That's heavily dependant on the modality of the situation. Isn't it?

How so?

It would be good for a brute-fact to be something undeniable, or at least something whose denial has the burden of proof. Maybe it wouldn't be called a "brute fact" then, because maybe only arbitrary brute-facts are brute-facts.

What would be a brute fact that is undeniable, or whose denial has the burden of proof?

Suppose 'brute fact' had to do with how we value experience, about our ability to discriminate one thing from another. This discriminatory ability points to a temporal claim. A claim that all facts implicitly require, the claim of giveness that precedes every distinguishable fact. A claim which we are rarely conscious of making, yet for which I have read some neurological evidence.

It's odd to come up with a term - "brute fact" - and then spend time arguing about what it means; as if its meaning were there to be discovered, not there to be decided.

Would it be wrong to call a brute fact just a 'state of affairs'?

Unless we decide what brute fact is, your question cannot be answered.

A brute fact is the assigned value of a property and the property itself.

Is it? That's not how, for example, Searle used the term.

Further, what is the assigned value of a property, as distinct from the property?

Or are you saying that a brute fact is a property and an individual of which that property is true?

But if that is the case, how does a brute fact differ from a fact per se?

Is it? That's not how, for example, Searle used the term. — Banno

How did he use the term?

Further, what is the assigned value of a property, as distinct from the property? — Banno

The assigned value of a property is everything that can be said about it, this is distinct from the object itself, e.g a black hole or a star.

Or are you saying that a brute fact is a property and an individual of which that property is true? — Banno

Whatever can be said about the object and compared with itself.

But if that is the case, how does a brute fact differ from a fact per se? — Banno

The truth value of brute facts are not subject to modalities and are not contingent unlike facts per se.

The truth value of brute facts are not subject to modalities and are not contingent unlike facts per se. — Question

Interesting. Could there be different brute facts in other worlds?

What?

That is, I can't make much sense of what you said.

The assigned value of a property is everything that can be said about it, this is distinct from the object itself, — Question

Distinct from what object? The assigned value is what can be said about red that is distinct from the red sports car? Or is it what can be said about red that is distinct from every red item?

Whatever can be said about the object and compared with itself. — Question

That's not a sentence. Did you leave something out?

The truth value of brute facts are not subject to modalities and are not contingent unlike facts per se. — Question

Not subject to modalities, and yet not contingent? That looks like a contradiction.

We seem not to be going anywhere.

Interesting. Could there be different brute facts in other worlds? — Marchesk

But how can a fact not be subject to modality; neither necessary nor contingent?

I don't know. If it's brute, there's no explanation for it, right?

If there's no reason why something is brute, then there's no reason for it to be brute in another world, perhaps?

If something is not subject to modality, then ipso facto it cannot be discussed in terms of possible worlds.

If something is not subject to modality, then ipso facto it cannot be discussed in terms of possible worlds. — Banno

I suppose so. But then again, did we just make that up?

Or what I'm trying to point out is that maybe brute facts are like infinity in counting. Infinity doesn't follow the same rules as the finite numbers.

Or maybe brute facts are like 1 divided by zero, which is not a number, but it is something that comes up when you have zero in the number system.

Unless we decide what brute fact is, your question cannot be answered. — Banno

Being an observer you are modal independent.

Distinct from what object? The assigned value is what can be said about red that is distinct from the red sports car? Or is it what can be said about red that is distinct from every red item? — Banno

Yes, the second. I believe that what can be said about red is dependant on the red observed, it's intuitively obvious once you imagine the multitude of factors presenting 'red' to you, However, proper names are distinct in that the one's I have in mind entail direct referents and one's with family resemblance a.la Wittgenstein.

as I said, "modal independent" appears to be an oxymoron.

Ridged designators aren't a-modal?

What does that mean?

I'm not really sure how your response follows from @Marchesk's suggestion. Isn't he just asking if brute facts can be contingent?

Perhaps that is what March is suggesting. Is it what Question is suggesting?

And that is my point. What is it we are talking about?

And that is my point. What is it we are talking about? — Banno

Brute facts. Are there facts that do not have explanations? For example, why do the physical constants have the values they have? Does this question have an answer (e.g. "God did it")?

And if not – if them having the values they have is a brute fact – then are they contingent? Is there a possible world where the physical constants have different values?

Is there a possible world where the physical constants have different values? — Michael

Of course.

So they're contingent facts. But are they brute, or can them having the values they have (in whichever possible world) be explained by something else?

Going back briefly to the beginning:

"His analysis is that there has to be some things for which there is no explanation that explain the things that do have explanations. Something must be brute."

But is that sound? I'm not sure. Suppose there exist no things that lack an explanation, at least in principle. Then there would be an infinite regress of both things to be explained and of explanations. Suppose we accept that possibility. In that scenario, whenever we find an explanation we also find a new thing to be explained. Well, that's exactly the way it's been for us so far. It might be that way just as long as we choose to go on and are able to find new explanations. It's an infinite regress. But it is not a vicious regress as far as I can see.

I think we are tempted by the notion of brute facts because it opens up the possibility that in the future anything that can be explained will have been explained; and that anything that has not been explained is beyond explanation. It's a comforting thought, perhaps. But there's no reason to suppose that we will ever reach that happy state. And even if we did reach it, we would never know that we had reached it, because we could never be quite certain that the things we presume to be 'brute facts' are not, after all, explicable by something else.

So perhaps the whole 'brute fact' idea is an illusion.

I think it's a different notion from the idea of underlying assumptions that held to be true beyond doubt. They are in a different case, I think. The argument there is that unless we hold some things to be true and beyond doubt we cannot even begin to make sense of any questions or uncertainties. I think there's a good case to be made for that view. But that's not about 'brute facts'.

Going back briefly to the beginning:

"His analysis is that there has to be some things for which there is no explanation that explain the things that do have explanations. Something must be brute." — Cuthbert

Certainly not. There's no reason to believe in a metaphysical brute-fact.

There's a metaphysics that doesn't posit a brute-fact. (I posted a discussion-thread about it).

Earlier I'd said that whether there's a brute fact depends on whether a fact can be called "brute" even if that fact is undeniable. Of course it can't: If a fact is undeniable, then it isn't unexplained, and, not needing and lacking an explanation, it isn't Brute.

I don't agree it's true to say that everything, to avoid bruteness, has to be explained in terms of something more fundamental.

For example, how about a system of abstract logical statements and facts, mathematical theorems, and the if-then relation among these and a system of if/then statements, including hypothetical statements stating hypothetical relations among hypothetical quantities.

"If certain quantities are related by the following formula, and if some of them have the following values, then, as a consequence of that, and of certain mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts, then..."

Those things don't claim any existence or reality other than in reference to eachother. Call them "real", or not; it doesn't matter. But they nevertheless can be true, in reference to eachother.

That system doesn't need any explanation in terms of anything else. But it's the basis of our physical world, a hypothetical possibility-world. There's no reason to believe that our physical world is other than that.

Infinitely-many other such systems describe other hypothetical possibility worlds too.

None of this requires a brute-fact.

It's probably true that physics will remain an open-ended discovery-process. But, in metaphysics, the hypothetical relational system I described doesn't need an explanation.

But is that sound? I'm not sure. Suppose there exist no things that lack an explanation, at least in principle. Then there would be an infinite regress of both things to be explained and of explanations.

The hypothetical relational system that I described doesn't need explanation in terms of anything else. It doesn't need existence or reality in terms of anything else, or in any context other than its own, the context of its elements' referential relations to eachother.

Suppose we accept that possibility. In that scenario, whenever we find an explanation we also find a new thing to be explained.

It can be expected that that's how it will remain in physics.

But not in metaphysics, as I described above.

I think we are tempted by the notion of brute facts because it opens up the possibility that in the future anything that can be explained will have been explained; and that anything that has not been explained is beyond explanation. It's a comforting thought, perhaps. But there's no reason to suppose that we will ever reach that happy state.

It probably won't and can't happen in physics.

And even if we did reach it, we would never know that we had reached it, because we could never be quite certain that the things we presume to be 'brute facts' are not, after all, explicable by something else.

Good point.

So perhaps the whole 'brute fact' idea is an illusion.

Yes, in metaphysics, and almost surely in physics too.

Michael Ossipoff

So this is the topic:

Are there facts that do not have explanations? — Michael

What sort of thing is an explanation?

If it is another statement, then does it have to be true? If not then "God did it" will suffice as an explanation for any fact, and all facts have an explanation.

IF an explanation must be true, then isn't an explanation just another fact? Then how must one fact be related to another in order to be an explanation?

Material implication? But then since any given fact is true, any given fact can serve as an explanation for any other fact.

Cause? Then explanations are just causes, and you can go off and play in the quagmire of causation without using explanations.

Justifications? Then using explanations is just seeking justification for true beliefs.

And under any of these variations, modality would seem to be irrelevant.

So it appears to me that seeking explanations does not help us progress.

Where did I go wrong?

What I meant to say, in summary was that:

Metaphysics doesn't need a brute-fact.

Physics might or might not lead to a brute-fact being found.

It seems to me that there are 3 possibilities for physics:

1. An infinite sequence of explanations, each of which has an explanation at a deeper, more fundamental level of physics laws and things.

From the experience reported by physicists, that seems the most likely state of affairs.

2. A physics brute-fact could be found at some point. An explanation (of the rest of physics), that doesn't, itself, have any explanation.

3. Maybe physics will find a set of physical laws and things that explain the rest of physics, but doesn't need an explanation because it's inevitable. Its inevitability would be its explanation, and so it wouldn't be a brute-fact..

Possibility #3 is the one that seems that it would be the most pleasing and neat.

Is #3 a possibillty?

Michael Ossipoff