There are other choices available. — noAxioms

I am, in fact saying your use of the word "available" is nonstandard. If an "alternative" will never be selected, is it really available? — LuckyR

By what definition of 'available' is that not the case? I mean, given unitary time evolution, entirely free choice (however you choose to envision it), some outcome will be chosen and the alternatives not chosen. It will never be chosen. So how is your use of the word 'available' any different that you consider the unchosen alternatives available?

Alternative scenario: Consider MWI, a completely deterministic interpretation of QM. In MWI, all the viable alternatives are chosen from a given state sufficiently prior to the choice being made. So by that use, all the available choices are chosen, and only the unavailable ones are not. What would your "outside observer who has true insight" say about if there was choice going on.

I had asked you for an example illustrating the difference between will and free will, or choice and free choice, or now a decision vs. a true decision. You have not done that, nor has Jerry, leading me to conclude that there is no difference and the adjective 'free' (or 'true') is meaningless in this context.
I gave an example distinguishing the two cases for a definition of 'free will' that I find at least meaningful.

Why do you all like to speak theoretically and hypothetically without any examples? Not a single example here. How can one relate all this with reality, the world, life and so on? How can one understand what do you actually have in mind? What is your frame of reference, the context in which you are referring to free will? — Alkis Piskas

I seem to not be the only one noticing this lack of distinction that lends meaning to the word 'free'.

Determinists (that I commonly interact with) say that the brain state BEFORE Determines what happens DURING and therefore afterwards. — LuckyR

Do the non-determinists say otherwise?? I mean, the statement simply says that each state is a function of prior state. Determinism doesn't seem to come into play since that's true even with non-deterministic interpretations.

For the record, as a relationalist, I think I qualify as a non-determinist since multiple different states can claim the same prior state.

I think I agree with you that there isn't really a difference between "will" and "free will". So just understand that I'm really just using the term "free will" because it's what most people use to denote this idea of one making choices not determined by anything else, like a demon or prior external causes.

I also tend to agree that an indeterministic selection of choice based on randomness wouldn't be desirable; it runs into the same problems as determinism, that being the choice isn't yours. So to me, to salvage our idea of free will, it must be the case that either: 1) we are capable of making our own choices despite being determined by prior causes, or 2) our choices are indeterminant in the sense that they are not determined by prior causes, but the mechanism by which the choice is selected is not random chance. For what it's worth, btw, I don't think there must be a hidden variable of sorts in quantum mechanics, I think God may genuinely play dice with the universe, pure randomness. I don't see why not.

For the record, as a relationalist, I think I qualify as a non-determinist since multiple different states can claim the same prior state. — noAxioms

Isn't this what I asked when I talked about events with multiple outcomes? In other words, causes that have multiple potential effects?

I seem to not be the only one noticing this lack of distinction that lends meaning to the word 'free'. — noAxioms

It's not about the word "free"! Is this all that you got from my whole comment?
It's about your whole thesis. I quote it again below:

"Consider some hypothetical world, a world I would call deterministic because it follows these principles: it obeys certain laws/rules/regularities, such that an outcome follows directly from previous states, these laws/rules/regulations do not change and that they are unbreakable."

1) What world is this? Physical, human, both? Because it's one thing talking about deterministic laws in Physics (the physical world) and another thing talking about deterministic actions in humans.
2) Where or how does free will --which is the main subkect here-- come in here? Can the physical world have free will? Of course not. So it leaves us with human free will.
3) What (kind of) laws/rules/regulations are these?
4) Don't you think that at least one example is needed?

Well, I'm maybe the only one who has all these questions and also see the "gaps" in your thesis, as I explained in detail this time. I believe that you should take advantage of this and improve your thesis, instead of just questioning the validity of comment.

But since I see that you don't appreciate anything in all this, I won't bother you again.

Every single group of observational data ever collected is consistent with Free Will, — LuckyR

I don't know what you're referring to here

No one has been able to predict human decision making, no matter how detailed their knowledge of the antecedent state might be. If such predictions could be made, it would be concrete proof of Determinism and a solid refutation of Free Will.

Thus analysis of antecedent states and their respective resultant outcomes act, statistically as if, humans actually makes decisions through pondering various aspects of the subject matter at least partially separate from their antecedent brain state. Though while consistent with this, if falls short of proof of it.

Arthur Schopenhauer once summed up free will this way:

“Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills.”

oh I thought you were referring to something more robust than general ignorance

It's not about the word "free"! Is this all that you got from my whole comment? — Alkis Piskas

I think I'm the one you mean to be speaking to lol.

I read your comment and was going to respond, but never got around to it. Allow me to address your more detailed points now.

1) What world is this? Physical, human, both? Because it's one thing talking about deterministic laws in Physics (the physical world) and another thing talking about deterministic actions in humans. — Alkis Piskas

This world can be likened to something of a formal system, which I liken to our universe. This is contentious; although I don't go so far as to say the universe is equivalent to the models that describe it (a.k.a. the math), I do think, when looking at the fundamental nature of the world, we can strip away most of the material things we usually attribute to making up reality. For example, we often think of the world being comprised of physical "stuff" interacting: space, time, particles, energy, matter, etc. all related and obeying certain laws. However, I would say none of these features of the world, despite their supposed indispensability, are necessary in any possible world. The only thing that is necessary are that there are laws that determine how things work. It's like mathematics in the sense that you could create your own internally consistent system, as long as everything (its objects and rules of inference and such) is precisely defined. So the answer to your question is that this world is not physical in the sense that its made up of material in our world, merely that it is a well-defined and self-consistent system.

2) Where or how does free will --which is the main subkect here-- come in here? Can the physical world have free will? Of course not. So it leaves us with human free will. — Alkis Piskas

Free will comes in because even this sort of hypothetical world seems deterministic, because everything obeys the laws, and if things obey laws (like a cellular automata for example), there doesn't seem to be room for anything in the world to have a say in the matter. You say the physical world of course doesn't have free will. This is what I'm trying to ascertain. The reason I bring up this hypothetical world in the first place is because I think such a world can exist, and it would be a world in which agents (choice making entities) would be fundamental (like an axiom) to the world. Because the difficulty it seems for free will in our world is that pre-determined causes have their effects on us, so we're just a domino in the chain. But if there was a possible world in which agents are the ones that push the dominos, we would at least be able to think of some possible world in which free will could exist, while still obeying laws, hence free will compatible with determinism. The next step would be to figure out if it's possible to somehow map this possible reality onto our own, to see if the agents we take as axiomatic in the possible world can emerge in the actual world. I don't know if I can, but it doesn't seem impossible to me, so I'm trying to explore it.

3) What (kind of) laws/rules/regulations are these? — Alkis Piskas

I kind of answered this earlier, but these laws are basically the rules of the game. They are the well-defined, governing, unchanging laws (like the laws of physics) that comprise reality, that make a world predictable and not just meaningless chaos.

4) Don't you think that at least one example is needed? — Alkis Piskas

I mentioned cellular automata before, so let's talk about Conway's Game of Life. Because this is an example of a possible world: it is entirely composed of well-defined rules that govern the cells, their states, and determine the evolution of the game. What I wish to do is imagine a world like this, except that somehow agency is built in, so that we can try to map such a world onto our own.

As I've been thinking a lot about this, I keep having new ideas, new questions, and new potential answers. Unfortunately, when communicating this I don't have the proper knowledge or vocabulary to accurately get my point across (I've never been educated on formal systems, well, formally). So apologies for being confusing, but I would like to hear your input if you better understand my position.

I seem to not be the only one noticing this lack of distinction that lends meaning to the word 'free'. — noAxioms

No, you were not the ony one. And, as I see, I wasn't the only one either! :smile:

BTW my last comment "It's not about the word "free"! Is this all that you got from my whole comment?" that I addressed to you was actually meant for ! This is what can happen when you include different replies to and quotes from different people in a single message ...

BTW #2, are you a programmer? Your alias name "noAxiom" is a unique form that a lot of programmers use to create variable names: starting with a small letter for the first word and separating it from the next with a capital.

I think I'm the one you mean to be speaking to lol. — Jerry

Certainly. But it was the fault of @noAxioms, who has included different replies to and quotes from different people in a single message ...

Thank you for taking care of and the trouble to answer my questions. I really appreciated that.

This world can be likened to something of a formal system, which I liken to our universe. This is contentious; — Jerry

It is ineed contentious. It tastes like a soup with different vegetables mixed with meat. Good for meat-eaters but not for vegetarians. :smile:

[Re: space, time, particles, energy, matter, etc. all related and obeying certain laws] I would say none of these features of the world, despite their supposed indispensability, are necessary in any possible world. — Jerry

What would be a "possible world"? I have in mind one but I don't know what you have in mind. See here's a classic case where an example is needed! Just a "possible world" for me means nothing.

The only thing that is necessary are that there are laws that determine how things work. — Jerry

Alright, but can the same laws apply to the vegetables as well as to the meat?
Can the same laws apply to the physical things as well as human? This is what I asked. In fact, not only between these two but also between different kinds, categories of physical things. Can we form a single set of laws that apply to everything? I mean, even the unified (field) theory, the unifield reality theory, etc. are still an attempt. And even these would be resolved in the future, what about the non-physical world of the mind and consciousness? They have their own deterministic and non-deterministic laws. This is what I'm trying to put through ...

Free will comes in because even this sort of hypothetical world seems deterministic, because everything obeys the laws — Jerry

OK, this follows the same line of thinking. (Re: "everything"]

You say the physical world of course doesn't have free will.
This is what I'm trying to ascertain. — Jerry

Well, can the physical world have free will? If yes, in what sense? If no, then it will always be deterministic --which it is-- so what's the point to hypothetize any kind of (different) world?

Because the difficulty it seems for free will in our world is that pre-determined causes have their effects on us, so we're just a domino in the chain. — Jerry

OK. But again, what are these pre-determined causes have their effects and in what world? Does this world you are envisioning or hypothetize includes human manifestations, actions, behaviour?
So, of course there is a difficulty ...

let's talk about Conway's Game of Life. Because this is an example of a possible world: it is entirely composed of well-defined rules that govern the cells, their states, and determine the evolution of the game. — Jerry

Good example. But on a physical level only of course. And it involves randomity. Which is totally different than free wiill. And one can see randomity everywhere in the physical universe, As simple coin tossing shows that very clearly. Coins do not have free will but neither does tossing follow any deterministic paterm. (Assuming of course that the coins are not fake or unfair, in any way.)

I would like to hear your input if you better understand my position. — Jerry

Yes, of course I understand better your position now. But, as I mentioned several times, the human factor is missing from your hypothetical world, which, for that reason seems to be clearly a physical world. And alll that would be just fine if you had not involved free will at all.

I think I agree with you that there isn't really a difference between "will" and "free will". — Jerry

I will agree that you don't use a definition that makes the two cases distinct. Others, especially proponents of free will, probably do. There is a difference using the definition I gave, but many people don't use my definition, or worse, they do, but word it like possession is a good thing.

So just understand that I'm really just using the term "free will" because it's what most people use to denote this idea of one making choices not determined by anything else

Again, I think you should ask said proponent, since providing your own definition smacks of a strawman fallacy. It's why I'm trying to get a clear reply from those that I think are proponents.

I cannot conceive of why anything would want to make a choice that is not a function of anything else. With my street crossing example, that would entail choosing a moment without in any way basing the decision on when there is a gap in the traffic.

There very much are examples of possession, of free will being destroyed. You have this parasite that infects a creature (slug I think), makes it climb to high exposed places and wiggle it's butt enticingly in an effort to get eaten, which is part of the life cycle of the parasite. For that matter, rabies disease is an excellent example of the free will of the infected creature being taken over by the virus, making it do things it would not normally choose to do. All very nice, but it only applies to the definition of FW that I provided.

I also tend to agree that an indeterministic selection of choice based on randomness wouldn't be desirable; it runs into the same problems as determinism, that being the choice isn't yours.

Disagree here. A choice based (partly or entirely) on randomness would still be your choice, but it wouldn't be a better one.

So to me, to salvage our idea of free will, it must be the case that either: 1) we are capable of making our own choices despite being determined by prior causes, or 2) our choices are indeterminant in the sense that they are not determined by prior causes, but the mechanism by which the choice is selected is not random chance.

Let me try to alter that to something closer to that which I might agree.
It must be the case that either:
1) 'Choices' are defined in such a way that they can be a product of causal physics. (notice that whether the laws of physics are deterministic or not is irrelevant here)
2) Our choices are are not a product of causal physics, in which case anything that has choice violates physical law.
3) 'Choice' is an illusion.

Notice that I never said 'free choice' anywhere, but I suppose you can put that in if you can come up with a distinction between the two.
I think LuckyR would deny the first two, so he says there is no choice, the 3rd option.
Given the list above, I would pick 1. I define choice (true, free, or otherwise) as a physical process.
The biggest proponents of free will tend to lean towards the second option, but are reluctant to come out and say it in the terms I used. They propose a supernatural entity (the 'mind') using the body as an avatar, which is possession in my book, something that cannot be done without violation of physical law.

For what it's worth, btw, I don't think there must be a hidden variable of sorts in quantum mechanics,

Well that eliminates a good deal of the deterministic options then.

For the record, as a relationalist, I think I qualify as a non-determinist since multiple different states can claim the same prior state.
— noAxioms

Isn't this what I asked when I talked about events with multiple outcomes?

Under my relational view, events don't have outcomes. Only measured things exist relative to a given event, and outcomes of an event cannot be measured by that event.

In other words, causes that have multiple potential effects?

MWI says that.
I carefully worded my statement, which says that multiple different states can claim the same prior state.
Since you used the word 'potential', I think I can agree to it. You have some unstable atom (the cause), and it might decay at any time in the next minute, or not in that time. That's a lot of different potential outcomes. All those resulting states can claim the same initial state (the atom at the beginning of the minute in question) as its prior state. In MWI, all of them happen. In Copenhagen, god rolls the dice (as you put it) and one of them happens. I'd have to look up some others to describe how they'd spin it.

No one has been able to predict human decision making, no matter how detailed their knowledge of the antecedent state might be. — LuckyR

A very weak statement since gathering even rudimentary knowledge of the antecedent state would kill a person. Over short periods and at the bio-chemistry level, human physiology is very classical and would be quite predictable if the state could be measured. That is also a weak statement, amounting to an unbacked assertion. Still, the negation of it is pretty simple: Somewhere inside a human, physics is either violated, or (for unexplained purposes) quantum randomness is amplified. It would be a simple matter to look for structures where either takes place. Nobody has found one. Descartes put it in the pinial gland, probably due to the fact that it was safely inaccessible to falsification at the time. Any study of it would kill the subject.

If such predictions could be made, it would be concrete proof of Determinism and a solid refutation of Free Will.

The are already far simpler systems that are nevertheless unpredictable, and that doesn't prove indeterminism. The ability to predict a classical system would similarly not constitute any kind of evidence of determinism.

You seem to completely deny the concept of choice at all. Why? Are you trying to argue that you should be held responsible for any actions? That would be like putting your hand in the fire and subsequently complaining that it's not your fault that you no longer have a hand.

BTW my last comment ... that I addressed to you was actually meant for ↪Jerry! — Alkis Piskas

I figured that out pretty quick when you quoted the OP and said 'your thesis'.

Free will comes in because even this sort of hypothetical world seems deterministic, because everything obeys the laws, and if things obey laws (like a cellular automata for example), there doesn't seem to be room for anything in the world to have a say in the matter. — Jerry

Disagree here. Yes, cellular automata is usually entirely deterministic, although one can design one that isn't. I can create something in a cellular automata, or say a Turning machine (also entirely deterministic), that makes choices, so I disagree that there's no room for anything that 'has a say', unless, like LuckyR, you deny the existence of choice just because they're the product of the laws chosen.

You seem to completely deny the concept of choice at all. Why? Are you trying to argue that you should be held responsible for any actions? That would be like putting your hand in the fire and subsequently complaining that it's not your fault that you no longer have a hand.

Huh? As a Free Will believer, I completely support the concept of (true) choice. In other words I believe that the conversation we each have in our minds where we go over the pros and cons, possible and probable outcomes, memories of similar incidents in the past, what have you, is where the choice is made, ie exactly as we perceive it in real time. I don't believe that the outcome is set before all of the aforementioned "pondering" by the physical and electrical brain state just before the act of "pondering". To my way of thinking this latter situation would amount to no True choice.

That is, what does a non-deterministic world with free will look like/how would it behave? — Jerry

The question concerns instantiations of freedom, no amount of formal systematising could give us evidence for these instants if they have not been experienced (this is both intuitive and provable), and to speak clearly about the topic of freedom we must expose these instants and define our concept of freedom by a duality.

We also have to be clear about what kind of thing it is which may or may not be free, and what kind of thing it is which is not free, luckily for us we could not even investigate these issues if these answers weren't already included in our questions, we summon the self as we so ask and we have no self to summon in the absence of the things that the self is not.

The things conjoined with the self is not infinite so therefore is the self not free without restrictions (it weren't even a self without restrictions).

We can further establish that concepts (abstractions) are also a necessary ground for freedom (though it is still unsolved whether it in addition to self and the non-self (say blue) is sufficient for freedom), we also know that the self is nothing without its concepts.

We know that freedom is impossible without concept, but we also know that freedom is one of the things which also becomes a concept for the self and we know that it is not concepts which were questioned to be free or not free and we must therefore accept that the concept of freedom is itself entirely unfree even if the self were determinably free in its will.

Let us investigate how concepts relates to the things they apply to, surely we can agree that the concept of elephant is far simpler than the experience of an elephant? And that the concept in proportion to its simplicity applies to many different individual creatures in Africa? Could this proportionality be the answer to our question of the freedom of the self? I believe so.

I believe freedom to act either towards A or B exists precisely because the proportionality between simplicity and reality allows for many simple things at once and that the will is the feeling towards either of the simple concepts.

I do not think that the will is freed from the feeling of either of the concepts, but i think the self is freed from the future it does not choose by not being reducible to the will. I do not think the will is free to choose which concept to "feel" for but I do think the self, in being always more than the natural will/volition is free to act within the limits of the simultaneity of its concepts.

You are not free to will anything, but your consciousness is more than the will itself and is therewith freed from it. The will is determined by the state of the universe, but consciousness through the "space" left it by the simple nature of its concepts is perpetually freed from the will, some humans excessively so.

This were not very well written, I hope to come back to the topic later and respond more directly to the OPs concerns by judging it under the principles I established, I also hope that it can be accepted by the moderators that I first delve into the concepts and then only later perform the deductive tasks of judging the post by means of them though as most threads here suggest common practice is to reverse that order.

As a Free Will believer, I completely support the concept of (true) choice. In other words I believe that the conversation we each have in our minds where we go over the pros and cons, possible and probable outcomes, memories of similar incidents in the past, what have you, is where the choice is made, ie exactly as we perceive it in real time. — LuckyR

All that would be the same even under hard determinism. Are you changing your definition here?
A chess computer does the deliberation. A thermostat doesn't particularly, so I can see the difference there. The chess computer is probably slightly more determined than the thermostat (less sensitive to small environmental fluctuations), but each is only truly deterministic if physics is.

You defined 'true choice' before in terms of determinism, not in terms of deliberation:

Just to be clear, the ANTECEDENT brain state is what I describe as the physical and electrical state of the brain.
...
Long story short, in Determinism antecedent state X always leads to resultant answer Y, never Z. In Free Will antecedent state X can lead to resultant answer Y or Z depending on the decision making process which occurred. — LuckyR

This is pretty funny since by this definition, we have free will even in a deterministic world because antecedent brain state X does not always lead to the same decision being made since decisions are not solely a function of the brain state. The decision of when to cross the street depends far more on the traffic than it does the antecedent brain state.
The deliberation clause seems to define a choice vs something else, such as what the thermostat does. You seem to only consider very formal pondering with a sort of verbal conversation going on, an internal discussion of pros and cons and such. Most choices take place far quicker than allowed by this slow formal method with might take days. The decision to swerve left or right (or not at all) for the deer crossing in front of you is very much a choice, and doesn't have any time to do all the steps you list above.
The formal decision making process is also very nice, but it's not where the decisions are made. Your conscious (rational) mind for instance knows that drinking is destroying your life and you've vowed never to touch a drink again, and yet you find yourself drinking at the next opportunity. The rational mind is not in charge. It is only in an advisory role, and the actual decisions often take its advice, but like with the deer, the rational mind is way too slow and the boss takes over for such situations, and the boss often has very different priorities than does the conscious part. This paragraph is pretty much opinion and the result of a lot of observation and experience. Most of it is irrelevant to the topic at hand, but I thought it fit in well here.


So here you have a different assertion:

I happen to believe that while brain states can and do INFLUENCE decision making, that there is another factor beyond brain states that participate in TRUE decision making — LuckyR

What is this other factor? Because there is only one in physics, which is randomness. There is no other information that can help. So if you go by that, the only way to make a true choice is to ponder up two or more viable options and then make a true random (not determined) choice between them, perhaps weighted. There are physical ways to do that in a non-deterministic interpretation of QM, but human physiology doesn't seem to have any mechanism to leverage it.

That said, I suspect that your 'other factor' is something other than randomness, which puts you in option 2 above: Humans and maybe nothing else can violate physics. Magic in other words. Your shots are being called by a external entity, which is possession by my definition ,a loss of free will, not the gaining of it. Simple to prove: Just show the circuitry that is sensitive to it somewhere in a human, something that does something that violates physical law, with the resulting signal being amplified to action rather than the action that the no-longer free brain might have chosen.

Did one of those two options (randomness, possession) describe your 'other factor', or do you care to fill me in on a 3rd option?

This is pretty funny since by this definition, we have free will even in a deterministic world because antecedent brain state X does not always lead to the same decision being made since decisions are not solely a function of the brain state. The decision of when to cross the street depends far more on the traffic than it does the antecedent brain state

Well, since in your view, Determinism can have antecedent state X leading to many possible resultant states, that (as I stated previously as you quoted) is a "Determinism" that I can get behind.

I am somewhat amused that you're stumped as to what additional factors might be responsible for multiple resultant states that are not "randomness", yet you provided one yourself. Namely traffic patterns when deciding when to cross the street.

Bottom line, I have previously conversed with Determinists who do believe 1) it's all about the antecedent brain state, 2) what we subjectively experience as pondering is an illusion and 3) there is only a single possible resultant state. I apologize for assuming your brand of Determinism was similar. You've been clear, though that none of those 3 features of other's Determinism is part of your understanding of it. Like I said before, that's the kind of "Determinism" I can live with.

Well, since in your view, Determinism can have antecedent state X leading to many possible resultant states — LuckyR

Well, under MWI it can, but I never said MWI was my view, so the above comment seems to be just something you made up. Bohmian mechanics is the only other prominent deterministic interpretation and state X cannot lead to different resultant states according to it.

I am somewhat amused that you're stumped as to what additional factors might be responsible for multiple resultant states that are not "randomness", yet you provided one yourself. Namely traffic patterns when deciding when to cross the street. — LuckyR

Ah, so your 'other factors' are simply antecedent states of something other than the brain. Yes, hopefully all decisions are based on such things, else sensory organs would be pointless. But if you include all antecedent states and not just the brain ones, then under determinism 'antecedent state X leads to' only one resultant state (not an actual choice by your assertions), and under non-determinism, it still leads to only one resultant state unless either randomness or some physics violation goes on, the only two choices I could think of.

The street crossing example was simply an illustration of how an antecedent brain state (your words) can easily result in different choices being made, even if the universe is utterly deterministic.

Bottom line, I have previously conversed with Determinists who do believe 1) it's all about the antecedent brain state, — LuckyR

OK, the street crossing example pretty much shoots that idea down, but I seriously doubt a determinist would make any such assertion unless they're incapable of logic, which I admit plenty are.

2) what we subjectively experience as pondering is an illusion

I think I know what they mean by that, but it makes it sound like we don't actually ponder at all. Why did humans evolve such an expensive brain (that has killed so many of us due to its cost) if it doesn't actually help make better decisions by 'pondering' better? Pondering is there since it is simply a deterministic mechanism doing what it's supposed to do. The illusion is that it is free, by the definition where multiple subsequent states can result from an antecedent state. But by those assertions, not sure why 'free' would be a good thing. I have a different definition of a free choice, one where it very much is a good thing.

3) there is only a single possible resultant state.

That sounds like Bohmian thinking. If so, they're right about that one. Still, I'm not impressed with the quality of the determinists with which you speak if they actually say especially the first thing, but I am also not impressed with your ability to actually convey somebody else's position, especially given the statement above headed by the words "in your view" and then stating something that isn't my view.

You've been clear, though that none of those 3 features of other's Determinism is part of your understanding of it.

The third one was, but again, it's not my view. Again, MWI is deterministic and it doesn't even assert the 3rd point. It says you choose both flavors, but not equally. The percentages of worlds with each choice getting less imbalanced the further back the antecedent state is. Far back enough and there are worlds where you don't even find yourself at the ice cream shop. Further back than that there's worlds without a you to make a decision.

I apologize for assuming your brand of Determinism was similar.

I never said I was a determinist. I'm just trying to figure you out, and I still don't know the factor that allows you to not choose the same flavor each time given multiple identical antecedent states. You seem to evade the question, like it's embarrassing. You say you believe in free choice, but you don't identify the mechanism via which the choice might be different given the same antecedent state. Is it something only humans can do? Can I build a device that leverages the same technique? If so, how? If not, why not?

I have a different definition of a free choice, one where it very much is a good thing

Okkaaayyy... You may be unimpressed with those who I have conversed with before (which is entirely reasonable) yet at least when they state a contrary opinion or fact those represent their beliefs. I guess I assumed too much in this exchange.

While I am happy to reply to your queries, could you please enlighten me with what you're referring to above. It is tedious having an exchange where one party's input is a set of opinions/understandings that they don't actually believe in.

You may be unimpressed with those who I have conversed with before (which is entirely reasonable) yet at least when they state a contrary opinion or fact those represent their beliefs. — LuckyR

If they state a contrary opinion, sure, since opinions are often based on beliefs. I try not to let my beliefs clutter a topic that isn't mine. I've been known to attack posters expressing beliefs in line with mine if I think their reasoning doesn't hold up.
I cannot figure out your stance. I can suspect it, but as I said, you seem really reluctant to identify the other factors that make multiple outcomes a reasonable likelihood, or why that would be preferable to a method that chooses best each time. So not sure if you're really happy to reply to my queries, which is OK, since again, it ain't my thread.

could you please enlighten me with what you're referring to above. — LuckyR

What, the different definition? I've mentioned that a few times. My choices are free if I'm the one making them, and not something else making them for me. Rabies was one example. I consider myself free willed because I'm not rabid, with my will being bent to the purposes of the Rabies instead of to my own purposes.
This is a pretty thin definition of free will which has nothing to do with determinism but it has not just a little to do with being responsible for one's actions. If I'm rabid, am I to be held responsible for trying to bite somebody?

It is my opinion that the best choices are made with classical methods, that is, not involving true randomness, which cannot make any decision better. Randomness is not to be confused with unpredictability. The latter might be very advantageous certain situations.

There are several schools of thought in this area. I think you are confusing Hard Determinism for Determinism. Those who tend to argue against free-will are Hard Determinists or Fatalists.

Determinists can easily believe we have free-will for the very same reasons you have stated. There are a plethora of different flavours of ‘Determinism’ though.

All in all it makes sense to live as if free-will is a thing rather than not.

Got it.

There are some things we know and others we don't. We know there are initial conditions before a "decision" is made (though don't know them in granular detail), we don't know the details of the process of decision making (it is thus essentially a Black Box) and we know that when faced with "choices", decisions of individuals can be predicted much better than random chance but nowhere near 100% of the time.

Obviously folks guess how the Black Box works. One possibility is that it's workings are predictable solely through physical laws, like neurology. Another acknowledges that physical laws play a role (perhaps a major role), but there are also factors that have not been demonstrated to be predictable solely by physical laws, like psychology.

I suspect that the impact of this factor is likely at the level of the prioritization of the various initial analyses (the pros and cons of various choices) to come up with the final decision.

This would explain why your memories of burritos and tacos would be the same, their prices would be the same etc, but sometimes you choose one over the other.

As a non professional in this field (you?), I don't follow the cutting edge of research but it is my prediction that this question will not be answered definitively in my lifetime.

One explanation of this is that initial conditions Determine decision making but we just don't currently know those conditions with enough detail. — LuckyR

Doesn't work, per Godel. One can know the initial conditions perfectly and still not be able to predict the outcome. Pretty trivial to set up an experiment that illustrates this. Determinism or not is an unknown. Predictability is not an unknown.

Yes, there are things we don't know, and that's where belief comes in. But many go way too far and claim to 'know' that their beliefs are true.

Your post seems to have been entered mid-sentence.

One can know the initial conditions perfectly and still not be able to predict the outcome

I’d love to hear the details of this trivial experiment.

If a Determinist can’t use his Determinism to predict outcomes, what is the practical value of this Determinism?

I’d love to hear the details of this trivial experiment. — LuckyR

You have a machine that is entirely deterministic and classical: It executes instructions, and its purpose is to win rock-paper-scissors. Make it as simple or complex, slow or fast as you want. Its opponent is an identical robot, and both of them know that. The way the program works is to predict what the other robot will do (something that is completely determined ahead of time) and play the output that beats that.
That's a demonstration of deterministic vs predictable.

If a Determinist can’t use his Determinism to predict outcomes, what is the practical value of this Determinism?

Who ever claimed that the view had a practical value? I suppose its value lies in the fact that true randomness doesn't come into play, a priority that ranks high in some people's opinion, notably Einstein who was quite vocal about his distaste of randomness (and non-locality).

You are still evading my question, trying to steer things to another track.

How can you believe in free will when you cannot identify the 'other factors' that allow more than one potential outcome to a given antecedent state? Or is this one of those faith things where you believe in something that you think sounds desirable when in fact you have no evidence for it? (for both having it, and for it being a good thing to have)

Well the programmer of the robot can predict with 100% accuracy what his robot is going to choose. Unless his program notes (accurately) that the three options are equally probable and therefore it chooses randomly.

As to the factor, lay persons call it "thinking" or "choosing". I'm not much into labels. If you want a scientific label, sorry, it lies within the Black Box of human decision making therefore no one has worked out the intricacies of that.

Well the programmer of the robot can predict with 100% accuracy what his robot is going to choose. — LuckyR

Can he now? Maybe if the program is really trivial, making no attempt to work out what the other robot would do. Otherwise, you need to back that statement up.

He can of course just do a test run and see what it outputs. Given identical antecedent states and a deterministic algorithm (both were specified), then it has to do that each time. But that isn't the programmer 'predicting' anything. It's past tense at that point, not a prediction of the future, but it is a prediction in terms of future runs, that it must output the same thing as all prior runs.

The machine of course cannot win at rock paper scissors. It by definition has to fail despite the fact that we programmed it to work out what the other robot will pick (paper say) and choose a winning output (scissors) instead. Despite it knowing the antecedent state of its totally deterministic opponent, it is incapable of making that prediction. Hence the story illustrating the difference between determinism and predictability.


For the record, they have robots that they trot out on talk shows and such, that play rock paper scissors against humans. It has a hand as its output. Each iteration effectively starts at the same 'antecedent brain state' and are fully deterministic. They win every time, but they never pit one against a similar robot, at least not on camera. It is entertaining as a human to try to beat it. Are humans so lacking in free will that a simple robot can predict you every time? No, it doesn't work that way. It's more of a illustration as to why machines are better at some tasks than are humans.

Unless his program notes (accurately) that the three options are equally probable and therefore it chooses randomly.

These are deterministic algorithms. A computer has no instruction for randomness, so no, there is no equal probability. Neither do you have such a randomness amplifier, even though creatures would have evolved one had there been any survival benefit to it.

As to the factor, lay persons call it thinking" or "choosing". I'm not much into labels.

I think the word 'pondering' went by. Anything (human, machine, whatever) can do that much even under hard determinism, so thinking" or "choosing" only lets you make a better choice. It isn't what is going to make it possible for an antecedent state leading to many possible resultant states. You seem to conflate a good choice with a free one. Your choice is not free by the definition you give.

Again, there are very few options available. One is that multiple resultant states are chosen, and then a truly random selection is made between them. So held the feeble old lady across the street, or take advantage of the feebleness and snatch her purse. You, being a good person, want to help her, but you also want the choice to be free, so you 'roll the dice' instead, and it picks 'mug her' this time (but not every time). So glad you have that free will.

The other option is possession. Your body/brain wants to mug her, but a supernatural demon has possessed you and makes your body (in violation of natural law) help her across the street instead. The demon is now responsible for the actions of your body, and not your own criminal brain, which is safely shoved into some kind of epiphenomenal state, lacking the free will to act out its evil intent. For this to work, somewhere natural law has to be violated, severing the intent of the brain, and instead reacting to something with no natural cause. It should be pretty easy to spot such an organ.

Wow. Where to start?

First, the robots that beat humans at rock, paper, scissors 100% of the time essentially cheat (that is they don't have any "thinking" algorithm) since their camera sees the human hand start whichever motion their human opponent has chosen, then with superhuman speed, has their mechanical "hand" display the winning hand rapidly to end the motion simultaneously with the human, thus fooling the human into thinking the two "chose" at the same time.

As to robot vs robot, since there is no "data" to enter into the algorithm to truly predict what the other robot will choose, the programmer has used some other way to come up with a choice. If one knows what the algorithm is, one can reproduce it.

As to pondering leading to different choices with the same input, I agree with you that humans commonly use the same analysis based on memories, emotions, objective variables such as price etc, however the priotization of the numerous variables leading to different choices in essentially identical situations is a common human experience. Any lay person has experienced this countless times.

If what you imagine is going on in the Black Box of human decision making was actually true, when faced with a decision between two choices of equal merit, humans would be unable to make a choice, yet we do every day.

First, the robots that beat humans at rock, paper, scissors 100% of the time essentially cheat (that is they don't have any "thinking" algorithm) — LuckyR

I disagree about it not thinking, but yes, it leverages its far faster reaction time to see what the human hand is going for and bases its choice on that. For that to work, it must think, and very quickly. It would be instructive to put the robot in front of a mirror.
It takes far less thinking to just pick a seemingly random choice, and quite a bit more to learn its opponent's habits and begin to anticipate subsequent moves.

As to robot vs robot, since there is no "data" to enter into the algorithm to truly predict what the other robot will choose, the programmer has used some other way to come up with a choice.

Well, the data is that it knows exactly how the other robot is programmed, and thus it knows that its choice is determined. But the programmer knows the task to be mathematically impossible, leaving him with nothing to attempt the task.

If one knows what the algorithm is, one can reproduce it.

But the robot does know its opponent's algorithm, and is nevertheless incapable of predicting its outcome. That's the point I'm trying to make: illustration of the difference between determinism and predictability. You seem to see it.

As to pondering leading to different choices with the same input, I agree with you that humans commonly use the same analysis based on memories, emotions, objective variables such as price etc, however the priotization of the numerous variables leading to different choices in essentially identical situations is a common human experience.

That it is, but the antecedent states are never the same. Something critical is different when a different choice is made. Humans cannot be aware of that because they're never get to do anything twice. An antecedent state is never repeated. So the common human experience is of not always choosing the same thing, which, coupled with a naive assessment of identical antecedent state, results in what others have called 'the illusion of freedom'.in choice. Perhaps this is what you're getting at. The 'other factors' is simply antecedent states that are not identical. A huge factor is simply memory of the last time this choice came up, and wanting to not do the same thing all the time, hence picking a different ice cream today because you remember vanilla from last time.

If what you imagine is going on in the Black Box of human decision making was actually true, when faced with a decision between two choices of equal merit, humans would be unable to make a choice, yet we do every day.

Humans don't freeze in that scenario. It's called a metastable state, and we have a very fast mechanism to break such states, as is necessary for survival.
It comes up frequently in electronics, say a race between the Jeopardy buttons to indicate the one contenstant that pushed his button first. What if it's a tie? The circuit cannot freeze nor can it pick both. A metastability breaker is put in to resolve the condition. Mathematically, the task is impossible, but the resolution hammers the probability of continued metastability down to super low probabilities.

Maybe you can guess what sort of field I work in based on some of that.

If you accept this, which you may not, I want to then bring it back to our reality and ask this: if such a system is possible, can we know for certain that it is impossible for a system isomorphic to what I described may emerge from the goings on in our universe? So might those axiomatic truths in a possible world be actualized in our world through whatever interactions occur that produce our mind? It isn't clear to me that this is impossible. — Jerry

Or, to put it another way: If you wanted to implement an agent, how might you do it? Perhaps you would... I don't know... make something resembling a brain.

Determinism that tells us that what we perceive as decision making every single day is, in fact an illusion and that in reality "decisions" are not the product of pondering, rather are determined by the physical and electrical state of the brain before the supposed "decision" is made — LuckyR

I disagree. The act of pondering could be a deterministic process and still not be an illusion. Peter Tse ("The Neural Basis for Free Will") has proposed a neurological basis for mental causation. Even if an individual's pondering can only produce one possible result, it's still the case that this pondering was a necessary part of the causal chain that produced this result.

Even if an individual's pondering can only produce one possible result, it's still the case that this pondering was a necessary part of the causal chain that produced this result. — Relativist

Fully agreed. The process of pondering is, apparently, implemented in physical brains doing physical things. That's not the illusion of pondering, that's what pondering is.