one cannot argue seriously for the impossibility of the conditions of an argument being meaningful — plaque flag
That the boulder truly does not have a shape is supported by Einsteinian relativity, as shape is dependent on the frame of reference. — Metaphysician Undercover
You are mistaking the appearance of shape from different reference frames with each other.
It is similar to saying a pencil isn't straight because when dropped into a glass of water the pencil appears bent. — wonderer1
Each of these two concepts serves to account for the temporal continuity of sameness of objects, in its own way, with its own history, but in reality each is just a different place holder for the unknown; each having its own connotations and extensions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Haven't you said this from your own perspective? — Angelo Cannata
No it is not "appearance" only. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't agree with 'indirect realism' because it posits two separate things - the reality and its representation. As if we could compare them. — Wayfarer
transcendental theory, as epistemologically grounded as it is, makes explicit there are not two separate things, the real and the representation of the real, a seemingly ontological consideration to be sure, insofar as the representation is not a thing in the same sense as the thing which appears, is — Mww
I would point with ↪Wayfarer to Descartes, as I think that distinction is what underlies the "objective domain" cited by the OP.
So when <talking about> the mind knowing mind-independent reality as it is in itself, 'mind-independent reality' designates things like boulders, trees, mountains, walls, paint, etc. It doesn't really matter if the distinction is artificial, so long as an appreciable number of designata are understood by the term, and able to be spoken about. I don't see that the thread has foundered on this distinction in any way. It seems like everyone knows what is being spoken about. To be precise, though, the most obvious and most primary complement would be private, mind-generated realities, such as thoughts, opinions, Descartes' recognition that he is a thinking thing, etc.
I take the term 'objective' at face value, that is, 'inherent in the object'.
I suspect….I’d like to think…..the extent to which you have a problem with indirect realism, isn’t so great.
So saying, transcendental theory, as epistemologically grounded as it is, makes explicit there are not two separate things, the real and the representation of the real, a seemingly ontological consideration to be sure, insofar as the representation is not a thing in the same sense as the thing which appears, is. This denominates representation to a speculative procedural constituent, logically concluded or rationally presupposed, rather than empirically given. It also makes the determination as to necessity vs contingency a mitigating condition in itself, the logic being necessary, the empirical, contingent.
Perspective seems to correspond to the form of the rock; the rock has a form, and that gives rise to any subject necessarily having a particular perspective on the rock. Whereas the 'affect' of an organism is the internally generated sense of its own being. The yeast cell defines itself and delimits itself as sugar in, CO2 or Alcohol out.
A subject locates itself as an entity, and its perspective arises from its location. But such a definition of self is necessarily permeable and incomplete. It's affect is its response to its environment as well as its response to itself. ( — unenlightened
The enactivists look at subject-object, organism-environment this way:
The organism interprets its world — Joshs
t I am more interested in how the boundary is formed; the 'dash' between organism and environment. You say, "the organism interprets..." and one assumes therefrom that the environment does not interpret. So there is an action before the act of interpretation, which is the act of self identification, that has to happen for there to be a separate world to interpret. — unenlightened
My reticence re indirect realism (is) more a dissatisfaction with current theories of perception. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I do, however, tend towards the "direct," in some key ways. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I fear we end up in dualism. — Count Timothy von Icarus
…..doomed to end up very blurry. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Is there another reason you do not agree with indirect realism? Or is it simply that I’m misconstruing what you meant by it? — Mww
The analytic dudes got ahold of it, sent it off into the metaphysical puckerbrush. — Mww
Maybe 'minding' isn't right either but (a) it's a process, and I feel that much of what you write about is about process; (b) it relates to 'thinking' without imprisoning that thinking in a particular pseudo-place, allowing the body as well as the brain to get a look-in, indeed perhaps allowing the process to be free-floating in a Hegelian way as plaque flag references; (c) it's got an element of attention or caring in it, 'Yes I do mind', a touch of Heidegger's 'sorge' if we're prepared to mention the old Nazi - and for me that helps, we're talking about creatures who go about the world and aren't necessarily sitting back in their armchairs, puffing on their pipes, reflecting on great Matters, they are rather coping in the here and now with what matters to them, inventing ideas to explain what happens as they move around, improvising, improving, bouncing ideas off each other. — mcdoodle
So Berkeley demonstrates that "matter" as a concept of something which exists independently of human minds is no more justified, nor even better than the concept of "the Mind of God". — Metaphysician Undercover
if there isn't such a definition, then it's unclear to me exactly what objective idealists are arguing against or what their critics are arguing for. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Objective idealism starts with Plato’s theory of forms, which mantains that objectively existing but non-material "ideas" give form to reality, thus shaping its basic building blocks.
....
The philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce defined his own version of objective idealism as follows:
The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws (Peirce, CP 6.25).
By "objective idealism", Peirce meant that material objects such as organisms have evolved out of mind, that is, out of feelings ("such as pain, blue, cheerfulness") that are immediately present to consciousness.[8] Contrary to Hegel, who identified mind with conceptual thinking or reason, Peirce identified it with feeling, and he claimed that at the origins of the world there was "a chaos of unpersonalized feelings", i.e., feelings that were not located in any individual subject.[8] Therefore, in the 1890s Peirce's philosophy referred to itself as objective idealism because it held that the mind comes first and the world is essentially mind (idealism) and the mind is independent of individuals (objectivism) — Wikipedia
I take the term 'objective' at face value, that is, 'inherent in the object'.
This seems to be a definition of objectivity that requires too many metaphysical assumptions for me. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That notion seems to go beyond your notion of a local Mind-Created World, to an ideal Mind that is literally out-of-this-world. Does Peirce define his postulated "The Mind" in more detail? How does "The Mind" compare to your creative "minds"? :smile:Therefore, in the 1890s Peirce's philosophy referred to itself as objective idealism because it held that the mind comes first and the world is essentially mind (idealism) and the mind is independent of individuals (objectivism) — Wikipedia
As we look down on that city in the valley, it exists only as the-valley-for, never from no perspective at all. — plaque flag
How so ?You are appealing to a narrow concept of existence here. — Janus
Have you ever done the math? — wonderer1
Have you ever done the math?
— wonderer1
You haven't provided an argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's not called relativity for nothing. Yet it isn't hard to determine that a lot of thing are at rest with respect to my initertial reference frame and I can discuss the shape of many such things as they are in my inertial reference frame. If I, for some reason, need to calculate how they might look from a different inertial reference frame I could do so. It's not a big deal. — wonderer1
Anyway, why would I bother providing an argument to someone who wants to argue about something he doesn't understand? I don't see the point in doing so. — wonderer1
Well, it seems like you took objection to something I said, not vise versa. So if you cannot provide an argument to support your objection, then please be still. But I really wish you would provide such an argument, so I could find out why you think as you do, concerning this matter. — Metaphysician Undercover
A fact does not hold in the universe if it has not been explicitly formulated. That should be obvious, because a fact is specific. In other words, statements-of-fact are produced by living observers, and thereby come into existence as a result of being constructed. It is only after they have been constructed (in words or symbols) that facts come to exist. Commonsense wisdom holds the opposite view: It holds that facts exist in the universe regardless of whether anyone notices them, and irrespective of whether they have been articulated in words.
I meant you are stipulating that the sense of the term "existence" should be restricted to "exists for us". — Janus
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