I am agnostic as to whether AI will ever be conscious. It was not too long ago that it was generally believed that a computer program and associated hardware could pilot a car. Such a thing was thought to require consciousness. — Fooloso4

Yes sure. But my point was that perhaps there is a difference in kind.

This 2021 article says that sponges don't have neurons but do have cells that may have some neuron like functionality. However, the investigation is very preliminary.

Also, it is an open question as to what extent very simple creatures like worms might achieve a rudimentary mental representation. Neurons can automate behavior without mental representation and I'm skeptical towards the idea that worms (or jellyfish) have even the most rudimentary mental representations. (Although projects like Open Worm may eventually provide evidence one way or another.) — wonderer1

Nice, very cool stuff thanks.

Sheer quantity of neurons matters. Quantity of neurons plays a significant role in how complex the interconnections between neurons can be. It is (very crudely) analogous to the way that a higher transistor count in a microprocessor can allow for more complex calculations performed within a given unit of time. With 'surplus' neurons available an organism can have neurons which aren't directly involved with getting from sensory input to behavioral output. A network of 'surplus' neurons can sit alongside the neurons which manage basic survival, and instead of monitoring sensory inputs or participating in causing motor responses, the surplus network can monitor both the outputs of sensory neurons and motor neurons and learn about patterns to the organisms own operation that the more primitive I/O networks are not able to learn.

So this higher level monitoring might recognize something like, 'My automatic response the last time I saw something like that was to eat it, but the result was bad.', and manage to interfere with the behavioral output, so as to avoid a reoccurence of such a bad event.

I'd suggest that neurons available to learn a more complex way of interacting with the world are a prerequisite to mental representation. The more such 'surplus' neurons there are in a brain the more complex the mental representation can be. — wonderer1

But whence "mental representation" versus the prior "behavioral inputs/outputs"? How is it this difference in degree at least SEEMS to be a difference in kind? What is it, this change, this "mental representation"?

I suggest that the 'subjective essence of experience' is one of the connotations of the term 'being' when used as a noun - that 'a being' is precisely the kind of entity that possesses the element of subjectivity, even if in rudimentary form. This is the point at which qualities of being a.k.a qualia start to become manifest.
— Wayfarer
Wow! That is a deep philosophical insight. — Gnomon

Not of my devising. It’s really just an implication of Chalmer’s ‘facing up to the problem of consciousness’. The following is from the précis of Mind and Cosmos published in the NY Times:

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe (i.e. described by the natural sciences), composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained…. — The Core of Mind and Cosmos, Thomas Nagel

So it occurred to me on reading this that the appearance of living organisms just is the manifestation of Being, which becomes gradually elaborated and differentiated during the course of evolution. I’m sure that’s one of the themes found in Henri Bergson and Tielhard du Chardin although I haven’t read much of them.

But whence "mental representation" versus the prior "behavioral inputs/outputs"? How is it this difference in degree at least SEEMS to be a difference in kind? What is it, this change, this "mental representation"? — schopenhauer1

I would think an important aspect of it is that more neural net resources allow for more detailed memories. (Somewhat analogous might be the qualitative difference between the eight bit graphics of video games of the 1970s and the CGI we see today.)

By having a greater amount of memory (allowing for more detail in modelling our interactions with the world) we are able to develop more accurate and detailed models of ourselves in the world. That accuracy and detail provide a qualitative difference.

But whence "mental representation" versus the prior "behavioral inputs/outputs"? How is it this difference in degree at least SEEMS to be a difference in kind? What is it, this change, this "mental representation"? — schopenhauer1

Have a look at From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning Steve Talbott. Argues that organic life is qualitative from the get go, that the processes embodied in organic molecules already transcend the bounds of physical causation.

There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

I agree, but where does the grounds come in to elevate the subject to such ultimate precedence? After all, once consciousness becomes subjective it begins to posit a Cartesian subject, and thus the tables are turned and the scientific explanation is really explaining the manifestations of the subject and leaving out the objective.

I see no reason why not to extend the concept of consciousness to ordinary objects like a rock or a waterfall that are not even able to move themselves. They still constitute subjects in the sense that cues of existence come from conscious perception and are described by the same internal concept of cohesion (ie: having internal self-representing qualities). Why is there nothing of consciousness in a rock? Because we define consciousness by the negation of our determination of a rock, neglecting its real essential continuation to ourselves. Because we seek imagination over analysis.

I see no reason why not to extend the concept of consciousness to ordinary objects like a rock or a waterfall that are not even able to move themselves. — kudos

There is much that can be learned about differences between rocks, and organisms which have evolved sense organs and brains. Perhaps a lack of such learning plays a role in your view?

I agree, but where does the grounds come in to elevate the subject to such ultimate precedence? — kudos

Because it's fundamental to what organisms are. It's the specific difference between even very simple organisms, and inorganic matter. Even the most simple life-forms encode and transmit information, maintain homeostasis, heal and grow. This is what the essay from Talbott above helps to distinguish.

Not of my devising. It’s really just an implication of Chalmer’s ‘facing up to the problem of consciousness’. — Wayfarer

OK. But I like your phrasing of the "problem of Consciousness" (psychology) in terms of the problem of Being (ontology) and Becoming (evolution).

First BE (physical instantiation), then Become (animation), then Know (perception), then know-that-you-Know (conception), then study how you know (reduction), then argue incessantly about why you think you Know what's possible-but-not-actual (erudition). :smile:

PS___ That last parenthetical term was supposed to be "philosophy", but I was looking for a word that ended in "---tion". :joke:

:lol:

I have the idea that, just as energy can be defined as 'the capacity to do work', biological consciousness may be defined as 'the capacity for experience'. And that capacity always inheres in a subject of experience - which is never known as an object of perception.

Not sure what you are accusing me of here. But here is an article discussing the scientific propositions (at a high level for a broad audience, but based on harder scientific studies)

Thanks for sharing, it's an interesting article with a stupid title. But I find this some and what @wonderer1 is saying extremely interesting. What is the point of explaining consciousness? It is a fruitless and useless exercise in vain-glory. Sometimes it feels like the whole point of it is to supply a vehicle for a vain attempt at proclaiming the nature of reality as deterministic; essentially the cinders of post-christian abstraction. Keep in mind, I'm not talking about you specifically here. Just saying so because it is seeming like this is maybe is coming off more trollish than socratic at this point. For instance, what was the meaning of juxtasposing this specific article into our conversation after the line below?

You are leveraging this Darwinian outlook to claim a hypothesis that it rests on simple content has already been fulfilled.

The kind of consciousness I am talking about wouldn't necessitate "rationality" but some sort of "awareness" of the environment, something akin to a "point of view" or "something it is like to be something".

So you agree in the claim an identity of consciousness=subjectivity, so we are back again to 1600's Descartes philosophy.

Argues that organic life is qualitative from the get go, that the processes embodied in organic molecules already transcend the bounds of physical causation. — Wayfarer

That's right, the organization inherent within organic molecules extends to the most fundamental levels of the physical parts of these molecules. This implies that the cause of this type of organization is itself not physical.

Because it's fundamental to what organisms are. It's the specific difference between even very simple organisms, and inorganic matter.

Could you clarify, are you saying subjectivity is fundamental to what organisms are or what is fundamental to what organisms are is subjectivity? In other words, are you simply defining what is fundamental to organisms as subjectivity or stating that what organisms are has the fundamental quality of subjectivity?

What about the subject that observes the subject and equates its subjectivity? I take it we are conveying a fully self-consciously anthropomorphic view of subjectivity. Flies having less subjectivty, humans the most, diatoms none, etc.

What is the point of explaining consciousness? It is a fruitless and useless exercise in vain-glory. — kudos

For me it has been a quite fruitful and useful in understanding being on the autism spectrum and understanding humanity more generally.

It's understandable that you haven't felt the need to educate yourself in a similar way, but it would be silly of you to consider yourself meaningfully informed about the topic.

Could you clarify, are you saying subjectivity is fundamental to what organisms are or what is fundamental to what organisms are is subjectivity? In other words, are you simply defining what is fundamental to organisms as subjectivity or stating that what organisms are has the fundamental quality of subjectivity?

What about the subject that observes the subject and equates its subjectivity? I take it we are conveying a fully self-consciously anthropomorphic view of subjectivity. Flies having less subjectivty, humans the most, diatoms none, etc. — kudos

The first thing an organism has to do - any organism - is to establish a boundary between itself and the environment. What organic processes then do is all directed by the organism maintaining itself and continuing to exist. I’m considering the idea that this constitutes the beginning of subjective awareness - even though very primitive life-forms are not what we would recognise as conscious beings in any meaningful sense, that rudimentary form of subjectivity is implied by the distinction between self and other (at least in a philosophical sense). Plainly humans are then able to interrogate the nature of the subject - ‘who or what am I?’ - which I don’t think other animals are able to do (although many higher animals and birds do possess a sense of self, as is evidenced by ‘the mirror test’)

Yeah sure, but you aren't hu-mansplaining consciousness, are you? I have no problems with rigorous scientific inquiry.

But whence "mental representation" versus the prior "behavioral inputs/outputs"? How is it this difference in degree at least SEEMS to be a difference in kind? What is it, this change, this "mental representation"? — schopenhauer1

I'd say the difference is a function of memory; the ability to visualize what has been experienced but is no longer present. It seems to make sense that memory and the ability to visualize should be greatly enhanced by symbolic language capability. (By 'visualize' I mean not only recalling visual data but all sensory and somatosensory data: auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, motoric and proprioceptive).

The first thing an organism has to do - any organism - is to establish a boundary between itself and the environment. What organic processes then do is all directed by the organism maintaining itself and continuing to exist. I’m considering the idea that this constitutes the beginning of of subjective awareness

You have already posited the subject as existing in the line 'the organism has to establish a boundary...' So the subject is then object, since all these boundaries begin to become established by objective means, as in fertilization from cells created through biological processes. It sounds like you are including the idea of Becoming as referenced by @Gnomon if I am not correct. Care to elaborate?

I have no problems with rigorous scientific inquiry. — kudos

But you aren't informed about rigorous scientific inquiry on this subject. So your point is moot, and you can only offer your ignorant opinion.

BTW, this article (which @Luke started a thread about awhile back) touches on related stuff.

Could you clarify, are you saying subjectivity is fundamental to what organisms are or what is fundamental to what organisms are is subjectivity? In other words, are you simply defining what is fundamental to organisms as subjectivity or stating that what organisms are has the fundamental quality of subjectivity? — kudos

Consider this, quantum mechanics demonstrates to us the real existence of possibilities in the physical world. However, quantum mechanics does not provide for us the means for understanding the subjective capacity to choose from possibilities. This subjective capacity, to choose from possibilities available, is demonstrated by even the most basic life forms.

You're right, I am not that informed on scientific explanations of consciousness, as opposed to scientific inquiry pertaining to consciousness, because I think there is no point in explaining it scientifically with speculations instead of observations. By all means please prove me wrong by demonstrating the ways in which there is.

Critical reviews of Humphrey by Galen Strawson and Mary Midgley (although I disagree with Strawson's panpsychism, subject of this thread.)

Critical reviews of Humphrey by Galen Strawson and Mary Midgley (although I disagree with Strawson's panpsychism, subject of this thread.) — Wayfarer

Thanks. However neither of those reviews have to do with the article I linked. So it looks like you are promoting a genetic fallacy:

The genetic fallacy (also known as the fallacy of origins or fallacy of virtue)[1] is a fallacy of irrelevance in which arguments or information are dismissed or validated based solely on their source of origin rather than their content. In other words, a claim is ignored or given credibility based on its source rather than the claim itself.

The fallacy therefore fails to assess the claim on its merit. The first criterion of a good argument is that the premises must have bearing on the truth or falsity of the claim in question.[2] Genetic accounts of an issue may be true, and they may help illuminate the reasons why the issue has assumed its present form, but they are not conclusive in determining its merits.[3]

However neither of those reviews have to do with the article I linked. — wonderer1

They're both reviews of another of Nicholas Humphrey's books, covering similar theories, and Humphrey being the author of the linked article. Neither of the reviews propagate the 'genetic fallacy', rather they are critical of Humphrey's reductionist account of consciousness. His latest book gets much more positive reviews, but I will concede that as his is straightforwardly physicalist account, I am disinclined towards entertaining the thesis, on philosophical grounds.

Neither of the reviews propagate the 'genetic fallacy'... — Wayfarer

I didn't suggest that the reviews were propagating the genetic fallacy. I said, "...it looks like you are promoting a genetic fallacy..." ...by bringing up reviews of an older work, as if they are relevant to the argument more recently presented.

https://www.reuters.com/science/scientists-propose-sweeping-new-law-nature-expanding-evolution-2023-10-16/#:~:text=Titled%20the%20%22law%20of%20increasing,that%20generate%20many%20different%20configurations.

Sort of what I'd argued for before in other evolution threads. There are very many "selection-like processes." Some, like neural pruning, Hebbian fire together, wire together learning, etc. clearly involve purpose, some don't seem to. Biological evolution involves intentionality to the extent that intentional action affects reproduction. Further, if rocks don't think, dust doesn't think, etc. but life forms do think, then we might suppose that thinking emerges through these very sorts of processes, since they seem to be the source of growing complexity in the world.

It seems like fractal recurrence to me, similar information processes, occurring from nation-states down to crystal formation.

But if conciousness as we know it is something that emerges way down the line in these processes, no wonder it's not hard to find. It's an onion with a very large number of layers.

Fair call, I should have let it go.

You're right, I am not that informed on scientific explanations of consciousness, as opposed to scientific inquiry pertaining to consciousness, because I think there is no point in explaining it scientifically with speculations instead of observations. By all means please prove me wrong by demonstrating the ways in which there is. — kudos

Speculation has always been part of science. Informed speculation is where hypotheses come from, and consideration of the speculations of scientifically informed people is an important part of how science progresses.

Because of the technological challenges and ethical issues involved in studying working human brains, we have to settle for speculation to a large extent in neuroscience. Of course we might throw up our hands and just say that God wants some people to be autistic, schizophrenic, bipolar, etc. I find considering scientifically informed speculation to be of vastly greater practical and humanistic value.

I'm saying that I don't think religious narratives are meant for us to "understand" ourselves, but to become a particular type of people. Religions are all about how one *should* be. (Whatever narratives religions have about who we are and where we came from are in the service of how we should be.) — baker

Is not "knowing thyself" the first step to becoming something other than what you already are? I mean, you could merely pay lip service to an imposed injunction, but that would not count as being a real change, but merely an act of self-repression designed to make you appear to others (and perhaps to yourself) to be living up to some introjected ideal. It would only be by understanding or knowing yourself that you would be able to tell the difference. — Janus

Here we need to bear in mind that people who are born and raised into a religion have their sense of self shaped by the religion. They have no sense of identity apart or outside of their religion.

What you're bringing up applies to prospective adult converts. It's evident that people sometimes do internalize the idea of "who they really are" when this idea is given by someone else. The actual psychological processes underlying this seem to be rather complex.