s it that Wittgenstein rejects Moore’s language-game or that he is showing Moore what a language game is? Does the idea of rejecting a language-game make sense? — Joshs
I would say language-games never reflect the facts. Rather, facts only get their sense within language-games. — Joshs
(352)Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree.
I would say language-games never reflect the facts. Rather, facts only get their sense within language-games.
— Joshs
From Wittgenstein's Zettel:
Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree”.
I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature
were different, people would have different
concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). Rather: if
anyone believes that certain concepts are
absolutely the right ones, and that having
di!erent ones would mean not realizing
something that we realize—then let him imagine
certain very general facts of nature to be
di!erent from what we are used to, and the
formation of concepts di!erent from the usual
ones will become intelligible to him. (PPF, xii,
366)
140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught
judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to
us.
141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a
whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)
142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and
premises give one another mutual support.
152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.
And yet one can be deceived about one's own hand. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3125296/#:~:text=The%20Rubber%20Hand%20Illusion%20(RHI,the%20participant%27s%20own%20occluded%20hand. — unenlightened
While he shows that Moore's use of "know" in "I know this is my hand" is problematic, I suspect Wittgenstein pretty much agreed with the argument Moore presents against idealism. "Here is a hand" shows that there is stuff around us to be dealt with, providing a foundation, a certainty. Again, there have to be slabs in order to engage in the builder's game — Banno
"The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them (OC 100 - my emphasis)," which he doesn't. — Sam26
I interpret this differently. Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to the fact that philosophers treat claims of knowledge and certainty as if they are metaphysical claims, and this leads them to confusion. Both the skeptic and those like Moore who argue against skepticism suffer from this. They put demands and requirements on these terms that do not exist outside the puzzles they create. — Fooloso4
Moore must think sceptics are idiots. As if they;re going to read his argument and go 'Oh yes, I have hands, I hadn't notice that before'. — FrancisRay
However, what Moore is appealing to, is a mental state of knowing — Sam26
This isn't so much about metaphysical claims, unless you are referring to mental states ... — Sam26
42: To think that different states must correspond to the words "believe" and "know"
would be as if one believed that different people had to correspond to the word "I" and the name
"Ludwig", because the concepts are different.
230. We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement "I know..."? For it is not a question of
mental processes or mental states.
356. My "mental state", the "knowing", gives me no guarantee of what will happen.
"[f]rom it seeming to me-or to everyone-to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. — Sam26
For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed." — Sam26
Moorean propositions (so-called bedrock propositions) and there role in epistemology. They ground our epistemology in important ways, — Sam26
359. But that means I want to conceive it [certainty] as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.
475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination [Raisonnement].
476. Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch books,
sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.
Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise
The puzzles occur as a result of an analysis of knowledge it terms of an analysis of propositions: — Fooloso4
I consider the claim that there are mental states of knowing as a metaphysical claim. Do we have a particular mental state because we know or do we know because we have a particular mental state. Does knowing cause the mental state or does the mental state cause us to know? Is there a different mental state for knowing I have hands that differ from the mental state of knowing I have feet or fingers?
It is not clear to me whether you are accepting or rejecting an appeal to mental states. — Fooloso4
From it seeming to be that there is this queer and extremely important mental state it does not follow that it is so that there is this state. It arises from the misuse of the expression "I know". — Fooloso4
I don't think Moore's claims that he had hands is a bedrock proposition and do not see how it grounds or plays a role in epistemology. It may have its place in his attempt to refute skepticism but it most contexts it is odd and out of place. It is an example of philosophers being puzzled by the puzzles they create. — Fooloso4
This seems clearly incorrect, viz., that Moore's statement that he knows he has hands is not a bedrock proposition. — Sam26
Moorean propositions ...(hinge-propositions) — Sam26
...show just where justification ends, and where doubt falls apart or makes no sense. — Sam26
Actually Moore is appealing to what seems to be obvious to all of us, viz, having knowledge of his hands. The skeptic makes the same mistake that Moore makes, viz., not only is there no knowing these Moorean propositions, but there is no doubting them either. The radical skeptic is even further out on the limb than Moore. — Sam26
Actually Moore is appealing to what seems to be obvious to all of us, viz, having knowledge of his hands. The skeptic makes the same mistake that Moore makes, viz., not only is there no knowing these Moorean propositions, but there is no doubting them either. The radical skeptic is even further out on the limb than Moore. — Sam26
What are we to do with that proposition? What rests on it? — Fooloso4
It seems clear to me that Moore's statement that he knows he has hands is a prime example of a bedrock belief. It's definitely prelinguistic, and it generally cannot be doubted, at least in most contexts without having to doubt the whole of our inherited background. — Sam26
(I want to be clear that there are other names associated with these beliefs. The obvious one is hinge-proposition (OC 341) — Sam26
It's not just the belief about hands, but a whole system of beliefs that falls into the same category. — Sam26
Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.
Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise
Think of these beliefs as ways of acting, i.e., the actions associated with my hands show my belief that I have hands. — Sam26
The one thing that makes bedrock beliefs stand out is that doubting them makes no sense or is senseless. Why? Because the framework for doubting and knowing is built upon the inherited background of our surroundings. The inherited background is prior to doubting and knowing, i.e., you wouldn't be able to doubt or know without this framework. — Sam26
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.
The one thing that makes bedrock beliefs stand out is that doubting them makes no sense or is senseless. — Sam26
So, "What rests on it?" Language rests on it. — Sam26
360. I know that this is my foot. I could not accept any experience as proof to the contrary. - That may be an exclamation; but what follows from it? At least that I shall act with a certainty that knows no doubt, in accordance with my belief.
475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination [Raisonnement].
It's not just the belief about hands, but a whole system of beliefs that falls into the same category. — Sam26
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