, I'm advocating for semantic holism. — baker

I've been unable to see any such advocation. Perhaps if you were to set it out more explicitly, I'd be able to follow.

But especially in virtue of adopting semantic holism, it seems reasonable to ask what it is that is reincarnated; the answer will after all tell us where reincarnation fits in any mooted semantic web.

It's like with one's native language: it's not subject to one's choice, it "just happens". — baker

Yep.

You know it's more complex than that. — baker

Well, sure. There's all the living, doing, wanting, making that takes place within the made-up world. Unfortunately including sacred cows and the existence of the dalet. If we are to treat Hinduism holistically, such must also be taken into account.

Autonomy — baker

Interesting. There's a tension between placing emphasis on autonomy while maintaining that one is culturally embedded, as you did in your reply to Joshs, .

No, I mean individuation, not autonomy, and am looking to the logic of the description of reincarnation and asking, again, what it is that is born again. And it seems that we not only do not know, but have no way of determining the answer; and so we turn to mandating that it is so, instead. We make it up.

it seems reasonable to ask what it is that is reincarnated — Banno

I’m a bit unclear as to why this question keeps being asked. The studies of children recalling past lives observe that children are born who apparently remember details of their past lives - where they lived, their names, parents names, and so on, details which were then cross-checked against documentary and other evidence. There were also numerous cases where physical deformities and birthmarks corresponding to sites of past-life trauma were observed. So the answer to ‘what is born’ is ‘a child with past life memories and sometimes physical marks’. Doesn’t that answer the question?

I’m a bit unclear as to why this question keeps being asked. — Wayfarer

It's tempting to treat this as a curious piece of biography, and leave it. But.

Your suggestion is that it is memory that is reincarnated; @Baker says otherwise. There is a discrepancy amongst the advocates of reincarnation. My evil purposes can be served by niggling at that. The vast mass of humanity have no such recollections, so one might conclude that if that is what reincarnation is, it is very rare indeed. From a more philosophical perspective, it is just not clear what it is that makes you the reincarnation of Napoleon, or whomever...

At issue is the capacity of advocates of reincarnation to present a coherent account.

Reincarnation involves something moving from one body to the next - being clear as to the nature of that something is central. And problematic.

Reincarnation involves something moving from one body to the next - being clear as to the nature of that something is central. — Banno

That’s the issue - a medium by which memory and experience is transmitted. (Incidentally I also noted that the one book I read on it shows that most of the remembered previous lives are not of Napoleon or Julius Caesar but ordinary people with unremarkable lives.)

And yet the vast mass of humanity have no such recollection.

And what it means for an experience to be reincarnated is obscure. Are you the experience of being a handmaid to Cleopatra? And this despite having no such memory?

We have a congenital difference, you and I, that leads me to think of you as credulous. I won't be able to show you - it's not just that the evidence is insufficient, but that it is incoherent.

I supose it was inevitable that this thread become yet another on the topic of reincarnation.

My appologies, .

I'll drop this here, just by way of summary.

a. Reincarnation

Parapsychologists usually claim there is a good deal of evidence in favor of the doctrine of reincarnation. Two pieces of alleged evidence are especially meaningful: (1) past-life regressions; (2) cases of children who apparently remember past lives.

Under hypnosis, some patients frequently have regressions and remember events from their childhood. But, some patients have gone even further and, allegedly, have vivid memories of past lives. A few parapsychologists take these as so-called ‘past-life regressions’ as evidence for reincarnation (Sclotterbeck, 2003).

However, past-life regressions may be cases of cryptomnesia, that is, hidden memories. A person may have a memory, and yet not recognize it as such. A well-known case is illustrative: an American woman in the 1950s was hypnotized, and claimed to be Bridey Murphy, an Irishwoman of the 19th century. Under hypnosis, the woman offered a fairly good description of 19th century Ireland, although she had never been in Ireland. However, it was later discovered that, as a child, she had an Irish neighbor. Most likely, she had hidden memories of that neighbor, and under hypnosis, assumed the personality of a 20th century Irish woman.

It must also be kept in mind that hypnosis is a state of high suggestibility. The person that conducts the hypnosis may easily induce false memories on the person hypnotized; hence, alleged memories that come up in hypnosis are not trustworthy at all.

Some children have claimed to remember past lives. Parapsychologist Ian Stevenson collected more than a thousand of such cases (Stevenson, 2001). And, in a good portion of those cases, children know things about the deceased person that, allegedly, they could not have known otherwise.

However, Stevenson’s work has been severely critiqued for its methodological flaws. In most cases, the child’s family had already made contact with the deceased’s family before Stevenson’s arrival; thus, the child could pick up information and give the impression that he knows more than what he could have known. Paul Edwards has also accused Stevenson of asking leading questions towards his own preconceptions (Edwards, 1997: 14).

Moreover, reincarnation runs into conceptual problems of its own. If you do not remember past lives, then it seems that you cannot legitimately claim that you are the same person whose life you do not remember. However, a few philosophers claim this is not a good objection at all, as you do not remember being a very young child, and yet can still surely claim to be the same person as that child (Ducasse, 1997: 199).

Population growth also seems to be a problem for reincarnation: according to defenders of reincarnation, souls migrate from one body to another. This, in a sense, presupposes that the number of souls remains stable, as no new souls are created, they only migrate from body to body. Yet, the number of bodies has consistently increased ever since the dawn of mankind. Where, one may ask, were all souls before new bodies came to exist? (Edwards, 1997: 14). Actually, this objection is not so formidable: perhaps souls exist in a disembodied form as they wait for new bodies to come up (D’Souza, 2009: 57). — IEP Immortality

On July 27, 1656, the Jewish community of Amsterdam expelled Baruch de Espinoza. As Josef Kaplan's work has shown, the community used ḥerem as a standard disciplinary instrument, usually on a temporary basis. In Spinoza's case, however, the Amsterdammers issued a fierce and permanent denunciation on grounds of “abominable heresies” and “monstrous deeds.” Speaking for the community, the rabbis “excommunicate, expel, curse and damn” him with formidable intensity. In addition to forbidding contact with Spinoza himself, the ḥerem concludes with a prohibition against reading “any treatise composed or written by him.” What were these heresies and deeds, and why was the ḥerem so harsh? Only twenty-three years of age, Spinoza had not yet, so far as we know, begun to write the philosophical works—the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670) and the Ethica (1677), the former published anonymously, the latter only posthumously—that would to make him notorious well beyond the domain of the Portuguese Jews. Looking at the later texts, it is not difficult to imagine the cause of the outrage: Spinoza denies creation and divine providence, individual or personal immortality (together with the doctrine of eternal reward and punishment), and the truth of the Torah. But what exactly was Spinoza doing in the mid-1650s, and why were his ideas and actions so offensive to the community? — Stephen Nadler

Remember where discussion of Spinoza started in this thread to which I responded, 'As I understand it, Spinoza said that the liberated soul had no reason to fear death and no fear of the afterlife, and I'm sure in that, he was in perfect accord with both the Hindu and Buddhist understanding of the matter.' I'll return to that, as it was the point at issue in respect of this OP. — Wayfarer

Spinoza said the free person thinks least of all death, he says nothing about fearing death or the afterlife.

In 1656, after being excommunicated from Amsterdam’s Portuguese-Jewish community for “abominable heresies” and “monstrous deeds,” the young Baruch Spinoza abandoned his family’s import business to dedicate his life to philosophy. He quickly became notorious across Europe for his views on God, the Bible, and miracles, as well as for his uncompromising defense of free thought. Yet the radicalism of Spinoza’s views has long obscured that his primary reason for turning to philosophy was to answer one of humanity’s most urgent questions: How can we lead a good life and enjoy happiness in a world without a providential God? In Think Least of Death, Pulitzer Prize–finalist Steven Nadler connects Spinoza’s ideas with his life and times to offer a compelling account of how the philosopher can provide a guide to living one’s best life.

In the Ethics, Spinoza presents his vision of the ideal human being, the “free person” who, motivated by reason, lives a life of joy devoted to what is most important—improving oneself and others. Untroubled by passions such as hate, greed, and envy, free people treat others with benevolence, justice, and charity. Focusing on the rewards of goodness, they enjoy the pleasures of this world, but in moderation. “The free person thinks least of all of death,” Spinoza writes, “and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life.”

An unmatched introduction to Spinoza’s moral philosophy, Think Least of Death shows how his ideas still provide valuable insights about how to live today.

Spinoza’s guide to life and death
A new way of life

From here

I mean individuation — Banno

Socrates presents the problem arithmetically in the Phaedo.

The overarching question of the dialogue is what will happen to Socrates when he dies. The concern is that the unity that is Socrates will be destroyed. In order to address this Socrates divides his unity into a duality, body and soul. It is by this division of one into two that he attempts to demonstrate his unity in death. If each is one then Socrates is two. But since he is neither the one (body) or the other (soul) then the two together must be a third.

How can there to be a logos or an account without a proper count? Is Socrates one thing or two or some third thing that arises from the unity of these two separate things?

Sure. Not a bad first version. The problems go deeper, as the SEP article cited previously shows.

For my part, I suspect that individuation is an act rather than an observation. I might borrow Searle's counts as here: we can choose what we like to count as an individual. Then it's the utility and community acceptance of the mooted usage that carries weight. Or something like that.

However, Stevenson’s work has been severely critiqued for its methodological flaws. — IEP Immortality

I'm familiar with the efforts to debunk Stevenson, but many of them clearly have their own agenda.

The background to Stevenson's research was that a chair was endowed at the University of Virginia by Chester Carlson, who had made his fortune by inventing xerography. His wife was a Theosophist with interest in spiritual philosophy (they also helped fund one of the early Zen centers.) Stevenson occupied that chair for around 30 years and during that time documented thousands of cases. (The same department at the University of Virginia - the Division of Perceptual Studies - has become a world-leading 'centre for woo'. Later books including Irreducible Mind and Beyond Physicalism.)

I've read the Wikipedia entry on Stevenson, but again, I think there's something of a bias on Wikipedia against the paranormal (and I say this as a Wikipedia contributor and subscriber). There's a well-known group Guerilla Sceptics who make it their business to throw shade at entries on the paranormal (they were heavily involved in the controversy over Rupert Sheldrake's deleted TED talks.) Consequently a reading of the Wikipedia article leads to the view that Stevenson's entire corpus can be dismisses as 'shoddy research', but having read some alternative accounts, I don't necessarily buy that conclusion.

The overarching question of the dialogue is what will happen to Socrates when he dies. — Fooloso4

Perhaps an analogy can be drawn by comparision with the way stem cells individuate in the growth of the embroyo. Any developing embroyo comprises hundreds of millions of separate cells, yet as development occurs, the individual cells are all integrated into a single organism. Similarly a human person comprises many separate parts that nevertheless possess functional unity. There seems to be such a holistic principle at work on many levels, biological and psychological. I think that at least deflates the question of 'how many Socrates there are'. //I think that squares with the ancient idea of the soul as 'the principle of unity' as distinct from 'an entity'.//

Thanks for that, but I've decided not to try and assimilate Spinoza again. The Ethics reads like a 250 page insurance contract. After yesterday's conversation I did rather impulsively buy the kindle edition of the Claire Carlisle book Spinoza's Religion so will persist with reading that.

It cannot be said that what children do when they internalize the religious teachings of their parents and their community is an act of "choice" or conscious acceptance. Given that for children born and raised into a religion the exposure to religious teachings begins to take place even before the child's critical cognitive abilities have formed to the point of consciously being able to a make choices, to consciously accept or reject things, it's remiss to say that this is what is happening.

It's like with one's native language: it's not subject to one's choice, it "just happens". — baker

Right, I haven't said the child necessarily has any choice in what is accepted and introjected. I used the word "accepted" but that was not meant to suggest that the child necessarily had any choice in that acceptance, certainly not any choice in any libertarian-freewill or rationally chosen sense. But I would hesitate to claim that all children must acquiesce to what they are being taught. Humans are diverse.

Language does not strike me as a good analogy since it is a tool not a belief; one does not accept or reject it but rather one learns to use it.

Thanks for that, but I've decided not to try and assimilate Spinoza again. The Ethics reads like a 250 page insurance contract. After yesterday's conversation I did rather impulsively buy the kindle edition of the Claire Carlisle book Spinoza's Religion so will persist with reading that. — Wayfarer

As you know I am not against people believing in rebirth or whatever. Obviously there can be no definitve evidence either way. What I am curious about is why people care about it, since it obviously cannot be understood to personal survival of death. Is it an irrational fear of annihilation?

It seems to me that whatever the truth might be regarding rebirth, the most important thing is living the best life in terms of acceptance and love of oneself and others, equanimity and non-attachment to inconsequentials that we can. Worrying about what happens after death does not seem to be conducive or relevant to that task.

What I am curious about is why people care about it, since it obviously cannot be personal survival of death. Is it an irrational fear of annihilation? — Janus

I have my reasons, and I started writing them out, but it's a bit personal. Suffice to say that I don't believe birth is an absolute beginning, or death an absolute end; a life overflows those bookends. And I think annihilation is considerably less frightening than the alternatives - it's comforting, in a way, because it zeroes out anything you might have done in your life. I mean, if you're a mass-shooter who kills a number of people then yourself, you would presumably believe that that act ends it all. If it turns out not to, then....

During Buddhist Studies, I studied the longest sutta in the early Buddhist texts, 'the Net of Views'. It describes all the various views considered to be fallacious by the Buddha. About half are 'eternalist' views - theories about continuing to exist in future lives. The other half are nihilistic views, that death is an absolute end and that human life arises as a consequence of chance. The translator, Bhikkhu Bodhi, remarked that this kind of view is characteristic of modern culture, something which is believed to be 'proven by science'. Ultimately, both views (or dispositions) derive from either the desire to continue to be (eternalism) or the desire not to exist (nihilism. In other words, they're motivated by either greed or aversion. Although this is drastically condensed and the text itself is long and detailed.)

I'm considering the idea - I've discussed this with Schopenhauer1 - that we're condemned to existence, in one realm or another. We don't get a choice about it because we haven't understood what is the causal factor behind all of it. So 'ending it all' would not, actually, 'end it all'. I suppose that is the Buddhist view in a nutshell, not that I want to claim any special insight into that or mastery of it.

And I think annihilation is considerably less frightening than the alternatives - it's comforting, in a way, because it zeroes out anything you might have done in your life. I mean, if you're a mass-shooter who kills a number of people then yourself, you would presumably believe that that act ends it all. If it turns out not to, then.. — Wayfarer

The flipside is the idea that everything you have learned throughout your life will die with you, apart from what you may have imparted to others or committed to writing, music or artwork. But then what value can any life lesson be but within life itself? Also, personal rebirth is not necessary to support the possibility that everything which is done and learned is somehow "recorded' as is conceived in the idea of the akashic records (which is not to say I believe in that either)

Spinoza was a strict determinist; he believed free will is an illusion based on the illusion of our separation from the cosmos. If this is right, then everything everyone does is a manifestation of the "will", of the inevitable unfolding of the cosmic process. Apropos this Kastrup also holds that free will is an illusion.

But the other point against the idea of rebirth, or at least against the idea that it could be a rationally motivating consideration for us, is that whatever suffering might be coming to the entity that is the reborn you on account of ill deeds done by you, that could, rationally speaking, have no more significance for you than the suffering of any being, past, present or future, given that this future 'you' will have no conscious connection with the present you whatsoever. So, if we are going to care about, and act to ameliorate the suffering of any beings it makes more sense, rationally speaking, to dedicate oneself to ameliorating the suffering of beings that we know exist and that we know are suffering.

Ultimately, both views (or dispositions) derive from either the desire to continue to be (eternalism) or the desire not to exist (nihilism. In other words, they're motivated by either greed or aversion. — Wayfarer

This makes no sense to me; I would love to live forever provided I am healthy and not suffering too much pain. But I am more inclined to believe that my personal self will end at death and that the constituents that make up what I am will continue on in other forms for as long as the universe exists. My reason for not believing in any form of personal rebirth or afterlife is not that there is any definitive evidence against it, but simply that I cannot make rational sense of the idea, and I cannot believe something I am incapable of even making coherent to myself. So, I can honestly say that my thoughts on this are not at all driven by wishful thinking.

My reason for not believing in any form of personal rebirth or afterlife is not that there is any definitive evidence against it, but simply that I cannot make rational sense of the idea, and I cannot believe something I am incapable of even making coherent to myself. So, I can honestly say that my thoughts on this are not at all driven by wishful thinking. — Janus

Yep.

I cannot make rational sense of the idea — Janus

I get that. I can’t make rational sense of the obverse, although I’d never seek to persuade you or anyone else.

Kastrup also holds that free will is an illusion. — Janus

Not according to this article

the question of free will boils down to one of metaphysics: are our felt volitional states reducible to something outside and independent of consciousness? If so, there cannot be free will, for we can only identify with contents of consciousness. But if, instead, neurophysiology is merely how our felt volitional states present themselves to observation from an outside perspective—that is, if neurophysiology is merely the image of conscious willing, not its cause or source—then we do have free will; for in the latter case, our choices are determined by volitional states we intuitively regard as expressions of ourselves.

My reason for not believing in any form of personal rebirth or afterlife is not that there is any definitive evidence against it, but simply that I cannot make rational sense of the idea, and I cannot believe something I am incapable of even making coherent to myself. So, I can honestly say that my thoughts on this are not at all driven by wishful thinking. — Janus

:up: :up:

The argument against free will always seems to undermine the point of philosophical dialogue. I mean, if one’s opinions are determined prior to discussion, how could any act of rational persuasion prevail? Nobody could ever change their mind about anything, if it were true.

this future 'you' will have no conscious connection with the present you whatsoever. — Janus

But that being will nevertheless be the subject of experience, a conscious agent.

One of the minor epiphanies that struck me was when I studied prehistoric anthropology. I suddenly had a sense of how long our ancestors had lived for those many thousands of generations, often under painful and harsh conditions, obviously with no modern medicine or life comforts. I realised one day, those people were me - me with my struggles, joys, children, and the rest. Obviously I’ll never know who they are - I know my family tree back to the mid 1800’s - but it’s not hard to imagine that they were men just like myself, carrying the torch, so to speak. (I started to wonder if this is where ancestor worship originated.)

Similarly, that when I was born into this life, I did not (contra Locke) arrive a tabula rasa. I inherited many characteristics, I was born into a situation, and I also embody various archetypes and proclivities, which have shaped the life I’ve lived in the (now) 70 years since. When I die, and that’s obviously not that far off any more, there’ll be one child born to carry on.

The argument against free will always seems to undermine the point of philosophical dialogue. I mean, if one’s opinions are determined prior to discussion, how could any act of rational persuasion prevail? Nobody could ever change their mind about anything, if it were true. — Wayfarer

You are mistaking determinism for fatalism. On determinism your mind can change in response to events. The way things are determined is ongoing and there is no reason to think that events occurring in philosophical dialogs can't change our minds.

https://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/free-will/fatalism/determinism-vs-fatalism

You may be right, I do. have trouble working out the meaning of determinism

I added a link just before your post showed up. It's a very brief discussion of the differences.

:up:

Socrates is this guy they know and love. This person they talk to and see engaged in conversation in the marketplace. What will happen to him when he dies?

It is easy to miss what Plato is up to here. The argument moves in two opposite directions.

The common assumption is that Socrates is attempting to persuade his friends that the soul is immortal. He thinks that for many such a belief is beneficial.

The philosopher, however, seeks the truth of the matter, to the extent that is possible. The second possibility of what happens to us when we dies is raised explicitly in the Apology, but here, as he is about to die, we must, so to speak, do the math. Rather than myths of rewards and punishment and reincarnation, we are confronted by the incoherence that arises when a single, unified person is divided in two and only one part of who he is is believed to endure.

I get that. I can’t make rational sense of the obverse, although I’d never seek to persuade you or anyone else. — Wayfarer

I don't really seek to persuade either but to present and be presented with rational arguments for beliefs and standpoints, since this is a philosophy forum and I think that activity of presenting and being presented with (hopefully) rational argument is what the critical activity of philosophy is all about.

There are things I believe or at least tend to entertain that I would not try to argue for, because I realize they are merely personal articles of faith.

Not according to this article — Wayfarer

I don't think he is asserting the truth of the libertarian conception of free will. From the article you linked:

In Schopenhauer’s illuminating view of reality, the will is indeed free because it is all there ultimately is. Yet, its image is nature’s seemingly deterministic laws, which reflect the instinctual inner consistency of the will. Today, over 2000 years after he first published his groundbreaking ideas, Schopenhauer’s work can reconcile our innate intuition of free will with modern scientific determinism.

And from the horse's mouth:

I don't really seek to persuade either but to present and be presented with rational arguments for beliefs and standpoints, since this is a philosophy forum and I think that activity of presenting and being presented with (hopefully) rational argument is what the critical activity of philosophy is all about. — Janus

:100:

I don't know what the significance of 'libertarian' free will is, and I recognise that the will is constrained. Kastrup says he's not for either determinism or libetarian free will, that it's a false dichotomy. From that video 'nothing in the universe knows what our pre-determined choices are going to be'. 'The universe plays itself out in our actions' - much like something Alan Watts used to say.

I think the subtle issue behind this is the question of ego. If Krishnamurti was asked whether we have free will, he would always respond that 'will is the instrument of desire'. His teaching was always 'choiceless awareness' - to see what it is that drives our likes and dislikes as they are. The will itself is not free, because it's always conditioned. But I don't think he would accept the kind of deteminism that naturalists posit either. He represents the kind of liberation which is not within the ambit of Western philosophy generally.

I added a link just before your post showed up — wonderer1

From which

Determinism holds that every thing and event is a natural and integral part of the interconnected universe. From the perspective of determinism, every event in nature is the result of (determined by) prior/coexisting events. Every event is a confluence of influences. While determinism regards humans as "one with" the unfolding matrix of the natural universe, supernaturalism and fatalism regard humans as existing outside of this system.

I think the subtle issue there is 'what does "outside" mean?' Does it mean, 'outside what we currently understand as natural causation?' Because, as per Hempel's dilemma, our understanding of what constitutes physical causation is constantly changing. What I object to with determinism as usually presented is, 'hey we (scientists) know what the real causes of everything is, and your sense of rational autonomy is illusory.' That's where it becomes scientistic rather than scientific - everything has to be explainable within the procrustean bed of physical causation.

Besides, determinism has been called into question since the discovery of quantum mechanics. Ernst Cassirer (neo-Kantian philosopher) argued that quantum mechanics did not necessarily negate determinism but instead revealed a new form of determinism that was based on probabilities and statistical laws. He saw the probabilistic nature of quantum events as a different kind of determinism, one that operated on the level of statistical regularities rather than strict, deterministic causation.

While C S Peirce's tychism predated quantum mechanics, it shares a philosophical affinity with the probabilistic and indeterministic aspects of quantum theory. Both tychism and quantum mechanics challenge the classical, deterministic worldview by acknowledging the presence of randomness and probability in the description of natural phenomena.

I also see a conflict between determinism and rational causation - that as rational agents, we are able to make decisions that can't be reduced to physical causation. (cf 'the space of reasons'.)

Kastrup is asked 'is there randomness involved' and responds 'I don't think so, I think it's the word we use when WE don't know'. He says that if we did know all the factors involved, determinism would be maintained, but that it's computationally irreducible to derive the details of the causal chain.

God works in mysterious ways!

Anyway this has drifted a long way off topic (although it is a kind of omnibus topic) but thanks to both for those resources.

Rather than myths of rewards and punishment and reincarnation, we are confronted by the incoherence that arises when a single, unified person is divided in two and only one part of who he is is believed to endure. — Fooloso4

That might need reworking, but I gather you are asking about what happens at the point of death. The language "divided in two" is loaded with dualism. The common prejudice is that at death something leaves the body. I don't think that's right - rather the body stops doing stuff it once did. It no longer works in the same way.

That can be put in terms of identity. The body no longer serves to present the characteristics that made it the person it once was. In the same way one looks at a person in pain and understands that they are in pain, one understands by looking at a corpse that it no longer functions as a person.

My thoughts too

From that video 'nothing in the universe knows what our pre-determined choices are going to be'. 'The universe plays itself out in our actions' - much like something Alan Watts used to say. — Wayfarer

Yes, there is a sense in which we, as a more or less self-determining organism. determine our own actions, but those actions are determined by processes we cannot be conscious of. And we are not really separate from the rest of nature and its constant unfolding.

Libertarian free will presupposes a radically free soul, so it is a necessarily dualistic conception subject to the incomprehensibility of interaction.

Libertarian free will presupposes a radically free soul... — Janus

A libertarian is simply one who rejects compatibilism and determinism. The specific varieties differ. According to SEP a libertarian is simply one who requires "that one’s action not be causally determined by factors beyond one’s control" (link).