• plaque flag
    2.7k
    "Blessed is he whose beginning is before he came into being!"

    Jesus - Gospel of Thomas - V 20

    "The disciples said to Jesus, "Tell us how our end will be." Jesus said, "Have you discovered, then, the beginning, that you look for the end? For where the beginning is, there will the end be. Blessed is he who will take his place in the beginning; he will know the end and will not experience death."

    Gospel of Thomas - V18

    This refers to what in Taoism is 'our face before we were born'. If we can dive this deep we can overcome life and death, and this would be the Grail experience of total 'holiness'. In its proper meaning yoga is the 'art of union with reality',and this definition reveals what meditation is all about. It's about going back to the beginning, before we began to identify as a subject with a perspective.

    . . . .
    FrancisRay

    :up:

    Nice. Sort of like 'the face of a baby at a parade before it has learned to smile.'

    In its proper meaning yoga is the 'art of union with reality',and this definition reveals what meditation is all about. It's about going back to the beginning, before we began to identify as a subject with a perspective.FrancisRay

    :up:

    I like to think that there's also a discursive path to some discursive analogue of that. I do think that analysis gets us far. But of course I value ineffable experiences that I also won't try to talk much about.
  • PeterJones
    415
    I expect the book you mention is good in its way, but with the possible exception Augustine your post mentions no philosophers who understood mysticism. It seems to be a review of mystical-leaning ideas in western philosophy, not an introduction to mysticism. A book on the implications of mysticism for formal philosophy would look very different. This is no to say it isn't a good book but the title appears to be misleading. .

    . . ,
  • PeterJones
    415
    Nice ! That's what I'm basically try to say in this thread. Of course we need account for the fact that there are many of us, each of us the being of the 'same' world from a different 'point of view.'plaque flag

    In this case we're on the same page.

    Waves on the ocean or sparks of the divine are common metaphors for our situation as individuals.

    “Dost thou reckon thyself only a puny form
    When within thee the universe is folded?”

    Baha’u’llah quoting Imam Ali,
    the first Shia Imam
    .
  • PeterJones
    415
    I like to think that there's also a discursive path to some discursive analogue of that. I do think that analysis gets us far. But of course I value ineffable experiences that I also won't try to talk much about.plaque flag

    I also believe in the value of analysis, since although it cannot take us all the way to an understanding it clearly signposts what it is we need to understand and disposes of philosophical problems. For a sceptic analysis is the only way forward, since they will not be inclined to do the practice.

    . ..
  • Joshs
    5.6k


    . The idea of the eternal now requires the idea that we can transcend the experience-experiencer duality. As you seem to say, if we cannot do this the idea makes no sense.

    We never experience the pure present. There isn't time to experience it. But we can be in it. This explains how yogis can sit for weeks without moving. They are not experiencing the passing of time.
    FrancisRay

    Is such a sitting yogi having an experience of anything while they claim to not experience the passing of time? There is a tendency to confuse the conventional measurement of time
    via clocks and time itself. For instance, the concept of time dilation in physics is typically described as a slowing down or speeding up of time because clocks slow down when accelerated. But a more slowly ticking clock is not the same thing as a time moving more slowly. Most fundamentally time is not like motion, to be sped up or slowed down. Time is the nature of the changes in what we are involved in. If we are immersed in a flow experience, the consistency and coherence of that kind of creative unfolding will be experienced as a speeding up or stoppage of time, because we normally pay attention to a clock and it’s meaningless movements when our task is interrupted, or when we are distracted and bored.
    In short , where there is no time there is no experience. The mystical and religious notions of pure unchanging reflexivity, of awareness without intention, fail to recognize that such notions of pure identity rely on fundamental difference. The only pure ground is already a repetition. It is the repetition of difference in itself.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    I'm going to quote from Mach and weave those quotes into my larger point.

    Colours, sounds, and the odours of bodies are evanescent. But their tangibility, as a sort of constant nucleus, not readily susceptible of annihilation, remains behind; appearing as the vehicle of the more fugitive properties attached to it. Habit, thus, keeps our thought firmly attached to this central nucleus, even when we have begun to recognise that seeing hearing, smelling, and touching are intimately akin in character. A further consideration is, that owing to the singularly extensive development of mechanical physics a kind of higher reality is ascribed to the spatial and to the temporal than to colours, sounds, and odours; agreeably to which, the temporal and spatial links of colours, sounds, and odours appear to be more real than the colours, sounds and odours themselves. The physiology of the senses, however, demonstrates, that spaces and times may just as appropriately be called sensations as colours and sounds. — Mach
    This is part of Mach's showing how relatively permanent enties (including the ego) can be decomposed into elements which will turn out to be neither mind nor matter, prior to both, the raw ingredients of both. By dissolving primary qualities (as Kant also did), he goes beyond Hobbes and Locke. But unlike Kant he feels no need to hang these neutral elements on something obscure. This is probably because he wasn't religious in the same way. He also didn't need an afterlife. Digression, but Mach's minimal, understated 'spirituality' (if we still want to call it that) also speaks to me.

    Here's a sample:


    Further, that complex of memories, moods, and feelings, joined to a particular body (the human body), which is called the "I" or "Ego," manifests itself as relatively permanent. I may be engaged upon this or that subject, I may be quiet and cheerful, excited and ill-humoured. Yet, pathological cases apart, enough durable features remain to identify the ego. Of course, the ego also is only of relative permanency.
    ...
    The ego is as little absolutely permanent as are bodies. That which we so much dread in death, the annihilation of our permanency, actually occurs in life in abundant measure. That which is most valued by us, remains preserved in countless copies, or, in cases of exceptional excellence, is even preserved of itself. In the best human being, however, there are individual traits, the loss of which neither he himself nor others need regret. Indeed, at times, death, viewed as a liberation from individuality, may even become a pleasant thought. Such reflections of course do not make physiological death any the easier to bear.
    — Mach
    I suspect that many people come to this same realization. The same virtues that die with the old return with the young. The flame leaps from candle to candle. In Feuerbach, we find also that

    [ the true belief in immortality is ] a belief in the infinity of Spirit and in the everlasting youth of humanity, in the inexhaustible love and creative power of Spirit, in its eternally unfolding itself into new individuals out of the womb of its plenitude and granting new beings for the glorification, enjoyment, and contemplation of itself.
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ludwig-feuerbach/

    This will not please the antinatalist, and there is maybe an optimism in Mach and Feuerbach that's more difficult for us in age that's come to dread technology, to feel ourselves enslaved perhaps to screens, or to others who are so enslaved.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    Here's a key passage.
    Not only the relation of bodies to the ego, but the ego itself also, gives rise to similar pseudo - problems, the character of which may be briefly indicated as follows:

    Let us denote the above-mentioned elements by the letters A B C . . ., X L M . . ., a, b, c . . . Let those complexes of colours, sounds, and so forth, commonly called bodies, be denoted, for the sake of clearness, by A B C . .; the complex, known as our own body, which is a part of the former complexes distinguished by certain peculiarities, may be called K L M . . .; the complex composed of volitions, memory-images, and the rest, we shall represent by a b c . . . Usually, now, the complex a , c . . . K L M. . ., as making up the ego, is opposed to the complex A B C . . ., as making up the world of physical objects; sometimes also, a b c . . . is viewed as ego, and K L M . . . A B C . . . as world of physical objects. Now, at first blush, A B C . . . appears independent of the ego, and opposed to it as a separate existence. But this independence is only relative, and gives way upon closer inspection. Much, it is true, may change in the complex a b c . . . without much perceptible change being induced in A B C . . .; and vice versa. But many changes in a b c . . . do pass, by way of changes in K L M . . ., to A B C . . .; and vice versa. (As, for example, when powerful ideas burst forth into acts, or when our environment induces noticeable changes in our body.) At the same time the group K L M . . . appears to be more intimately connected with a b c . . . and with A B C . . ., than the latter with one another; and their relations find their expression in common thought and speech.

    Precisely viewed, however, it appears that the group A B C . . . is always codetermined by K L M. A cube when seen close at hand, looks large; when seen at a distance, small; its appearance to the right eye differs from its appearance to the left; sometimes it appears double; with closed eyes it is invisible. The properties of one and the same body, therefore, appear modified by our own body; they appear conditioned by it. But where, now, is that same body, which appears so different? All that can be said is, that with different K L M different A B C . . . are associated.

    A common and popular way of thinking and speaking is to contrast " appearance " with " reality." A pencil held in front of us in the air is seen by us as straight; dip it into the water, and we see it crooked. In the latter case we say that the pencil appears crooked, but is in reality straight. But what justifies us in declaring one fact rather than another to be the reality, and degrading the other to the level of appearance ? In both cases we have to do with facts which present us with different combinations of the elements, combinations which in the two cases are differently conditioned. Precisely because of its environment the pencil dipped in water is optically crooked; but it is tactually and metrically straight. An image in a concave or flat mirror is only visible, whereas under other and ordinary circumstances a tangible body as well corresponds to the visible image. A bright surface is brighter beside a dark surface than beside one brighter than itself. To be sure, our expectation is deceived when, not paying sufficient attention to the conditions, and substituting for one another different cases of the combination, we fall into the natural error of expecting what we are accustomed to, although the case may be an unusual one. The facts are not to blame for that. In these cases, to speak of " appearance " may have a practical meaning, but cannot have a scientific meaning. Similarly, the question which is often asked, whether the world is real or whether we merely dream it, is devoid of all scientific meaning. Even the wildest dream is a fact as much as any other. If our dreams were more regular, more connected, more stable, they would also have more practical importance for us. In our waking hours the relations of the elements to one another are immensely amplified in comparison with what they were in our dreams. We recognise the dream for what it is. When the process is reversed, the field of psychic vision is narrowed; the contrast is almost entirely lacking. Where there is no contrast, the distinction between dream and waking, between appearance and reality, is quite otiose and worthless.
    — Mach

    Here's a key part:
    Let those complexes of colours, sounds, and so forth, commonly called bodies, be denoted, for the sake of clearness, by A B C . .; the complex, known as our own body, which is a part of the former complexes distinguished by certain peculiarities, may be called K L M . . .; the complex composed of volitions, memory-images, and the rest, we shall represent by a b c.

    Note that capital letters are used for everything that's typically understood to be physical.

    ABC = elements that make up chairs for instance
    KLM = elements that make up my arm, for instance
    abc = elements that make up my daydream, for instance

    The breakthrough move is to simply consider functional relationships between all of these elements, forgetting or ignoring our usual prejudices about mental and physical and appearance and reality.

    Precisely viewed, however, it appears that the group A B C . . . is always codetermined by K L M.

    A cube when seen close at hand, looks large; when seen at a distance, small; its appearance to the right eye differs from its appearance to the left; sometimes it appears double; with closed eyes it is invisible. The properties of one and the same body, therefore, appear modified by our own body; they appear conditioned by it. But where, now, is that same body, which appears so different? All that can be said is, that with different K L M different A B C . . . are associated.


    I think Mach's point is that the cube is one and the same body throughout those changes as a matter of convention. We blow open the hermeneutic space by thinking of ABC as a function of KLM, or the reverse.

    The other issue is the conventional nature of our taking this or that assembly of elements for 'real' or 'physical.' Mach doesn't stress the fact here, but he seems to echo Wittgenstein's 'I am my world.' The ego, along with everything else, is composed of such elements. Its boundaries (its assembly) is in some sense arbitrary, though I doubt Mach would deny the force of habit and enculturation.
  • Antony Nickles
    1.1k
    Although I may comment here after reading through, I did start a discussion about ‘When the self “exists” or not’, here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14691/when-do-we-exist-or-not
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    That in this complex of elements, which fundamentally is only one, the boundaries of bodies and of the ego do not admit of being established in a manner definite and sufficient for all cases, has already been remarked. To bring together elements that are most intimately connected with pleasure and pain into one ideal mental-economical unity, the ego; this is a task of the highest importance for the intellect working in the service of the pain-avoiding, pleasure-seeking will. The delimitation of the ego, therefore, is instinctively effected, is rendered familiar, and possibly becomes fixed through heredity. Owing to their high practical importance, not only for the individual, but for the entire species, the composites " ego " and " body " instinctively make good their claims, and assert themselves with elementary force. In special cases, however, in which practical ends are not concerned, but where knowledge is an end in itself, the delimitation in question may prove to be insufficient, obstructive, and untenable.

    Similarly, class-consciousness, class-prejudice, the feeling of nationality, and even the narrowest-minded local patriotism may have a high importance, for certain purposes. But such attitudes will not be shared by the broad-minded investigator, at least not in moments of research. All such egoistic views are adequate only for practical purposes. Of course, even the investigator may succumb to habit. Trifling pedantries and nonsensical discussions; the cunning appropriation of others' thoughts, with perfidious silence as to the sources; when the word of recognition must be given, the difficulty of swallowing one's defeat, and the too common eagerness at the same time to set the opponent's achievement in a false light: all this abundantly shows that the scientist and scholar have also the battle of existence to fight, that the ways even of science still lead to the mouth, and that the pure impulse towards knowledge is still an ideal in our present social conditions.

    The primary fact is not the ego, but the elements (sensations). What was said on p. 21 as to the term " sensation " must be borne in mind. The elements constitute the I. s have the sensation green, signifies that the element green occurs in a given complex of other elements (sensations, memories). When I cease to have the sensation green, when I die, then the elements no longer occur in the ordinary, familiar association. That is all. Only an ideal mental-economical unity, not a real unity, has ceased to exist. The ego is not a definite, unalterable, sharply bounded unity. None of these attributes are important; for all vary even within the sphere of individual life; in fact their alteration is even sought after by the individual. Continuity alone is important. .. But continuity is only a means of preparing and conserving what is contained in the ego. This content, and not the ego, is the principal thing. This content, however, is not confined to the individual. With the exception of some insignificant and valueless personal memories, it remains presented in others even after the death of the individual. The elements that make up the consciousness of a given individual are firmly connected with one another, but with those of another individual they are only feebly connected, and the connexion is only casually apparent. Contents of consciousness, however, that are of universal significance, break through these limits of the individual, and, attached of course to individuals again, can enjoy a continued existence of an impersonal, superpersonal kind, independently of the personality by means of which they were developed. To contribute to this is the greatest happiness of the artist, the scientist, the inventor, the social reformer, etc.
    The underlined part is more of Mach's spirituality, and I suspect that of many scientific and artistic types. I'm sure many of us here would love to contribute something worthy --- somehow push the conversation forward. Even if such a drive also includes petty-selfish elements, so be it. We are mud that breathes.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    Here we get to Mach's implicit version of I-am-my-world --- of consciousness as the being of the world itself (a true monism in some sense, but plural in its endless variety of integrated elements.)

    If a knowledge of the connexion of the elements (sensations) does not suffice us, and we ask, Who possesses this connexion of sensations, Who experiences it ? then we have succumbed to the old habit of subsuming every element (every sensation) under some unanalysed complex, and we are falling back imperceptibly upon an older, lower, and more limited point of view.

    This is the 'worldstreaming' mentioned previously. 'Sensation' is a ladder that must be thrown away, for the subject with sense organs emerges from these neutral elements along with its other, the sensed environment. Given the intense connection of our flesh with this worldstreaming, it's natural enough to want to make subjectivity absolute, but this ignores the interpenetration of our worldstreamings and the crucial sociality and worldliness of language. Note that Mach is content to dissolve the ego because he feels himself in a society where what's worthy in any ego is safely leaping from mortal vessel to mortal vessel. Mach is not alone in a sensation bubble. The world is not reduced to consciousness. Consciousness is 'reduced' or properly understood as exactly the [only] being of the world. [The only being that we know anything about and talk sensibly about ---a world of possible and actual experience. ]
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    I'm going to add a supplement to the OP here. I think (?) the 'transcendence' of the object in phenomenology is little known and yet important. The relevance is the alternative to indirect realism and basically the idea that appearence hides [ or substitute for ] the 'true' nature of the object.

    Husserl
    The thing is given in experiences, and yet, it is not given; that is to say, the experience of it is givenness through presentations, through “appearings.” Each particular experience and similarly each connected, eventually closed sequence of experiences gives the experienced object in an essentially incomplete appearing, which is one-sided, many-sided, yet not all-sided, in accordance with everything that the thing “is.” Complete experience is something infinite. To require a complete experience of an object through an eventually closed act or, what amounts to the same thing, an eventually closed sequence of perceptions, which would intend the thing in a complete, definitive, and conclusive way is an absurdity; it is to require something which the essence of experience excludes.
    Experience is flowing and 'horizonal.' I see the front of a house and have a sense of the unseen back of the house. I read the first few pages and have a vague sense of the many that follow. I 'get to know' someone, who I find interesting. Of course the 'now' itself is 'stretched' with anticatipation and memory, allowing me to appreciate music and understand a long sentence. Note that I constant expect expect expect, and that attention is drawn to violations of expectoration.

    Sartre
    MODERN thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it. Its aim was to overcome a certain number of dualisms which have embarrassed philosophy and to replace them by the monism of the phenomenon. Has the attempt been successful? In the first place we certainly thus get rid of that dualism which in the existent opposes interior to exterior. There is no longer an exterior for the existent if one means by that a superficial covering which hides from sight the true nature of the object. And this true nature in turn, if it is to be the secret reality of the thing, which one can have a presentiment of or which one can suppose but can never reach because it is the "interior" of the object under consideration-this nature no longer exists. The appearances which manifest the existent are neither interior nor exterior; they are all equal, they all refer to other appearances, and none of them is privileged. Force, for example, is not a metaphysical conatus of an unknown kind which hides behind its effects (accelerations, deviations, etc.); it is the totality of these effects. Similarly an electric current does not have a secret reverse side; it is nothing but the totality of the physical-chemical actions which manifest it (electrolysis, the incandescence of a carbon filament, the displacement of the needle of a galvanometer, etc.). No one of these actions alone is sufficient to reveal it. But no action indicates anything which is behind itself; it indicates only itself and the total series. The obvious conclusion is that the dualism of being and appearance IS no longer entitled to any legal status within philosophy. The appearance refers to the total series of appearances and not to a hidden reality which could drain to itself all the being of the existent. And the appearance for its part is not an inconsistent manifestation of this being. To the extent that men had believed in noumenal realities, they have presented appearance as a pure negative. It was "that which is not being"; it had no other being than that of illusion and error. But even this being was borrowed, it was itself a pretense, and philosophers met with the greatest difficulty in maintaining cohesion and existence in the appearance so that it should not itself be reabsorbed in the depth of nonphenomenal being. But if we once get away from what Nietzsche called "the illusion of worlds-behind-the-scene," and if we no longer believe in the being-behind-the-appearance, then the appearance becomes full positivity; its essence is an "appearing" which is no longer opposed to being but on the contrary is the measure of it. For the being of an existent is exactly what it appears.
    ...
    Thus we arrive at the idea of the phenomenon such as we can find, for example in the "phenomenology" of Husserl or of Heidegger-the phenomenon or the relative-absolute. Relative the phenomenon remains, for "to appear" supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear. But it does not have the double relativity of Kant's Erscheinung. It does not point over its shoulder to a true being which would be, for it, absolute. What it is, it is absolutely, for it reveals itself as it is. The phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of itself. The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence. The essence of an existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this existent; it is the manifest law which presides over the suc­cession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series.
    The thing is not behind its appearances but something like their ideal unity, which is 'infinite' in that the object can continue to be examined by me or others who might arrive. The worldly object is experienced as experienceable-by-others-too. It's a relatively permanent possibility of perception, projected into the future and into considerations of alternate versions of the past.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    Waves on the ocean or sparks of the divine are common metaphors for our situation as individuals.FrancisRay

    :up:

    I suspect that this :
    Indra's net (also called Indra's jewels or Indra's pearls, Sanskrit Indrajāla, Chinese: 因陀羅網) is a metaphor used to illustrate the concepts of Śūnyatā (emptiness),[1] pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination),[2] and interpenetration[3] in Buddhist philosophy.

    is another way to say the same thing that I mean by ontological cubism.

    Note that interpenetration is stressed. I 'am' my world in some sense, but of course I am our world, and you are in our world with me. But the world is arranged around sentient bodies, so that each of us is at the center of our own coordinate system. Our feet don't move. The street rolls beneath them. Einstein and Mach come to mind here, and not just Husserl.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    “Dost thou reckon thyself only a puny form
    When within thee the universe is folded?”

    Baha’u’llah quoting Imam Ali,
    the first Shia Imam
    FrancisRay

    :up:

    Beautiful. Yeah I think we are on the same page in the most important way. The feeling tone, the sense of philosophy's radical potential, the sense of the 'illusory' nature of the ego. I'll even give you the 'illusory' nature of time in a certain sense. Though I think the form of flow itself is static. The river runs on smoothly forever. The reels of the projector turn. Hebel. Breath. Vapor. All procession is.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    I also believe in the value of analysis, since although it cannot take us all the way to an understanding it clearly signposts what it is we need to understand and disposes of philosophical problems. For a sceptic analysis is the only way forward, since they will not be inclined to do the practice.FrancisRay

    I guess I find the discursive and 'the rest' to be pretty entangled. But I've been known to talk about the feeling of being 'behind language.' Or maybe 'over language. ' This is still a figure of speech, but it points at a 'feeling' or heightened state that triumphs over the useful neurotic discursivity, plays with it.

    My own favored sense of mysticism is close to Nietzsche's interpretation of Jesus in The Antichrist.

    ...he regarded only subjective realities as realities, as “truths” ... he saw everything else, everything natural, temporal, spatial and historical, merely as signs, as materials for parables...
    ...
    The “kingdom of heaven” is a state of the heart—not something to come “beyond the world” or “after death.” .. The “kingdom of God” is not something that men wait for: it had no yesterday and no day after tomorrow, it is not going to come at a “millennium”—it is an experience of the heart, it is everywhere and it is nowhere....
    ...
    This faith does not formulate itself—it simply lives, and so guards itself against formulae. ...It is only on the theory that no word is to be taken literally that this anti-realist is able to speak at all. Set down among Hindus he would have made use of the concepts of Sankhya, and among Chinese he would have employed those of Lao-tse—and in neither case would it have made any difference to him.—With a little freedom in the use of words, one might actually call Jesus a “free spirit”—he cares nothing for what is established: the word killeth, whatever is established killeth. The idea of “life” as an experience, as he alone conceives it, stands opposed to his mind to every sort of word, formula, law, belief and dogma...
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    One more quote that I think/hope you will relate to:

    ... if the only form of tradition, of handing down, consisted in following the ways of the immediate generation before us in a blind or timid adherence to its successes, “tradition” should positively be discouraged. ...Tradition is a matter of much wider significance. It cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour.

    Some one said: “The dead writers are remote from us because we know so much more than they did.” Precisely, and they are that which we know.

    Shakespeare acquired more essential history from Plutarch than most men could from the whole British Museum. What is to be insisted upon is that the poet must develop or procure the consciousness of the past and that he should continue to develop this consciousness throughout his career.

    What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality.

    There remains to define this process of depersonalization and its relation to the sense of tradition. It is in this depersonalization that art may be said to approach the condition of science.


    That's T.S. Eliot

    I think there's a 'good' discursive part of philosophy, some of it basically so creative as to be visionary. This or that person somehow cuts through the general confusion with just the right metaphor, just the right revelation of false necessity as mere contingency, opening up the space.

    But we probably agree that philosophy can be a dreary excuse for conformity --a soporific even...
  • PeterJones
    415
    I found your post interesting but couldn't quite understand it. For the mystic time and change would not really exist and this is because they have seen beyond it. The clock still ticks but what is truly and ultimately real is unchanging. This would be Being, not the personal experience.of a being.

    The word 'reflexivity' implies some sort of dualism so I'm not sure it's relevant here. I may be misunderstanding what you mean but it. .
  • PeterJones
    415
    Nicely put. Indra's Net is a wonderful metaphor.
  • PeterJones
    415
    I guess I find the discursive and 'the rest' to be pretty entangled.plaque flag

    Aha. I can show you how to untangle it. It requires knowing only two or three vital facts. If you know that all metaphysical questions are undecidable then you're half way there.

    I am not a fan of Nietzsche. He's brilliant but seems to be floundering around in the dark.

    That was an Interesting Eliot quote.

    I don't share your view of philosophy and have a much higher regard, but I'm not talking about mainstream western philosophy. . . . . ,
  • Janus
    16.2k
    Metaphysics has to reduce the many to the one, and if we assume the many is truly real this cannot be done. I think you'd have to admit that the incomprehension of philosophers suggests that they're missing a trick. .FrancisRay

    I see it more as reducing duality to non-duality; non-duality being neither one nor many. Duality is simply based on the notion of separation, a conception which is essential to thought and perception, but has no being or provenance beyond that.
  • jgill
    3.8k
    Of course the 'now' itself is 'stretched' with anticatipation and memory, allowing me to appreciate music and understand a long sentence. Note that I constant expect expect expect, and that attention is drawn to violations of expectorationplaque flag

    Come on. Spit it out. :smile:

    I think there's a 'good' discursive part of philosophy, some of it basically so creative as to be visionary. This or that person somehow cuts through the general confusion with just the right metaphor, just the right revelation of false necessity as mere contingency, opening up the space.plaque flag
    :up:

    The problem, as I see it, is that then a revolutionary idea is drowned in a sea of words. Being a math guy and not a philosopher, to be concise is paramount (though some in my former profession violate that principle).
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    Come on. Spit it out. :smile:jgill

    I'm glad someone caught my little joke.

    The problem, as I see it, is that then a revolutionary idea is drowned in a sea of words. Being a math guy and not a philosopher, to be concise is paramount (though some in my former profession violate that principle).jgill

    I feel you. Did you ever look into the famous TLP ? It's got a tree structure, where you can open up any claim for more detail. But even with all the leaves out, it's still a brief, beautiful book. Definitely one of my favorites in the entire tradition, and a big influence on this thread.

    Personally I'd like to squeeze the gist of anything I've learned into such a tight presentation, but I think it takes lots of experimentation (longwinded at times, and likely interactive ) to whittle it down.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    Aha. I can show you how to untangle it. It requires knowing only two or three vital facts. If you know that all metaphysical questions are undecidable then you're half way there.FrancisRay

    Not to be difficult, but claiming that all metaphysical questions are undecidable seems to decide an important metaphysical question. Though I can actually feel my way toward what you might mean. And I've maybe made similar claims, most recently in terms of an ineradicable ambiguity which I was calling semantic finitude.

    To my ears, you are little too down on mainstream philosophy, forgetting maybe that it's not just the domain of respectable professors. And some of those professors are great anyway. Hegel was a professor, as was Heidegger and Husserl.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    I am not a fan of Nietzsche. He's brilliant but seems to be floundering around in the dark.FrancisRay

    I know that there are aspects of Nietzsche that hard to enjoy, but I definitely personally defend his overall philosophical greatness. To be clear, it's of course not a matter of endorsing all of his claims. It's more about the value of wrestling with an original and daring mind.

    FWIW, I adore Emerson.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    The clock still ticks but what is truly and ultimately real is unchanging.FrancisRay

    A question that might be asked is whether this is true by definition --- whether we tend to understand 'Being' [the truly real ] precisely in terms of constant presence. If so, is this a bias ?
    I'm of course not the first person to speculate in this way. I bring up a famous issue. Much of the radicality of Being and Time is perhaps in its claim or suggestion (according to some) that being is time. This is maybe like Heraclitus making the Flux itself most real.

    My own view is that discursive philosophers really can't help looking for atemporal structure. That's the quasi-scientific conception of the enterprise at least. But perhaps we can articulate the perduring matrix or structure of the flow of otherwise continuous novelty. We can sketch the form or 'skeleton' of all possible experience. For instance, the rainbow shows us the palette with which reality must eternally be painted. The human ear experiences a certain range of tones. Wittgenstein tried to express the logical form of [the conceptual aspect of] the world. Mathematicians arguably disclose necessities in quantitative and spatial aspects of reality.
  • jgill
    3.8k
    I feel you. Did you ever look into the famous TLP ?plaque flag

    6.5 If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.

    Incompleteness in mathematics puts a kink in this. Is "this and that" provable? Will "yes" or "no" always suffice?
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    6.5 If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.

    Incompleteness in mathematics puts a kink in this. Is "this and that" provable? Will "yes" or "no" always suffice?
    jgill

    You raise a good point. I can't endorse all of his claims, but some of them are great. I recommend checking out 5.6 and its leaves, which largely inspired this thread.

    Here's a little comment he makes in passing in response to Kant's [ failed ] argument that space is not real.

    A right-hand glove could be put on a left hand if it could be turned round in four-dimensional space.
  • jgill
    3.8k
    A right-hand glove could be put on a left hand if it could be turned round in four-dimensional space.plaque flag

    That's a stretch. :cool:

    But I like his conciseness.
  • Joshs
    5.6k


    For the mystic time and change would not really exist and this is because they have seen beyond it. The clock still ticks but what is truly and ultimately real is unchanging. This would be Being, not the personal experience.of a being.

    The word 'reflexivity' implies some sort of dualism so I'm not sure it's relevant here. I may be misunderstanding what you mean but it.
    FrancisRay

    I’m aware that the classical understanding of the ultimately real is the eternally unchanging. My argument is that the idea of seeing beyond time to some sort of awareness or reality is incoherent. To be aware is to change. Pure anything , including pure timelessness, is not Being but the definition of death itself.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    But I like his conciseness.jgill

    :up:
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    My argument is that the idea of seeing beyond time to some sort of awareness or reality is incoherent. To be aware is to change. Pure anything , including pure timelessness, is not Being but the definition of death itself.Joshs

    I think the most charitable way to read it is as gazing on The Unchanging with adoration. Or feeling oneself in a sort of divine stasis, having temporarily become The Illuminated One. There's only One of 'em to, because it's the Central and Ideal State of Being. The capital letters aren't meant as a parody but only to capture the feeling I think is involved.

    You know Sartre's talk about our desire to be like stones --to flee from our twisting and ragger nothingness and yet somehow keep our freedom in that stonelike plenitude.
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