Granted, it's also fun to try to eat the whole meal in one bite. :grin: — Leontiskos
even in this scenario things are human-mind independent. — Janus
Catholics accept the current cosmological paradigm, according to which the cosmos existed for far, far longer without humans than it has with them. — Janus
Granted, it's also fun to try to eat the whole meal in one bite. :grin: — Leontiskos
Yes, it's syncretist, and definitely unorthodox but there is a thread. — Wayfarer
The point was simply that both Leibniz' and Berkeley's metaphysics fall apart if you remove God. — Janus
Actually that wasn't the point. — plaque flag
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpintroa.htm#A1aThe bodily forms of those great minds who are the heroes of this history, the temporal existence and outward lives of the philosophers, are, indeed, no more, but their works and thoughts have not followed suit, for they neither conceived nor dreamt of the rational import of their works. Philosophy is not somnambulism, but is developed consciousness; and what these heroes have done is to bring that which is implicitly rational out of the depths of Mind, where it is found at first as substance only, or as inwardly existent, into the light of day, and to advance it into consciousness and knowledge. This forms a continuous awakening. Such work is not only deposited in the temple of Memory as forms of times gone by, but is just as present and as living now as at the time of its production. ... The conquests made by Thought when constituted into Thought form the very Being of Mind. Such knowledge is thus not learning merely, or a knowledge of what is dead, buried and corrupt: the history of Philosophy has not to do with what is gone, but with the living present.
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Since the progress of development is equivalent to further determination, and this means further immersion in, and a fuller grasp of the Idea itself-that the latest, most modern and newest philosophy is the most developed, richest and deepest. In that philosophy everything which at first seems to be past and gone must be preserved and retained, and it must itself be a mirror of the whole history. The original philosophy is the most abstract, because it is the original and has not as yet made any movement forward; the last, which proceeds from this forward and impelling influence, is the most concrete. This, as may at once be remarked, is no mere pride in the philosophy of our time, because it is in the nature of the whole process that the more developed philosophy of a later time is really the result of the previous operations of the thinking mind; and that it, pressed forwards and onwards from the earlier standpoints, has not grown up on its own account or in a state of isolation. — Hegel
now you seem to be flirting with full-fledged Idealism — Leontiskos
So the conviction was bound to spread more and more that in the final analysis all that man could really know was what was repeatable, what he could put before his eyes at any time in an experiment. Everything that he can see only at secondhand remains the past and, whatever proofs may be adduced, is not completely knowable. Thus the scientific method, which consists of a combination of mathematics (Descartes!) and devotion to the facts in the form of the repeatable experiment, appears to be the one real vehicle of reliable certainty. The combination of mathematical thinking and factual thinking has produced the science-orientated intellectual standpoint of modern man, which signifies devotion to reality insofar as it is capable of being shaped. The fact has set free the faciendum, the “made” has set free the “makable”, the repeatable, the provable, and only exists for the sake of the latter. It comes to the primacy of the “makable” over the “made”. . . — Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, Section 1.4
It all goes back to disagreement, and what to do about it, how to think about it.Who is "us"? Mankind as a whole, any particular person, or a particular person (but not some other person)?
— baker
I would have thought it should be obvious that I was referring to the way things generally appear to humans; you know, things like 'trees have leaves', 'water flows downhill,', 'clear skies are blue' and countless other well-established commonalities of appearances. — Janus
Given that people often say "This isn't real, it's all in your mind", there's clearly more to it.The differences in locutions are not superficial.
— baker
I think what you say here has no relevance to what it aims to respond to.
Traditional literary theory disagrees with you.In any case, the person who told you're wrong to like Portrait of a Lady was speaking idiotically; it's uncontroversial that there is no accounting for taste, no possibility of establishing objective aesthetic criteria.
Splendid Hegel quote. Just the kind of thing that Marx inverted. — Wayfarer
Coming into the world, one grows into a determinate tradition of speaking, seeing, interpreting. Being-in-the-world is an already-having-the-world-thus-and-so.
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Dasein, whiling away its own time in each case, is at the same time always [also, even primarily ] a generation. So a specific interpretedness precedes every Dasein in the shape of the generation itself. What is preserved in the generation is itself the outcome of earlier views and disputes, earlier interpretations and past concerns.
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Such a forgotten past is inherent in the prevailing interpretedness of being-together-with-one-another. To the extent that Dasein lives from ... this past, it is this past itself.
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The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility.
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... the 'fore'-character in the structure of interpretedness shows us that it is none other than what has already been that jumps ahead, as it were, of a present time pervaded by interpretedness. Guided by its interpretedness, expectant concern lives its own past.
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Dasein 'is' history.
The past is not an earlier position but the now implicitly functioning past....the past functions to "interpret" the present,...the past is changed by so functioning. — Gendlin
derivative on the thing that exists in itself
Can you unfold this ? My bias is that you won't find more than what Mill described, but perhaps you'll surprise me. — plaque flag
These various possibilities are the important thing to me in the world. My present sensations are generally of little importance, and are moreover fugitive: the possibilities, on the contrary, are permanent, which is the character that mainly distinguishes our idea of Substance or Matter from our notion of sensation.
The object itself and not some representation of it is known. — plaque flag
And traditionally, and in general, the way many people try to overcome disagreement (and to win verbal disputes) is to posit the existence of an external world of which they claim or imply to have special knowledge, and that anyone who doesn't think the way they do is wrong, bad, evil, or in some other way defective. — baker
:up:Further, no one actually thinks about objects in such a way. . — Leontiskos
Of course. But most people aren't philosophers. — plaque flag
It may be hard to see because radical indirect realism is so sexy. I watched a Donald Hoffman Ted talk, and it was gripping. I knew it was fallacious and confused, but I still enjoyed it. I felt the pull of the sci-fi. I could be one of the those in on the Secret, while others were lost in the shadow play on the cave wall. — plaque flag
Mill is close to talking about a representation (sensation) rather than the object itself. He is defining the object in terms of sensation-representation. — Leontiskos
The non-sequitur is that, just because we know objects through sensation, it does not follow that objects just are possibilities of sensation. — Leontiskos
Of course. But most people aren't philosophers. — plaque flag
Also, I have always thought this would be an interesting study in itself. What does it mean for a philosopher to redefine a commonly used term? For instance, what does it mean when Mill comes along and redefines objects as possibilities of sensation? Is this not equivocation? — Leontiskos
Explication (unfolding) is not redefinition. — plaque flag
Presumably what he is trying to do is convince the world that an object is not what they suppose it to be, but this is too seldom explicit. My favorite philosophers are very careful to avoid this sort of redefinition. — Leontiskos
An "unfolding" which contradicts the previous notion is redefinition. — Leontiskos
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htmWhat is “familiarly known” is not properly known, just for the reason that it is “familiar”. When engaged in the process of knowing, it is the commonest form of self-deception, and a deception of other people as well, to assume something to be familiar, and give assent to it on that very account. Knowledge of that sort, with all its talk, never gets from the spot, but has no idea that this is the case. Subject and object, and so on, God, nature, understanding, sensibility, etc., are uncritically presupposed as familiar and something valid, and become fixed points from which to start and to which to return. The process of knowing flits between these secure points, and in consequence goes on merely along the surface. Apprehending and proving consist similarly in seeing whether every one finds what is said corresponding to his idea too, whether it is familiar and seems to him so and so or not.
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Analysis of an idea, as it used to be carried out, did in fact consist in nothing else than doing away with its character of familiarity.
Come on though, that's presumption, as you say. Uncharitable. And Mill is dead. So please just try to understand me, and then defeat my position. — plaque flag
Respectfully, you still haven't met my challenge, unless I haven't got to that part yet.
How do you understand the existence of physical objects ? — plaque flag
...So the point for me is not sensation (though sense organs are involved) but perspective. The object is always situated in a field of vision, and we understand it in the first place as something that could be looked at. — plaque flag
What previous definition ? People most use words like tools with pre-theoretical skill. Concept-mongering practical primates. Making it explicit is hard work. — plaque flag
Objects are things that we encounter through our senses, not possibilities of sensation. — Leontiskos
I think what we understand in the first place is a thing, and secondarily that the thing has perceptible properties, and then later that the thing likely has non-perceptible properties. — Leontiskos
That's just a rephrasing, it seems to me. — plaque flag
I think someone like Mill is saying, "Objects are this and not that. Your pre-theoretical view was mistaken." I don't think he is saying that "this" unfolds from "that", such that both are secure. — Leontiskos
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