, and whether an animal signifies a soul in a body or a soul; for it is the soul which is the substance of the actuality of a certain body. The name "an animal" may also be applied to both, not as having the same the same formula when asserted of both, but a being related to one thing. But, although these distinctions contribute something to another inquiry, they contribute nothing to the inquiry of sensible substances, for the essence belongs to the form or actuality
For a soul and the essence of the soul are the same, but the essence of "a man" is not the same as a man, unless the soul is called "a man" accordingly, in some cases, a thing and its essence are the same, in others this is not so. — Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by Hippocrates G Apostle, Book Eta, Chapter3
he is not talking about some invisible act. The tuning of what is tuned is not the act of tuning, but rather the result. — Fooloso4
There is in this theory no outside agent or principle acting: — Fooloso4
where Socrates corrects Simmias,.with a more true description of "tuning" — Metaphysician Undercover
“Therefore it follows from this argument of ours that all souls of all living beings will similarly be good if in fact it’s similarly the nature of souls to be this very thing - souls.” (94a)
You are refusing to accept Socrates' correction — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, that's the whole point, in that theory, the one offered by Simmias, there is no outside agency. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no need for outside agency. This view is much closer to our scientific understanding of physiology and homeostasis. — Fooloso4
It is not a correction, it is a different concept of the soul. It is a soul that is completely separate from the body. — Fooloso4
The argument is as follows: soul is an attunement, vice is lack of attunement, and so the soul cannot be bad and still be a soul because it would no longer be an attunement. What is missing from the argument is that being in or out of tune is a matter of degree. Vice is not the absence of tuning but bad tuning. — Fooloso4
You previously denied that something can be more or less in tune, but, as any musician or car mechanic can tell you, that is simply not true. — Fooloso4
The problem with 94c is that there is such a thing as singing out of tune, internal conflict, acting contrary to your own interests, and so on. — Fooloso4
In the Republic passions and desires are in the soul. It is a matter of one part of the soul ruling over the other parts of the soul. Why does Socrates give two very different accounts of the soul? Does the soul have parts or not? Are desires and anger in the soul or in the body? Why would he reject attunement in the Phaedo and make it central to the soul in the Republic? — Fooloso4
. In addition to those above there is the problem of the identity of Socrates himself. — Fooloso4
I do not see that this is a "different account". The soul, as an activity which rules over all the parts of the body must be present to all parts. So passions and desires, as emotions, are movements of the soul, and there is no inconsistency. — Metaphysician Undercover
We are at an impasse. — Fooloso4
I believe that this type of conception is promoted by atheists who approach this issue with a bias which encourages them to unreasonably reject the requirement of agency. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further. You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially if a man happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather.
And Cebes laughed and said, “Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us”
It appears that the person who makes these statements holds fire, water, earth and air to be the first of all things, and that it is precisely to these things that he gives the name of “nature,” while soul he asserts to be a later product therefrom. (891c)
Atheism is treated by Plato as identical with the doctrine that the world and its contents, souls included, are the product of unintelligent motions of corporeal elements. Against this theory, he undertakes to demonstrate that all corporeal movements are, in the last resort, causally dependent on “motions” of soul, wishes, plans, purposes, and that the world is therefore the work of a soul or souls, and further that these souls are good, and that there is one ἀρίστη ψιχή [ariste psyche], “perfectly good soul,” at their head.
often in my past life the same dream had visited me, now in one guise, now in another, but always saying the same thing: "Socrates,'' it said, "make music and practise it." Now in earlier times I used to assume that the dream was urging and telling me to do exactly what I was doing: as people shout encouragement to runners, so the dream was telling me to do the very thing that I was doing, to make music, since philosophy is the greatest music. (61a)
Aargh, what a terrible thing has befallen me in my last hours, to have me doubt my life's work!
Did I misinterpret the music-dream? What about other dreams? And what of the signs?
What of the people I persuaded, did I point them in the wrong direction?
But no! I won't drag myself into self-doubt, not now, at the very end.
And anyway, it's not like I left anything written, it's all hearsay, thank god for that!
And besides, Socrates own doubt is the case here, and not whether Socratic philosophy has elements of doubt. — Pussycat
I find that the painting of Socrates as a man devoid of doubt, with no fear of death, no regrets (presumably no guilt either) and looking forward to the afterlife (if any), very foreign to me — Pussycat
Rather dogmatic, won't you think? — Pussycat
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