Bitbol provides a counter to this argument:

... the reality of first-person consciousness is apodictic, cannot plausibly be denied.
If X is true by definition (i.e. apodictic), then X is merely abstract and not concrete, or factual. Given ubiquitious and continuous (i.e. embodied) stimulae from environmental imbedding, sufficiently complex, functioning, brains generate recursively narrative, phenomenal self models (PSM)¹ via tangled hierarchical (SL)² processing of which "first-person consciousness" consists. That these processes are also voluntarily as well as involuntarily interruptable, Wayfarer, demonstrates that the "reality (that) cannot be plausibly denied" is primarily virtual. :sparkle: — 180 Proof

“The creators of objective knowledge become so impressed by its efficacy that they tend to forget or to minimize that conscious experience is its starting point and its permanent requirement. They tend to forget or to minimize the long historical process by which contents of experience have been carefully selected, differenciated, and impoverished, so as to discard their personal or parochial components and to distillate their universal fraction as a structure. They finally turn the whole procedure upside down, by claiming that experience can be explained by one of its structural residues. Husserl severely criticized this forgetfulness and this inversion of priorities, that he saw as the major cause of what he called the “crisis” of modern science (Husserl, 1970).

According to him, it is in principle absurd to think that one can account for subjective conscious experience by way of certain objects of science, since objectivity has sprung precisely from what he calls the “life-world” of conscious experience.
One might suspect that this is only the old-fashioned opinion of some philosophers of the past who knew virtually nothing about modern neurophysiology. But, interestingly, the same remark was stated in several texts of modern scientists, as an elementary truth one is bound to rediscover after a long wandering in the labyrinth of naturalism. One finds it, inter alia :
• in many articles of Francisco Varela, according to whom “Lived experience is where we start from and where all must link back to, like a guiding thread”

Bitbol's "counter" is lost on me. Why don't you instead – in your own words, Joshs – counter my counter to @Wayfarer's counter of my counter to his OP? :chin:

:up:

But you will be completely at a loss to say what that 'something' is. (Whilst you're reaching for your hatchet, I sense the impending feeling of futility that invariably accompanies our exchanges.) — Wayfarer

Like most materialists*1, 's Reality is limited to the reports of his physical senses. That blinkered worldview is good enough for most animals. But it omits the distinguishing feature of rational animals : the ability to infer abstractly what is not seen concretely*2*3. That mental function begins with observed premises and calculates conclusions that must also be logically true . . . . but not necessarily real in the here & now.

On a more positive note, Banno's poetic imagery, and yours, is materialistic. Yet the metaphors of poppies & butterflies are not referring to physical objects, but to human ideas & feelings : "the elusive butterfly of love" is not an insect. I wonder if an idea/feeling-rejecting materialist takes the symbolism literally. :smile:

*1. I don't know how Banno would characterize his personal worldview, because his posts are usually so succinct that the cosmology behind the pretty words is left to the imagination. That's fine for poetry, where the reader is expected to read-into the "text" his/her own meanings & feelings. But, for prosaic philosophy, it omits the essence of wisdom, to use words precisely, not just concisely. When is a poppy not a flower?*4 :smile:

*2. Inference in Arguments :
In logic, an inference is a process of deriving logical conclusions from premises known or assumed to be true.
https://www.thoughtco.com/inference-logic-term-1691165

*3. Raven reasoning :
It's the strongest evidence yet that ravens have a “theory of mind” – that they can attribute mental states such as knowledge to others.
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2076025-ravens-fear-of-unseen-snoopers-hints-they-have-theory-of-mind/

*4. Red poppy flowers represent consolation, remembrance and death. Likewise, the poppy is a common symbol that has been used to represent everything from peace to death and even simply sleep.

Then how do you overcome the problem of solipsism?

How does Buddhism overcome the problem of solipsism? — baker

I don't see how it applies. The form of idealist philosophy that I'm advocating does not say that 'the world only exists in your mind'. I'm referring to the mind - yours, mine, the mind that we as a species and culture share. The mind is not an objective reality, it's not a material thing - yet we can't plausibly deny it! That's the elephant in the room, the fly in the ointment, for naturalism.

Besides, I don't think that Buddhist philosophy has a problem with solipsism, because the basis of solipsism is that 'consciousness is mine alone'. What Buddhist would say that?

I once googled "how to be a genuine fake". That was how I formulated my inquiry! And Google gave me Watts' book! I was quite disappointed by it, though. — baker

That is the scandalous biography of Watts - I'm well aware of it and was dissappointed to read it at the time. In the end I decided it doesn't detract from the salience of his writings - Supreme Identity, Beyond Theology and Way of Zen have considerable merits in my view. What he said had to be said and I'm grateful that he said it.

I contend that it is not possible to make a case this way — baker

Like I said, you want to uphold the taboo! Push it behind the curtain, declare it out of bounds.

Look at the quote in the next post - that more or less re-states everything the essay says. (By the way, thankyou Josh, that passage really hits the nail on the head.)

going with paticcasamuppada makes you a member of a Buddhist epistemic community, at the exclusion of memberships in other epistemic communities. — baker

Just for the benefit of those unfamiliar with the terminology, paticcasamuppada is the 'chain of dependent origination' of Buddhism. It is true, as I say in the OP, that I'm drawing on non-dualist perspectives as well as phenomenology and idealism, and also that my overall approach is very much Buddhist. But I disagree that this 'excludes the argument from other epistemic communities'. As I said, we inhabit a pluralistic secular culture which ought not to make such arbitrary exclusions, and I believe the Buddhist perspective (which is really not a perspective!) is uniquely suited to the 'crisis of the Western sciences'. As did Francisco Varela, mentioned by Josh, who co-authored the ground-breaking book The Embodied Mind. It too incorporated many principles from Buddhism - for example:

The tension between the ongoing sense of self in ordinary experience and the failure to find that self in reflection is of central importance in Buddhism-the origin of human suffering is just this tendency to grasp onto and build a sense of self, an ego, where there is none. As meditators catch glimpses of impermanence, selflessness, and suffering (known as the three marks of existence) and some inkling that the pervasiveness of suffering (known as the First Noble Truth) may have its origin in their own self-grasping (known as the Second Noble Truth), they may develop some real motivation and urgency to persevere in their investigation of mind. They try to develop a strong and stable insight and inquisitiveness into the moment to moment arising of mind. They are encouraged to investigate: How does this moment arise? What are its conditions? What is the nature of "my" reactivity to it? Where does the experience of "1" occur? — The Embodied Mind, p61

I think that 'the taboo' exists, that it 'ought not to be spoken' because this kind of analysis is associated with religious philosophy or at least with a kind of deep introspection. Which is why I keep referring back to Thomas Nagel's important essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. He's a non-religious academic philosopher who has had that insight. That is the underlying dynamic, in a 'don't mention the war' kind of way.

Banno's Reality is limited to the reports of his physical senses — Gnomon

I wouldn't personalise it in that way. It's more the shortcoming of modern philosophy, generally. That's what we're both critiquing, although from rather different points of view.

Solipcism is irrelevant. Your experience of the external/other is what the word reality refers to. How precisely that replicates is a separate question. If that reality is ultimately a delusion or an illusion or a trick of an evil genie is irrelevant because none of those things have been shown to be possible, much less plausible, much less likely, much less actual. They're indistinguishable from fiction and should be treated accordingly. "Wouldn't it be cool if...?"

Picture a tranquil mountain meadow. Butterflies flit back and forth amongst the buttercups and daisies, and off in the distance, a snow-capped mountain peak provides a picturesque backdrop. The melodious clunk of the cow-bells, the chirping of crickets, and the calling of birds provide the soundtrack to the vista, with not a human to be seen.

Now picture the same scene — but from no point of view. Imagine that you are perceiving such a scence from every possible point within it, and also around it. Then also subtract from all these perspectives, any sense of temporal continuity — any sense of memory of the moment just past, and expectation of the one about to come. Having done that, describe the same scene. — Wayfarer

Are we to imagine perceiving the scene form no point of view (an obviously incoherent request) or from "every possible point within it, and also around it"?

There could be no perception without memory or expectation, so nothing to describe.

If there are butterflies flitting about, there is no possible point of view of them from which they would not be flittering about.

So, I am struggling to see the point of this thought-exercise.

I am struggling to see the point of this thought-exercise. — Janus

Try reading it in context.

Like most materialists, Banno... — Gnomon

How rude.

I don't see how it applies. The form of idealist philosophy that I'm advocating does not say that 'the world only exists in your mind'. I'm referring to the mind - yours, mine, the mind that we as a species and culture share. The mind is not an objective reality, it's not a material thing - yet we can't plausibly deny it! That's the elephant in the room, the fly in the ointment, for naturalism. — Wayfarer

I just googled "Buddhism existence of self" and the first thing that came up was:

From the Buddhist perspective, the idea of “individual self” is an illusion. It is not possible to separate self from its surroundings. Buddha in Lankavatara Sutra states, “Things are not what they seem… Deeds exist, but no doer can be found” (Majjhima Nikaya, 192).

The Buddha, the first eliminativist?

I did.

Notice a little further down the page you linked to:

Although Buddhism devotees continuously inquire into and doubt the existence of the individual self, they do not deny the existence of “I,” who inquires and doubts self-certainty. For this reason, Buddha introduces the middle way, which is neither a self nor a no-self doctrine.

(That, incidentally, is a very sophisticated review.)

The 'no-self doctrine' would correspond to eliminativism. That is rejected in Buddhism as being nihilistic. The 'self doctrine' is the idea that 'I will be reborn in perpetuity'. Both these are rejected in Middle Way philosophy as 'extremes'.

Take a look at this verse from the early Buddhist texts. It's quite short. The point being that, when asked 'Is there a self?', the Buddha declines to answer (usually given as 'maintains a noble silence'.) That is one of the sources of Middle Way philosophy. Another is this one:

By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “non-existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one. — The Buddha, Kaccāyanagotta Sutta

I know it's a hard idea to get your head around! It was the subject of the post-grad thesis I did in Buddhist Studies 11 years ago, I still only got to a rudimentary understanding of it.

Yes, it's a bit obtuse. So far as I can make sense of it, it seems to suppose that since A derives from B, B cannot derive from A. It forgets about circles, supposing everything to be linear.

And that's a problem with both idealism and materialism, each supposing that it alone has priority.

Something that @Wayfarer sometimes agrees with, when pushed.

And that's a problem with both idealism and materialism, each supposing that it alone has priority. — Banno

Right. It's often given as the materialism or 'the object view' of Hume et al, vs the idealism or subject view of Berkeley et al. This is sometimes depicted as a kind of Hegelian dialectic, whereby first one, then the other, are held up as being fundamental, which plays out over centuries.

But I think that Kant's transcendental idealism evades this dichotomy, because Kant acknowledges the harmonious co-existence of both empirical realism and transcendental idealism.

And that's a problem with both idealism and materialism, each supposing that it alone has priority. — Banno

This is sometimes depicted as a kind of Hegelian dialectic, whereby first one, then the other, are held up as being fundamental.

But I think that Kant's transcendental idealism evades this dichotomy, because Kant acknowledges the harmonious co-existence of both empirical realism and transcendental idealism. — Wayfarer

All just ways of thinking about things. How can we count any of them as being the real thing?

But I think that Kant's transcendental idealism evades this dichotomy, because Kant acknowledges the harmonious co-existence of both empirical realism and transcendental idealism. — Wayfarer

Yeah, but then to the never-ending joy of philosophy neophytes, unhelpfully mentions the thing-in-itself.

...the real thing? — Janus

Coke?

What do you mean, real? :kiss:

I know it's a hard idea to get your head around! — Wayfarer

It might be, if I hadn't read a lot of Suzuki and such, 40 years ago.

unhelpfully mentions the thing-in-itself. — Banno

And I'm cool with that. A lot of strife is caused by people wondering, hey, what *is* that? What is he talking about? If it's so mysterious, it must be something really important!

Kant's introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble. — Emrys Westacott

Excellent, that's what I started with too. I'll always have a special place in my heart for old D T.

Coke?

What do you mean, real? :kiss: — Banno

No, psilocybin. :hearts:

By "real" I mean how could we know whether some conceptual schema or other corresponds to what is independent of human experience and understanding, or how any conceptual schema could do so?

Amusingly enough, I had written the first part of my last post before @Janus chimed in. Providence.

Yes, I'm assured that Kant's use was innocent, by @Mww and others. But what came next made it into a dog's breakfast, only cleaned up by Russell and Moore. Your innocent use of "Idealism" might give some solace to those who like to eat out of a bowl on the floor. Case in point:

By "real" I mean how could we know whether some conceptual schema or other corresponds to what is independent of human experience and understanding, or how any conceptual schema could do so? — Janus

I should have said "by real thing I mean....", That's what these interminable arguments are really about, motivated by—wanting to know how things are independent of how we routinely perceive them to be.

It doesn't surprise me that you misunderstood what I was saying, though.

wanting to know how things are independent of how we routinely perceive them to be. — Janus

You mean, physics?

I'm guessing not. I don't think there is a way to understand your question, Janus.

I'm guessing not. I don't think there is a way to understand your question, Janus. — Banno

Is this the same as saying - if there is a reality outside of physics and how we understand our world, we are unable to access this and therefore can say nothing meaningful about it? (I wasn't thinking of Kant's noumena but I guess it amounts to the same point)

You mean, physics?

I'm guessing not. I don't think there is a way to understand your question, Janus. — Banno

Yes, there is no coherent answer to the question about how things are independently of human experience, although it is possible to imagine that things could be some way impossible for us to imagine.

So, no I'm not talking about physics, since it deals with things as they appear; that is things which are not independent of human experience.

Would physics be just one aspect of how things appear to or are understood by us?

I guess the only place to look for reality independent of human experience might be in the putative claims of mysticism or higher awareness? I guess inevitably this is the elephant in the room for threads like this and most discussions of idealism.

Would physics be just one aspect of how things appear to or are understood by us?

I guess the only place to look for reality independent of human experience might be in the putative claims of mysticism or higher awareness? I guess inevitably this is the elephant in the room for threads like this and most discussions of idealism. — Tom Storm

That's a good question. I think there is a sense in which physics is just one way that things appear to us, and also a sense in which it is taken to be the most fundamental way; the way from which all others ways are made possible, or to which all other ways can be reduced, ontologically at least, if not explanatorily.

I think the faith in mystical revelation relies on the idea that, as real beings, we are capable of intuitive insight into the nature of things. However, this insight cannot be explained or explicated, but only alluded to. I don't see how there could be any way to demonstrate such a claim, although I must admit I lean somewhat towards believing it myself.

. But what came next made it into a dog's breakfast, only cleaned up by Russell and Moore. — Banno

Oh, you mean when Moore discovered he had hands?

I do understand that German idealism kind of collapsed under the weight of its own verbiage. I nevertheless see it as the last gasp of the real Western philosophical tradition.

Pretty much. It's trying to talk about stuff about which we cannot talk...

Also, it's where showing (and doing) take over from saying.

...there is no coherent answer... — Janus

Cool. But at times you seem to look for an answer to those questions. It puzzles me, rendering some of my replies snooty. A bad habit of mine.

Yeah, that lecture, but I think his point was to show the audience that he had hands, and thereby that there is stuff in the world.

argumentum ad manum.

Cool. But at times you seem to look for an answer to those questions. It puzzles me, rendering some of my replies snooty. A bad habit of mine. — Banno

No worries, mate. I think Kant said that human beings, due to the nature of reason, will inevitably try to answer these "ultimate" questions that form the basis of metaphysics as traditionally conceived, and I acknowledge that I do find the impulse in myself, but I am utterly convinced that no answer is possible...go figure.

Going off now on a psychological tangent, the other thing is that I think that underlying these 'materialism vs idealism' debates is very often a concern that things should be a certain way, in accordance with what various people want to be the case. So, there are affective concerns at work behind the scenes, otherwise these questions would not be so compelling, having, as they do little to no practical significance for our everyday lives. It seems that some folk on both sides of the debate see these questions as representing a battle between the forces of good and evil, or at least enlightenment and endarkenment, that will determine the fate of humankind. Personally, I don't hold to that idea, I think it is too simplistic.