"To the things themselves" they said but those things were "phenomena", hence the name of the movement. This dualism was enabled by the influence of Kant on latter philosophy. Phenomena is not understood by the immediate sensations anyway, hence the mere fact that I know the moon is there when everybody closes their eyes — Gregory
This sounds like Plato. Kant has a different "feel" to his work but that may be from the historical distance between them. Is it possible Kant was just a Platonist? — Gregory
Kant didn't understand metaphysics at all. — Astrophel
That introduces the further complication of the 'ding an sich' (thing in itself) and the vexed question of whether that is the same as, or different to, the noumenal. — Wayfarer
'what two-dimensional surface do you think the purportedly two-dimensional image of our visual field is projected onto"? — Janus
In any event, it seems wrong to say that language would be the limit of our world. — Count Timothy von Icarus
By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. — Thomas Nagel
From my books on Kant, they all seem to agree in saying that Kant's main point for writing CPR was to draw a boundary on the power of human reason….. — Corvus
…..i.e. reason can only operate within the limits of our senses. — Corvus
Pitiful, ain’t it? Just as ol’ Henry didn’t understand production efficiency. Landry didn’t understand football. Gandhi didn’t understand civil rights. Wright didn’t understand buildings. Just what we of the vulgar understanding didn’t realize we always needed, huh? Another fool coming along, disrupting the status quo, knocking us from our collective intellectual comfort zone. — Mww
….we fill the world with purpose that is not in the phenomena…. — Gregory
He divorced the shadows from the forms such that we cannot know what a form even is. Agree? — Gregory
….if someting is affirmed to be true, then we have to be able to make sense of it not being true. — Astrophel
Kant didn't understand that what is transcendental is what is right before one's perceptions IN the empirical phenomenon. — Astrophel
It wasn't that this distinction was lost on him, but that in his philosophy, the terms signify different aspects of the world. He uses pheomena in the standard sense as 'what appears'. Noumena is a different matter and a source of both controversy and confusion. First, etymology - 'noumenal' means 'an object of nous', which is usually translated as 'intellect' albeit with different connotations to the modern equivalent. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy says "Platonic Ideas and Forms are noumena, and phenomena are things displaying themselves to the senses... This dichotomy is the most characteristic feature of Plato's dualism; that noumena and the noumenal world are objects of the highest knowledge, truths, and values is Plato's principal legacy to philosophy." — Wayfarer
Kant's introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble.
Not my kind of thinking. Instead, I view Metaphysics as literally beyond the scope of reductive materialistic Science. You can atomize matter down to evanescent Quarks, but you still won't find any evidence of Mind or Consciousness or Being.This kind of thinking suggests a kind of meta-science, as if science were on the cusp of metaphysical discovery, making speculative science the cutting edge of metaphysical disclosure. — Astrophel
Yes! Metaphysics and Philosophy are all about Holistic inter-relationships not about Reductive isolated objects.Metaphysics makes its appearance not in the laboratory or on the white board of equations and their speculative "interpolation" where paradigms leave off, but in the simple relation between me and this cup on the table in the inquiry that brackets or suspends all superfluous and implicit assumptions that construct the knowledge relationship. — Astrophel
Yes, again! Phenomenology is about things & events "out there", But Transcendental Phenomenology would be focused on the ideal mental representations and interpretations of those real physical things. Traditional Idealism tended to reject reality as an illusion. And Materialism rejected ideality as an illusion. Perhaps your term will rise above those either/or worldviews, to accept that our world is both Mental and Material.Transcendental idealism? It is right before your eyes. Drop the term 'idealism'. Better: transcendental phenomenology. — Astrophel
When we look at the world, we initially see a two-dimensional image. I am not aware of any two-dimensional surface that this two-dimensional image is projected onto. — RussellA
Logically grounded theories in the metaphysical discipline necessarily justify, or validate if you’d rather, whatever is the case given by the course of the argument.
It never was that “metaphysics sets out the background against which the world is ordered”, but sets the background by which the subject orders himself, such that the science by which the world is ordered, by and for him, becomes possible. — Mww
I am making use of Daniel Bonevac's Video Kant's Categories.
Reason doesn't create logic, rather, what we reason has been determined by the prior logical structure of the brain — RussellA
The brain must have a physical structure that is logically ordered in order to make logical sense of its experiences of the world. — RussellA
Kant is in effect saying that Chomsky's Innatism is a more sensible approach than Skinner's Behaviourism. — RussellA
Are not all consistent and coherent theories logically grounded? — Janus
Not quite right, in that reason alone does not account for PURE reason, right there is the title of the book.
“…This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics (…) constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Reason….” — Mww
I had in mind that empirical science theories are grounded in observation. — Mww
I think of empirical science theories as grounded in models of causation, and causation as not being observed, but inferred. — Janus
In any event, it seems wrong to say that language would be the limit of our world. — Count Timothy von Icarus
why do you suppose he devoted everything after A293/B350 to PURE reason, practically two thirds of the whole work, in Kemp Smith pg, 293 to pg.669, if reason and pure reason where so interchangeable.
I think the key is in pure, rather than reason. — Mww
On what basis do you say we initially see a two-dimensional image? I don't, and don't recall ever, seeing a two-dimensional image. — Janus
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