But do you agree that it is possible for proposition A to be true while B is false?

Wait--aside from switching "event" out for "entity," you're arguing that that it can't be the case that x just in case it was possible that not-x. — Terrapin Station

I don't understand what you mean.

Of course, and I have already stated that. This is so because even if we say we know that Caesar died, we don't know whether Caesar was murdered.

And do you agree that if A and B correspond to the same entity, then a situation in which A is true and B is false is impossible? (it simply follows from the definition of correspondence)

If statement A and B do correspond to actuality, then they do, and if they do not, then they do not. Of course it is logically possible that they might not have both corresponded to the same event, but in that case actuality would have been different. Possibility has nothing to do with actual correspondence, though, as far as I can tell.

This is not what the correspondence theory says though. The thing that correspond to a true proposition is not simply 'actuality' but a particular entity which is relevant to the meaning of the proposition. So if you have a true proposition such as "Trump is the president" then not everything which exists in the world is relevant to the truth of the proposition, like the fact that London is the capital of England or whatever. And this is for a simple reason: the proposition that "Trump is the president" still could be true even if London wasn't the capital of England, so surely London and England are irrelevant to the truth of "Trump is the president", even when both propositions happen to be true. So you must select only the entities which 'track' all the possibilities in which the proposition is true (like Trump for example), otherwise you'll get into absurdities.

If statement A and B do correspond to actuality, then they do, and if they do not, then they do not. Of course it is logically possible that they might not have both corresponded to the same event, but in that case actuality would have been different. Possibility has nothing to do with actual correspondence, though, as far as I can tell. — John

Maybe one way to explain what Fafner is driving at is this: If in the actual world A corresponds to x and B corresponds to y, where

A is the claim that Caesar died,
B is the claim that Caesar was murdered,
x is the event of Caesar's dying,
y is the event of Caesar's being murdered,

then, on the assumption that x and y denote the same numerically identical physical event, what make it the case that A is true is the very same thing that makes it the case that B is true, namely: x

However, it seems that there is something specific about x that makes it the case that B is true, namely that Caesar's actual death was a case of murder. But if it is only in virtue of x being a case of murder that x makes B true, then it would seem that what B "corresponds to" is something intensional about y, and not merely extensional; it is a concept under which the 'event' falls. And therefore it can't be y qua physical event that makes B true.

(On some accounts, it would rather be because the Fregean thought expressed by B is identical with the fact of Caesar's having been murdered that B is true. But then, this fact and the Fregean proposition expressed by B don't merely correspond to each other. They are identical.)

But any actual entity is only in principle separable from all other entities, not actually separable; so again you are talking about possibility, not actuality. The correspondence account of propositional truth is literally the only game in town it seems. It is the very same logic as Tarski's formulation

Possibility has nothing to do with actual correspondence, though, as far as I can tell. — John

Possibility has a lot to do with correspondence in general, because claims about possibility follow logically from the definition of correspondence (and therefore I have a full right to use premises about possibility when arguing against correspondence).

P is true = there's entity x corresponding to P
P is false = entity x doesn't exist (= the entity which would correspond to P if P were true)

It follows for the definition that if you have two propositions such that one could be true while the other is false, then it follows logically that they cannot correspond to the same entity when true. Because consider:

1) Assume A is true = entity x exists.
2) Assume B is false = entity y doesn't exist (B would be true if y existed).
3) If x can exist when y doesn't, then x is not identical with y (Leibniz law).
4) Therefore A and B are different propositions, since they don't correspond to the same entity when true.

x is the event of Caesar's dying,
y is the event of Caesar's being murdered, — Pierre-Normand

They are the same event iff Caesar was murdered. " Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered" are different statements about the event is all. They bear a different relation to one another: if the second statement is true then the first necessarily is. but the obverse does not follow. What's the point of trying to complicate it?

"Caesar was murdered with a knife"

"Caesar was murdered with a knife made in Japan"

"Caesar was murdered with a knife that severed his aorta"

"Caesar was murdered with a knife wielded by a man who was his friend"

And so, ad infintum...

They are the same event iff Caesar was murdered. " Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered" are different statements about the event is all. They bear a different relation to one another: if the second statement is true then the first necessarily is. but the obverse does not follow. What's the point of trying to complicate it? — John

It follows from the definition of correspondence that if two propositions corresponds to the same entity when true, then they are the same proposition, but "Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered" are not the same proposition.

They are the same event iff Caesar was murdered. — John

Precisely. In my post I only considered the actual world, not any alternative possibilities. And I assumed that Caesar was indeed murdered, and that x and y therefore denoted the same event/entity (on your own account!) It still does not seem to be the case that the actual event makes the claim that Caesar was murdered true. It is rather something specific about this event that makes the claim true: namely that the event happens to be falling under a specific concept expressed by the predicate ("...was murdered") in the claim.

You seem to be saying that the event of Caesar dying cannot be the same event as Caesar being murdered, because Caesar could have died some other way. All that follows is that they could have been different events not they are in fact different events. If Caesar was actually murdered then it is not possible that he was not murdered, so his dying and his being murdered cannot possibly be different events, although they could possibly have been different events. You are confusing yourself over this distinction, it seems to me.

This seems nonsensical. I can state multiple propositions about an entity, any of which will or will not correspond to the entity, and none of which are identical to one another.

"This house was built in 1950"

"This house has sandstone foundations"

The timber that the wall frames were constructed of was milled in Narrabri".

Ans so on...

It still does not seem to be the case that the actual event makes the Claim that Caesar was murdered true. — Pierre-Normand

I can't see that, because assuming that Caesar was murdered then it is his being murdered that makes "Caesar was murdered" true, and that also makes Caesar's dying and Caesar's being murdered the very same event.

Neither "Caesar died" nor 'Caesar was murdered" are exhaustive descriptions of the event, though.

You seem to be saying that the event of Caesar dying cannot be the same event as Caesar being murdered — John

I didn't say this, I only said that the propositions "Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered" are different, but the event to which they refer is the same (but of course they could've referred to different events).

But what I did claim is that if you have two different proposition, then by the definition of correspondence, they cannot have the same entity corresponding to them when true. So having two different propositions with the same corresponding entity (as in the case of "Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered") contradicts the definition, and renders the theory incoherent.

I can't see that, because assuming that Caesar was murdered then it is his being murdered that makes "Caesar was murdered" true, and that also makes Caesar's dying and Caesar's being murdered the very same event. — John

If x is the event of Caesar's dying and y is the event of Caesar's being murdered, then what makes x being a case of murder isn't the same thing as what makes x the same event as y.

What makes it the case that x is the same event as y, presumably, is that both occurrences are instantiated in the same region of space and time. (I am just trying to play along with the token-identity theory that seems to underlie your correspondence theory of truth). But what makes it the case that x is a case of murder is something else entirely. It depends on the significance of the concept of murder in a way its alleged identity with y doesn't.

I didn't say this, I only said that the propositions "Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered" are different, but the event to which they refer is the same (but of course they could've referred to different events). — Fafner

If they refer to the same event then they also correspond or fail to correspond to it.

But what I did claim is that if you have two different proposition, then by the definition of correspondence, they cannot have the same entity corresponding to them when true. So having two different propositions with the same corresponding entity (as in the case of "Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered") contradicts the definition, and renders the theory incoherent. — Fafner

Are you attempting to draw a distinction between "events" and "entities"?

"Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered" both refer to the same event, right? Either or both of those statements could correspond, or fail to correspond, to the event, right? But despite their ability to correspond or not, they are both only partial descriptions of the event, no? You seem to be thinking in some absolutist terms of correspondence, which would seem to have little or nothing to do with the ordinary logic of correspondence.

OK, it seems now you are saying that it is a matter of interpretation as to whether he was murdered or justifiably assassinated, or something like that? If that's so, it's a different question, and could be gotten around simply by saying that he was killed.

Are you attempting to draw a distinction between "events" and "entities"? — John

No, I treat events as entities for the sake of argument.

But despite their ability to correspond or not, they are both only partial descriptions of the event, no? — John

Sure, but I don't see how this helps (actually this fact is precisely what explains the reason that correspondence fails: descriptions don't overlap neatly with unique entities, because you can have the same entity satisfying many descriptions, and so you cannot define the truth of descriptions by simply referring to the entities which they describe).

You seem to be thinking in some absolutist terms of correspondence, which would seem to have little or nothing to do with the ordinary logic of correspondence. — John

Well either a proposition corresponds to an entity or it doesn't, what other options are there?

Well either a proposition corresponds to an entity or it doesn't, what other options are there? — Fafner

Well, that's right, and if it corresponds then it is true, and if not, then it's not.

Sure, but I don't see how this helps. — Fafner

The point is that any statement's correspondence to an event cannot ever be complete, but that that fact in no way rules out the possibility of correspondence. Nothing you have said seems to show that incompleteness of correspondence renders the idea contradictory, inconsistent or incoherent.

OK, it seems now you are saying that it is a matter of interpretation as to whether he was murdered or justifiably assassinated, or something like that? If that's so, it's a different question, and could be gotten around simply by saying that he was killed. — John

Not at all. Part of the point is that events are particulars whereas being murdered (or being killed) are general concepts expressed by predicates. Claims and sentences have (minimally) subject/predicate form. What purports to "correspond" to claims such as to make them true must therefore have a similar structure.

Say, the claims that a particular apple is red, or that it is tasty, may both "correspond" to the same apple. This is just to say that it is the same apple that is being referred to in both cases, whereas the predicates (and the general properties ascribed) are different. But the apple itself doesn't make both claims true quite appart from its falling under the corresponding predicates. It's the same with events, since just like apples, those are particulars. "Caesar's dying" may seem to be referring to an event, and hence to a particular, but it's only really the individual Caesar (and also, possibly, a specific time, or the values of a time variable being quantified over) that are the particulars being referred to in the judgement expressed by "Caesar died". The "event" all by itself doesn't single out the general properties that it falls under such as to make claims about it true.

The point is that any statement's correspondence to an event cannot ever be complete, but that that fact in no way rules out the possibility of correspondence. Nothing you have said seems to show that incompleteness of correspondence renders the idea contradictory, inconsistent or incoherent. — John

I give up.

But the apple itself doesn't make both claims true quite appart from it's falling under the corresponding predicates. — Pierre-Normand

Characteristics of the apple; its sweetness and its redness separately make those corresponding statements true. It is that entity, that apple, which is both red and sweet. Just as with the two statements: that Caesar died and that he was murdered, it is the corresponding characteristics of that event that make them true.

Fair enough, but I honestly can't see your point. I think you are haunted by chimeras of your own making, and confusing yourself over what is really very straightforward and not problematic at all. It seems you are looking for something, some "absolute correspondence" that could somehow come to light on further analysis.

But it doesn't work like that: correspondence is, like truth, irreducible, and you will only produce aporias if you try to dig deeper. I would say there is a correspondence account of truth, and there is no other account; but there cannot really be a correspondence theory of truth, or at least there cannot be a theory of correspondence that explains how correspondence works, because any such theory would assume what it sets out to prove, insofar as it would always already be predicated upon correspondence working, as does all our discourse.

Characteristics of the apple; its sweetness and its redness separately make those corresponding statements true. It is that entity, that apple, which is both red and sweet. Just as with the two statements: that Caesar died and that he was murdered, it is the corresponding characteristics of that event that make them true. — John

Exactly. That's my main point. But then when you suggest that x and y are numerically the same 'event' you are conflating the physical movements where those events occurred (or some other such allegedly 'neutral' way to characterize what's going on), which are the particulars falling under the predicates "...exemplifying Caesar's being murdered", and "...exemplifying Ceasar's dying", on the one hand, and those particular events falling under the corresponding predicates, on the other hand. The former are particulars, which indeed are numerically identical, but the latter are structured propositions, which aren't.

Well either a proposition corresponds to an entity or it doesn't, what other options are there? — Fafner

A proposition such as "Caesar died" might be true not because it has a truth-maker of its own, but because it is entailed by a proposition such as "Caesar was murdered" that does have a truth-maker.

In fact, it seems most natural to say that a fact, such as Caesar having been murdered in 44 BC, should buy you not just a single proposition, but a cofinal set of propositions, ordered by entailment. It is after all the occurrence of this one event that makes it true that Caesar was still dead last week and was still dead yesterday, and on and on. Whatever the problem with correspondence theories, it can't be this trivial addition of true propositions.

A proposition such as "Caesar died" might be true not because it has a truth-maker of its own, but because it is entailed by a proposition such as "Caesar was murdered" that does have a truth-maker. — Srap Tasmaner

But what if Caesar had not been murdered but died a natural death? In this case it seems that "Caesar died" would have its own truthmaker (distinct from the truthmaker of "Caesar was murdered"), and this will contradict the basic idea of correspondence that for any proposition, there's a unique entity that makes it true if it is the case (because "Caesar died" is the same propositions no matter how he died, but on your account it looks like two different propositions).

And also I think that the correspondence theorist would argue that if P is entailed by Q, then the truthmaker of Q is also the truthmaker of P (but this is just speculation).

What you are missing is the fact that given a particular interpretation of the sentence 'cats fly', it is objectively true or false; and the mere fact that the sentence can express something different doesn't show that its truth is subjective. — Fafner

No, that's not the case, because to be objectively true or false, requires that there is an objective reality which the interpretation of the sentence either corresponds with, or does not. But there is no such thing. The so-called "objective reality" only exists as interpreted. There is no reality without a perspective, so any reality which would be judged as corresponding to an interpretation, is itself subjective because it is dependent on a perspective.

That's the point I was making which creativesoul didn't seem to get, that both sides of the equation are interpretation dependent, subjective. On the one hand we have the words, the sentence, "cats fly", which needs to be interpreted. On the other hand, we have the reality which "cats fly" is supposed to correspond with, and this needs to be interpreted as well. Therefore you cannot say that there is an objective truth or falsity to any interpretation of the sentence because reality, what is real, needs to be interpreted as well, in order that it does or does not correspond to the interpretation of the sentence.

So, for example person A interprets "cats" as referring to domesticated house cats. In order that this interpretation may be true or false, reality must be interpreted to determine whether "cats" properly refers to only these domesticated cats, or all types of feline animals, as person B claims. This is just a matter of interpretation as well, a subjective determination. However, in making this interpretation, we may refer to standards, conventions and agreements, "correct usage", to produce a form of "objectivity", which is supported by justification. The interpretation is justified by referring to these standards of correct usage. But this objectivity which is supported by justification, does not qualify to be called "objective truth", because the objectivity is produced by justification, not by truth..