does this implied subject need to be made aware that it is a self in order to deserve the name? — kudos
When you think of yourself, there is a concept with which you can play with; I am referring to such concept. The idea would be to explore the concepts necessary for the formation of the concept of the self, whatever the true nature of the self is. — Daniel
…..one might say that one needs to form a concept of shape before having a concept of self since it might be very difficult to reference/contemplate/visualize/imagine something if one does not comprehend or has the capacity to comprehend that there are shapes…. — Daniel
do you believe we posses an idea/concept of our individual self? — Daniel
I would like to focus your attention to this idea and ask you if you think that the existence of such idea is dependent on the formation of some other concepts, or if it can be formed without the need of any other concepts, — Daniel
(I wanna know if you understand what my purpose is) — Daniel
Is the self and the idea of it two distinct things? — Daniel
Wouldn't a distinction imply conceptualization? — Daniel
….about things affecting themselves… — wonderer1
I guess Im trying to separate the idea of the self from the self itself. — Daniel
….about things affecting themselves…
— wonderer1
I wasn’t being so general, meaning only the self by my comment. See below, if you like. — Mww
From my perspective it seems fairly obvious that we affect ourselves — wonderer1
Perdurantist. New one on me. — Mww
Perdurantism or perdurance theory is a philosophical theory of persistence and identity.[1] The debate over persistence currently involves three competing theories—one three-dimensionalist theory called "endurantism" and two four-dimensionalist theories called "perdurantism" and "exdurantism". For a perdurantist, all objects are considered to be four-dimensional worms and they make up the different regions of spacetime. It is a fusion of all the perdurant's instantaneous time slices compiled and blended into a complete mereological whole. Perdurantism posits that temporal parts alone are what ultimately change. Katherine Hawley in How Things Persist states that change is "the possession of different properties by different temporal parts of an object".[2]
Take any perdurant and isolate a part of its spatial region. That isolated spatial part has a corresponding temporal part to match it. We can imagine an object, or four-dimensional worm: an apple. This object is not just spatially extended but temporally extended. The complete view of the apple includes its coming to be from the blossom, its development, and its final decay. Each of these stages is a temporal time slice of the apple, but by viewing an object as temporally extended, perdurantism views the object in its entirety.
The use of "endure" and "perdure" to distinguish two ways in which an object can be thought to persist can be traced to David Kellogg Lewis (1986)...
I think Corvus and Mww argue that the idea of the self is not an element of the set of ideas. — Daniel
the exercise is concerned with the idea of the self. — Daniel
So, the purpose of this thread is to explore those ideas/concepts/mental objects that might be required for the formation and sustenance of the self, assuming the self is contingent on previously formed concepts; — Daniel
This idea is absurd in that, if all these ideas/concepts/mental objects are the self, then you end up having 1000s of different selfs. — Corvus
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