He is not telling us not to think, but rather, in this case, if we think that all games must have something in common we will fail to see that they do not. — Fooloso4

Yes, I can agree with things like this when applied to say, Kant's Categorical Imperative. One can spend all day figuring out how reality can be set up to make any "certain" conclusions that fit the criteria of Kant's CI. But then, Kant had some better ideas that conveyed the "sense" of his idea better- that is to say, he had the second formulation "don't treat people as a mere means to an ends". Now, here is a less strict formulation. It is still fuzzy because there can be all kinds of scenarios where we can think of some hard-to-tell ideas.. and is this mental, or is this according to your view, the other person's view, etc.. See, we can all ask these questions of "certainty" for sure. But because it is "fuzzier boundaries" for the second formulation, it can be internalized as a general approach to how we treat people (internalized value or rule rather than a formulation that has to be solved).

That has always been the philosophical approach of dialectic in general. Everything can be questioned, including the question, and it can go endlessly. Nothing can be grounded completely in theory. However, I think this misses the goal of philosophy. It is trying to find some coherence within the Forms of Life. That is to say, it is putting the cart before the horse when saying because we have forms of life that differ from ideas about reality or ethical principles or whatnot, that doesn't mean we can't attempt to create various theories or ideas. Ideas are weighed and judged and applied, and critiqued, and so on. They create their own "forms of life" that lead to other ideas and expansions and applications and the like. One need not stay in the "web of ecology" of word use and then decide to pack your bags and stop philosophizing (what I call now Radagasting).

concepts that are not tied to a correspondence theory of words to metaphysics, are simply describing their theory. And it is implicit in their descriptions of reality that they are mere descriptions- a way of relating their ideas about reality. — schopenhauer1

But this is creating a vision of "reality" because it is required ahead of time to meet a certain requirement, which I am going to stop calling "certainty" because you are conflating it with the sense of being confident, or something like that.

They are using "forms of life" if you will, to convey their message, and there is no error had with any above and beyond demand for "certainty". — schopenhauer1

Forms of life is not how, say, my ideas are conveyed, as some kind of way of talking for a certain thing, that we might, then, create or abstract. It is just all the stuff we share in common that is necessary to even have language (but not how it is conducted or ensured).

Stanley Cavell will put it like this:

[Being able to, for example, project words into new contexts] is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfilment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation – all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life”.

@Banno has a good Austin quote that amounts to the same but I can’t remember where that is.

In terms of what a “language game” is, look at the examples of "concepts" that Wittgenstein investigates, the list of which is above in a response to RussellA--these are just things we do that he uses as test cases. He will of course invent contexts and imagine worlds in which what the philosopher says might fit.

What I mean by Certainty (what Wittgenstein is getting at in saying "purity") cascades from an occurrence of things not working out; creating doubt in morality, others, and even physical objects; taking that as a rift (between words and meaning, words and the world, appearances and essences, logic and emotion, etc.); wanting to never have that happen again; requiring there be a way to solve (intellectually) ahead of time what is seen as this "problem"; which creates a prerequisite of a single standard which necessitates a generalized application (universalized, known, predetermined, dependable, etc.). It is basically the age-old problem of skepticism and responses to it, based on knowledge. Schopenhauer, Hume, Kant, Plato, Descartes, on and on, are wrestling with skepticism. Positivism, Moore, Russell, and Frege are just one instance of a response; another is the belief that neuroscience will resolve the "problem".[/quote]

I think you believe Wittgenstein is throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Kant took away our possibility of knowing the "thing-in-itself" (what Wittgenstein will say is essential about something) because of his requirement for what it would mean to "know". He then replaces it with something that would meet the same standard, the "imperative". But that is not to say that everything Kant says is useless; Wittgenstein's examination of Grammar is based on Kant's Conditions (#90), and his method is contingent on Kant's seeing the possibility of a universal voice in his Critique of Judgment.

As to theorizing, I take his main point to be that our theories can stand in the way of seeing.

When he says at PI 66:

... don’t think, but look!

He is not telling us not to think, but rather, in this case, if we think that all games must have something in common we will fail to see that they do not. — Fooloso4

@schopenhauer1

I am merely putting this same observation in a way that goes further to incorporate the larger issue of the fear of skepticism. That it is our desire for purity ("something in common") that blinds us to our ordinary criteria because we will not accept the human condition that we must stand in the place of the limitations of knowledge (it's not just: look! but see why you want an intellectual solution to take your place of being responsible for our interest in our ordinary criteria, or our desire to flee that position).

I don’t have anything more on his thoughts on God. — Antony Nickles

Could it be the case that Wittgenstein's ideas on God have little philosophical significance, or you personally are not interested in his God topic?

Wittgenstein and religion

This might give an idea of the discussions surrounding Wittgenstein and god.

Well I wouldn’t take what I pointed out before as of little significance; it is the conclusion on Descartes’ Meditations. But of what I have seen of his opinions about religion (which is very little), they seem personal. I am not without interest, just not familiar with those, so to what extent that informed or shaped his insights I can’t say.

He does, of course, say things in the ballpark, for example: about another’s soul.

My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul — Wittgenstein, Investigations 3rd p. 178

That is to say our posture to someone else is not a matter of knowledge, knowing something (or something lesser, like my opinion), it is a matter of, say, treating them as if they have a soul.

@RussellA @Banno @Sam26

I came across this (attached) very short 13-paragraph synopsis of the ethical import of the Investigations. It includes a discussion of the actual importance of “forms of life”, as expressions of our interests, and even touches on why he is not abandoning philosophy or its issues @schopenhauer1 I’m not sure I would agree with everything, but perhaps these points are expressed better here than by me.

It is trying to find some coherence within the Forms of Life. — schopenhauer1

I think for Wittgenstein it all about making connections. I think I have said a few things about that. I will have to look.

that doesn't mean we can't attempt to create various theories or ideas. — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein might be more hard lined on than I am, but as I look at it, the problem is not theorizing but when the theory stands in the way of seeing something. The theory is accepted and what does not fit the theory is missed or ignored or downplayed This is similar to the problem of a picture holding us captive.

As I mentioned, Wittgenstein cites examples of different uses of language at PI 23. He is not saying "the use of a word is meaning is use", as you seem to think. He offers some examples of the different types of uses of language. To quote one of these several examples, a word or sentence could be used for "Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting," to name just a few. These alternative uses of language alone falsify the assertion that language is only used to refer to objects. — Luke

What textual evidence in the PI is there that the PI is not taking the position of Linguistic Idealism?

Linguistic Idealism is the position that language is the ultimate reality. GEM Anscombe in her paper The Question of Linguistic Idealism considered the question whether Wittgenstein was a linguistic idealist.

For the PI , the meaning of a word is its use in language. Within language, a word can be used to describe the appearance of an object, give an order, obey an order, etc as set out in PI 23. But all these things happen within the world of language, not in a world outside language.

It is true that within the PI is the expression "bring me a slab", but what does this word "slab" refer to. It seems to refer to its use within the world of language, not its use in a world outside of language.

It may seem obvious that language must have a use outside of language, but that does not seem to be the position of the PI. If that were the case, then where in the PI is there any connection between the world in language and the world outside language.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

PI 43 states that the meaning of a word is its use in language. It doesn't continue to say that the use of language is in the world outside language. It doesn't continue to say that language has any use in a world outside language.

Even the phrase "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer." as expanded upon in PI 40 can be read as the meaning of a word is its use in language.

If the PI is taking the position of Linguistic Idealsim, then there is the problem of circularity. As you said "this word is being used to get its meaning from its use".

As I wrote before: "If meaning as use means use in language, then this is unworkable because of the circularity problem. If meaning as use means use in the world, then this is workable, as the only use of language is to change facts in the world. Language gets its meaning from being able to change facts in the world."

If the PI is not taking the position of Linguistic Idealism, with its inherent problem of circularity, then where in the PI is the textual evidence that this is not the case.

Wittgenstein and religion

This might give an idea of the discussions surrounding Wittgenstein and god. — Banno

Thanks for the link. :up: :pray:

I am not without interest, just not familiar with those, so to what extent that informed or shaped his insights I can’t say. — Antony Nickles

I have a copy of "The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein", and one of the chapter is about "Wittgenstein on Religious Belief" by Stephen Mulhall.

https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-wittgenstein-9780199287505?cc=gb&lang=en&#

I have also met a guy who was reading Witt for exclusively analysing the Religious Literatures such as The Bible and the ancient Buddhist scriptures under Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion and Logic. He was a lecturer in Religious Dept. of University in Japan. Not sure if he finished his thesis. But I have seen his book published and being sold in Amazon Japan in Japanese language.

First, it is a realization so only you can come to it on your own; understanding is not possible without inner change. — Antony Nickles

True, whether I agree or not with the PI is in a sense secondary, as I am using it to help me develop my own understanding of the relationship between the mind and the world using language.

Did you read the Cavell I suggested (attached above starting at p 56?) — Antony Nickles

The two major topics in the PI, self-knowledge and ordinary language, appear to lead into two different directions. Self-knowledge leads into scepticism and Indirect Realism, in that I see a red postbox but this only exists as a representation in my mind, and ordinary language leads into the absence of rationalism and Direct Realism, in that as I see a red postbox there must be a red postbox in the world.

Cavell writes about self-knowledge and ordinary language
p 68 - for the nature of self-knowledge-and therewith the nature of the self is one of the great subjects of the Investigations as a whole.
p 56 - Pole says, or implies, that Wittgenstein regards ordinary language as "sacrosanct"

Self-knowledge comes from self-reflection, from which sceptical doubt arises naturally about the beliefs inherent within ordinary language
p 60 - Their method is uniformly what Hume describes as "profound and intense reflection" from which, he says, "sceptical doubt arises naturally"

Ordinary language is criticised as lacking rational justification and is founded on what the observer believes to be obvious.
p 58 - "We know that there are material objects," "We directly see them," "We know that other persons are sentient," all of which are believed by the vulgar, have been discovered by philosophers to lack rational justification
p 71 - And that is why there is virtually nothing in the Investigations which we should ordinarily call reasoning; Wittgenstein asserts nothing which could be proved, for what he asserts is either obvious (§ 126)-whether true or false-or else concerned with what conviction, whether by proof or evidence or authority, would consist in

From my reading of Cavell, there appears to be a fundamental ambiguity in the PI. On the one hand the lack of rationalism in ordinary language, yet on the other hand a desire for self-knowledge which inevitably leads to scepticism about things such as ordinary language.

What textual evidence in the PI is there that the PI is not taking the position of Linguistic Idealism?

Linguistic Idealism is the position that language is the ultimate reality. GEM Anscombe in her paper The Question of Linguistic Idealism considered the question whether Wittgenstein was a linguistic idealist.

For the PI , the meaning of a word is its use in language. Within language, a word can be used to describe the appearance of an object, give an order, obey an order, etc as set out in PI 23. But all these things happen within the world of language, not in a world outside language. — RussellA

I think there is abundant evidence in PI that Wittgenstein situates language use within the world among a community of speakers, and so there is definitely "a world outside language". For example, he refers to language use as "part of an activity". Again, at PI 23 (my bolding):

The word “language-game” is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. — PI 23

Wittgenstein compares language use to games very deliberately. Games are played in the world (outside our minds), usually with other people, and they often have a set of rules guiding the actions of the players. Once again, they are activities:

66. Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on... — PI 66

Wittgenstein is at pains to get us (philosophers) out of our own heads and very much into the "world outside language" (my bolding):

The sense in which philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words is no different from that in which we speak of them in ordinary life when we say, for example, “What is written here is a Chinese sentence”, or “No, that only looks like writing; it’s actually just ornamental”, and so on. We’re talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity. — PI 108 - boxed section

He also situates philosophical problems or contradictions within the community of speakers, referring to their "status in civic life":

The civic status of a contradiction, or its status in civic life — that is the philosophical problem. — PI 125

Wittgenstein also emphasises that language is something we learn; something that we are taught by others how to use. He speaks of how we learn the names of sensations from others (PI 244). He speaks of a teacher and a pupil and makes references to, e.g., learning language, learning to play chess, learning to calculate, learning rules, learning how to go on, etc.

Not to mention that the majority of the work is focused on trying to break the misconception that meaning is something subjective or mentally determined, and trying to get us to see that the grammar of our language is based in a community of speakers and our publicly observable behaviours (in the world). That's the point of the private language argument.

241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” — What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life. — PI 241

Form of life is the wider activity surrounding language use; the passing of slabs on command, the smile that accompanies a greeting, the gathering of friends and family to witness a couple say "I do", the facial expression suitable for a question or a sympathetic word. In short, our human life on Earth in which language is embedded.

It's quite isolating though. You are left with your private sensation of pain, and the word pain just becomes this epiphenomenal construction. Also a problem I see here, is that it's hard to see if there is any criteria for anything here. I would normally say the closest epistemology for criteria of meaning would be pragmaticism. In other words, did the usage "get something done in a particular way", but I don't think Witt is saying that either because that has sort of a telos to it (did this usage get this thing accomplished). I don't think he is saying that either necessarily. — schopenhauer1

According to Wittgenstein's PI, what is the purpose of language? Wittgenstein may intend it to have other purposes than as described in the PI, but if we are to take the PI at face value, there seems to be no more purpose for language than to be coherent within itself.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

PI 43 states that the meaning of a word is its use in language. It doesn't continue to say that the use of language is in the world outside language.

Even the phrase "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer." as expanded upon in PI 40 can be read as the meaning of a word is its use in language.

It seems easy to read the PI as Linguistic Idealism, whereby language is the ultimate reality, and if this is the case, then language cannot be said to have any pragmatic use outside of language.

It is true that within the PI is the expression "bring me a slab", but what does this word "slab" refer to. It seems to refer to its use within the world of language, not its use in a world outside of language.

Language then becomes an incredibly intricate machine, where one lever hits another cog, which open s a valve which moves a spindle. All meticulously controlled to create an intricate piece of work, such as a Rowland Emett construction. Beautiful in its integrity but having no practical use in a word outside of itself. Each Emett machine is its own language game, each wonderfully coherent but none corresponding to a world outside of themselves.



This may not be the case with the PI, but if so, out of interest, where in the PI is the textual evidence that this is not the case.

PI 293 in giving the analogy of the beetle describes how my private sensation of pain drops out of consideration in the language game. But this is not what I want. I want my pain to have a real world effect outside of language, but this is not something the PI seems to go into.

True, whether I agree or not with the PI is in a sense secondary, as I am using it to help me develop my own understanding of the relationship between the mind and the world using language. — RussellA

This explains a lot.

The two major topics in the PI, self-knowledge and ordinary language, appear to lead into two different directions. Self-knowledge leads into scepticism and Indirect Realism, in that I see a red postbox but this only exists as a representation in my mind, and ordinary language leads into the absence of rationalism and Direct Realism, in that as I see a red postbox there must be a red postbox in the world. — RussellA

Skepticism is the fear that there is an ever-present breakdown in activities such as just: seeing a mailbox, which leads to the fantasy of an essence or “real” mailbox, and thus the creation of the“representation” or something else that is “mine”, to explain our inability to deal with differences and exceptions, etc. of “a mailbox”. In other words, your “own understanding” is philosophy’s classic freakout to uncertainty and doubt.

Self-knowledge comes from self-reflection, from which sceptical doubt arises naturally about the beliefs inherent within ordinary language — RussellA

Skepticism doesn’t come up because of something wrong with ordinary language (and we don’t “believe” in it, or have certain “beliefs” because of it). Our uncertainty just comes up when things just naturally fail, or turn out not as we expected, as, from the first part of the meditations:

SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation — Descartes 1sr Meditation

(My emphasis)

Descartes was wrong a couple times and now he is compelled to “build” something certain, “foundational” so he doesn’t have to worry about being wrong.

Ordinary language is criticised as lacking rational justification and is founded on what the observer believes to be obvious. — RussellA

The condemnation of our ordinary criteria is the skeptic’s reaction to their doubt; they fly away from our everyday means of judgment. And Wittgenstein’s claims are not obvious, they are uncontroversial (not as "common sense" but that which we can acknowledge or find out by ourselves).

From my reading of Cavell, there appears to be a fundamental ambiguity in the PI. On the one hand the lack of rationalism in ordinary language, yet on the other hand a desire for self-knowledge which inevitably leads to scepticism about things such as ordinary language. — RussellA

Wittgenstein is using a method other than what we would "usually call reasoning"; that does not mean it "lacks rationality"; plus that is not a characterization of "ordinary language", so not ambiguous or conflicting with skepticism of our ordinary criteria (not language), which does not come from the desire for self-knowledge, but, if examined, leads to self-knowledge.

Maybe one more time through that article.

But this is creating a vision of "reality" because it is required ahead of time to meet a certain requirement, which I am going to stop calling "certainty" because you are conflating it with the sense of being confident, or something like that.

They are using "forms of life" if you will, to convey their message, and there is no error had with any above and beyond demand for "certainty".
— schopenhauer1

Forms of life is not how, say, my ideas are conveyed, as some kind of way of talking for a certain thing, that we might, then, create or abstract. It is just all the stuff we share in common that is necessary to even have language (but not how it is conducted or ensured).

Stanley Cavell will put it like this:

[Being able to, for example, project words into new contexts] is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfilment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation – all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life”.

@Banno has a good Austin quote that amounts to the same but I can’t remember where that is.

In terms of what a “language game” is, look at the examples of "concepts" that Wittgenstein investigates, the list of which is above in a response to RussellA--these are just things we do that he uses as test cases. He will of course invent contexts and imagine worlds in which what the philosopher says might fit.

What I mean by Certainty (what Wittgenstein is getting at in saying "purity") cascades from an occurrence of things not working out; creating doubt in morality, others, and even physical objects; taking that as a rift (between words and meaning, words and the world, appearances and essences, logic and emotion, etc.); wanting to never have that happen again; requiring there be a way to solve (intellectually) ahead of time what is seen as this "problem"; which creates a prerequisite of a single standard which necessitates a generalized application (universalized, known, predetermined, dependable, etc.). It is basically the age-old problem of skepticism and responses to it, based on knowledge. Schopenhauer, Hume, Kant, Plato, Descartes, on and on, are wrestling with skepticism. Positivism, Moore, Russell, and Frege are just one instance of a response; another is the belief that neuroscience will resolve the "problem". — Antony Nickles

[/quote]

Ironically, you are trying to convey some sort of "certainty" about WIttgenstein's philosophy to me :snicker:.

I just "love" how the usual discourse in Witt goes though.. Cause the next move for you to say is that, "Well no, I am just doing my best to convey to you what cannot be conveyed because you just have to "get it" from this therapeutic demonstrative approach.". So you can spare me that next line.. I still claim you are trying to instill some "certainty" about Wittgenstein :razz:.

Also, I get what Forms of Life are.. But I see the philosophical tradition as it's own Form of Life that it has generated through the years and thus, in a way, its context is within that tradition. Even you said that Witt relies on this understanding of Western history to "get" it.

I just don't agree with the premise that philosophers are working to solve skepticism necessarily. I know I am not when I am "doing" or "reading" philosophy. There can be all sorts of reasons to philosophize. If we define philosophy as generally "thinking about the bigger picture", we all at some level, at some times in our lives, "philosophize". We might ask, "What's the meaning of it all?". And you might say, "Aha! That is skepticism!". Fine, then skepticism is anything with an open-ended answer.. But that is a lame way of using skepticism, because it is so broad. The skepticism you seem to be intending for Witt is something akin to skepticism in knowledge if something is true. But, even that is not necessarily an implicit drive for philosophical inquiry. I don't study Schopenhauer's Will because it answers questions of claims of knowledge, for example. I don't think Will will help me understand how a toilet works, or how it is that humans evolved brains that have the ability for language, for example. But if I was to inquire about that, I might research evolutionary biology or anthropology, and the like. I might look at and evaluate various theories for how and why language evolved. And yeah, none of those answers are going to necessarily be "the" right answer, just more convincing based on arguments and evidence presented. But it takes a personality-type that "needs" certainty for this to be an issue, and I don't think all philosophical drives or philosophers (whether academic or not) are completely taken by the idea that they will find "one universal answer". Rather, the search for Truth itself is something that seems motivating in some way.. A search for answers to abstract questions. And thus, there may not be a final answer to any of them, but there are ones that accord with what makes sense. And those theories become "THE theory" because you have either agreed with its sensibility for answering the question, or you yourself have constructed the theory to what you view as sensibly answering the question.

So this is all to say, none of this really strikes some sort of profound truth to a personality that never had the demand for certainty in the first place.

Wittgenstein might be more hard lined on than I am, but as I look at it, the problem is not theorizing but when the theory stands in the way of seeing something. The theory is accepted and what does not fit the theory is missed or ignored or downplayed This is similar to the problem of a picture holding us captive. — Fooloso4

Sure, I'd agree with that, but I am not sure the whole PI was what convinced me of this. There might be some personality types this is useful for- one's he worked close with perhaps?

I think the idea for example of Will is an intriguing one.. But then I see flaws in how it is contradictory or incomplete, and unprovable, etc. So, that doesn't mean there isn't some sort of interesting truths or gleanings that one can gather from the idea or use as a jumping off point, etc. I mean, isn't that practically what all of modern philosophy is? You take a previous philosopher, you discuss it, then you critique it, and often you offer what you think might be a better solution, and so on.

It seems easy to read the PI as Linguistic Idealism, whereby language is the ultimate reality, and if this is the case, then language cannot be said to have any pragmatic use outside of language.

It is true that within the PI is the expression "bring me a slab", but what does this word "slab" refer to. It seems to refer to its use within the world of language, not its use in a world outside of language. — RussellA

Yeah, I like your analogy there. So I think you are correct. He is caught in the "web of ecology" and is trying to demonstrate various ways that language is vague or breaks down. He really wants you to see that.

As far as how this can be "used" outside of seeing that things are only family resemblances and forms of life, I don't know what else you can make of it other than, a collection of language breakdowns.

It seems you want to provide a framework and structure to something he just didn't do himself and perhaps is trying to show is the wrong approach anyways because language to him, will just elude your trying to define it. Perhaps your idea of Linguistic Idealism doesn't work in various cases.. You can imagine Witt presenting you with a host of language games that breakdown when applied to his theory where it doesn't apply, etc. That is I guess part of his point. So yeah, you can try to pin his theory down in a grand theory of epistemology and ontology, but he would probably say it's a lost cause or something like that.

In other words, your “own understanding” is philosophy’s classic freakout to uncertainty and doubt. — Antony Nickles

As Cavell wrote in The Later Wittgenstein, for Wittgenstein, knowledge starts with self-knowledge, not just simply adopting a method and then blindly accepting its results. Self-knowledge is one of the great subjects of the Investigations.
If the little I have said makes plausible the idea that the question "How do we know what we say (intended to say, wish to say)?" is one aspect of the general question "What is the nature of self-knowledge?" then we will realize that Wittgenstein ·has not first "accepted" or "adopted" a method and then accepted its results, for the nature of self-knowledge-and therewith the nature of the self is one of the great subjects of the Investigations as a whole.

Skepticism doesn’t come up because of something wrong with ordinary language (and we don’t “believe” in it, or have certain “beliefs” because of it). — Antony Nickles

The Indirect Realist is surely sceptical of the ordinary language of the Direct Realist who, when they say "I see a slab", believes they are directly seeing a slab in the world as it really is.

So, that doesn't mean there isn't some sort of interesting truths or gleanings that one can gather from the idea or use as a jumping off point, etc. — schopenhauer1

When discussing a particular philosopher or particular work of that philosopher, to use it as a jumping off point, however valuable that might be, is a jumping away from what that philosopher says and means and intends for us to examine.

These are two different practices that are too often treated as if they are the same.

When discussing a particular philosopher or particular work of that philosopher, to use it as a jumping off point, however valuable that might be, is a jumping away from what that philosopher says and means and intends for us to examine. — Fooloso4

No you can understand what they intend to examine, see how they examine it, critique it, and offer your own alternative. One can get a picture of what the author is saying and then evaluate it. I see "philosophy" as an iterative, participatory thing, unless one is purely just trying to interpret or analyze a work without doing anything else with it, even if perhaps at a later point. The author themselves shouldn't be a substitution for one's own thoughts. Even if you agree 100% with the author, it's the evaluation and integration part that is yours.

The interpretive challenge is made evident by the fact that interpretations vary widely. He can not possibly mean all these different things attributed to him. One's jumping off point may be at odds with what the author says and means. If that is not a concern then I question the extent to which you are discussing Wittgenstein.

I see "philosophy" as an iterative, participatory thing ... — schopenhauer1

If one has little concern for what the author means then to what extent is this a participatory thing? If I say "ABC" and you respond as if I said "XYZ" in what way is talking passed each other iterative or participatory?

The author themselves shouldn't be a substitution for one's own thoughts. — schopenhauer1

In my opinion, one of the greatest values of reading certain philosophers is that through our attempt to understand them they teach us to think.

Even if you agree 100% with the author, it's the evaluation and integration part that is yours. — schopenhauer1

I agree with the second part, but see it as part of interpretive practice. As to the first part, all too often what one agrees or disagrees with their own misunderstanding of the author.

The interpretive challenge is made evident by the fact that interpretations vary widely. He can not possibly mean all these different things attributed to him. One's jumping off point may be at odds with what the author says and means. If that is not a concern then I question the extent to which you are discussing Wittgenstein. — Fooloso4

But, it seems since Wittgenstein's "method" is not direct, this will always be more of a problem, and especially so for his particular brand of philosophy. It's a philosophy that touts its inability to be directed, but then pretentiously condescends to those whom the Wittgensteinians think have not "really" understood.. Pick a lane.. Either its non-interpretive and up for various interpretations, or the author truly wanted you to see something, in which case, I am going to say shame on him for not explicating his ideas and thus making it a hipster-parlor-game for the "in the knows" who "really" understand Witt.

If one has little concern for what the author means then to what extent is this a participatory thing? If I say "ABC" and you respond as if I said "XYZ" in what way is talking passed each other iterative or participatory? — Fooloso4

Did I say that one was to not understand the author? When did I say that?

In my opinion, one of the greatest values of reading certain philosophers is that through our attempt to understand them the teach us to think. — Fooloso4

Rubbish. While I agree to a certain extent that you can learn from various philosophers and their writings, that to me is a dead-end if you just read a philosopher and you don't do anything with it for yourself. Also, these people aren't prophets or gods. It's narcissistic dogmatic self-limiting to think you can't "think" past the "published works" of the "great philosophers".

I agree with the second part, but see it as part of interpretive practice. As to the first part, all too often what one agrees or disagrees with their own misunderstanding of the author. — Fooloso4

Dude, I never said that one shouldn't try to understand the author. This is a strawman.

Either its non-interpretive and up for various interpretations, or the author truly wanted you to see something — schopenhauer1

I think he follows the ancient tradition of esoteric writing:

From a draft for the preface to Philosophical Remarks:

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.

— Culture and Value

It is not that he did not want to be understood but that he had not and would not be understood by more than a few people:

From the preface to PI:

I make them public with misgivings. It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another a but, of course, it is not likely.

Did I say that one was to not understand the author? — schopenhauer1

Again, given the divergence of interpretations the problem of interpretation remains. My concern it that when the reader (note that this is a general comment about readers of difficult texts) uses the text

...as a jumping off point, — schopenhauer1

or when you

offer your own alternative. — schopenhauer1

it is as if the interpretative work has been completed.

While I agree to a certain extent that you can learn from various philosophers and their writings, that to me is a dead-end if you just read a philosopher and you don't do anything with it for yourself. — schopenhauer1

Your practice and experience with interpretation seems to be quite removed from mine. Interpretation is not a matter of just reading. Rather than being a dead-end it is an opening up and shedding light. An interpretive reading is not passive. It is doing something with it for yourself, but not by yourself. It is an engagement with the thinking of the author and with other readers and to the extent that philosophy is a dialogue across the ages, with other philosophers.

It's narcissistic dogmatic self-limiting to think you can't "think" past the "published works" of the "great philosophers". — schopenhauer1

Perhaps you are the exception, but very few will stand the test of time. This does not mean that the philosophers are prophets or gods, but that their work is superior to ours. Exempt yourself if you like.

Ironically, you are trying to convey some sort of "certainty" about WIttgenstein's philosophy to me :snicker: — schopenhauer1

That is not irony, it’s obtuseness. What you are haphazardly referring to is certainty in its sense as particularity, and, despite your condescension, I am, of course, arguing that Wittgenstein is being rigorous and specific. Also, generalizing my response in with others is starting to be more just rude than simply unfair and intellectually lazy.

I just don't agree with the premise that philosophers are working to solve skepticism necessarily. — schopenhauer1

You mean the analytical tradition’s disappointment with knowledge and its attempts to resolve that? You’d need to answer for a lot of evidence.

I don't think Will will help me understand how a toilet works, or how it is that humans evolved brains that have the ability for language, for example. — schopenhauer1

But is that philosophy? …isn’t that science? and… plumbing?

the search for Truth itself is something that seems motivating in some way. A search for answers to abstract questions… that accord with what makes sense. — schopenhauer1

“Accord with what makes sense”? Is that rationality? So the uncertainty of another person has a rational answer? If we have a moral disagreement we just agree (or judge?) what or who makes the most sense?

none of this really strikes some sort of profound truth to a personality that never had the demand for certainty in the first place. — schopenhauer1

Feeling the grip of skepticism is not an easy experience to engender either. But you just make up what you think is right about philosophy and I’ll do the same and we’ll just hope we agree.

Wittgenstein is using a method other than what we would "usually call reasoning"; that does not mean it "lacks rationality"; plus that is not a characterization of "ordinary language", so not ambiguous or conflicting with skepticism of our ordinary criteria (not language), which does not come from the desire for self-knowledge, but, if examined, leads to self-knowledge. — Antony Nickles

Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein writes that self-knowledge and ordinary language are two major themes in the Investigations.

p 68 - for the nature of self-knowledge-and therewith the nature of the self is one of the great subjects of the Investigations as a whole.
PI 132 - We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order.

Self-knowledge naturally leads to scepticism, and the rational justifications of philosophy. But Wittgenstein is not a fan of philosophy.

p 60 - Their method is uniformly what Hume describes as "profound and intense reflection" from which, he says, "sceptical doubt arises naturally"
PI 116 - What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use

However, Wittgenstein does find personal change important, which can only be a result of self-knowledge.

p 72 - Both thought of their negative soundings as revolutionary extensions of our knowledge, and both were obsessed by the idea, or fact, that they would be misunderstood, partly, doubtless, because they knew the taste of self-knowledge, that it is bitter.

I am unclear whether Cavell is making the point that Wittgenstein does or doesn't support self-knowledge. On the one hand it leads to philosophy, which he doesn't approve of, and on the other hand it leads to personal change, which he does approve of.

I think there is abundant evidence in PI that Wittgenstein situates language use within the world among a community of speakers, and so there is definitely "a world outside language". For example, he refers to language use as "part of an activity". — Luke

I agree that the Investigations refers to a world of board games, athletic games, ordinary life, civic life, teachers, pupils, communities and other forms of life.

In the Investigations, within the sentence "bring me a slab", I agree that the word "slab" is naming an object in the world. The question is, does this world exist only in language or both inside and outside of language.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

The meaning of the word "slab" derives from its context in the language game being used by the speaker.

When I say "bring me the slab", my concept of "slab" is part of from my language game. When you say "bring me the slab", your concept of "slab" is part of your language game.

But because we have had different forms of life, perhaps you are an engineer in South Africa and perhaps I am a chemist in Ghana , as our language games must inevitably be different, our concepts of "slab" must also inevitably be different.

It cannot be the case that the word "slab" names an object in a world outside language, because, if that were the case, this object in the world outside of language would have to be existing in two different forms at the same time. One form determined by my use of the word "slab" and a different form determined by your use of the word "slab".

I am sure we agree that the object in the world outside language can only have one form. But if that were the case, and my word "slab" names this object, and your word "slab" names the same object, then our concepts and language games must be the same

In fact, everyone who used "slab" in their language must be using the same language game, with the result that within a community there can only be one language game. This would mean that everyone using the word "slab" had the same exact concept of "slab", which is clearly not the case

If Wittgenstein is interpreted as saying that the world of board games, etc did exist not only in the world in language but also in the world outside language, then one consequence would be that everyone's concept of "slab" would be exactly the same, which is clearly not the case.

When I say "bring me the slab", my concept of "slab" is part of from my language game. When you say "bring me the slab", your concept of "slab" is part of your language game. — RussellA

Typically, we don't each play our own individual language-games. It isn't that I have my own concept of slab and you have yours. You either learn to use the word/concept "slab" like others do or else you haven't learned the concept. We both speak English, right? You wouldn't get very far in the builder's language-game if you repeatedly fetched a hammer in response to the command "Slab!".

You are talking about us each having our own private language. Wittgenstein took issue with that idea.

Perhaps your idea of Linguistic Idealism doesn't work in various cases.. You can imagine Witt presenting you with a host of language games that breakdown when applied to his theory where it doesn't apply, etc. That is I guess part of his point. So yeah, you can try to pin his theory down in a grand theory of epistemology and ontology, but he would probably say it's a lost cause or something like that. — schopenhauer1

Yes, it may be that Wittgenstein was opposed to theories as any theory can later be shown to be either wrong or incorrect. But if that advice was followed, humans would still be living in caves.

Notwithstanding, PI 43 does set out the distinct theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language. Even if this theory is shown to be either wrong or incomplete, it is still invaluable in being able to be used as a foundation to develop something better. Because that is how theories work, a gradual improvement with time.

The next step in improving the theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language is to begin to incorporate the principles of Linguistic Idealism, and to clarify the consequences to language of the distinction between Indirect and Direct Realism.