You've added just one more gross misrepresentation of another's position Meta. One must first understand another's position before one can effectively critique it. Luck doesn't count, and you ain't lucky anyway...

If we understand an English sentence such as 'cats fly' as saying that cats fly, then our 'interpretation' of the sentence commits us to an understanding of the sentence as depending on whether a certain truth condition obtains; but this is an objective matter - the question whether cats fly is of course a question about cats, not about us. — Fafner

No one understands "cats fly" as saying that cats fly. This is just repeating the same thing using the same words,, and that is not understanding. Understanding "cats fly", is first, apprehending that there is a type of animal which is called "cat", and there is an activity referred to by "fly", which cats do. That is a first level of understanding. The second, deeper level, is to understand the conditions under which an animal qualifies to be called "cat", and to understand the conditions under which an activity is qualified to be called "flying". That's what understanding is. It's not knowing how to repeat words, parrots do that without understanding.

Since we all understand these various conditions (what qualifies as a cat, and what qualifies as flying) in different ways, our understandings, and therefore interpretations, vary. This variance is a matter of subjectivity. There are idiosyncrasies in relation to understanding, which are specific to the subject, and this produces what we call subjectivity.

So your argument simply begs the question (if it can be called an argument - since you just assert that all interpretation is subjective, but why?) — Fafner

No Fafner, clearly you have this backwards, it is your argument which begs the question, not mine. Asserting that to understand the sentence "cats fly", is to apprehend it as saying that cats fly, is the most obvious and precise case of begging the question that one could come up with. It's very similar to creativesoul saying "a cow is in the barn" is true because a cow is in the barn. Creative might as well just say, "a cow is in the barn" is true because "a cow is in the barn" is true. And you might as well just say that "cats fly" means that cats fly. Care to beg the question some more?

Just to make sure you know, creativesoul, there's a member of tpf whose name is Meta. So, out of respect, you shouldn't make false accusations against that person, just like you shouldn't make false accusations against me.

I assumed(perhaps erroneously) that you were one in the same as MetaphysicianUndiscovered, if not my apologies. Not sure what false accusations I've levied towards you aside from possibly mixing the two of you up. But then if that were the case, it wouldn't make much sense for you to say that you'd told me something in the past about pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief most likely being probabilistic. That's quite a strange way to put it, by the way... "most likely"...

8-)

I harbor no hard feelings nor ill-will. Just do not like spending time dealing with too many misattributions of meaning to my words. That's happened in this thread more often than not between us. I'll gladly discuss my position. I'll gladly bear any burden it carries. However, I'm not at all inclined to bear the burden of another's misrepresentation of my position.

Corrected what's bolded above...

By the way... begging the question is an informal 'fallacy'. There are times, particularly when one is setting out their own axioms, definitions, key terms, etc. when it takes a method that another could always say was begging the question.

Affirming the consequent is another matter altogether.

More importantly, especially and particularly in discussions such as this one, an astute reader will quickly pick up on someone using the term "truth" to mean more than one thing in the same debate. That is an equivocation fallacy, and it is at hand here in this thread, by more than one participant.

No one understands "cats fly" as saying that cats fly. This is just repeating the same thing using the same words,, and that is not understanding. Understanding "cats fly", is first, apprehending that there is a type of animal which is called "cat", and there is an activity referred to by "fly", which cats do. That is a first level of understanding. The second, deeper level, is to understand the conditions under which an animal qualifies to be called "cat", and to understand the conditions under which an activity is qualified to be called "flying". That's what understanding is. It's not knowing how to repeat words, parrots do that without understanding.

Since we all understand these various conditions (what qualifies as a cat, and what qualifies as flying) in different ways, our understandings, and therefore interpretations, vary. This variance is a matter of subjectivity. There are idiosyncrasies in relation to understanding, which are specific to the subject, and this produces what we call subjectivity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure I agree, it's much more complicated than how I presented it, and the sentence itself is ambiguous in some respects and can have different meanings etc. etc.. What I tried to show is simply that interpreting the meaning of a sentence as saying that such and such is the case can commit you to objective standards of truth. It is up to us to decide what 'cats' and 'fly' mean etc., but once that has been decided then it's not a subjective matter (as you claimed) whether 'cats fly' is true or false. It's just an schematic example which illustrates how 'interpretation of meaning' is compatible with objective standards of truth.

No Fafner, clearly you have this backwards, it is your argument which begs the question, not mine. Asserting that to understand the sentence "cats fly", is to apprehend it as saying that cats fly, is the most obvious and precise case of begging the question that one could come up with. It's very similar to creativesoul saying "a cow is in the barn" is true because a cow is in the barn. Creative might as well just say, "a cow is in the barn" is true because "a cow is in the barn" is true. And you might as well just say that "cats fly" means that cats fly. Care to beg the question some more? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that you are confusing use and mention...

It is true that if I say 'cats fly' is true iff cats fly then I repeat the same sentence twice, but it does show that there are two ways of using a sentence (which is what the use/mention distinction is about): one is to talk about the sentence as a bunch of words ('cats fly'), and the other is to use the sentence to state how things are in the world (either truly or falsely), and that is objective.

What I tried to show is simply that interpreting the meaning of a sentence as saying that such and such is the case can commit you to objective standards of truth. — Fafner

All you showed is that the sentence is interpreted with words. You did a bad job, and didn't represent how a sentence is really interpreted, because you just repeated the same words. If you do it properly, you would use different words, like I did when I showed how that statement would be understood.

But since you and I would use different words from each other, this shows that there are no objective standards, except through agreement and conventions, as is evident in mathematics. And this is what I already claimed is the basis of "objectivity" in knowledge, agreement, which is itself based in justification.

It's just an schematic example which illustrates how 'interpretation of meaning' is compatible with objective standards of truth. — Fafner

When we refer to "objective standards", we refer to these agreements and conventions. But this is not "truth", it is "justification". It is evident that it is not truth because sometimes these standards themselves are based in a misunderstanding of reality.

It is true that if I say 'cats fly' is true iff cats fly then I repeat the same sentence twice, but it does show that there are two ways of using a sentence (which is what the use/mention distinction is about): one is to talk about the sentence as a bunch of words ('cats fly'), and the other is to use the sentence to state how things are in the world (either truly or falsely), and that is objective. — Fafner

I don't accept the use/mention distinction, I think it is unjustified. I see a bunch of words as a bunch of words. If you want to insist that a bunch of words is something other than a bunch of words, you have to demonstrate how this is the case. But how a bunch of words could be something other than a bunch of words is dependent on subjects, so this is something subjective. It is not objective, as you state. "How things are in the world" refers to nothing more than justified statements, what we, as human beings, believed by convention..

But since you and I would use different words from each other, this shows that there are no objective standards, except through agreement and conventions — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand this argument. What you said doesn't show anything of this sort. We can use all sorts of words when explaining something, but what is important is not the particular words that we use, but whether the words are understood the right way; and by 'understood the right way' I mean that one is able to go on acting in a particular way in the appropriate circumstances. So from the mere fact that there are many ways of explaining a sentence such as 'cats fly' it doesn't follow that the sentence itself cannot be used to say what is objectively the case. In other words, the objectivity consists in the use of the sentence, and you've said nothing that would show that use of language in this sense cannot be objective.

Also, I don't understand what you mean by 'agreement' and 'convention' and how it is relevant. There's a sense in which agreements and conventions actually serve the function of precisely creating objective standards. For example, standard unites of measurement such as a 'meter' or 'hour' are defined arbitrary, and are useful because we all agree on what they mean. However it is a perfectly objective matter whether a given object is a meter long, or that a certain event has lasted for an hour, despite the conventionality of the units themselves.

I don't accept the use/mention distinction, I think it is unjustified. I see a bunch of words as a bunch of words. If you want to insist that a bunch of words is something other than a bunch of words, you have to demonstrate how this is the case. But how a bunch of words could be something other than a bunch of words is dependent on subjects, so this is something subjective. It is not objective, as you state. "How things are in the world" refers to nothing more than justified statements, what we, as human beings, believed by convention.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well if everything is just a bunch of words, then what you say is also a bunch of words, so by your own lights nothing of what you said here or anywhere should be taken as true (or even meaningful), so I don't understand why you even bother typing something on your keyboard.

We can use all sorts of words when explaining something, but what is important is not the particular words that we use, but whether the words are understood the right way; and by 'understood the right way' I mean that one is able to go on acting in a particular way in the appropriate circumstances. — Fafner

Are you serious? It's not important which words are used to explain something? So I could explain "apple" as "a round crisp fruit", or as "a bright green liquid", and my choice of words is unimportant.

What does acting have to do with this? The person wants to know, and understand what an apple is, nothing else, just the truth. That person might never use this information toward any action, never being asked, or inclined to actually get an apple. Yet you belief it is unimportant whether the person believes that an apple is a round crisp fruit or a bright green liquid. For you, the person's actions are important, but knowing the truth is unimportant.

That's the thing about truth, it's desired for the sake of itself, not so that "one is able to go on acting in a particular way". This is philosophy, we act in a moral way, so that we can direct our attention toward knowing the truth. We do not simply accept whatever explanation someone gives us, just because it inclines us to behave in the way that they want us to. That's brainwash. You describe "understood the right way" as brainwash, that which inclines one to act in a particular way.

Well if everything is just a bunch of words, then what you say is also a bunch of words, so by your own lights nothing of what you said here or anywhere should be taken as true (or even meaningful), so I don't understand why you even bother typing something on your keyboard. — Fafner

You are free to interpret the words as you please, that's the point, your interpretation is your interpretation, and it is subjective. if your interpretation leaves you uninterested, then so be it.

Greetings Fafner...

Having read through some of your earlier responses in this thread, I'm wondering if you'd be interested in revisiting some of it, particularly the parts about the burdens of one arguing for correspondence. As you may know already, I'm not a typical correspondence theorist, so I'm not so much looking to defend it or my own view. Rather, the aim is to acquire a bit more understanding regarding correspondence theory, it's strengths and weaknesses. Seems to me that that would be helpful to me and the reader...

Would you be interested?

(Y)

Sure, ask me anything you want.

What I meant when I said that words are not important is that there is no necessary definitions that one must understand in order to understand what it means for a sentence to be true or false. There are countless different ways to explain what a sentence means, but what counts as a correct understanding is the ability to use the sentence in the right sort of way.

This is to show that your argument completely miss its target. You said that truth is subjective because it is given by a subjective interpretation of words, or something of that sort. And further, you said that interpretations themselves consist of words. But this is false. To understand what it is for any sentence such as 'cats fly' to be true or false is not to grasp some verbal formula such that "'cats fly' is true iff ....". And this is the reason why I mentioned actions because understanding a sentence is a practical ability, such as being able to discriminate between the circumstances under which the sentence is true and false. And this is not a matter of simply interpreting a bunch of words as you said, because trivially, being able to see that cats can fly has nothing to do with words per se. Similarly, if you have a parrot that can recite some verbal 'interpretation' or 'explanation', it doesn't make it the case that he understands what he says. Words which are not connected to action are empty, so words in isolation are not the right place to look for understanding truth.

What I meant when I said that words are not important is that there is no necessary definitions that one must understand in order to understand what it means for a sentence to be true or false. — Fafner

We're in complete agreement then. There are no necessary definitions, and a person is free to define the words as one pleases, so the determination of true or false is completely subjective. That's the exact point I've been trying to make. Why do you think that this demonstrates that my argument misses the point? It seems to be right on the point.

There are countless different ways to explain what a sentence means, but what counts as a correct understanding is the ability to use the sentence in the right sort of way. — Fafner

This I do not agree with. Using a sentence is speaking, writing, etc.. Explaining what a sentence means is interpretation. The two are distinct, and completely different. You seem to desire to reduce the interpretation of a sentence to a form of using the sentence, but this is impossible. Interpretation is done with the use of other sentences, or demonstrations to oneself, and this is not a case of using the sentence which is being interpreted, it is using something else which is within the demonstration.

And further, you said that interpretations themselves consist of words. But this is false. — Fafner

As I said, there are different levels of interpretation, or understanding. We can do a shallow interpretation just using words. For example, an interpretation of mathematics may be done with words. But to go to a deeper level, and produce a thorough understanding, I agree that more than just words are required. I normally refer to images in my mind. Producing images in my mind, for understanding, is a form of action, I suppose, but I don't think it's what you mean by "action". And I don't see how it could be a case of using the sentence.

It seems to me that you have an idiosyncratic understanding of 'interpretation' that in my opinion is confused. Give me a concrete example of what it would be on your account to interpret a sentence in some way as opposed to other, and we can discuss it.

Let's take your example, "cats fly" . Person A thinks "cats" refers to domesticated house cats, while person B thinks "cats" refers to wild cats like tigers, lions, and cougars as well as domesticated cats. So we have a difference of interpretation here. Further, person A and person B both think that "fly" refers to what we do in airplanes, and knows that domesticated cats fly on airplanes, and claims "cats fly" is true. Person B says no, wild cats like tigers and lions do not go on airplanes, so "cats fly" is false. Person C says that "fly" refers to what animals and insects with wings do, moving themselves through the air, and neither domesticated nor wild cats have wings, so it is not true that any cats fly. So the truth or falsity of "cats fly" is dependent on interpretation, and is therefore subjective.

If the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation, and there are three different interpretations of "X", all of which conflict with one another, then it would follow that "X" can be both true and false at the same time.

"X" cannot be both, true and false, at the same time.

Thus, it is not the case that the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation.

QED.

Nice. I want to revisit a few things you wrote earlier, and take it from there.

Back on page 7 you wrote the following:

You don't really need counterfactuals or statements about the past to demonstrate that the correspondence theory doesn't work (there's a lot of philosophical controversy surrounding them). Just take the simpler case of negative facts (that is, negated propositions that are true). It is a true statement that Bernie Sanders is not the the president of the US, what is the 'corresponding' thing or the entity that makes it true? It is certainly not the existence of Bernie himself with the negation sign attached to him. Or what about the fact that Barack Obama is not (the current) president of the US? Nothing in the world corresponds to either of these statements yet they are true and have furthermore different truth conditions.

This looks like an interesting direction. I'd pose the following question:

What would it take in order for us to be able to sensibly say something like "X is in the world and it corresponds with 'X'?

Consider the proposition that "Caesar was murdered". What entity makes this proposition true? It seems that it is the event that Caesar was murdered (-"the murder of Caesar"). But what about the proposition "Caesar died in 44 BC"? Since his death was caused by his murder, his death must be the same event as his murder. But if this is so, it means that the same entity (the same event) corresponds to two different propositions (and they are different propositions because they mean different things: not all deaths are the result of a murder). — Fafner

Do you have an argument for why two or more propositions cannot correspond to the same event. That claim just seems plain ridiculous so far.

I took note of the same thing...

What would it take in order for us to be able to sensibly say something like "X is in the world and it corresponds with 'X'? — creativesoul

Well, the first problem is that it is simply unclear what 'correspondence' is supposed to be. It is very hard if not impossible to give an non circular or non trivial analysis for the term, therefore it is not very clear what the theory even says.

Do you have an argument for why two or more propositions cannot correspond to the same event. That claim just seems plain ridiculous so far. — John

Because as I explained they are different propositions with different truth conditions, so if they correspond to the same thing, you cannot explain the difference between them (if we suppose that correspondence is meant to explain what makes every proposition uniquely true). I explained this in more detail in the original post:

this is a problem, because the correspondence theory is supposed to assign a unique truth-maker to each proposition, that explains why the proposition is true under some specific conditions and not some others. And that entails that if two propositions have the same truth conditions (they correspond to the very same entity, if true) then they are the same proposition. But "Caesar was murdered" and "Caesar died in 44 BC" are not the same proposition, so the correspondence theory is inadequate. — Fafner

If the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation, and there are three different interpretations of "X", all of which conflict with one another, then it would follow that "X" can be both true and false at the same time.

"X" cannot be both, true and false, at the same time.

Thus, it is not the case that the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation. — creativesoul

How do you justify your second premise, that X cannot be both true and false at the same time? Your first premise defines truth as being dependent on interpretation. Your second premise excludes falsity from truth. All you have done is provided two incompatible definitions of "truth", and denied the first in favour of the second.

I've demonstrated, therefore justified the soundness of the first premise. Now the onus is on you to demonstrate the soundness of the second premise, the one you prefer. How is it the case that X cannot be both true and false at the same time?

Let's start with your use of "X". What does X signify, and why can't this be true and false at the same time?

So the truth or falsity of "cats fly" is dependent on interpretation, and is therefore subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are talking here only about the assignment of meaning to a sentence, which I already agreed is an arbitrary matter (and therefore you can say 'subjective'), but it doesn't prove what you want to prove. What you are missing is the fact that given a particular interpretation of the sentence 'cats fly', it is objectively true or false; and the mere fact that the sentence can express something different doesn't show that its truth is subjective.

If the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation, and there are three different interpretations of "X", all of which conflict with one another, then it would follow that "X" can be both true and false at the same time.

"X" cannot be both, true and false, at the same time.

Thus, it is not the case that the truth or falsity of "X" is dependent upon interpretation.

QED. — creative soul

I like this a lot! It seems to me, though, that this and much of this part of the discussion has ignored the notion of incomplete specification, not only about the content of propositions, but as well their interpretations.

This is about meaning v. usage; let's stick with meaning. Let proposition P be appropriately well-formed and meaningful, for present purpose, but not a complete specification of whatever it happens to be about. The expressions P and ~P are, then, are contingent subject to the complete specification of P, whenever that should happen, or be agreed on.

Unrecognized/unacknowledged contingency can cripple discussion. The cure is the recognition that significant questions require some care on approach, and very likely a preliminary definitions section. With these there is a chance that disputants at least may start on the same page.

In consideration of Caeser, above, while it's true not all deaths are from murders, it is certainly true that all murders result in a death; so this, then, is merely a usage problem.

Bottom line, I suppose, is that nearly all Ps that are taken as meaning(ful) are in fact contingent. Converting most of them into a univocal form either by complete specification or definition ranges from impractical to impossible. Fortunately in many cases that effort is also unnecessary.

What do you mean by "uniquely true"?

Any event, it seems to me, could correspond to multiple propositions. You haven't explained why correspondence is ruled out by multiplicity. For example the statement that a particular person died at a particular time is true if the person died at that specified time. If the person was murdered it does not follow that the statement that they died fails to correspond with their being murdered; it neither, in the strictest sense, corresponds nor fails to correspond with that further fact because it does not mention murder. However the statement that they died is certainly consistent with their being murdered.

The statement that the person was murdered is not a "more true" proposition, it is merely more comprehensive, unless you think of truth as being analogous to archery where we can be ever closer to the mark. No statement could ever include all the facts of this death, this murder, though, because that would entail stating all the conditions that obtained, leading to the death. This would mean stating all the events that occurred in the body of the victim, down to the levels of tissue, cell, molecule, and so on (exactly how they died) as well as all the events, reaching back into the indefinite past, and around the Earth, that obtained in order to make the murder possible.

Proposition A = Caesar died
Proposition B = Caesar was murdered

Proposition A is true = there's an entity x corresponding to A
Proposition B is true = there's an entity y corresponding to B

x=y (Caesar's death and Caesar's murder is the same event) therefore it follows that A is true whenever B is true and vice versa; but A can be true even if B is false (Caesar could've died without being murdered), therefore it can't be the case that the same entity corresponds to A and B. But Caesar's death and Caesar's murder was the same event (contradiction), therefore the correspondence theory must be false.

That does not follow at all. If Caesar was murdered then x=y obtains; if not, then not. Of course A could be true when B is false, but only in case Caesar was not murdered. You seem seriously confused about this.

Of course A could be true when B is false, but only in case Caesar was not murdered. — John

So what? I don't see how it is relevant. Which part of the argument you don't agree with?

I'd have to understand what your argument actually is in order to tell you what part I disagree with. It doesn't seem to be a cogent argument at all. Correspondence is about actuality, not possibility. Statements A and B could possibly either correspond with actual events or not, but they actually do or do not correspond. If both statements do not correspond with actual events, and hence with each other, then they cannot both be true; if they both do correspond with actual events, then they wil both be true. I fail to see any problem at all for correspondence in this.

x=y (Caesar's death and Caesar's murder is the same event) therefore it follows that A is true whenever B is true and vice versa; but A can be true even if B is false (Caesar could've died without being murdered), therefore it can't be the case that the same entity corresponds to A and B. — Fafner

Wait--aside from switching "event" out for "entity," you're arguing that that it can't be the case that x just in case it was possible that not-x.