I am sorry, I don't feel there is much fruitful to be gained in continuing this specific conversation. I find it very difficult to engage with your way of writing, it all seems very vague — Apustimelogist

Sorry about this. It isn't at all vague but perhaps it looks that way. My basic point is that your idea of consciousness is bound to lead to problems. Rogue AI makes the point is a different way.

See, evrn in this reply you don't make a constructive point which makes it difficult for me to have an answer or even know what I am supposed to be defending.

You're conflating consciousness and experience, but I;m suggesting that the former is prior to the latter. Bear in mind that experience-experiencer is a duality that must be reduced in order to overcome dualism — FrancisRay

How does making consciousness prior to experience eliminate the hard problem, which results from separating body and mind, subject and object? It seems to me that your approach reifies dualism by hardening the separation between these aspects of being. Dont we need to find a way to think subject and object, mind and world, inside and outside, feeling and thinking, experiencer and experience together, rather than giving one side priority over the other?

How does making consciousness prior to experience eliminate the hard problem, which results from separating body and mind, subject and object? It seems to me that your approach reifies dualism by hardening the separation between these aspects of being. Dont we need to find a way to think subject and object, mind and world, inside and outside, feeling and thinking, experiencer and experience together, rather than giving one side priority over the other? — Joshs

Yes! This is exactly what we need to do. The only way to do it is to assume consciousness is fundamental and prior to all the distinctions that give rise to dualism.

This requires assuming that intentional or 'subject/object' consciousness reduces to the the 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss' of the Upanishads. This is nondualism, the rejection of all the distinctions that you say we should reject.

We seem to agree but maybe use the words differently.

This requires assuming that intentional or 'subject/object' consciousness reduces to the the 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss' of the Upanishads. This is nondualism, the rejection of all the distinctions that you say we should reject.

We seem to agree but maybe use the words differently — FrancisRay

Phenomenology offers this kind of approach, and a number of writers embracing phenomenology ( Evan Thompson, Francisco Varela) have tried to meld this philosophy with meditative traditions. But I have a problem with the notion of pure self-reflexive awareness, precisely in its claim to being devoid of intentional content.
The phenomenologist Edmund Husserl reduced everything to consciousness, but this ‘inwardness’ consisted of self and object poles in inseparable interaction via intentional directness. The nature of the self is continually being transformed by the world.

Yep. There are all sorts of ideas out there, But only one survives close analysis.and has the ability to explain philosophy. For nondualism the subject-object distinction is of a functional order only and must be reduced for a fundamental theory.

This theory states that nothing really exists or ever really happens, so it is quite easy to distinguish from the ideas you mention. For the mystic the explanation of one phenomenon is the the explanation for all of them, so phenomenology is a doddle. At present, however, phenomenology is unable to explain even one phenomenon, since to do so would require a systematic metaphysical theory.
As there is only one reality and only one way that it works there is only one fundamental theory.that works.


. .

An experience requires an experiencer. I;m suggesting that if you explore your consciousness you are capable of transcending this duality for the final truth about consciousness. The task would be to 'Know thyself', as advised by the Delphic oracle. When Lao Tzu is asked how he knows the origin of the universe he answers, 'I look inside myself and see'. . . — FrancisRay

To say that consciousness is fundamental is to propose an answer to a metaphysical question. I had thought you agreed with me that metaphysical questions are undecidable, which I take to mean they cannot be definitively answered.

'Consciousness' is just a word. What do we mean when we say consciousness is fundamental? Our notion of consciousness finds its genesis in understanding consciousness as intentional consciousness wherein there is always something that consciousness is of.

If this is right, the idea of consciousness is necessarily dualistic, and thus would have no place in non-dualism.

It is also worth noting that in the context of Buddhism the Yogācāra or "mind-only" school is only one among many schools. And the salient question is whether it was meant to be an ontological position rather than a phenomenological explanation of experience and a conceptual aid to practice.

We could equally say that being is fundamental, but 'being' is also just a word, and also misses the non-dual mark.

We could equally say that being is fundamental, but 'being' is also just a word, and also misses the non-dual mark. — Janus

To me 'being' is just empty enough to work. But it is indeed just a word. The nondual stuff doesn't even need a name. We might also agree with James that monism is just as easily conceived as a radical pluralism. There are all kinds of things as many as we care to come up with. But those things are, so 'being' is not so bad, seems to me. The 'world' is also good, if it's understood to include everything.

This theory states that nothing really exists or ever really happens, so it is quite easy to distinguish from the ideas you mention. — FrancisRay

Such a theory is so obviously false that it only make sense if understood as ironic or metaphorical. It's like 'all is vanity.' Or there's a line in Kafka's journal to the effect that 'nothing has yet happened.' Poetic, maybe profound, but hard to see as something one argues about. Along these lines, I would never argue that 'all is vanity.'

To me 'being' is just empty enough to work. But it is indeed just a word. The nondual stuff doesn't even need a name. We might also agree with James that monism is just as easily conceived as a radical pluralism. There all kinds of things. But those things are, so 'being' is not so bad, seems to me. The 'world' is also good, if it's understood to include everything. — plaque flag

I'm down with that although I would say it depends on what we mean by "world"; do we mean "human world' or simply 'world' as in 'everything that is' including what may be unknowable to the human?

I'm down with that although I would say it depends on what we mean by "world"; do we mean "human world' or simply 'world' as in 'everything that is' including what may be unknowable to the human? — Janus

That gets us into metaphysical details. Is there a difference in the first place ? I will of course grant that humans always have more to learn, that we are always surrounded or fringed by darkness.

There is a clear conceptual distinction between 'knowable' and 'unknowable'. Can it be proven that everything is knowable or that some things are unknowable? Fitch's Paradox of Knowability?

Phenomenology is the business of describing how things appear to be, not explaining anything in terms of metaphysical theses.

There is a clear conceptual distinction between 'knowable' and 'unknowable'. Can it be proven that everything is knowable or that some things are unknowable? Fitch's Paradox of Knowability? — Janus

Given the Kantian background, I'm slower to commit, because metaphysical types can come up with some strange phrases (I don't mean you, but just the context of this forum.) But the world (as I understand it) includes all sorts of possibilities, including 'unknown unknowns,' but this kind of speech is at the limit of intelligibility. Consider how many paradoxes there are in naive set theory. It's very easy for humans to snap together words into phrases that do not compute.

It's very easy for humans to snap together words into phrases that do not compute. — plaque flag

Doesn't compute to who, though? The distinction is perfectly clear to me; perhaps you cannot understand how that could be, but conversely it is hard for me to understand why it is not clear to you. This is just down to the fact that we all think differently, accept different foundational presuppositions and so on. This is exactly why metaphysical questions are undecidable; and that doesn't mean that you or I cannot decide one way or the other what to believe, but that there can be no definitive demonstration of truth regarding metaphysical propositions.

there can be no definitive demonstration of truth regarding metaphysical propositions. — Janus

That sounds like an analytic proposition, with metaphysical propositions thereby implicitly defined. Which is fine, if endlessly debatable. I like the word ontology better myself.

That sounds like an analytic proposition, with metaphysical propositions thereby implicitly defined. Which is fine, if endlessly debatable. I like the word ontology better myself. — plaque flag

It's a synthetic phenomenological proposition in that it reflects the actual and historical situation, as experienced and reflected upon by me. Have you encountered and can you present one metaphysical question which can be shown to be decidable?

Metaphysics can be understood to be reducible to ontology, but it can also be understood that ontology is subsumed by metaphysics. It depends on how you want to define the terms.

It depends on how you want to define the terms. — Janus

:up:

Sure. And that's the essence of my response.

Sure. And that's the essence of my response. — plaque flag

Right, so it all comes down to personal preference.

Speaking of the hard problem, a letter was published in Sept 2023, signed by 100 notable scientific researchers, to the effect that the currently-popular ‘theory of consciousness’, IIT (Integrated Information Theory) is pseudoscience. It’s caused a furore,

Earlier this week, a letter signed by over 100 researchers, including several philosophers, was published online, calling a popular theory of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT), “pseudoscience.”

Others, including some who themselves have criticized IIT, have called the letter “so bad” and “unsupported by good reasoning.

On both sides of the dispute are concerns about the reception of ideas beyond those researching them. The authors of the letter are concerned about the damaging effects that taking IIT seriously might have on certain clinical and ethical issues, while the critics of the letter are concerned about the damaging effects that accusations of pseudoscience might have on the whole field of consciousness studies.

The letter, published at PsyArXiv, is a response to publicity about IIT following the recent resolution of a bet made in 1998 between David Chalmers and Christof Koch. The bet was over whether, within the next 25 years, someone would discover a specific signature of consciousness in the brain, with Koch betting yes and Chalmers betting no. Chalmers was recently declared the winner of the bet, based on recent testing of two theories of consciousness, global network workspace theory (GNWT) and IIT.

The letter’s primary authors are a group of scientists, but the signatories include several philosophers, including Peter Carruthers, Patricia Churchland, Sam Cumming, Felipe De Brigard, Daniel Dennett, Keith Frankish, Adina Roskies, Barry Smith, and others.

The letter writers take issue with the reported status of IIT as a leading theory of consciousness:

The experiments seem very skillfully executed by a large group of trainees across different labs. However, by design the studies only tested some idiosyncratic predictions made by certain theorists, which are not really logically related to the core ideas of IIT, as one of the authors himself also acknowledges. The findings therefore do not support the claims that the theory itself was actually meaningfully tested, or that it holds a ‘dominant’, ‘well-established’, or ‘leading’ status.

More here.

My take: ‘theories of consciousness’ can’t conform with modern scientific practice, which begins with the assumption of the separation of knower and known. Phenomenology, of course, sees through this, but then, it was never the target of the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ argument.

My take: ‘theories of consciousness’ can’t conform with modern scientific practice, which begins with the assumption of the separation of knower and known. — Wayfarer

Do you think those "100 notable scientific researchers" would agree?

The criterion of objectivity would presume that, would it not?

I don't know what criterion of objectivity you are referring to.

Have you read the letter referred to? It seems mostly concerned with the way the media and IIT proponents have been interacting. I don't see any reason, based on the letter, to think that the signatories would agree with your take.

I read it. I’m making a philosophical observation, not offering a scientific theory.

To say that consciousness is fundamental is to propose an answer to a metaphysical question. I had thought you agreed with me that metaphysical questions are undecidable, which I take to mean they cannot be definitively answered. — Janus

You make a good point. I spoke sloppily. They are undecidable if one assumes that their extreme answers are an instance of A/not-A. For a neutral theory they are not. Both the extreme answers would be be incorrect and there is a third answer. So they are undecidable but answerable. It's like asking whether two plus two equals three or five. This question is undecidable as asked, but not an intractable problem. , .

'Consciousness' is just a word. What do we mean when we say consciousness is fundamental?
Our notion of consciousness finds its genesis in understanding consciousness as intentional consciousness wherein there is always something that consciousness is of.

Oh yes, another good point. Intentional consciousness is clearly not fundamental. The words are difficult. I'm speaking of the 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss' of the Upanishads. .

If this is right, the idea of consciousness is necessarily dualistic, and thus would have no place in non-dualism.

Another good point. An inability to see beyond intentional consciousness might be the most ubiquitous problem in modern consciousness studies. . . .

It is also worth noting that in the context of Buddhism the Yogācāra or "mind-only" school is only one among many schools. And the salient question is whether it was meant to be an ontological position rather than a phenomenological explanation of experience and a conceptual aid to practice.

I'm endorsing Middle Wat Buddhism, which is an ontology and epistemology.(since 'knowing' would be fundamental) as described by Nagarjuna, who attempted to normalize the sangha on a specific metaphysical position.
.

We could equally say that being is fundamental, but 'being' is also just a word, and also misses the non-dual mark.

All the words are hopeless. Words are inherently dualistic. Really we should say 'Being/non-Being' Hence Lao Tzu states 'True words seem paradoxical'. Sri Aurobindo explains this point clearly in his 'Life Divine'. But we have to use words, and the usual words are 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss'. . . . .

Such a theory is so obviously false that it only make sense if understood as ironic or metaphorical. — plaque flag

I can;t fight against this sort approach. Okay, so you think you know know the Perennial philosophy.is false. Lots of people think the same. I feel you'd be better off trying to understand it before dismissing it, but it's your choice.

rancisRay
Phenomenology is the business of describing how things appear to be, not explaining anything in terms of metaphysical theses. — Janus

Quite so. Although even phenomenologists seem to sometimes forget this.

I've enjoyed our chat but feel we're at loggerheads. No problem, but if it's okay I'll drop out here. We'll cross paths again no doubt. Cheers.

It's like asking whether two plus two equals three or five. This question is undecidable as asked, but not an intractable problem. , . — FrancisRay

I am not getting your drift here—I see the question as decidable two plus two does not equal either three or five. If the question is whether reality is foundationally matter or mind, or something else, we cannot answer; and that is what I mean by undecidable. The closest we might get to a decision there would be to say the question is inapt, that no answer we give can state the actuality.

I'm speaking of the 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss' of the Upanishads. . — FrancisRay

I think the same goes for this answer. We don't know, discursively, what "being. consciousness, bliss" is, so discursively speaking it is a non-answer. One might enjoy an altered state of consciousness wherein one feels and thinks intuitively "Oh, this must be the satchitananda the sages speak of", but this remains an experience, open to different interpretations. Another person might say "I saw God". These kinds of experiences are ineffable and discursive interpretation necessarily distorts them because thought and language are inherently dualistic, and such experiences, in fact I would say all experiences, are inherently non-dual.

Another good point. An inability to see beyond intentional consciousness might be the most ubiquitous problem in modern consciousness studies. . . — FrancisRay

I agree, though I'm not convinced we should expect any discursive or analytic investigation to be able to see beyond intentional consciousness. One might have an experience that convinces one that one sees beyond intentional consciousness, but the belief that one sees beyond intentional consciousness is itself a dualistic interpretation of a non-dual experience.

I'm endorsing Middle Wat Buddhism, which is an ontology and epistemology.(since 'knowing' would be fundamental) as described by Nagarjuna, who attempted to normalize the sangha on a specific metaphysical position. — FrancisRay

Yes, I think this is analogous to what Hadot says about some ancient philosophies: that they were systems of ideas designed to be aids to spiritual transformations and realization, not discursive propositions to be debated.

All the words are hopeless. Words are inherently dualistic. Really we should say 'Being/non-Being' Hence Lao Tzu states 'True words seem paradoxical'. Sri Aurobindo explains this point clearly in his 'Life Divine'. But we have to use words, and the usual words are 'Being, Consciousness, Bliss'. . . . . — FrancisRay

:up: I agree; those words do seem to be the most appropriate in the context of spirituality.

Quite so. Although even phenomenologists seem to sometimes forget this. — FrancisRay

Yes, they are merely fallible humans like the rest of us, and it is very human to want to overstep one's bounds.

In a nutshell: because correlation doesn’t explain consciousness. — Art48

Any operational-scientific definition of consciousness will work just fine. We can agree to attribute 'consciousness' to this human body or that moon-sized computer, given this or that set of observations. But (here's where I go nondualist and weird and controversial) what people are trying to say (if they could wriggle out of the net?) is that consciousness is being itself. But, for just that reason, there is no consciousness. Rashomon. Or As I Lay Dying. The unreliable narrator is inextricably tangled with the narrated. Ontological cubism. 'But tell us what really happened, apart from all telling...' There's just the world-from-perspectives, an utter fusion of the subject and object. Though these categories remain practically relevant. The empirical-normative subject is not going anywhere. It's a basic technology like language (and both are part of the same system, really?)