I would be more sympathetic to atheism if science could explain consciousness. As it is, I think it's more likely we're aspects of a universal one-mind.

I would be more sympathetic to atheism if science could explain consciousness. As it is, I think it's more likely we're aspects of a universal one-mind. — RogueAI

What basis do you have to think that it is possible for a mind to exist, sans an information processing substrate for the mind to supervene upon?

I would be more sympathetic to atheism if science could explain consciousness. As it is, I think it's more likely we're aspects of a universal one-mind. — RogueAI

We're free to speculate and fantasize, why not? For me, atheism doesn't seek to explain anything. While it might posit that there are better explanations available than the god theory, atheism really only addresses one thing - whether you believe in gods or not. I am quite happy with 'I don't know' being the main go to answer for our complex questions like consciousness. The nature of consciousness is a subject for experts and perhaps only time will tell. Or maybe the mysterians are right and we'll never know the answer.

There was never any outright rejection, I just stopped. I think most young people who leave the church are probably like that. As long as there isn't any pressure, they never really need to reject belief. — T Clark

Yes. That's my story, too.

The human mind "wants" explanations for the unknown, and meaning for events — Agree-to-Disagree

True! For the most part, we don't just shrug our shoulders and move on after seeing something remarkable and previously unknown. Unfamiliar bird, an explosion, odd new weed in the lawn, objects falling from the sky, strange weather -- no matter what, we want some sort of explanation. And we want to know what it means. The explanation may be plausible but wrong, and we will be reasonably happy with it. The meaning may be spurious, but if it meshes with other meanings we will accept it -- at least until holes begin appearing.

and god provides these. — Agree-to-Disagree

"God" has explanatory power for a rather narrow set (or sect) of people. Some people distrust scientific knowledge (or know little of it). If, for theological reasons one requires divine action in all events, then "God willed it", "God wanted that to happen" whether it was a nice rain or a devastating flash flood. "God is in charge of the world."

The threshold for assigning divine responsibility can be pretty low. A flat tire might be divine intervention. That the tire was worn out would have nothing to do with it, of course. God willed it.

God still might work as an explanation for existence, if one doesn't find the Big Bang grand enough on its own merits. It isn't that we now understand EVERYTHING; but rather, we live in a model where physical events have physical causes of some sort (well, most of us, anyway).

I think illness and injury are critical tests: When the devout believers in divine rule get sick, do they resort to prayer as their only option (Christian Scientists, for example) or do they pray they will get well while they are sitting in the doctors exam room? For most people, even fundamentalists who think God is all in all, get their oil changed, check their tires, get an annual physical, insure their property, and so on. God may rule, but God isn't going to fill the gas tank.

There was never any outright rejection, I just stopped. — T Clark

Blessed are they who just stopped.

I progressed through a long complicated withdrawal from religious belief. I'll spare everyone the tedious details. Better a quick chippy choppy on a big black block. Get it over with. Move on.

What basis do you have to think that it is possible for a mind to exist, sans an information processing substrate for the mind to supervene upon? — wonderer1

I think the theories that involve mind emerging from a substrate are unconvincing-bordering-on-absurd. Do you think that if you wire a bunch of electric switches together and turn them off and on in some way the pain of stubbing a toe will emerge? Or the taste of of orange? Or the experience of seeing red?

Confidently committing to atheism rather than say agnosticism or unsure if God exists strikes me as equal to theism although the other side of the coin and without evidence, instead granting explanation power to science itself which it does not fully have.

How about answering my question? Do you have something more than incredulity for an argument?

How about answering my question? Do you have something more than incredulity for an argument? — wonderer1

I think science's continued failure to explain consciousness is evidence that incredulity is the right response to the idea that minds and consciousness emerge from mindless unconscious stuff. Philosophers will continue to win bets against neuroscientists.

Ah, so you have incredulity AND bluster.

Not enough of a reasoned basis to mention?

But god doesn't explain anything — Tom Storm

In some ways God explains everything. Believing in God lets people accept the good and the bad things that happen without the need to agonize excessively about them. God knows the reasons for things even if people don't understand them. The belief can help people accept things. For example, how does a person cope with the death of their child? It is probably of some comfort to think that the child is now in heaven with God. God knows why the child died and people have faith that there was a good reason. It was God's will.

MATTHEW 10:29 - Yet not a single sparrow falls to the ground without your Father’s knowledge.

Otherwise, I don't know why ... — Bob Ross

Exactly.

I think this is partly the idea behind apophatic theology at least. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up:

It's not bluster to point out science's failure to explain consciousness. It's also not bluster to predict science will continue to fail to explain consciousness. You might not agree with that prediction, but there's no blustering going on. When do you think science will figure out consciousness? 10 years from now? 100? 1000?

Do you think mind/consciousness can emerge from electronic switches being turned on and off in a certain way? From moving abacus beads? Would a system of valves, pumps, and water that's functionally identical to a working brain have a mind?

If you come up with something other than fallacious reasoning, get back to me. Just as a reminder, the question is, "What basis do you have to think that it is possible for a mind to exist, sans an information processing substrate for the mind to supervene upon?"

:up: :up:

You're coming across as kind of a jerk. I notice that happens a lot in these consciousness discussions for some reason.

What basis do you have to think that it is possible for a mind to exist, sans an information processing substrate for the mind to supervene upon?"

It seems it'd be possible to deny this is the right question though, or even a meaningful one. If information is primarily process (good arguments for this exist) and if the pancomputationalist physicists are correct and information is our core ontological primitive, then superveniance itself is a mistaken concept.

Information does not require an "information processing substrate," in this case. The appearance of substance is simply the result of stabilities in process. Substance (substrates) emerge from the underlying process, not the other way around. Flux is
fundemental.

And I'm inclined towards this view because:
-Consciousness and other natural phenomena appear to require strong emergence.
- Jaegeon Kim's argument that strong emergence cannot exist given a substance metaphysics is convincing.
- Paul Davies' proof that the entire information carrying capacity of the visible universe is not enough to compute even basic lifeforms' causal history is less convincing (maybe I don't understand it) but still tips the scales towards strong emergence existing.

Thus, if it seems like we need strong emergence. Since substance superveniance rules this out, then it seems like superveniance isn't the right concept. Plus it has other unresolved problems.

So then the question becomes: what process causes consciousness to emerge?

But this doesn't really support the idea of consciousness as some sort of sui generis special thing that can't be explained by science either. If anything, I'd think it gives us less of an incentive to look for dualist explanations because it we no longer have the problem of explaining consciousness without strong emergence.

I also think the process view makes the physicalism/objective idealism divide sort of irrelevant. If substance emerges from process, what would claims like Katsrupt's that the world is made up of "mental substance," even mean vis-á-vis competing claims that is is "physical substance." I think the issue sort of dissolves and becomes a red herring.

honestly, I don't think most atheists would, or should, care to even attempt to convince you to change your mind in that. The most important aspect of atheism for most atheists isn't a rejection of all god concepts, in my opinion, it's the rejection of religion, religious epistemology and religion's idea of morality.

Universal consciousness conceptually doesn't have those trappings. If you reject religion for similar reasons, a lot of atheists are going to consider you a like mind

If substance emerges from process, what would claims like Katsrupt's that the world is made up of "mental substance," even mean vis-á-vis competing claims that is is "physical substance." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think Kastrup would say the primary difference is that in his ontology there is no mind-independent stuff. If all minds disappeared, so would the universe. Materialism/physicalism claims the universe would still exist, even if there were no minds.

Universal consciousness conceptually doesn't have those trappings. If you reject religion for similar reasons, a lot of atheists are going to consider you a like mind — flannel jesus

Until you start talking about the cosmic one mind. Then you're considered a dupe who believes in "woo".

I don't think so. I mean if you go to meetings with other people who believe that, and your organisation treats it as important for you to convert other people, and you think people are immoral for disagreeing with you, then yeah you're just another religious nut.

But if it's just an idea you think is compelling, and you're not just refusing to look at any scientific evidence that might conflict with your point of view (like astrologists for example), then... I mean, I don't speak for all atheists, but I'm an atheist and I don't consider the concept you've brought up to be inherently woo, stupid, or religious. I see why others might but I am at least sympathetic to weird ideas of consciousness. Consciousness is the hard problem, right?

You have an enlightened view. All the atheists I've interacted with roll their eyes when I talk about idealism.

Right, but all the "stuff" is just mentation, mental stuff. We're all part of one disassociated cosmic mind for him, right? So, of course if all minds disappear there is nothing, because there is nothing but mind. Saying "all minds cease to exist," is equivalent with saying "the universe ceases to exist."

But if the undergirding framework is a process, then the process explains how it is that we, as "disassociated minds," emerge from the universe, and all the traits the universe has from our perspective. The "substance" of the world that emerges from the process being mental instead of physical doesn't seem to make much of a difference.

To be sure, if the entire universe is mental, we might be tempted to say "then the universe is conscious, or could be /become conscious." But he denies panpsychism if I recall. In any event, with strong emergence nothing precludes a physical universe from becoming conscious either. The mental/physical substance issue seems irrelevant to global psychism (as opposed to panpsychism).

The universes' being conscious or not in a process view simply becomes an empirical question. Knowing what we know about the processes at work in the universe, should/could it produce an umbrella awareness?

The other neat thing about the process view is that it explains how multiple minds can be nested, how split brained individuals can seem to have "two minds in one," multiple personality disorder, the ant hive as a whole and the individual ants both being thought of as minds, states/organizations as mind-like entities with their own goals and desired distinct from their member, etc. The problem of group minds presents no metaphysical problems, unlike in superveniance views.

This is good since there is good psychological evidence for group mind-like properties within our minds and for group minds in human social institutions. These have normally been rejected for metaphysical reasons based on superveniance, despite being empirically predictive in models. However, in the process view there is no reason to say multiple "functions" can't be nested so as to generate novel functions. So multiple functions that generate consciousnesses can be nested so as to create a larger consciousness.

That is very interesting, as I am more sure that I have thoughts then that the world exists, and it seems kind of backwards to me to think otherwise.

non sequiturs [...] follow [...] therefore — Bob Ross

... are examples of deduction.

By “elaborate”, it seems (from your OP) that you are referring to laymen’s beliefs about God. — Bob Ross

Not exactly, no. We're talking what the Pope, priests, gurus, imams, pujas, etc promote (be it simple complex sophisticated renditions), the Avestan Ahura Mazda, the Vedic Shiva, the Biblical Yahweh, the Quranic Allah, etc, the currently prevalent, elaborate religious faiths, often mutually incompatible (as mentioned), what people out there actually believe and sometimes practise:

(typically involving lengthy stories, religious texts, divine intervention/participation, personal/divine revelations, personal deities, rituals, commands/rules, fate designations) — jorndoe

^{(link, link, link, IEP, SEP)} — jorndoe

By “idealized”, it seems to me that you are referring to formal theological arguments for God, is that correct? — Bob Ross

Maybe. I'd call them definitions, e.g. G is defined as a supposed 1^st cause (like Aquinas did), or "super-designer", or ... As to the mentioned gap, the kalam/cosmological argument, for example, does not derive the Biblical Yahweh, cannot particularly differentiate those "historicized" deities or "the unknown" for that matter (incidentally admitted by one of the foremost promoters of that argument). I suppose that's a characteristic of the "idealized" category, though "definitions" is a better word. (How would one go about practising religious faith in a supposed 1^st cause or "super-designer" anyway? Those apologetics don't derive the 10 commandments or Sun-prayer or much of anything.)

predicated off of idealism. — Bob Ross

There's been realism versus idealism threads before. Maybe it's time for another. Hit it, if you have something good, it's one of those things the forum is about. Roughly 4/5 contemporary philosophers go with realism. ^{2009, 2020} A topic in its own right, all the way back to Plato ... (Descartes) ... Berkeley ...

they are personifying God, which obviously makes no sense. — Bob Ross

I guess your take is more or less at odds with the entire elaborate category above? If my bare guess holds up, you'd have something in common with a few atheists:

I'm guessing atheism primarily is concerned with the former (elaborate), and agnosticism more found in the context of the latter (idealized) — both of which could be held by one person, and thus need clarification. — jorndoe

Sort of. Bad arguments for God, or simply ill-thought out metaphysical explanations of the world [...] — Bob Ross

Those mentioned above aren't arguments, just poor explanations. Some reasons were listed.

It seems it'd be possible to deny this is the right question though, or even a meaningful one. If information is primarily process (good arguments for this exist) and if the pancomputationalist physicists are correct and information is our core ontological primitive, then superveniance itself is a mistaken concept. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's a lot of highly speculative ifs.

And I'm inclined towards this view because:
-Consciousness and other natural phenomena appear to require strong emergence.
- Jaegeon Kim's argument that strong emergence cannot exist given a substance metaphysics is convincing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Kim doesn't seem to think that consciousness requires strong emergence. He ends his book Physicalism, or Something Near Enough with:

So here is the position that has emerged. It begins by embracing ontological physicalism. Taking mental causation seriously, it also embraces conditional reductionism, the thesis that only physically reducible mental properties can be causally efficacious. Are mental properties physically reducible? Yes and no: intentional/cognitive properties are reducible, but qualitative properties of consciousness, or “qualia,” are not. In saving the causal efficacy of the former, we are saving cognition and agency. Moreover, we are not losing sensory experiences altogether: qualia similarities and differences can be saved. What we cannot save are their intrinsic qualities—the fact that yellow looks like this, that ammonia smells like that, and so on. But, I say, this isn’t losing much, and when we think about it, we should have expected it all along.

The position is, as we might say, a slightly defective physicalism—physicalism manqué but not by much. I believe that this is as much physicalism as we can have, and that there is no credible alternative to physicalism as a general worldview. Physicalism is not the whole truth, but it is the truth near enough, and near enough should be good enough.

Thus, if it seems like we need strong emergence. Since substance superveniance rules this out, then it seems like superveniance isn't the right concept. Plus it has other unresolved problems. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I think the Kim quote shows, Kim doesn't seem to think that we need strong emergence.

But god doesn't explain anything. When we say god created the world, it's equivalent to saying, 'the magic man did it.' God as a (pseudo) explanation does not tell us how or why, it answers nothing. — Tom Storm

Scientists and belief in God

A survey of scientists who are members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press in May and June 2009, [...] According to the poll, just over half of scientists (51%) believe in some form of deity or higher power; specifically, 33% of scientists say they believe in God, while 18% believe in a universal spirit or higher power. [...] Finally, the poll of scientists finds that four-in-ten scientists (41%) say they do not believe in God or a higher power [...] — Pew Research