Wayfarer--

The matter or question of the difference between the kinds of existence of material objects and abstract facts doesn't bother me, because it seems to me that there's no reason to believe that, metaphysically, there's anything other than abstract facts.

That certainly simplifies explanations.
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What I read about that statement by Nagarjuna agrees with my impression that there's no provably correct metaphysics.

But, when Buddhists sometimes seem to be suggesting a metaphysics, I don't understand what they're suggesting. That's just speaking for myself--I don't mean any criticism of Buddhism.

I've read important good points made by Buddhists. It's just that I haven't understood their metaphysics.

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It has been argued that there was a relationship between the origins of Greek skepticism and Buddhism, in the person of Pyrrho of Elis, who was a wandering Greek, said to have visited 'India' (probably ancient Gandhara, nowadays Afghanistan) and conversed with Indian sages who may well have been Mahayana Buddhists. This idea is explored in books such as The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies, Thomas C. Mcevilley and Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism, Adrian Kuzminski

Interesting. I hadn't heard about that.

Though I agree with the suggestion that there isn't a provably correct metaphysics, no doubt there's more to Greek Skepticism than that, and so I can't say that I know about Greek Skepticism, or what it is; and I certainly am not claiming that what I call "Skepticism" is the same thing or similar.

I'm just borrowing the name "Skepticism" as a name for a particular proposed metaphysics,because avoidance of assumptions, controversial statements, and brute-facts certainly qualifies as skeptical.

Michael Ossipoff

I hope you're referring to the statement "There are no abstract facts other than this one", or "The only fact is the fact that there are no other facts", or "There is only one fact", etc. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes.

If I understand you right, you're saying that the concepts used in that statement imply the many other abstract facts that the statements claims that there are not. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes.

Also, wouldn't the burden of proof be on the person who claims that there could have not been self-consistent systems of interrelated hypothetical if-statements that relate only to eachother?

That sounds like a very big claim, in need of good justification.

...maybe partly because, maybe it isn't even clear what it would mean to say that there could have not even been even that?

Michael Ossipoff

When I said that Newton's law of gravity could be expressed as a relation between 2 masses' spatial coordinate positions, their mass, and the time rate of change of their positions...

...I should have said, "the 2nd-order time rate-of-change of their positions." ...referring to acceleration, the rate of change of the rate of change of their position-vectors.

But the point was that if there were a space-time continuum, with those masses at those positions, then they'd accelerate in that space as described by a certain formula.

...all completely hypothetical of course.

If there were space-time, and those point-masses, and if the quantities were related by that formula...

So the hypothetical story proceeds.

Michael Ossipoff

I believe in answering any objection that is made, to a proposal that I’ve posted, such as the proposal in my initial post to this discussion-thread.
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Here’s T Clark’s objection again:
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I’d said:
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There’s no evidence that our physical universe consists of more than inter-related if-then statements. — Michael Ossipoff

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T Clark’s objection:
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Here I am, sitting in my chair. My fan is on. It's almost time for dinner. The sun is a bit low in the West. The chair arms are brown-stained wood, ash I think. It's smooth. The varnish and stain on the right side, which gets more use, is fading in some spots.

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Please explain how this concrete expression of physical reality consists of interrelated if-then statements.

In my initial reply, I told how T’s facts could be said as if-then statements, from T, by intercom, to someone else in his household, that if they come into his room, then they’d find the facts that T describes.
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Then, in a subsequent reply, I told how these if-then statements can be said about T’s expected experience, if he makes the necessary observations.
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So I told how T’s facts could be said as if-then statements.
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But that wasn’t enough, or satisfactory to me, because of course the Protagonist of a life sometimes already knows such facts--having already made the observations, for example. In such cases, the facts aren’t conditional for T, and so, though my initial claim can be supported, it plainly isn’t the whole story, and T’s question wasn’t yet fully answered.
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What I should have said is that every event and thing in the physical world can be described in terms of if-then statements.
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I’ve said some of this in other discussion-threads:
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The laws of physics are hypothetical mathematical relations between hypothetical quantities.
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Maybe life requires, or is facilitated by constancy of those physical laws, and constancy or at least near-constancy of the physical constants referred to in those laws.
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There are “if-then” statements/facts that, if those hypothetical relations between “physical” quantities be so, and if certain of the hypothetical quantities have certain hypothetical values, then there are conclusions regarding the values of other hypothetical quantities.
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Such if-then facts are uncontroversial. They aren’t saying that there is anything. They’re just uncontroversially saying “If this and this, then that.”
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…all hypothetical. All matters of “if-then”.
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And those uncontroversial systems of if-then fact have conclusions describing every state-of-affairs in this physical world, which could be the setting for one big hypothetical if-then story.
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There’s no reason to believe otherwise. There’s no reason to believe that there’s other than that possibility-world, and the hypothetical if-then life-experience possibility-story that has our possibility-world as its setting.
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T Clark’s statements of his facts are his statements about some of those conclusions (called “results”) of those if-then facts regarding the conditions for those conclusions.
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I never meant to say that T can’t mention a state of affairs that’s the conclusion of many if-then statements about many hypothetical relations among the values of quantities, and hypothetical values of many of those quantities. …”if” conditions whose conclusions are the state-of-affairs facts that T stated.
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T wasn’t talking about all the physical laws and quantity-values that have his facts as their conclusions. He mentioned some results…logical conclusions of many if-then facts.
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And those conclusions are, of course, also part of hypothetical conditions which (along with the hypothetical physical laws) imply still other conclusions. (Dinner will soon be served. Sunset will be soon. …etc.)
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T Clark’s statements describe a point in his ongoing life-experience possibility-story.
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Such a story, and the possibility-world that is its setting, can be examined as closely as (feasibly) desired, by physicists. What they find will, of course, always be consistent with our being here, and with previously-concluded conclusion-facts. …because a possibility-story has to be self-consistent. Otherwise, contradicting itself, it would be an impossibility-story.
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Of course the observations that we humans make aren’t usually the detailed probing of matter that the physicists’ experiments are. But the physicists’ observations, told to us (after being thoroughly verified as mutually-consistent by the physicists) must be, and are, consistent with ours. And when we read of the physicists’ observations, then they become, indirectly, our observations.
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T’s facts seem very “concrete”, because he’s part of his life-experience possibility-story (…the essential part, in fact), and of the possibility-world in which that story is set. That life-experience possibility-story is about T, so obviously it’s the one that’s real for T.
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Other possibility-worlds of course don’t seem at all real to us. Because the definition of “real” is an individual matter, I’d say that, for us, our possibility-world is “real”, and the other possibility-worlds are not. But that only seems so, and can be locally said to be so, because we inhabit this possibility-world. This possibility-world, as I said, is “real” to T, because it’s the setting of the life-experience possibility-story that is about T.
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(I use quotes for the word “real”, because I don’t like to encourage its use.)
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As I said, to say that our possibility world is intrinsically, objectively metaphysically more real or existent than the other possibility-worlds would be pre-Copernican.
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But, when the question comes up, I call our possibility-world “real”, because it’s real in the context of our lives. …with the understanding that that’s all I mean.
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I’m posting these answers so that it can’t be said that I haven’t answered the objections to my proposed metaphysics. …the genuinely parsimonious metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

By the way, I’d like to add that, so far as I’m aware of, the words “Real”, and “Exist” aren’t metaphysically-defined. Better to not use them. Of, if I use them, it’s with the understanding that they don’t say anything definite or meaningful. You can define them as you like, and people do. — Michael Ossipoff

If they want to define existence in terms of something else, then that something else cannot exist.
But it's rather trivial to exemplify, can't miss it, it's all over the place. ;)
It's one of those things, like truth perhaps, where you strand on rock bottom as it were.
I've become a bit wary of (always) demanding definitions; doing so may also be susceptible to a regress anyway.
Conversely, if we were to exemplify something that does not exist, it could only be by non-referring definitions or nonsense, something like that.
Incidentally, in some older thread, I tried to sort of assert "real on top of existence" as per:
• x is real ⇔ x exists irrespective of anyone's definitions
Not sure it's any good though (maybe some day).

If they want to define existence in terms of something else, then that something else cannot exist. — jorndoe

Maybe, but I don't try to define existence.

But it's rather trivial to exemplify, can't miss it, it's all over the place. ;)

Existence is all over the place? By what particular definition?

I agree that it's reasonable to speak of our physical world as real and existent, because it's real and existent in the context of our lives. But I only say it with respect to a particular context.

I've become a bit wary of (always) demanding definitions; doing so may also be susceptible to a regress anyway.

Definitions can be helpful for expressing what we mean when we say something.

Michael Ossipoff

Existence is all over the place? By what particular definition? — Michael Ossipoff

Not by definition.
You exist, I exist, my coffee cup exists ☕, heck even my dreams exist, you're walking on it, your walking exists (when occurring), ...
Darn unavoidable!

Definitions can be helpful for expressing what we mean when we say something. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes.

I'd said:

Existence is all over the place? By what particular definition? — Michael Ossipoff

You reply:

Not by definition.

Anything you say means something only if we both know the definitions of the words and phrases that you're using.

And the meaning of what you say can be different, depending on those definitions.

Or your statement can be true or false, depending on those definitions.

You said:

You exist, I exist, my coffee cup exists

Suppose that, as I claim, our physical world and everything in it consists only of a system of interrelated hypotheticals, if;then statements.

Does anything in that physical world really exist?

I agree with you in saying that those things exist, because they exist in the context of our lives.

I'm saying that they exist in a particular context. I'm saying what I mean by "exist", when I call something "existent"..

We don't have any agreement about saying that those things exist.

But, if "exist" means some kind of fundamental, unconditional objective existence, then it's another matter. Then you, I, your table and your chair don't exist anymore. Or at least there's no particular reason to believe that they exist.

The physical world that the Physicalist believes in doesn't exist, I claim. The physical world that he believes in is the Fundamental, primary existent, the Ground of All Being. ...independently, objectively uncoditionally existent..

I suggest that there's no reason to believe that there's any such thing as the physical world that the Physicalist believes in.

So, if you're using "exist" to refer to the existence that the Physicalist believes in for the physical world and its contents, then there's no reason to believe that our physical world exists, by that definition.

Michael Ossipoff

I sounded a bit partisan in that most recent post, because I answered in terms of my proposed metaphysics. So let me say it more non-partisanly:

1. Metaphysics is about what is. There is a wide diversity of metaphysicses, and no proof of which of them is right.

2. The words "Exist" and "Real" don't have agreed-upon metaphysical definitions.

Given those facts, you obviously can't tell us for sure what exists and what doesn't.

You seem to take "physical" and "existent" as meaning the same thing. You're probably a Physicalist. Physicalists are maybe unique in their assertion of the proved certainty of their metaphysics.

I'm not an Advaitst, but many Advaitists say that the physical world is illusory. I mention that just to show that not everyone agrees that your chair and desk exist.

I emphasize that Sankara, considered Advaita's main authority, didn't say that the physical world doesn't exist. "Neo-Advaitists", mostly Western, tend to disagree with him, and with much of actual traditional Advaita.

As I said, I agree that your chair and desk exist, because the physical world exists in the context of our lives, and that's as much existence as we could ask for. But, when making a statement like that, I specify how I mean it.

Michael Ossipoff

1. Metaphysics is about what is. There is a wide diversity of metaphysicses, and no proof of which of them is right.

2. The words "Exist" and "Real" don't have agreed-upon metaphysical definitions. — Michael Ossipoff

You said that there are certain facts. Isn't it the same as saying that there exist certain facts?

2. The words "Exist" and "Real" don't have agreed-upon metaphysical definitions. — Michael Ossipoff

Agree on this, but one can supply a definition. I seem to be settling on existence being a relation between some thing and some context. This chair exists in the world to which my phenomenal experience is confined. The world is the context. The velocity of my car exists only in the context of some reference frame (the road presumably). Twelve is even because there exists in the context of integers some number which can be doubled to get twelve. But six doesn't have existence without that context. Platonism would disagree, working off a different definition.

Given those facts, you obviously can't tell us for sure what exists and what doesn't.

You can if you have a mutual agreed upon definition. The intuitive definition of existence is more of a context-free property, which falls apart when you try to make sense of things like the universe or a god.

You seem to take "physical" and "existent" as meaning the same thing. You're probably a Physicalist. Physicalists are maybe unique in their assertion of the proved certainty of their metaphysics.

Yea, I threw away 'physicalist' long ago because of this. My 'realist' description is also slowly eroding. Planning a post soon that attempts to tie realism with idealism, despite their seemingly mutual contradiction.

You said that there are certain facts. Isn't it the same as saying that there exist certain facts? — litewave

Had you asked this question of me, I'd say facts exist in the same way anything exists: within some context. Are there no objective facts then? Not even the paradoxical "There are no objective facts"? This is a good way to destroy my definition of existence requiring a context. If no-context is a valid context, then there is objective existence. But the fact must be demonstrable without any empirical evidence at all.

As always litewave, you are the wrench in my gears.

Had you asked this question of me, I'd say facts exist in the same way anything exists: within some context. Are there no objective facts then? Not even the paradoxical "There are no objective facts"? This is a good way to destroy my definition of existence requiring a context. If no-context is a valid context, then there is objective existence. But the fact must be demonstrable without any empirical evidence at all. — noAxioms

Every object, including facts, exists in relations to all other objects, even in objective reality. For example, a fact exists in relations to the objects it explicitely refers to: the fact that 1+1=2 exists in relations to number 1 and number 2. Or you can always define a collection of which this fact is a part, for example the collection with these two parts: "the fact that 1+1=2" and "London Bridge". So the fact exists in the context of this collection.

Every object, including facts, exists in relations to all other objects, even in objective reality. — litewave

I'm not denying that existent things relate to each other. But that relation (you haven't stated what that relation is) is not existence in itself, which as I recall you had defined as the property (not relation) "is possible" which eliminated almost nothing and thus made it hard for existent things to stand apart from the nonexistent ones.

Or you can always define a collection of which this fact is a part, for example the collection with these two parts: "the fact that 1+1=2" and "London Bridge". So the fact exists in the context of this collection.

That's more like what I just said. The relation "is part of" is to the collection, but London Bridge is part of more than just that collection, so 1+1=2 does not relate to it directly. This is not your definition of existence. The relation "is part of <context>" is different that the property "is possible". Given the former definition, the context itself cannot exist except as a larger context. There is no seeming bottom to that, which is why it questions objective reality. The "is possible" property suffers from a different problem since objective reality has little from which it can stand apart.

I'm not denying that existent things relate to each other. But that relation (you haven't stated what that relation is) is not existence in itself, which as I recall you had defined as the property (not relation) "is possible" which eliminated almost nothing and thus made it hard for existent things to stand apart from the nonexistent ones. — noAxioms

I defined existence as logical consistency (possibility), which I summed up as "being identical to oneself and different from others". This means that every thing has an intrinsic identity (being what it is) and an extrinsic/relational identity (being different from others). Being different from others entails having relations to others, and the most fundamental relation is similarity (difference), which is necessarily connected with two other fundamental relations (which are simultaneously special kinds of the similarity relation): instantiation and composition, because if two things are similar to each other then they instantiate some same properties and some different properties, and they also automatically compose a collection. Every thing has these three relations and any other relations are reducible to these three.

So, existence entails having relations.

An ontology that allows everything that is logically consistent is surely vast, but it may seem vaster than it actually is because many things that seem logically consistent to us may actually be inconsistent and therefore don't exist.

"1. Metaphysics is about what is. There is a wide diversity of metaphysicses, and no proof of which of them is right.

2. The words "Exist" and "Real" don't have agreed-upon metaphysical definitions". — Michael Ossipoff


You said that there are certain facts. Isn't it the same as saying that there exist certain facts? — litewave

That's true. I usually uncomfortably, awkwardly say that the hypothetical if-then statements or facts "are there" (with the quotes)..

So sure, the facts exist, as facts.

But some Advaitists (mostly Western "Neo-Advaitists") say that the physical world is illusory, not really existent; and they can say that because they mean something different when (at least in that instance) they use "exist".

(As I've mentioned elsewhere, Sankara, the recognized Advaita authority, didn't say that the physical world doesn't exist; and I don't say that either, because it exists in the context of our lives.)

I suppose it could be argued that even plainly false statements and propositions exist as false statements and propositions. I mean, are there false statements and propositions? Sure.

It seems to me that it's a matter of context.

But yes, as you suggested, by the default meaning of "Exist", without qualification, context, or specific definition, a person would have to admit that pretty much anything that can be mentioned exists.

Michael Ossipoff

But yes, as you suggested, by the default meaning of "Exist", without qualification, context, or specific definition, a person would have to admit that pretty much anything that can be mentioned exists — Michael Ossipoff

Well,at least all facts, statements and propositions, and anything that's a possibility in some hypothetical possibility-world.. (Or an impossibility in an impossibility-world?)

Michael Ossipoff

Every object, including facts, exists in relations to all other objects, even in objective reality. For example, a fact exists in relations to the objects it explicitely refers to: the fact that 1+1=2 exists in relations to number 1 and number 2. Or you can always define a collection of which this fact is a part — litewave

Yes, that's why I was saying that there couldn't have not been systems of inter-related hypothetical if-then facts: Their existence is in relation and reference to eachother, and there's no need to even consider whether they exist in any other context than that of their relation and reference to eachother.

Their reference and relation to eachother is their "existence", and it's inevitable, and couldn't have not been.

So the hypothetical possibility stories and worlds, such as ours, were inevitable and couldn't have not "been".

Michael Ossipoff

So sure, the facts exist, as facts. — Michael Ossipoff

And facts are related to other objects, at least, obviously, to those objects that constitute the content of the facts. You may take an arbitrary fact, for example an if-then fact such as "If I jump of out window I will fall", but would this fact have any meaning without objects like "I", "window", or (temporal) objects/processes like "jumping" and "falling"? It seems that if such a fact "exists" then those objects should "exist" too, or else the fact would have no content and thus no "truth" or "existence" either.

So I would say that facts (or if-then facts) are not the only objects that exist; that there are also other existent objects, and facts (true propositions) are just a particular kind of existent objects. The most general ontology I can think of contains all consistently defined objects.

But some Advaitists (mostly Western "Neo-Advaitists") say that the physical world is illusory, not really existent; and they can say that because they mean something different when (at least in that instance) they use "exist". — Michael Ossipoff

They seem to use a narrower definition of existence then. It seems to reflect their values, namely that the physical world is "inferior". According to the most general definition of existence (existence = logical consistency), only those things that are inconsistent do not exist.

I suppose it could be argued that even plainly false statements and propositions exist as false statements and propositions. I mean, are there false statements and propositions? Sure. — Michael Ossipoff

A proposition may be false in some context (possible world) and true in another. I see a proposition as a kind of property, so if a proposition is false in some context it just means that the proposition is not instantiated in that context (is not a property of that context). The proposition itself may exist but is not instantiated in that context. A proposition that is false in every context is inconsistent. Such a proposition does not even exist as a false proposition because it is nothing. (a proposition should not be confused with statements in the sense of utterances or ink marks on paper though)

"2. The words "Exist" and "Real" don't have agreed-upon metaphysical definitions." — Michael Ossipoff

Agree on this, but one can supply a definition. I seem to be settling on existence being a relation between some thing and some context. — noAxioms

And, within a system of inter-related hypothetical if-then facts or statements, those hypotheticals have their validity in their reference and relation to eacother....and don't need any other validity or measure of their existence.

This chair exists in the world to which my phenomenal experience is confined. The world is the context. The velocity of my car exists only in the context of some reference frame (the road presumably). Twelve is even because there exists in the context of integers some number which can be doubled to get twelve. But six doesn't have existence without that context. Platonism would disagree, working off a different definition.

It sounds reasonable and right to say that existence needs (only) a relational, referential context.

The square-root of two has its meaning, relevance, and "existence" in relation to a larger system of relations of mutual reference among such things.

"Given those facts, you obviously can't tell us for sure what exists and what doesn't. "

You can if you have a mutual agreed upon definition. The intuitive definition of existence is more of a context-free property, which falls apart when you try to make sense of things like the universe or a god.

Yes, though we can speak of facts' existence without mentioning context, they only meaningfully have meaning and "existence" in relation to some system of such things.

I don't regard God as an element of metaphysics, subject to the issue of existence, or issues of proof or argument. Not a metaphysical topic. Many, including some philosophers, have expressed the impression of a Principle of Good.








"You seem to take "physical" and "existent" as meaning the same thing. You're probably a Physicalist. Physicalists are maybe unique in their assertion of the proved certainty of their metaphysics. "--Michael Ossipoff

Yea, I threw away 'physicalist' long ago because of this. My 'realist' description is also slowly eroding. Planning a post soon that attempts to tie realism with idealism, despite their seemingly mutual contradiction.

Will be curious to hear it.


"You said that there are certain facts. Isn't it the same as saying that there exist certain facts?" — litewave

Had you asked this question of me, I'd say facts exist in the same way anything exists: within some context. Are there no objective facts then? Not even the paradoxical "There are no objective facts"? This is a good way to destroy my definition of existence requiring a context. If no-context is a valid context, then there is objective existence. But the fact must be demonstrable without any empirical evidence at all.

--noAxioms

I might have already made this comment in reply to that passage, where quoted in one of the subsequent replies, but:yes, I'd say that facts exist (only) in some referential relational context, among some system of other such hypotheticals.

In the statement, "There are no facts other than the one fact that there are no other facts." that use of "There are no..." wouldn't make sense and couldn't have any authority. because, hypothetical if-then facts don' t need to "be", other than in relation to a system of other hypotheticals. They couldn't not have that relational "existence" as part of such a system.

Michael Ossipoff

And, within a system of inter-related hypothetical if-then facts or statements, those hypotheticals have their validity in their reference and relation to eacother....and don't need any other validity or measure of their existence. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes, but not all contexts contain if-then relations, as you put it. Most do not. Just so happens that ours does.

I don't regard God as an element of metaphysics, subject to the issue of existence, or issues of proof or argument. Not a metaphysical topic. Many, including some philosophers, have expressed the impression of a Principle of Good.

Applying metaphysical tools helps clarify such things, but no proof is to be had.
I find I am unable to define God with my definition. If God exists, the God is but one member of some context greater than God. This doesn't preclude our context from being the result of some act by a thing that cares for us specifically and wants to throw a party for us afterwards, but even I can create things.
If God is defined as the root context itself, then it isn't something that exists, and stands apart from nothing. There is no difference between that view and the same context not labelled God.

Planning a post soon that attempts to tie realism with idealism, despite their seemingly mutual contradiction. — noAxioms

Will be curious to hear it.

I think I will post it under advocatus diaboli, since it is not really a view I hold, but one I feel needs to be explored. I did a similar thing with presentism once.

Had you asked this question of me, I'd say facts exist in the same way anything exists: within some context. Are there no objective facts then? Not even the paradoxical "There are no objective facts"? This is a good way to destroy my definition of existence requiring a context. If no-context is a valid context, then there is objective existence. But the fact must be demonstrable without any empirical evidence at all. — noAxioms

I might have already made this comment in reply to that passage, where quoted in one of the subsequent replies, but:yes, I'd say that facts exist (only) in some referential relational context, among some system of other such hypotheticals.

Gave it some thought since posting that, and I think I agree. "There are no objective facts" is not an objective fact, since there are none. No paradox. The statement seems only true in a context where logic holds.

"And, within a system of inter-related hypothetical if-then facts or statements, those hypotheticals have their validity in their reference and relation to eacother....and don't need any other validity or measure of their existence." — Michael Ossipoff

Yes, but not all contexts contain if-then relations, as you put it. Most do not. Just so happens that ours does. — noAxioms

Maybe, but ours is of special interest to us.

" I don't regard God as an element of metaphysics, subject to the issue of existence, or issues of proof or argument. Not a metaphysical topic. Many, including some philosophers, have expressed the impression of a Principle of Good. "

Applying metaphysical tools helps clarify such things

But I was referring to a principle above metaphysics, Not an assertion, not subject to proof or disproof. An impression. People often express gratitude for how good what is, is.

, but no proof is to be had.

Agreed. ...neither regarding that, nor even regarding any metaphysics either.

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Planning a post soon that attempts to tie realism with idealism, despite their seemingly mutual contradiction. — noAxioms

[...]

I think I will post it under advocatus diaboli, since it is not really a view I hold, but one I feel needs to be explored. I did a similar thing with presentism once.

It seems that Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism fills the bill, for a metaphysics combining Idealism and Realism.

I like the Eliminative Ontic Structural apart, but I don't agree with the Realism part.

You're the center of your life-experience possibiity-story. You're its essential component. It's about your experiences.

Could our possibility-world be there without you, could it have existence apart from you? Sure. But then we're talking about an entirely different story, and that doesn't have relevance to your own actual life-experience story.

So sure, the physical world without you has some sort of existence, as do all of the infinitely-many hypothetical possibilty-worlds and possibility-stories--but that doesn't matter because that isn't the story that you're living in. There are infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-stories, and only one of them is real for you. ...the one that you're in.

So I suggest that Realism is unrealistic.

By the way, I was pleased to find,in an Ontic Structural Realism article, that the article refers to Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) as Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), because that means that Skepticism is different from MUH, and so Tegmark didn't propose exactly the same metaphysics that I propose.


Had you asked this question of me, I'd say facts exist in the same way anything exists: within some context. Are there no objective facts then? Not even the paradoxical "There are no objective facts"? This is a good way to destroy my definition of existence requiring a context. If no-context is a valid context, then there is objective existence. But the fact must be demonstrable without any empirical evidence at all. — noAxioms

I'd said:

I might have already made this comment in reply to that passage, where quoted in one of the subsequent replies, but:yes, I'd say that facts exist (only) in some referential relational context, among some system of other such hypotheticals.

About the statement or argued-conceivable fact "There are no facts other than the fact that there are no other facts.", I'm just saying that that couldn't have been so, because systems of interrelated hypotheticals are self-contained, and so is their meanng, applicability and "existence" (in relation and reference to eachother).

Michael Ossipoff

"So sure, the facts exist, as facts." — Michael Ossipoff

And facts are related to other objects... — litewave

Yes, and those "objects" (more specifically, certain hypothetical quantities that can be described as object-propertie) are among the hypotheticals that I was referring to.

, at least, obviously, to those objects that constitute the content of the facts.

Yes, the hypothetical if-then facts are about those hypothetical "objects", and, specifically, about the hypothetical quantities that "are" their mass, positions, motions, etc., and the hypothetical "physical-law" relations among those facts.

You may take an arbitrary fact, for example an if-then fact such as "If I jump of out window I will fall", but would this fact have any meaning without objects like "I", "window", or (temporal) objects/processes like "jumping" and "falling"? It seems that if such a fact "exists" then those objects should "exist" too, or else the fact would have no content and thus no "truth" or "existence" either.

The hypothetical if-then statements do have content. They're about relations among other hypotheticals, as I described above.

I emphasize that a fact needn't be about anything other than relations among hypothetical things.

Referring to other possible metaphysicses, you write:

So I would say that facts (or if-then facts) are not the only objects that exist; that there are also other existent objects, and facts (true propositions) are just a particular kind of existent objects. The most general ontology I can think of contains all consistently defined objects.

Of course you can propose such metaphysicses, such as Physicalism. No metaphysics can be proved, and there are probably many that can't be disproved.

Do you subscribe to Physicalism?

" I suppose it could be argued that even plainly false statements and propositions exist as false statements and propositions. I mean, are there false statements and propositions? Sure". — Michael Ossipoff


A proposition may be false in some context (possible world) and true in another. I see a proposition as a kind of property, so if a proposition is false in some context it just means that the proposition is not instantiated in that context (is not a property of that context). The proposition itself may exist but is not instantiated in that context. A proposition that is false in every context is inconsistent. Such a proposition does not even exist as a false proposition because it is nothing. (a proposition should not be confused with statements in the sense of utterances or ink marks on paper though)

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That's a special definition of "exist". As I said, people can and do define "exist" how they want to.

Yes, "exist" could be defined so that only consistent propositions "exist"., and that's one possible definition for "exist".

Certainly only the consistent propositions or consistent facts relating hypotheticals are important or relevant to us.

Inconsistent facts can be ignored as soon as their inconsistency is pointed out. Do they "exist"? Certainly importantly. Not in a way that makes them useful or relevant.

So your definition is reasonable in a practical way.

Michael Ossipoff

The hypothetical if-then statements do have content. They're about relations among other hypotheticals, as I described above. — Michael Ossipoff

But if there are relations between objects then there must also be the objects. So it seems to me that the objects that constitute the content of facts are ontologically just as real as the facts.

Inconsistent facts can be ignored as soon as their inconsistency is pointed out. Do they "exist"? Certainly importantly. Not in a way that makes them useful or relevant. — Michael Ossipoff

I would say that the existence of inconsistent objects is absurd. These would be objects that are not what they are, for example square circles.

Inconsistent facts can be ignored as soon as their inconsistency is pointed out. Do they "exist"? Certainly importantly. Not in a way that makes them useful or relevant. — Michael Ossipoff — litewave

I meant to write, "Certanly not importantly..."

Sure, propositions known to be inconsistent are absurdly un-useful, so a conventional definition that they don't "exist" seems fair. But, because such propositions don't matter, then the issue of their existence of nonexistence doesn't seem to matter.

Michael Ossipoff

"The hypothetical if-then statements do have content. They're about relations among other hypotheticals, as I described above." — Michael Ossipoff


But if there are relations between objects then there must also be the objects. — litewave

Of course. Such as the hypotheticals that I referred to.

Are you claiming that there can't be hypothetical facts about hypotheticals and their relations?

So it seems to me that the objects that constitute the content of facts are ontologically just as real as the facts.

Fine, but that doesn't mean that there can't be hypothetical facts about hypotheticals, or that (to say it in another wording) hypotheticals can't be what facts refer to.

Do you advocate Physicalism?

Michael Ossipoff.

Fine, but that doesn't mean that there can't be hypothetical facts about hypotheticals, or that (to say it in another wording) hypotheticals can't be what facts refer to. — Michael Ossipoff

I agree. I just thought that your ontology was limited to facts but now it seems that it also contains other existent objects.

Do you advocate Physicalism? — Michael Ossipoff

No, I advocate the existence of whatever is identical to itself and different from what it is not.

I agree. I just thought that your ontology was limited to facts but now it seems that it also contains other existent objects. — litewave

No, I'd been speaking about hypothetical values for hypothetical quantities, and hypothetical relations (physical laws) between those quantities..

It hadn't occurred to me, but I guess those hypothetical values could be spoken of as facts about hypothetical values, and the hypothetical relations between them could likewise be spoken of as hypothetical facts.

I've been speaking of a system of inter-related and inter-referring hypotheticals. Maybe I could subsitute "hypothetical facts" for "hypotheticals".

Even if so, it's just a matter of wordings.

Michael Ossipoff

It hadn't occurred to me, but I guess those hypothetical values could be spoken of as facts about hypothetical values, and the hypothetical relations between them could likewise be spoken of as hypothetical facts. — Michael Ossipoff

Well, for it all to be facts, it would be a matter of speaking of the quantities, the values, as facts. The matter of what they're the quantities or values of or for could be spoken of as merely those facts' names or labels.

Then it could be spoken of as just hypothetical facts about other hypothetical facts.

I've been speaking of a system of inter-related and inter-referring hypotheticals. Maybe I could subsitute "hypothetical facts" for "hypotheticals".

But I don't know that wording-differences like that are important. I don't think the viability of Skepticism depends on it.

Michael Ossipoff

It seems that Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism fills the bill, for a metaphysics combining Idealism and Realism.

I like the Eliminative Ontic Structural apart, but I don't agree with the Realism part. — Michael Ossipoff

You'd have to define what the realism part means to you, that you don't like it. Realism isn't really a view, it just means you consider something to exist, but without a definition of existence, that can be taken a number of different ways.

You're the center of your life-experience possibiity-story. You're its essential component. It's about your experiences.

Could our possibility-world be there without you, could it have existence apart from you? Sure. But then we're talking about an entirely different story, and that doesn't have relevance to your own actual life-experience story.

That is the gist of the new thread I'm working on, once I seem to have time to attend to it.

ThatSo sure, the physical world without you has some sort of existence, as do all of the infinitely-many hypothetical possibilty-worlds and possibility-stories--but that doesn't matter because that isn't the story that you're living in. There are infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-stories, and only one of them is real for you. ...the one that you're in.

So I suggest that Realism is unrealistic.

Nonsense. You've just described existence in sort of idealistic terms. Inferred things exist, even to you. The far side of the moon makes no difference to my life, but that doesn't mean I think it doesn't exist.

By the way, I was pleased to find,in an Ontic Structural Realism article, that the article refers to Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) as Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), because that means that Skepticism is different from MUH, and so Tegmark didn't propose exactly the same metaphysics that I propose.

Tegmark himself did a post or two on the old forum, and actually referenced my post where I noted that a determined structure need not be instantiated (computed say) for the elements within (us) to be functional. My tiny little claim to fame I guess. I think that statement is the gist of what you're saying with this if-then terminology of this thread.

Do you advocate Physicalism?

This was also asked of me, and it seems irrelevant to the thread. Physicalism isn't really any ontological stance. It is mostly a view that the mental supervenes on the physical, and yes, I think that is the case. If the other way around, it is idealism of sorts, and if neither, then some sort of dualism. None of the three assert a foundation for ontology. Materialism does I think, the view that nothing is more fundamental than, well, material.