Now picture the same scene — but from no point of view. Imagine that you are perceiving such a scence from every possible point within it, and also around it. Then also subtract from all these perspectives, any sense of temporal continuity — any sense of memory of the moment just past, and expectation of the one about to come. Having done that, describe the same scene. — Wayfarer

One can do something close to that. It's called a map. From the map, if it is a contour map, one can construct elevations along a sightline and thus reconstruct the perspective at any point in any direction.

I therefore conclude that perspective is not personal (as @Banno points out if we swap places, we swap perspectives), but a feature of topography.

Everybody has to be somewhere! — Spike Milligan

The trick, as always, is not to confuse the map, where one is not, even when there is a label saying "you are here", with the territory where one has to be, with or without a decent map. In general, theoretical physics is in the business of map-making, whereas engineering alters the landscape. New telescope produces new perspective, produces new physics.

Well, not really. Physics, with one of its principal subjects being the relations of one thing to another, motions, is actually designed for understanding complexity. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems that your history of trying to keep scientific understanding from entering your "fortress" has left you with so many misconceptions that it doesn't seem like a very good use of my time to try to disabuse you of those misconceptions. However, feel free to explain who designed physics and quote their explanation of what they designed physics for.

:smirk: :up:

:cool: :up:

Buddhism is a sidenote here. My criticism is aimed at eclecticism and at disregarding the complex systemic context of claims.

I therefore conclude that perspective is not personal (as Banno points out if we swap places, we swap perspectives), but a feature of topography. — unenlightened

This is an interesting point. How can it be extrapolated? That a person's psychological, social, economical situation is also a type of topography? So that we can say, for example, that someone is a drug addict because of their psychological, social, economical topography (and that any person who would be placed in such a topography would also become s drug addict)?

(By the way, googling for the source of the quote that Josh provided above, I happened upon this pdf from the erudite and charming Michel Bitbol, a French - therefore continental! - philosopher of science - Is Consciousness Primary?) — Wayfarer

One of the important features of the paper is that it isn’t trying to posit consciousness as an ineffable, inner sanctum. On the contrary, Bitbol emphasizes the irreducibly intersubjective nature of experience.

“…objectivity arises from a universally accepted procedure of intersubjective debate. Do not construe it as a transcendent resource of which intersubjective consensus is only an indirect symptom. Draw inspiration from a careful reflection about physics : either from the process of emergence of objective temperature valuations from an experiential underpinning , or from the model of quantum mechanics construed as a science of inter-situational predictive invariants rather than a science of “objects” in the ordinary sense of the word. Then, recognize that intersubjectivity should be endowed with the status of a common ground for both phenomenological reports and objective science. Start from this common ground in order to elaborate the amplified variety of knowledge that results from embedding phenomenological reports and objective findings within a unique structure.”

How can it be extrapolated? That a person's psychological, social, economical situation is also a type of topography? — baker

Well, I would like to suggest that social and psychological situations along with social constructs are all real, but I don't have that map to hand, if there is one. Humans are territory rather than map, is more my point, whereas physics is map.

Interesting thesis, and well-spoken. — Mww

:pray:

Banno appears to have the attitude that this is something which cannot be talked about, so shut up because you're proving me wrong by talking about it. — Metaphysician Undercover

:lol:

Buddhism is a sidenote here. My criticism is aimed at eclecticism and at disregarding the complex systemic context of claims. — baker

That's not at all what you said. What you said was

It seems that you're trying to get the benefits from Buddhism without really signing up for it. — baker

Which is patronising, and also irrelevant. The argument I'm putting forward has similarities to that of Berkeley, who had never heard of Buddhism, and other idealist philosophers including Schopenhauer (who had, but who was completely independent of it and Kastrup (who is a current philosopher.) The OP doesn't mention the Buddha, and the full version of the essay does only once in a footnote. As I said, this is a philosophy forum, and mine is a philosophical argument, convergences with Buddhist philosophy notwithstanding.

New telescope produces new perspective, produces new physics. — unenlightened

Quite. I recall an interesting article I read somewhere on how quantum physics and relativity required the invention of many novel forms of mathematics which were required by concepts that had never previously been considered. And I've mentioned many times the immense philosophical fallout from the advent of quantum theory in the 1920's, which is ongoing.

One of the important features of the [Bitbol] paper is that it isn’t trying to posit consciousness as an ineffable, inner sanctum — Joshs

I didn't think I was trying to do that (a criticism, by the way, that echoes Buddhism's criticism of Vedanta). I will add, I learned of Michel Bitbol from this forum (from @Pierre-Normand) and have found his work fascinating and enriching.

By the way, as I mentioned Bernardo Kastrup above, here is an interview with him that provides an effective intro for those who aren't familiar. Worth the read, in my opinion.

I’m careful to explain that I’m not claiming that things go into and out of existence depending on whether they’re being perceived, but that, absent an observer, whatever exists is unintelligible and meaningless as a matter of fact and principle. Again, that even if you imagine an empty universe, you still introduce an implicit perspective. I said, of course there are unseen objects and empty rooms with nobody in them, but that is something one observer (myself) is saying to another (you). — Wayfarer

As you should know I agree that whatever is real beyond human experience and understanding cannot be imagined. Nonetheless, we cannot but imagine that things must somehow be real independently of the human; I think that is an existential fact about human existence, and its importance lies in it making us recognize that, at bottom, life is really an ineluctable mystery, and how that opens up the field for all the riches of the human speculative imagination. As rich as the imagination is, though, I think it should be borne in mind that whatever we imagine should not be taken too seriously as it can never be definitive.

I am in agreement. Seems this kind of leaves us with the phenomenal world as our only domain for fruitful exploration. Which for me, as someone who probably qualifies as scientist in orientation, leaves us with science as the primary (but not sole) source of reliable information about the world we inhabit. I remain however, somewhat fascinated with phenomenology and process of human interaction with the world and co-creation (if that is the right word) of our reality.

I am in agreement. Seems this kind of leaves us with the phenomenal world as our only domain for fruitful exploration. Which for me, as someone who probably qualifies as scientist in orientation, leaves us with science as the primary (but not sole) source of reliable information about the world we inhabit. I remain however, somewhat fascinated with phenomenology and process of human interaction with the world and co-creation (if that is the right word) of our reality. — Tom Storm

:up: I think the human imagination is a domain for fruitful exploration, but not for definitive knowledge of anything other than just what is imaginable. I, like you, am science oriented in that I think the only really definitive knowledge comes from observation. Phenomenology, including introspection, I would say gives us knowledge of how things appear to us to be, but I don't have any confidence that it can tell us how things really are. Here I have principally the nature of consciousness in mind, and maybe we can never know what its nature is as it cannot be directly observed.

I tend to think our world is pre-cognitively co-constructed by the bodymind/ environment and that we are constitutionally blind to that process. We and the world, the whole shebang, emerge out of the other side of that process, so to speak,

If you look at the Medium version of the essay, I appended a quote from C S Peirce at the top:



Just to re-iterate the point of the argument: I am not disputing the scientific (i.e. naturalist) account but attempting to reveal an underlying assumption that gives rise to a distorted view of what this means. What I’m calling attention to is the tendency to take for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth. (That, I contend, is the major source of 'scientism' and a major weakness of naturalism, generally.)

By ‘creating reality’, I’m referring to the way the brain receives, organises and integrates cognitive data, along with memory and expectation, so as to generate the unified world–picture within which we situate and orient ourselves.' That part of the argument is supported with passages from Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order, not a philosophy text as such, but a cognitive science book.

From this, what I'm saying is that philosophical reflection or analysis reveals the way in which the mind creates - or construes! - the nature of reality. That is where insight, self-knowledge, becomes a factor.

I tend to think our world is pre-cognitively co-constructed by the bodymind/ environment and that we are constitutionally blind to that process. — Janus

You frequently put this up as a kind of maxim, but one of the over-arching themes of philosophy since ancient times has been the possibility of self-knowledge. The fact that this seems such a remote or perplexing idea might be as much a consequence of the shortcomings of our way of looking at the question, as of the question itself.

I see this somewhat differently than you do, as follows. The idea of the mind is a part of the taken-for-granted reality. We don't really know what constitutes the world as experienced because we emerge out of the precognitive process of its constitution.

So this:

By ‘creating reality’, I’m referring to the way the brain receives, organises and integrates cognitive data, along with memory and expectation, so as to generate the unified world–picture within which we situate and orient ourselves.' — Wayfarer

seems to be you relying on the objective relaity of the empirical scientific understanding of the brain to support a claim that empirical investigations cannot show us what is real because they

imbue the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. — Wayfarer

which seem to be a performative contradiction.

That is where insight, self-knowledge, becomes a factor. — Wayfarer

For the very reasons which you have adduced, I am not as confident as you are that what might be called self-knowledge is anything more than an appearance- it just tells us how things seem to us with no guarantee that it reflects any reality beyond human experience.

You frequently put this up as a kind of maxim, but one of the over-arching themes of philosophy since ancient times has been the possibility of self-knowledge. The fact that this seems such a remote or perplexing idea might be as much a consequence of the shortcomings of our way of looking at the question, as of the question itself. — Wayfarer

Well, I see those "shortcomings" as inherent limitations of human knowledge and understanding. Obviously, I am more of a skeptic than you are.

the tendency to take for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. — Wayfarer

Agree. And it's a point well made. I think this kind of thread is rich in potential triggers for all sorts of other related discussions.

one of the over-arching themes of philosophy since ancient times has been the possibility of self-knowledge. — Wayfarer

I'm aware of this view (Know Thyself, Delphic maxims, etc) but I've not seen philosophy as playing an extensive role in self-knowledge. The self-knowledge (insight) I am aware of (and I doubt people much acquire it except through experience) is generally acquired through the process of living or through therapy/counselling/meaningful interventions/dialogue from/with others.

Can you give me a couple of examples of self-knowledge arrived at through philosophy?

For the very reasons which you have adduced, I am not as confident as you are that what might be called self-knowledge is anything more than an appearance- it just tells us how things seem to us with no guarantee that it reflects any reality beyond human experience. — Janus

I understand that is your belief, but not that it is definitive.

Can you give me a couple of examples of self-knowledge arrived at through philosophy? — Tom Storm

I certainly won't hold myself up as one. But I have the idea that this is what philosophy in the pre-modern sense used to mean. You know - Pierre Hadot and philosophy as a way of life, how ancient philosophy used to be practiced rather than just being an academic pursuit. I had a kind of intuition of that, and I'm interesting in pursuing it although in today's world, it's something like forensic pathology. It is really difficult to tell if I'm actually learning something or progressing or whether I'm chasing rainbows (hence the icon.)

It is really difficult to tell if I'm actually learning something or progressing or whether I'm chasing rainbows (hence the icon.) — Wayfarer

:up: It's a very interesting question for us all here. I think terms like 'self-knowledge' are used imprecisely by many of us and self-knowledge is automatically assumed to be a virtue we don't really question. I think what we do here mainly is engage in disputes over contesting epistemologies, often slogged out through metaphysical presuppositions. I don't see where self-knowledge comes into it much except perhaps in understanding the limitations of our own positions and knowledge.

@Wayfarer

Unless solipsism obtains, mind is dependent on (ergo, inseparable from) More/Other-than-mind, no? and that "experience" consists of phenomenal traces (or outputs) of the 'entangled, or reflexive, interactivity' of mind with More/Other-than-mind? and therefore mind interprets "experience as world" which is wholly subjective, or imaginary – an 'online hallucination' that is nothing but mere folk knowledge (i.e. parochial heuristics / biases) aka "common sense" to the degree "common sense" is n o t bias-filtered/error-corrected by hypothetico-deductive testing (i.e. science and/or sound arguments)?

So what is 'mind'? AFAIK, basically mind is a recursive (strange looping, phenomenal self-modeling) aspect of More/Other-than-mind – a nonmental activity (process ... anatman), not an entity (ghost-in-the-machine ... X-of-the-gaps), that is functionally blind to its self-recursivity the way, for instance, an eye is transparent to itself and absent from its own field of vision.

I understand that is your belief, but not that it is definitive. — Wayfarer

Of course, I am happy to admit that, since I don't think anything is definitive except observation, and that only within the context of observation.

You know - Pierre Hadot and philosophy as a way of life, how ancient philosophy used to be practiced rather than just being an academic pursuit. — Wayfarer

I agree that philosophy can be a practice in the sense that Hadot outlines in Philosophy as a Way of Life, but the methodology of such philosophy is not speculation and critique, but acceptance of a body of cardinal ideas, or systems, which are to serve as guidelines for practice, for "spiritual exercises". I don't believe such exercises yield any definitive knowledge in the propositional sense, but of course, like any practice, they develop certain "know-hows".

But I have said this to you many times, and you are probably tired of hearing it, since it doesn't accord with your own beliefs apparently.

:up:

:up: I think the human imagination is a domain for fruitful exploration, but not for definitive knowledge of anything other than just what is imaginable. I, like you, am science oriented in that I think the only really definitive knowledge comes from observation. Phenomenology, including introspection, I would say gives us knowledge of how things appear to us to be, but I don't have any confidence that it can tell us how things really are. Here I have principally the nature of consciousness in mind, and maybe we can never know what its nature is as it cannot be directly observed. — Janus

Imagination and observation can’t be disentangled in the way you think they can. It is not as though what we imagine is locked in some secret inner sphere we call subjective consciousness. That’s an old fashioned way of thinking about subjectivity which just perpetuates a dualistic thinking (imagination is non-observational subjectivity, scientific observation is oriented toward contact with a real, objective world). This way of thinking is utterly unable to explain how leading edge philosophical ideas thoughout history have anticipated , by decades or more, the results of the sciences. Observation indeed.

I tend to think our world is pre-cognitively co-constructed by the bodymind/ environment and that we are constitutionally blind to that process. We and the world, the whole shebang, emerge out of the other side of that process, so to speak — Janus

This intersubjective construction of objectivity is what phenomenology is about , not ‘introspection ’, which is a common misunderstanding of its method.

Imagination and observation can’t be disentangled in the way you think they can. It is not as though what we imagine is locked in some secret inner sphere we call subjective consciousness. That’s an old fashioned way of thinking about subjectivity which just perpetuates a dualistic thinking (imagination is non-observational subjectivity, scientific observation is oriented toward contact with a real, objective world). This way of thinking is utterly unable to explain how leading edge philosophical ideas thoughout history have anticipated , by decades or more, the results of the sciences. Observation indeed. — Joshs

I haven't said or suggested that imagination and observation can be disentangled. That said imagining abstruse metaphysical possibilities and observing everyday phenomena are very different activities.

I also have not denied that speculative ideas can sometimes anticipate what is later observed to be the case.

This intersubjective construction of objectivity is what phenomenology is about , not ‘introspection ’, which is a common misunderstanding of its method. — Joshs

This I don't agree with, since I think the construction of objectivity is a pre-cognitive and hence inscrutable process. For me phenomenology consists in reflection on experience in order to clarify how things seem to us. And the only possibility of anything definitive in that comes with intersubjective assent in the form of "yes, that is how it seems to me also". What other kind of demonstration do you think could be possible in that context?

One can do something close to that. It's called a map. From the map, if it is a contour map, one can construct elevations along a sightline and thus reconstruct the perspective at any point in any direction.

I therefore conclude that perspective is not personal (as Banno points out if we swap places, we swap perspectives), but a feature of topography. — unenlightened

The problem though is that not all aspects of a human perspective can be reconstructed in the way you describe. And a human perspective, as @wonderer1 pointed out, is very complex. So the fact that one, or even a number of aspects of a perspective can be reconstructed, does not produce the conclusion that a human perspective can be reconstructed. That's a composition fallacy.

Quite simply, swapping places does not imply swapping perspectives, because the unique particularities of the being brings a lot to the perspective. If swapping perspectives was just a matter of swapping places, you could take a dog's perspective, or a cat's perspective, by taking that creature's place. But this is all wrong. And that is why "walking in someone else's shoes" is a matter of understanding the other person, not a matter of swapping physical positions.

Unless solipsism obtains, mind is dependent on (ergo, inseparable from) More/Other-than-mind, no? — 180 Proof

Think about alternative terms for mind - psyche or geist, for instance (or the Sanskrit 'citta'). Is it not conceivable that the first stirrings of life, the very simplest organisms, are also the manifestation of mind? Which then over the course of aeons evolves into self-aware forms including rational sentient beings such as ourselves? So which comes first, viewed that way? Did the primitive proto-organic chemistry suddenly and miraculously develop into a chain reaction capable of homeostasis and evolution, thereby giving rise to mind? Or does a latent tendency in the Cosmos towards self-awareness manifest where circumstances are favourable? If that sounds like vitalism, I am not proposing that 'life' or 'mind' is an actual essence or substance in any objective sense. Think of it as a metaphorical expression which is nevertheless suggestive. And it maps well against the ancient maxim of 'man as microcosm' (from hermetic philosophy). In any case, it is a plausible model for preserving the ontological priority of mind (as disinct from relegating it to 'the product of' mindless processes.)

AFAIK, basically mind is a recursive (strange looping, phenomenal self-modeling) aspect of More/Other-than-mind – a nonmental activity (process ... anatman), not an entity (ghost-in-the-machine ... X-of-the-gaps), that is functionally blind to its self-recursivity the way, for instance, an eye is transparent to itself and absent from its own field of vision. — 180 Proof

Well, as said above, I agree that mind is not anything objectively real. 'Anatman' is a term in Buddhism, usually used adjectivally, i.e. 'all phenomena (dharmas) are anatta (not self)' - which does not deny that there are subjects of experience, although it is often misinterpreted to mean that. The meaning is to recognise that phenomenal objects are not the self (in addition to being transient (anicca) and unsatisfying (dukkha)).

As for the eye being 'absent from its own field of vision', that is exactly the metaphor behind The Blind Spot of Science article which you have previously dismissed (and which incidentally is being published in book form next March.)

I don't believe such exercises yield any definitive knowledge in the propositional sense, but of course, like any practice, they develop certain "know-hows".

But I have said this to you many times, and you are probably tired of hearing it, since it doesn't accord with your own beliefs apparently. — Janus

I agree with that, and I don't recall your having put it that way. That is what I think was the distinction between 'theoria' and 'praxis' in ancient philosophy, was it not? And the kind of 'unitive vision' that it was thought to culminate in was a blend of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. It's often said that philosophy lost its way by becoming totally absorbed in intellectual abstractions, whereas traditional philosophy (and Buddhist praxis) is very much grounded in bodily awareness (which is a basic feature of enactivism and embodied philosophy).

I've got to do an advertisement for a book, again - a little-known book, hardly commented on, which is why I mention it - De-fragmenting Modernity, Paul Tyson (a UQ academic):

We live in a strangely fragmented lifeworld. On the one hand, abstract constructions of our own imagination--such as money, "mere" facts, and mathematical models--are treated by us as important objective facts. On the other hand, our understanding of the concrete realities of meaning and value in which our daily lives are actually embedded--love, significance, purpose, wonder--are treated as arbitrary and optional subjective beliefs. This is because, to us, only quantitative and instrumentally useful things are considered to be accessible to the domain of knowledge. Our lifeworld is designed to dis-integrate knowledge from belief, facts from meanings, immanence from transcendence, quality from quantity, and "mere" reality from the mystery of being. This book explores two questions: why should we, and how can we, reintegrate being, knowing, and believing?

He traces the historical development of this 'fragmentation' quite plausibly, in my view. It's germane to the ideas in this thread. That re-integration or holistic vision is what I think philosophy ought to be striving for.

Is it not conceivable that the first stirrings of life, the very simplest organisms, are also the manifestation of mind?

Well, as said above, I agree that mind is not anything objectively real.  — Wayfarer

:roll: Any "manifestation of" that which "is not objectively real" is, of course, "conceivable". But are we just fantasizing, Wayf, or are we philosophizing?

:up:

It is really difficult to tell if I'm actually learning something or progressing or whether I'm chasing rainbows — Wayfarer

Cool. Cuz I can’t make heads or tails out of self-knowledge.

I agree with that, and I don't recall your having put it that way. That is what I think was the distinction between 'theoria' and 'praxis' in ancient philosophy, was it not? And the kind of 'unitive vision' that it was thought to culminate in was a blend of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. It's often said that philosophy lost its way by becoming totally absorbed in intellectual abstractions, whereas traditional philosophy (and Buddhist praxis) is very much grounded in bodily awareness (which is a basic feature of enactivism and embodied philosophy). — Wayfarer

It does surprise me that you don't recall me framing it that way before, because I am sure I have more than a few times. But anyway, no matter; and I have to say I still don't see the possibility of a definitive "unitive vision" that could be shown to be based on anything other than faith.

I mean, I don't reject the possibility that intuition might give us insight into the nature of reality, I just reject the possibility that it can be demonstrated to be able to do so or demonstrated to be doing so in any particular case, and that is why I say it remains a matter of faith.

That said, I lean towards the idea that intuition might sometimes give us insight into the nature of reality, and I acknowledge that to the extent that I believe that I am believing something which cannot be tested. Even scientific theories can never be proven to be true.

Cuz I can’t make heads or tails out of self-knowledge. — Mww

It's not just me then... :wink:

I lean towards the idea that intuition might sometimes give us insight into the nature of reality — Janus

And I often wonder how having an insight into the nature of reality matters? What happens then... chop wood, carry water?

Sometimes it seems to me that the quest to gain glimpses of transcendence is more about self-aggrandizement or a kind of metaphysical tourism.

And I often wonder how having an insight into the nature of reality matters? What happens then... chop wood, carry water?

Sometimes it seems to me that the quest to gain glimpses of transcendence is more about self-aggrandizement or a kind of metaphysical tourism. — Tom Storm

I don't think it really does matter in any practical sense, since such insight cannot be definitive. However, the insight might be conceptually creative and rich, inspiring creative ideas and activities, heightened affect and altered consciousness. I value such things in themselves, because I see them as enriching experiences.

I agree with you about chasing enlightenment being very often a cult of the self and a kind of "tourism". I've seen quite a bit of that in my travels.