A name is always attached to some thing.
In order to use a name the thing to which it is attached must be identifiable.
The identification of things occurs via description.*
Therefore, names presuppose description. — Leontiskos
But to the topic of this thread, what sort of place do you see here for essence? — Banno
I'm not intent on writing a thesis here. — Banno
I have not come across a version of essence that is of much use, but I’m happy to gives consideration to any that’s proffered. I’m hoping for something a bit more useful than “what makes a thing what it is“ — Banno
The argument is pretty straight forward. Suppose that it turned out that nothing we thought we knew about Thales were true; that he did not think all was water, did not fall into a well and did not say "know thyself". Who is it that the previous sentence is about? Well, it is about Thales. But if, "in order to use a name the thing to which it is attached must be identifiable", we now have no way of identifying Thales, which would imply that the sentence is not about Thales. — Banno
I'm sorry that you haver been unable to identify the argument. — Banno
I am not aware of anything in which Anscombe directly addresses Donnellan and Kripke. IF you come across something, I'd be most interested. — Banno
The essence of a thing is the rigidity with with which we designate it.
the essence of :—
Frodo is the ring bearer.
King Arthur is the legendary hero of an imaginary magical realm on the pattern of Britain.
Thales is that he fell down a well and thought everything was water, and was one of the founders of Greek philosophy.
Lavender is the fragrance.
unenlightened is his willingness to make up shit on the fly.
I imagine some tedious archeologist finding the remains of a real king called Arthur, and his wife Guinevere, and some record of his reign that did not include quests or saving damsels in distress or the Holy Grail, or the round table. "Oh, that King Arthur, no one is interested in him." I would say, as if allowing that names are not always unique, while maintaining the rigidity of my designation. — unenlightened
I would say, as if allowing that names are not always unique, while maintaining the rigidity of my designation. — unenlightened
Really? If Thales did not fall down the well, that is a truth about Thales, not about his name.But this is a confusion of a name with an individual, — Leontiskos
The argument is pretty straight forward. Suppose that it turned out that nothing we thought we knew about Thales were true; that he did not think all was water, did not fall into a well... Who is it that the previous sentence is about? Well, it is about Thales. — Banno
But if, "in order to use a name the thing to which it is attached must be identifiable", we now have no way of identifying Thales, which would imply that the sentence is not about Thales. — Banno
For the sake of simplicity, I've been focusing on the third... — Banno
A novice who asks "Who is Thales?" does not have at hand a description of Thales, and yet they are asking about Thales. — Banno
In this passage Locke shows that he supposes it to be understandable what individuals are called Wewena, Chuckery and Cousheda without its yet being determined whether these are proper names of men or what. To point and say ‘That is Wewena—and I mean that “Wewena” is the proper name of that’ should prompt the question ‘That what is Wewena?’ Or, what comes to the same thing: ‘And how am I to go on using the name Wewena?’ Locke writes as if an intelligible reply would be ‘so long as it is the same individual’. And hence the question which often concerns philosophers: ‘What is an individual? What is a particular?’ — Elizabeth Anscombe, On Russell's Theory of Descriptions
Part of that semantics is that proper names refer to the very same individual in each possible world in which it exists. A consequence of this is that one might specify a possible world in which the characteristics that supposedly set out the essence of that individual do not apply. — Banno
Your supposed reply begs the question by supposing that "Thales" sans description does not refer to Thales. And yet, "What if every description we have of Thales were wrong?" is clearly a question about Thales. — Banno
Suppose, ex hypothesi, that the novice has no description of 'Thales'. If this were so, then what in the world do you propose they would be asking about when they ask about 'Thales'? In that case they could not be asking about a man, because if they were asking about a man then 'Thales' would have a description. They could not be asking about a previously existing thing, because if they were asking about a previously existing thing then they would have a description. They could not be asking about a name from their textbook, because if they were asking about a name from their textbook then they would have a description, etc. — Leontiskos
Suppose that the only thing we know about Thales is that he fell into a well. On the descriptivist account, "Thales" and "The fellow who fell into a well" are synonymous, then on your view "The fellow who fell into a well" is what we mean by "Thales" — Banno
I hope it clear that in this case Thales certainly exists, but we do not have to hand a description that sets him apart, he has no "essence", so it seems, and yet we can still talk about him. — Banno
A consequence of this is that one might specify a possible world in which the characteristics that supposedly set out the essence of that individual do not apply. Nevertheless, what they do not apply to is that same individual. — Banno
[Kripke's] argument counts against the view that the meanings of names are given by their associated descriptions, but not against the view that the reference of a name is fixed by its associated descriptions. — Nd.Edu Lecture Notes on Kripke
Moliere began a discussion of essences with the example of hammers. This is a strange move from the perspective of an Aristotelian, because hammers have no real essence. A hammer is a derivative being, a human artifact. Hammers should always be studied in relation to humans, because their existence is dependent upon humans. — Leontiskos
If hammers don't have essences, then what does? And on what basis are we to exclude tools from having being (or, perhaps they have being, but no essence?)? — Moliere
I'm a bit pressed for time today, but for Aristotle the fundamental issue is that a kangaroo has an essence whereas a hammer does not, and this is because only the first is a cohesive thing (substance) with its own proper mode of being and acting (and this also includes teleological considerations). A hammer is an aggregate of substances thrown together for a human purpose.
A simpler example would be a horse-and-rider. A horse-and-rider is not a substance, and it has no essence. Instead it is a composite of two substances (a horse and a human rider). We can talk about the essence of a horse-and-rider in an analogical way, as if it were just a single thing, but technically this is not quite right.
I am not opposed to talking about the "essence" of a hammer or the "essence" of a named individual, just so long as we do not forget that for Aristotle there are no such essences. More broadly, it makes sense for the Aristotelian to say that the human has being in a more primary sense than the hammer does; or that the name attached to a perceptual 'description' is more primary than the name attached to the conceptual 'description' (and that the latter should take its cue from the former). Such a distinction may seem quite odd to the modern mind, but it may also be at the root of some of these issues. — Leontiskos
It seems to me that the lack of a teleological cause might be a basis for making this claim -- basically anything which is a natural kind would participate in all four causes. — Moliere
I'm going back to the four causes because it seems to me that hammers have a definition, and so I would have said that a hammer has an essence on that basis from my understanding of Aristotle's notion of essence. — Moliere
(the strange thing here being that the basic materials participate in teleology by having a proper place to be in the stack... which clearly goes against how we understand matter to operate today) — Moliere
I take it your beliefs are Aristotelian-inspired, but since you're also saying "for Aristotle" it seems you may also be thinking about your account as different. — Moliere
Thus, rather than a metaphysical extravagance, a more definitional concept of essence is attuned to the practicalities of language use in a manner a modal logical characterisation must be blind to.
Ultimately that blindness comes from severing the connection between the target of the definition and how it seamlessly dwells in the world - beyond the words, its essence. What it means to count as a bachelor is different from what it means for a bachelor to count as an unmarried man. — fdrake
There is nothing archaic or 'metaphysical' about the doctrine of real essences: that doctrine merely supposes that among the properties of substances and stuffs some are explanatorily basic, others explanatorily derivative. — Introduction to Posterior Analytics, by Jonathan Barnes, p. xiii
In fending off the arguments, ↪Leontiskos is obliged to take extreme measures. Hence "If the definition of Thales is stipulated to be "the man who fell into the well," then Fred is Thales". His approach cannot envision, let alone articulate, the possibility that Thales did not fall into the well, because for him "Thales" is exactly "He who fell into the well". I hope others will accept that "Thales might not have fallen into the well" is a clear enough English sentence that might even have been true. — Banno
Suppose that the only thing we know about Thales is that he fell into a well. On the descriptivist account, "Thales" and "The fellow who fell into a well" are synonymous, then on your view "The fellow who fell into a well" is what we mean by "Thales" — Banno
But his logic has been superseded. Leontiskos has attached himself to the descriptivist view, and thus to the supposed utility of Aristotelian logic he holds dear. He has taken the next, predictable step, when Kripke shows your argument to problematic, attack the character and authority of Kripke (↪Leontiskos). — Banno
The deeper problem is that your specifications are mistaken. When someone talks about Thales they are not defining him as "the man who fell into the well" (i.e. they are not assigning that as the one necessary property of Thales (along with existence)). If they were doing this then Thales would just be Fred. When someone talks about Thales they have a large number of predicates in mind, some of which are necessary and some of which are not... — Leontiskos
Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. — Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I.II.Q2.A6
Well, I sometimes suspect that the capacity to giggle might be more common than the capacity for rationality. — Banno
Fine shows that there are necessary truths (the singleton) that are not true of the essence of Socrates, and so that the set of necessary truths is not identical to, or constitutive of, the essences. — Banno
If no modal account of essence is possible, then this is important for our understanding of the metaphysics of identity. For it shows that even when all questions of necessity have been resolved, questions of their source will remain. The example shows further that these questions will not always be unproblematic; they may raise real issues. Thus the subject should not be taken to be constituted, either in principle or practice, by its claims of necessity. — Fine, Essence and Modality
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