Five factors, according to Zaluzhnyi, for Ukraine to progress significantly: air force, electronic warfare, counter-battery fire, dealing with the extensive minefields, reserves. — jorndoe

It's a great and honest acknowledgement from Zaluzhnyi that the tech now has put them back to the trenches of WW1. And this is totally logical. If you have a drone which sees the tanks approaching, thanks to fire control computers, you can give the firing solution in seconds, not in minutes, to the artillery system. The it takes a minute or something for the projectile to fire and hit the target. Or then to shoot a minefield into where the tanks are moving.

And if neither side has any way by electronic warfare to severe the link, then it really is as Zaluzhnyi said. Large formations of armour rolling the Ukrainian flatlands is extremely dangerous.

A lot of talk on the side of the West about the war in Ukraine having reached a stalemate, and Zelensky being pressured into talks with the Russians.

Somewhat odd that considering the deteriorating situation for Ukraine it still seems to be Zelensky that is the obstacle for negotiations.

Though, in some sense I cannot blame him. He was after all promised Western support to fight the Russians, and that support has clearly come up short to achieve what was promised, or at least what was suggested as the goal: Ukraine regaining the territory it has lost during the 2022 invasion, and even retaking Crimea.

Or perhaps Zelensky is foreseeing that negotiations will not go anywhere, since interests on both sides are diametrically opposed.

Russia will not accept any agreement in which Ukraine enters NATO, and the West/Ukraine is unlikely to accept any agreement in which Ukraine doesn't enter NATO.

The same is roughly true for the issue of territory, though I think in the case of a Western concession vis-á-vis NATO membership, there's some chance that Russia will return territory to Ukraine.

But if negotiations indeed turn out to be impossible, I wonder how the war will proceed. Perhaps it will turn into a frozen conflict. While Mearsheimer has in the past suggested that he believes Russia may make at least one more push for a substantial amount of territory, in my eyes Russia does not look particularly interested in launching any real offensives.

The United States' international credibility is rapidly tanking due to its stance in the Israel-Gaza war, while the BRICS (with Russia taking a leading role) are looking to present themselves as the reasonable, mediating party.

With the Middle-East conflict looking to take up more of the West's (and especially the United States') military capacity, there is less pressure on Russia in the Ukraine war.

In other words, while the Middle-East conflict might present an opportunity for Russia to tighten the screws and press the issue in Ukraine, this does not seem to be in line with the image they are presenting of themselves in the wider international context, and this might be enough for the former not to take place.

According to Express UK and their sources, Russia (partially) went into a war economy, various places (shopping malls, whatever companies) turned into arms production and such.
Anyway, things might not be as rosy in those parts as Pesky says, surely not if some of those casualty estimates are in the right range.
A war economy in part (or perhaps whole) isn't all that surprising with their current leadership, is it?

Transcript: Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S. Oksana Markarova on "Face the Nation," Nov. 5, 2023 (Margaret Brennan · CBS)

Well their projected military budget, if one assumes that all the shadow military budgets rise proportionally, would put Russia at the level of military spending the USSR had in the 80s. That did not go so well.

And all this to defeat just Ukraine. I think it's worth remembering, among the daily back-and-forth of the war, just how unexpected it is that Ukraine can put up this level of resistance at all. And that while Russia has certainly succeeded in wrecking Ukraine, it has also wrecked itself in the process. It'll take at least a decade for Russia to recover from the war, especially the disastrous first year.

October was the first month of the war where Russia fired less shells than Ukraine. Originally, Russia was sustaining almost 16 times as many fire missions as Ukraine. Now Ukraine is carrying out about 20% more. Ukrainian fire missions haven't fluctuated much over the course of the war, but have been slowly trending upwards with new equipment.

At the same time, the share of all confirmed destroyed artillery (a good proxy for what is in use) has shown a dramatic decrease in 155/152mm guns as a share of all artillery for Russia, and an increase in 120mm guns. This bespeaks the ammunition and tube shortages. The very rapid fire mission rate early in the war probably also contributed, as you only get so many fire missions out a tube before it is degraded, and it will eventually be nonfunctional.

Russian Official Issues Nuclear Weapons Warning After Historic Achievement
^{— Nick Mordowanec · Newsweek · Nov 6, 2023}

For the first time in the history of the existence of nuclear missile weapons, our country is ahead of its competitors in this [nuclear] domain. — Patrushev (Russia Today)

For some reason, American politicians who are held captive by their own propaganda remain confident that in the event of a direct conflict with Russia, the United States is capable of launching a preventive missile strike, after which Russia will no longer be able to respond. — Patrushev (Rossiyskaya Gazeta)

Putin ally: West increasing risk of weapons of mass destruction being used
^{— Guy Faulconbridge, Andrew Osborn, Timothy Heritage · Reuters · Nov 8, 2023}

The natural consequence of the United States' destructive policies is the deterioration in global security. The risk that nuclear, chemical and biological weapons will be used is increasing. The international arms control regime has been undermined. — Patrushev (TASS)

Cold war style paranoia? When was the last time someone threatened the Kremlin with attacking Russia? Nuclear assault? Why would anyone want to? Investment opporutnity?

Meanwhile...

Moscow bombarded 118 Ukraine towns: officials | WION Speed News (WION · 13m:25s · Nov 8, 2023)


Not much by way of a peace trajectory coming out of the Kremlin circle these days. Rich powerful guys terrorize Ukraine and talk paranoia.

Chechen warlord appoints son, 15, as head of his security service (— Sara Odeen-Isbister · Metro · Nov 5, 2023) (also reported by Reuters and Euronews and others)

Not like when I grew up.

That entirely depends on the larger situation. You can't just sit on the defensive all the time either. There are plenty of plausible reasons why Ukraine might want to push even into prepared russian defenses - to fix troops in place, to keep russian commanders on the defensive psychologically, to seize tactically advantageous positions, to force the russian artillery to fire so they can be targeted with counter-battery fire. I could go on, but the point is your analysis is simplistic to the point of being useless. — Echarmion

You can't be on the defensive all the time in football, you can be on the defensive all the time in a war.

Of course, there are offensive actions that will optimize defence, but the great Ukrainian offensive to cut the land bridge and then retake Crimea is not such offensive actions undertaken for the purposes of defence.

When you are a smaller country invaded by a larger country, the correct military strategy is to defend, minimizing your own losses while maximizing losses on the enemy. Of course, doing so requires defending positions until they are no longer fit for purpose and retreating to prepared fortifications behind you (the opposite direction of a foolish charge at the enemy's fortifications).

Of course, the pace of retreat must be slow enough in order to render the ongoing conquest of the entire country too costly.

Now, offensive operations do have a uses within the context of a defensive strategy. Making your enemy fear surprise offensives and counter-offensives makes them divert resources and increases the costs and complexity of planning, all of which further slows down the attacker.

The classic purpose of defending against a superior force that will eventually win is give time for diplomatic actions.

There are only two available:

1. convince other parties to join the war. For example the UK defending against Nazi Germany to buy time for the US to join the war and save them.

2. Negotiate a peace using the leverage of the high cost of further fighting.

When a larger country with a much larger military invades a smaller country with a smaller military, plan A is for the smaller country to simply capitulate. There are many sound and rational reasons to simply capitulate and this happens regularly throughout history. People don't want to die, nor see their country destroyed, and the new boss maybe remarkably similar to the old boss anyways.

However, if the smaller country musters a defence then it is in a position to negotiate better terms than an outright surrender.

Finland fighting the Soviet Union has been often cited as some sort of model for Ukraine.

Ukraine's initial defence does follow the Finnish model (or pretty much any smaller country putting up a serious defense).

However, in then quickly diverges into delusional fantasy of "beating" the Russians. Finland, not being delusional that it could defeat the Soviet Union, needed to agree to a peace and accept it lost said war with the Soviet Union, lost 20% of their territory, lost access to the Arctic Ocean, the largest lake previously split with the Soviet Union, a cultural heartland, and of course many lives, and last but not necessarily least had to concede defeat to the Soviet Union (kiss ass in more formal diplomatic parlance) and agree to pay massive war reparations that transformed the country's ecology (in order to cut down enough trees to pay for the privilege of still existing as a country).

In the case Finland, military defensive strategy coherently supported diplomatic efforts. The only nuance being the Finns did reconquer territory at one point, but this was not a delusional strategy but a bet that Nazi Germany (not themselves) would defeat the Soviet Union and they could get all their land back that way (though it should be noted the Finns also hedged their bets and did not go past their initial borders in order to have a better diplomatic position in case the Nazis lost; aka. not provide the Soviet Union with casus belli of a war of reprisal if they defeated the Nazis).

Point is, you can always be on the defensive and it is wise to do so against a superior force and the point would be to negotiate a peace that is better than both capitulation and complete conquest.

There is zero point to go on a delusional campaign right into sophisticated prepared defences of a superior force.

Catch-phrases such as "you can't just sit on the defensive all the time either." are true in football and other similar sports.

Now, if you mean that some offensive actions support defence and that by "depends on the circumstances" you agree Ukraine's campaign to "cut the land bridge" and "retake Crimea" was a delusional fools errand, then we agree.

Well, a Soviet Union, with far more arms and men, did tire from fighting a far smaller war Afghanistan, even they managed to kill far more Afghans than the US ever. But you assume this war hasn't had any effect on Russia? — ssu

I literally say "Of course, maybe Russia will 'tire out'," followed with "feel free to present evidence that will happen 'this time' ", and ending with "but there's a lot of lives to gamble to test such a theory."

I am completely aware that larger armies can simply tire of fighting and go home and that is one potential outcome in any war, that's why I literally say so.

That it has happened before, however, is not evidence it will happen this time.

Feel free to provide evidence Russia, in whatever general form is required to continue to prosecute the war, is not committed to said war, and in particular defending the annexed territories.

Unlike in Afghanistan in the Cold War, Russia is defending Russian speakers in the annexed regions and defending a critical long term strategic position.

Additionally, unlike Afghanistan, I would argue there isn't really an option of "just leaving" due to the geology (of there being no natural barrier between Ukraine and Russia) and politically due to the annexations.

↪boethius, let me just check that I understand your theory, the military-industrial complex decides what is and isn't sent to Ukraine, and they're in business. — jorndoe

This is not my theory at all.

"Drip Feed theory" (DFT) is that what is sent to Ukraine depends on what kind of help will prop up Ukraine in the short term while not being a real threat to Russia nor piss them off "too much".

So, the "next thing" is only sent to Ukraine after their fighting capacity is degraded sufficiently that they risk collapse if they don't get "the next thing" but also they no longer pose much of a threat even with "the next thing".

The reason for this policy is that if you sit down and really try to "push things" and consider doing what would need to be done to see through a Ukrainian victory, then rapidly you need to contend with nuclear escalation.

Help too much the Ukrainians with too sophisticated weapons and Russia can easily say things such as the weapons are entirely dependent on systems and information support outside Ukraine and is de facto at war with NATO and then not only strike Ukraine with nuclear weapons but also strike NATO bases in East-Europe.

Now, maybe NATO responds by nuking some Russian bases. If there's a full scale nuclear exchange that follows, that's not "winning" anything.

However, Russia could not respond, just take the loss in exchange for the loss of NATO bases in Eastern Europe, but retaliate instead by nuking more Ukraine, for example all the major cities rendering Ukraine completely unable to keep fighting.

And those would be the only two outcomes. Obviously, you have to nuke something if you get nuked, that goes without saying, but scenario 1 is a loss (doesn't matter much if Russia loses too for any rational actor) and scenario 2 is also a loss and arguably a win for Russia.

Of course, if there's no need to use nuclear weapons then as as has been noted many times there are lot's of reasons Russia would not use nuclear weapons in the current situation: because they are winning. Hence, if the West wants to minimize the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, then it needs to keep Russia winning by undersupplying Ukraine.

I am completely aware that larger armies can simply tire of fighting and go home and that is one potential outcome in any war, that's why I literally say so. — boethius

Hard to see the Russians going home.

I can't really blame anyone for not looking through the constant propaganda barrage, but the Russians are on track to decisively win the war.

Pressure on Zelensky is growing to start negotiations with the Russians. He has cancelled elections because by now everybody understands Zelensky wouldn't be re-elected. People within the Ukrainian military and political establishment are starting to admit that things are much worse than the media makes them appear.

While Zelensky is still trying to sell the myth of a Ukrainian offensive, both people in Ukraine and the Western media are openly saying its a stalemate, Ukraine is running out of men, etc.

But it's not a stalemate. Ukraine is losing, and it's losing decisively. That's why the pressure is growing. Sensible people understand that the longer Ukraine waits to negotiate, the more Ukraine's negotiating position will deteriorate.

'Stalemate' is just a cope term, to save face, to avoid having to admit defeat to domestic audiences, and to not have to utter the words "the Russians won".

The bottomline now is that Ukraine is not going to join NATO, and the question is whether negotiations will be able to produce something that the West and Ukraine can prop up to their domestic populations.

EU-membership might be that thing, though it's questionable whether this is realistic considering how utterly broken Ukraine is, and the fact that the EU has some pretty strict criteria on whether a country can join. It might simply be a carrot to dangle infront of Zelensky's face to get him to negotiate, or to give Zelensky something to sell to Ukrainians as a 'victory'.


I think this is all quite bleak and tragic, especially for Ukraine itself. I can't imagine having to make such sacrifices only for it to be in vain. But that's the price to pay for politicians who deal in delusions and fairy tales.

EU Enlargement: Commission recommends starting accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and candidate status for Georgia
https://commission.europa.eu/news/enlargement-commission-recommends-starting-accession-negotiations-ukraine-moldova-bosnia-and-2023-11-08_en

The classic purpose of defending against a superior force that will eventually win is give time for diplomatic actions.

There are only two available:

1. convince other parties to join the war. For example the UK defending against Nazi Germany to buy time for the US to join the war and save them.

2. Negotiate a peace using the leverage of the high cost of further fighting. — boethius

Right, because it's absolutely impossible for a smaller country to win against a larger one. Never happens, ever.

In the case Finland, military defensive strategy coherently supported diplomatic efforts. — boethius

And the Finns were right, while Ukraine is wrong, because?

Now, if you mean that some offensive actions support defence and that by "depends on the circumstances" you agree Ukraine's campaign to "cut the land bridge" and "retake Crimea" was a delusional fools errand, then we agree. — boethius

I don't have access to the intelligence Ukraine had when deciding on that offensive, so I have no idea whether the effort was delusional. They seem to have adjusted their tactics to the situation on the ground well enough.

Help too much the Ukrainians with too sophisticated weapons and Russia can easily say things such as the weapons are entirely dependent on systems and information support outside Ukraine and is de facto at war with NATO and then not only strike Ukraine with nuclear weapons but also strike NATO bases in East-Europe. — boethius

Now *that* is a delusional scenario unless we assume the Russian leadership is a suicide cult.

Russia would not use nuclear weapons in the current situation: because they are winning. Hence, if the West wants to minimize the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, then it needs to keep Russia winning by undersupplying Ukraine — boethius

What are they winning exactly?

I can't really blame anyone for not looking through the constant propaganda barrage, but the Russians are on track to decisively win the war. — Tzeentch

By waving their magic war winning wand, presumably.

He has cancelled elections because by now everybody understands Zelensky wouldn't be re-elected. — Tzeentch

Elections during wartime are against Ukrainian law, but your fantasy is interesting nonetheless. Care to share your evidence that Zelensky wouldn't be re-elected?

While Zelensky is still trying to sell the myth of a Ukrainian offensive, both people in Ukraine and the Western media are openly saying its a stalemate, Ukraine is running out of men, etc. — Tzeentch

Ah yes, "people are saying". Why have evidence or arguments when you can just say what people are saying?

But it's not a stalemate. Ukraine is losing, and it's losing decisively. — Tzeentch

The tanks will be in Kiev any minute. You heard it here first folks!

'Stalemate' is just a cope term, to save face, to avoid having to admit defeat to domestic audiences, and to not have to utter the words "the Russians won". — Tzeentch

Right. Russia lost three major campaigns, but since the Ukrainian offensive also failed to reach it's objective the status quo is now a decisive russian victory. That makes total sense.

If I told you in December 2021 that Russia would expend it's entire peacetime army, it's entire stock of artillery ammunition, a large part of its armored vehicles and artillery pieces, to conquer (parts of) three Ukrainian Oblasts, you'd call that a major victory?

The bottomline now is that Ukraine is not going to join NATO — Tzeentch

Ukraine was never going to join NATO with Russian troops on its soil.

I think this is all quite bleak and tragic, especially for Ukraine itself. I can't imagine having to make such sacrifices only for it to be in vain. But that's the price to pay for politicians who deal in delusions and fairy tales. — Tzeentch

Right, small states should just always do what their bigger neighbours want and not try to get out of there sphere of influence. Unless the neighbour is the evil imperialist US.

Just read the Western press. The fact that the war is going terribly for Ukraine and that Zelensky is facing heavy pressure domestically and internationally is not controversial.

Russia invaded Ukraine over NATO membership/US influence specifically, and the strategic vulnerability of Crimea more broadly. They have successfully waylaid plans for Ukrainian NATO membership, and have taken 20% of Ukraine in the process, creating a landbridge to Crimea.

The Ukrainian military and economy are badly battered and basically on permanent life-support.

It's an absolute humiliation for the West, considering how the propaganda machine tried to spin the war and how Europe and the establishment media all, for some reason, jumped on the neocon bandwagon straight into this disaster.

That this would be the predictable outcome was clear to many when the war started back in 2022, and it has been quite frustrating to see how Western opinion got hijacked by propaganda and prolonged this copium-fueled war when it could have ended in March/April 2022. But people started to believe their own bullshit fairytales about pushing the Russians back to the border and out of Crimea.

Ukraine's bargaining position has only deteriorated since then, and it still is deteriorating further. Zelensky and the neocons will be unable to admit defeat, and prolong Ukraine's suffering at least until the 2024 elections, which in a cruel irony Biden is set to lose anyway.

The Russians with their tiny economy somehow managed to completely outfox the collective West. Again, it's the price the West pays for delusional leadership, but it's sad for the Ukrainians that they are the ones that have to pay the bill.

Right, small states should just always do what their bigger neighbours want and not try to get out of there sphere of influence. — Echarmion

Ukraine was not in Russia's sphere of influence prior to the war, and its presidents actually did a fairly decent job at balancing between western and Russian interests. That balancing act is the price to pay for a small nation to exist between two large blocs.

Letting the Americans lead them down the primrose path was foolish in the extreme.

Just read the Western press. The fact that the war is going terribly for Ukraine and that Zelensky is facing heavy pressure domestically and internationally is not controversial. — Tzeentch

"It's not controversial" is not a substitute for an actual argument. You make an awful lot of claims but never actually supply anything as justification. Just being able to quote Mearsheimer doesn't make you some sort of authority that merely has to share their wisdom.

Is the war going terribly for Ukraine? By an objective standard, it's not. It went amazingly well earlier, so the current situation might look bad in comparison. But reducing Russia to fight a positional war on a peer footing isn't a small feat for a country that, in 2014, was barely able to react at all.

Russia invaded Ukraine over NATO membership/US influence specifically, and the strategic vulnerability of Crimea more broadly. They have successfully waylaid plans for Ukrainian NATO membership — Tzeentch

Nah. Russia had troops on Ukrainian soil since 2014 an no way in hell is anyone joining NATO that is currently fighting the russian army.

You're not getting around that simple fact. Probably you'll ignore it like the others that make this same argument.

, and have taken 20% of Ukraine in the process, creating a landbridge to Crimea. — Tzeentch

If that was the plan then the Russian leadership must simply be stupid, since there's no way in hell these territories are worth burning through your entire stock of armaments.

The Ukrainian military and economy are badly battered and basically on permanent life-support. — Tzeentch

And so is the Russian military. Their economy is better able to absorb this in the short term, but this will likely be cold comfort to the average russian when the state runs out of means to cushion the domestic economy.

It's an absolute humiliation for the West — Tzeentch

It's an absolute humiliation for Russia. No idea why you think the West is humiliated.

That this would be the predictable outcome was clear to many when the war started back in 2022, and it has been quite frustrating to see how Western opinion got hijacked by propaganda and prolonged this copium-fueled war when it could have ended in March/April 2022. — Tzeentch

You mean it's frustrating that your predictions were wrong but rather than face the facts you're just going to repeat them in the hope that they'll eventually turn out true.

Ukraine's bargaining position has only deteriorated since then, and it still is deteriorating further. Zelensky and the neocons will be unable to admit defeat, and prolong Ukraine's suffering at least until the 2024 elections, which in a cruel irony Biden is set to lose anyway. — Tzeentch

The Ukraine is set to loose, Biden is set to loose, you should play the lottery!

The Russians with their tiny economy somehow managed to completely outfox the collective West. Again, it's the price the West pays for delusional leadership, but it's sad for the Ukrainians that they are the ones that have to pay the bill. — Tzeentch

I'm sure the many thousands of dead russians feel very smug about having outfoxed the west.

Ukraine was not in Russia's sphere of influence prior to the war, — Tzeentch

Apparently Putin did not agree with that though.

You make an awful lot of claims but never actually supply anything as justification. Just being able to quote Mearsheimer doesn't make you some sort of authority that merely has to share their wisdom. — Echarmion

Well, this is a discussion forum where people share and talk about their ideas. I'm more than comfortable within these topics not to have to cite sources for uncontroversial claims.

Whinging about sources only to instantly hand-wave them when they're provided is a game people here play a little too often, and nothing in your demeanor suggests it would be worth my time.

In fact, you're already hand-waving Mearsheimer. Clearly you're not interested in anything I'd have to share, so don't be so dishonest as to ask for it.

Is the war going terribly for Ukraine? By an objective standard, it's not. It went amazingly well earlier, so the current situation might look bad in comparison. But reducing Russia to fight a positional war on a peer footing isn't a small feat for a country that, in 2014, was barely able to react at all. — Echarmion

Very difficult to understand where you're coming from.

Because the Ukrainians put up a valiant fight means Ukraine is somehow not in the process of losing the war?

I'm sure this type of emotional support counts for something to some people, but it count for nothing in the world of geopolitics.

Nah. Russia had troops on Ukrainian soil since 2014 an no way in hell is anyone joining NATO that is currently fighting the russian army.

You're not getting around that simple fact. Probably you'll ignore it like the others that make this same argument. — Echarmion

Note, currently. Geopolitics is about the long-term, and the US has been arming and training the Ukrainians for an eventual war with Russia since at least 2014.

Well, they got their war.

If that was the plan then the Russian leadership must simply be stupid, since there's no way in hell these territories are worth burning through your entire stock of armaments. — Echarmion

Crimea is extremely important to the Russians, so I'd disagree.

If the Russians have burned through their entire stock of armaments, how come they are still winning in Ukraine? Are they continuing the fight with sticks and stones?

Their economy is better able to absorb this in the short term, but this will likely be cold comfort to the average russian when the state runs out of means to cushion the domestic economy. — Echarmion

Yes, and I'm sure that will happen any day now.

It's an absolute humiliation for Russia. No idea why you think the West is humiliated. — Echarmion

The US attempted to wrench Ukraine from underneath the Russians' noses, and spent some 10 years arming and training the Ukrainians for this very purpose. Financial investments go back even further. Ukraine is the US neocon project.

At every step the US doubled down and played hardball.

Then Russia drew its line and is currently winning against a combined economic bloc that has over 20 times its GDP.

Russia's economy would collapse, Putin would be overthrown, the army would rebel, etc. - the Russians would be pushed back to the border and Crimea would be liberated.

It's obviously a humiliation, given how hard they went in with the rhetoric.

You mean it's frustrating that your predictions were wrong but rather than face the facts you're just going to repeat them in the hope that they'll eventually turn out true. — Echarmion

What prediction are you even talking about?

Apparently Putin did not agree with that though. — Echarmion

You fail to understand that the creation of Ukraine was based on a mutual understanding between NATO and post-Soviet Russia that Ukraine was to be a neutral bufferzone, necessary to avoid conflict.

Given the agreement was respected, the issue of Sevastopol and Crimea was negligible and Russian security interests could be covered through the lend-lease agreement they had.

It's the Americans who in 2008 at the NATO Bucharest Summit stated that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of NATO", thus clearly signaling they were intending to change Ukraine's neutral status. That's what the Russians are and have been reacting to.

This isn't some effort of Russia to 'add Ukraine to its sphere of influence'. What a nonsensical view.

Right, because it's absolutely impossible for a smaller country to win against a larger one. Never happens, ever. — Echarmion

Where do I say it's impossible?

It's called evidence. Actual evidence is needed to support the idea that Ukraine is winning or can win in this case against a larger and stronger opponent. Otherwise, without evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to assume that the much larger and more powerful force is going to win a military confrontation.

Something being hypothetically possible does not lend any weight to it actually being the case in reality, which is the topic here.

And the Finns were right, while Ukraine is wrong, because? — Echarmion

The Finns were right because their strategy was realistic: Finland in WWII could not defeat the Soviet Union, but by defending long enough it would motivate the Soviet Union to agree to a peace on more favourable terms that outright capitulation or eventual military defeat.

The Finns leveraged their much smaller military force to maximize their defensive advantage in order to support a political objective of remaining independent.

Throughout the entire conflict with the Soviet Union, Finland maintained constant diplomatic talks.

What they didn't do is just throw their hands up, declare the Soviet Union evil, Stalin evil, and they wouldn't talk or negotiate with them and demand the world finance their entire war effort and most of their economy without any discernible political objective, or "end game" in modern talking head parlance.

I don't have access to the intelligence Ukraine had when deciding on that offensive, so I have no idea whether the effort was delusional. They seem to have adjusted their tactics to the situation on the ground well enough. — Echarmion

We have enormous amounts of intelligence to go on, including regularly updated satellite imagery of Russian positions which showed us elaborate and multi-layered fortifications with extensive mine fields.

What sort of intelligence could Ukraine possibly have that would indicate attacking fortified lines built up over a whole year would be less costly to them compared to not-doing-that and waiting for Russia to attack Ukraine's own fortified positions?

Now *that* is a delusional scenario unless we assume the Russian leadership is a suicide cult. — Echarmion

Why didn't the US and NATO acolytes pour in all the advanced weaponry they have since trickled into Ukraine from the get go? Why aren't squadrons of f16 with all the advanced sensors and missiles and other munitions not patrolling Ukrainians skies as we speak?

The first year of the war, Ukraine had realistic chances of defeating the Russian forces that had invaded. Russia had not yet even partly mobilized, had not yet built up sophisticated defences, and were prosecuting the war with their professional soldiers and a band of mercenaries.

If the goal was to defeat Russia in Ukraine, it was certainly possible in the first months and year. Of course, that would not end the war but would be a humiliating military disaster for Russia, which combined with the disruption of the sanctions, would have solid chances of unravelling the Russian state as the Neo-cons so desired.

Now, instead of "providing what Ukraine needs" the West simply made arbitrary rules of what could be supplied: no tanks, no howitzers, no "offensive" missiles that could reach Russia proper, certainly no Western aircraft or helicopters, no advanced drones and so on.

When questioned about these limitations, sometime US or NATO officials would make up some lame excuse, but mostly they would simply say that they don't want to "escalate".

Escalate to where? To Ukraine winning, at least a first war?

No, obviously escalate to nuclear weapons.

If Russia was actually facing military defeat, lines collapsing, tens of thousands of prisoners, chaotic mobilization and so on, furious population and the start of civil unrest etc. they would certainly consider the use of nuclear weapons to salvage the situation.

Of course, we don't know if they would use nuclear weapons.

What we do know, is that the US and NATO did not want to find out what the decision would be.

And why? Because if you war game it out, if NATO and the US "pushed hard" in Ukraine and actually supplied what could deliver victory to Ukraine, and there was a flood of advanced Western weapons, then Russia certainly could legitimately say it is de facto in a state of war with NATO and so strike NATO bases in Eastern Europe with nuclear weapons as well as every bridge across the Dnieper as well as critical bunkers, C&C and supply centres to arrest the Ukrainian advance.

Now, you can argue that maybe such attacks wouldn't work, that all Russian warheads are duds or missile defence would work flawlessly to deal with it or whatever, but maybe such strikes would work perfectly well.

There is no rule that the use of tactical nuclear weapons automatically triggers a full on armageddon. You could say all Russian second strike capability are duds too ... ok, well, maybe they aren't.

So the question becomes first is it worth risking a full strategic exchange of nuclear weapons on all major cities in the West ... to protect a non-NATO members property over Russian speakers in East Ukraine?

And second, if the escalation stops and the end result is Russia hit some bases in Eastern Europe and NATO his some comparable Russian bases somewhere, and the war in Ukraine is ended as Russia can anyways just nuke at will there without there even being any treaty obligation to respond, is this a "win" for the West?

Maybe the outcome is better for the West than for Russia, but it doesn't seem to me a desirable situation.

More important than my opinion in explaining events, it is clearly NATO's opinion not to escalate anywhere close to what would cause Russia to seriously consider the use of nuclear weapons.

So, the logical corollary of such a policy is to support Ukraine enough to prop it up and avoid an embarrassing collapse but not enough to pose any real risk to Russian forces. So as Ukraine's fighting capacity diminishes, this policy calls for trying to reestablish parity with those advanced weapons that was "common sense" couldn't be sent sometimes even the month before.

What are they winning exactly? — Echarmion

They are winning the war. They have successfully conquered nearly a quarter of Ukraine, and arguably the most valuable quarter in terms of resources and the part that most speaks Russian.

The current "stalemate" is a war of attrition that heavily favours the larger force.

If you want to argue these aren't worthwhile moral objectives or then they are losing in some economic or political way (vis-a-vis the West; clearly Ukraine is far more damaged than Russia and is not winning in any political or economic sense against Russia), then you are free to do so, but the context of such an argument would be the Russians are at least winning militarily in Ukraine.

Hard to see the Russians going home. — Tzeentch

Yes, it's almost impossible to envision in the actual war at hand.

Unlike some remote and exotic place that normal people don't care about, the war is right on Russia's border and defending (from the Russian point of view) ethnic Russians as well as retaking lands that were Russian for hundreds of years. These are elements that strongly motivate a population to fight a war, very unlike wandering around the mountains in Afghanistan for no clear reason.

Pressure on Zelensky is growing to start negotiations with the Russians. He has cancelled elections because by now everybody understands Zelensky wouldn't be re-elected. People within the Ukrainian military and political establishment are starting to admit that things are much worse than the media makes them appear. — Tzeentch

Yes, we haven't even gotten to the part where all this skeptical analysis of Ukraine's prospects in a long war (compared to negotiating before or then in the short term after the war started) accumulated here and elsewhere is starting to be openly admitted and discussed even in mainstream Western media.

But it's not a stalemate. Ukraine is losing, and it's losing decisively. That's why the pressure is growing. Sensible people understand that the longer Ukraine waits to negotiate, the more Ukraine's negotiating position will deteriorate.

'Stalemate' is just a cope term, to save face, to avoid having to admit defeat to domestic audiences, and to not have to utter the words "the Russians won". — Tzeentch

Agreed.

What's worse than calling a war of attrition a stalemate, the comparison to WWI trench warfare is particular irritatingly ignorant.

WWI wasn't a stalemate! I'm pretty sure one side lost.

The bottomline now is that Ukraine is not going to join NATO, and the question is whether negotiations will be able to produce something that the West and Ukraine can prop up to their domestic populations.

EU-membership might be that thing, though it's questionable whether this is realistic considering how utterly broken Ukraine is, and the fact that the EU has some pretty strict criteria on whether a country can join. It might simply be a carrot to dangle infront of Zelensky's face to get him to negotiate, or to give Zelensky something to sell to Ukrainians as a 'victory'. — Tzeentch

This should be the problem, but the underlying problem is the extent of the losses. As soon as the war ends there is going to be a tally of Ukrainian dead and permanently disabled and it will be revealed the extent to which Ukrainians and the West were lied to and the madness driving the war will be revealed.

The entire justification for the war effort was that Ukraine was inflicting more losses than sustaining, or then the moments of skepticism about that in Western media would fall back to at least parity: that "maybe" Ukrainians aren't inflicting more losses but then it would be about the same.

It is the day of reckoning that Zelensky fears most and he will do everything to avoid it.

I would argue that it is simply not mentally possible for Zelensky to face the reality of what he has done, especially as multiple opportunities to negotiate a peace existed before and during the war.

Everyone else can just say they were following orders, naturally.

Hence the need to gradually discredit Zelensky and get rid of him.

That is my prediction anyways.

I think this is all quite bleak and tragic, especially for Ukraine itself. I can't imagine having to make such sacrifices only for it to be in vain. But that's the price to pay for politicians who deal in delusions and fairy tales. — Tzeentch

It is certainly a great tragedy.

And we have definitely learned that wishful thinking doesn't win wars. Again.

Well, this is a discussion forum where people share and talk about their ideas. I'm more than comfortable within these topics not to have to cite sources for uncontroversial claims — Tzeentch

What is there to discuss if you don't justify your claims re the military situation?

Very difficult to understand where you're coming from.

Because the Ukrainians put up a valiant fight means Ukraine is somehow not in the process of losing the war?

I'm sure this type of emotional support counts for something to some people, but it count for nothing in the world of geopolitics. — Tzeentch

How many armored vehicles has Russia lost? How many artillery pieces? How many soldiers?

The defense has been a bit more than a "valiant fight". Russia isn't sitting around leisurely twiddling their thumbs while they wait for Ukraine to surrender. For almost two years they have thrown everything they have into the conflict, and lost a good chunk of that.

Crimea is extremely important to the Russians, so I'd disagree. — Tzeentch

They already had Crimea. Their goals obviously went way beyond that but this doesn't fit your narrative so you'll ignore both the very obvious stated goals (demilitarise and denazify) and also the evidence in the form of actual russian invasion routes.

Yes, and I'm sure that will happen any day now. — Tzeentch

If you think a country can go on spending more than 10% of its GDP on the military without ill effects I don't know what to tell you.

The US attempted to wrench Ukraine from underneath the Russians' noses, and spent some 10 years arming and training the Ukrainians for this very purpose. Financial investments go back even further. Ukraine is the US neocon project. — Tzeentch

So you claim. The evidence for this is flimsy as has been discussed ad nauseum already. In any event Russia had a perfectly good frozen conflict in Ukraine already.

Note, currently. — Tzeentch

Russian troops have been fighting in Ukraine since 2014.

Then Russia drew its line and is currently winning against a combined economic bloc that has over 20 times its GDP. — Tzeentch

If winning is wrecking your military and throwing away your international prestige and various lucrative trade deals, I'd hate to see what loosing looks like.

What has Russia gained, a bit of territory? That won't transform the russian economy. Russian arms have been exposed as sub-par, russian military doctrine as a failure. Russia is loosing influence in it's "near abroad", primarily to China, due to its inability to uphold commitments. The need to keep Chechnya quiet is forcing Putin to allow Kadyrov to amass a significant independent powerbase.

Really for someone to claim they "look at geopolitics" your view seems remarkably focused on a single coloured line on a map. There's a reason states have largely stopped the kind of territorial aggrandisement Russia is undertaking.

Russia's economy would collapse, Putin would be overthrown, the army would rebel, etc. - the Russians would be pushed back to the border and Crimea would be liberated.

It's obviously a humiliation, given how hard they went in with the rhetoric. — Tzeentch

I think you're substituting what officials have actually said with your idea of what they wished for.

What prediction are you even talking about? — Tzeentch

That Ukraine would fall within weeks. That the real russian army wasn't yet fully in the fight.

Kiev was supposed to fall "any day now" as you like to claim. Then it was Charkiw that was about to fall. None of it materialised yet there's still the exact same rhetoric about how Russia, with it's superior resources, cannot fail to win.

You fail to understand that the creation of Ukraine was based on a mutual understanding between NATO and post-Soviet Russia that Ukraine was to be a neutral bufferzone, necessary to avoid conflict. — Tzeentch

Ridiculous nonsense. Ukraine was a SSR and gained independence when Jelzin decided to dissolve the USSR. That was a result of internal USSR politics, not some imagined understanding with NATO.

It's the Americans who in 2008 at the NATO Bucharest Summit stated that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of NATO", thus clearly signaling they were intending to change Ukraine's neutral status. That's what the Russians are and have been reacting to. — Tzeentch

Which was merely a reaffirmation of the previous policy, and in fact the plan was subsequently put in ice, as has been pointed out in this thread. Plus there's the previous point about NATO membership being impossible since 2014.

This isn't some effort of Russia to 'add Ukraine to its sphere of influence'. What a nonsensical view. — Tzeentch

Someone should tell Putin, because his statements very clearly say that Ukraine is an illegitimate state and should really just be part of Russia.

It's called evidence. Actual evidence is needed to support the idea that Ukraine is winning or can win in this case against a larger and stronger opponent. Otherwise, without evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to assume that the much larger and more powerful force is going to win a military confrontation. — boethius

Ukraine won the battle for Kiev, the battle for Charkiv (that one actually was a major rout) and the battle for Kherson.

Russia meanwhile has demonstrated the ability to take territory by assaulting a relatively small sector of the front with a large, grinding assault. But the losses this causes are apparently very heavy and it's very slow. Ukraine meanwhile has failed to penetrate heavy russian defenses.

That's the evidence, and it doesn't suggest either side is about to win decisively. At best it suggests a status quo peace.

They are winning the war. They have successfully conquered nearly a quarter of Ukraine, and arguably the most valuable quarter in terms of resources and the part that most speaks Russian. — boethius

But that wasn't the russian goal. And they have also wrecked their military to an extent that will likely prevent them from projecting serious military power for years.

That's a major defeat in my book.

Why didn't the US and NATO acolytes pour in all the advanced weaponry they have since trickled into Ukraine from the get go? Why aren't squadrons of f16 with all the advanced sensors and missiles and other munitions not patrolling Ukrainians skies as we speak?

The first year of the war, Ukraine had realistic chances of defeating the Russian forces that had invaded. Russia had not yet even partly mobilized, had not yet built up sophisticated defences, and were prosecuting the war with their professional soldiers and a band of mercenaries.

If the goal was to defeat Russia in Ukraine, it was certainly possible in the first months and year. Of course, that would not end the war but would be a humiliating military disaster for Russia, which combined with the disruption of the sanctions, would have solid chances of unravelling the Russian state as the Neo-cons so desired. — boethius

No-one wants the Russian state to unravel because then the nukes are unaccounted for and who knows what happens.

The point of the restrictions was, in part, to avoid just such an unraveling.

But also because popular opinion matters and while most people who looked at the matter concluded there was very little risk of a nuclear escalation, politicians aren't elected by foreign policy experts. People were very worried about a nuclear escalation, that has mostly faded by now.

How many armored vehicles has Russia lost? How many artillery pieces? How many soldiers? — Echarmion

You can't win a war without taking casualties. Pretty obvious.

They already had Crimea. — Echarmion

Crimea became strategically vulnerable when the US sought to change Ukraine's neutral status.

...and also the evidence in the form of actual russian invasion routes. — Echarmion

If you're saying that, I highly doubt you actually understand the implications of the size and disposition of the initial Russian invasion force.

It's a clear indicator of the fact that they had limited objectives going in.

The evidence for this is flimsy... — Echarmion

Flimsy? It's right there on the US state department's website. :lol:

To date, we have provided approximately $44.2 billion in military assistance since Russia launched its premeditated, unprovoked, and brutal full-scale invasion against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and more than $47 billion in military assistance since Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014. — Uncle Sam Himself

Or maybe you'd rather hear it from chief neocon Nuland in 2013. Even before the violent coup d'etat of 2014 the US was already deeply involved in Ukraine.

Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the United States has supported Ukrainians as they build democratic skills and institutions, as they promote civic participation and good governance, all of which are preconditions for Ukraine to achieve its European aspirations. We’ve invested over $5 billion to assist Ukraine in these and other goals that will ensure a secure and prosperous and democratic Ukraine. — Head Honcho Nuland

_

That Ukraine would fall within weeks. — Echarmion

I never said anything like that.

I've actually extensively argued the opposite. It is clear by Russian troop counts and disposition that capturing all of Ukraine (or Kiev, for that matter) was not their goal. And Mearsheimer makes that point as well.

Capturing all of Ukraine would be crazy, and would have invited an US-backed insurgency. In fact, there are good indications that is what the US was planning for.

Here is a lovely panel by CSIS in which they elaborately explain why occupying Ukraine would be a terrible idea, and how stupid the Russians are for trying it. The joke turned out to be on them, however, since the Russians never did.

They even invited Michael Vickers - the man responsible for the US-backed insurgency in Afghanistan against the Soviets. He literally states the insurgency they could create in Ukraine would be bigger than the one in Afghanistan.

They have no prospects of being able to occupy the country. Putin has said he has no intention of occupying. [...] If we support an insurgency Russian casualties will be through the roof. This will be-... This could be an insurgency that is bigger than our Afghan one in the 1980's in terms of things we could provide them that could really hurt Russians. — Michael G. Vickers

-

Plus there's the previous point about NATO membership being impossible since 2014. — Echarmion

The US was in the process of creating a fait accompli. They almost succeeded.

Russia takes 20% of Ukraine territory and your conclusions is:

Russia meanwhile has demonstrated the ability to take territory by assaulting a relatively small sector of the front with a large, grinding assault. But the losses this causes are apparently very heavy and it's very slow. — Echarmion

But the losses this causes are apparently very heavy and it's very slow. Ukraine meanwhile has failed to penetrate heavy russian defenses. — Echarmion

Apparent to whom? What evidence?

You demand others provide evidence (often of completely obvious things to anyone following the conflict, which is what we do here) and yet provide none yourself.

Ukraine won the battle for Kiev, the battle for Charkiv (that one actually was a major rout) and the battle for Kherson. — Echarmion

While Ukraine was "winning" the battle for Kiev, Russia simply rolled out of Crimea (on bridges that were neither bombed nor shelled) and created a land bridge from Crimea to Russian mainland.

However, true that Ukraine was at least able to defend Kiev and did not entirely capitulate and clearly demonstrated that if Russia was to settle things militarily it would be extremely costly (which it has been). Of course, when a smaller force makes such a demonstration to a larger force it is extremely likely that continued fighting will be even more costly to the smaller force.

Therefore, the smaller force should aim to use the leverage of the prospect of a costly and risky war (not only in itself but in terms of extrinsic events) to negotiate a peace on the most favourable terms.

Ukraine achieved that after the winning the battle of Kiev.

Unfortunately, if temporarily winning one battle among many losses, against what is essentially an imperial expeditionary force (not remotely the whole your adversary can muster) goes to your head and you, the smaller force, decide your soldiers are so much better and more motivated than your enemy and you are in fact in position to settle things on the battle field (aka. delusional), then that leverage starts going away.

The more the war goes on, the more the larger force will want to "show for it" and the more foolish the decision to keep fighting becomes compared to settling things quickly (especially when reasonable peace terms were proposed): enter wishful thinking driving strategy rather than any realistic summation of prospects.

And the reason it is delusional is that against a far larger force you'd need to inflict losses at such a disproportionate rate and sustain that against the enemy being able to do something call learning. There was never any concrete evidence Ukraine could inflict disproportionate casualties on the Russians at the scale of the entire war (certainly some engagements go better or worse) and any critical enquiry would be met with "well .... Ukraine doesn't disclose its casualties; it's a war you know, very secret stuff", but even if the propaganda was true you'd need to believe Russia would be unable to adapt and even the playing field, which is an incredibly foolish assumption considering Russia has not only more resources, available manpower but far more capabilities than Ukraine (air, sea, armour, etc.); it is not a situation where Ukraine is carpet bombing at will Russian troops equipped essentially with only small arms.

Why the myth of the incompetent Russian soldier who essentially wants to die was so critical to make Ukraine's commitment to further fighting and explicit refusal to negotiate make sense. You'd have to believe that the Russian soldier is essentially retarded to maintain the idea that the Russian army won't figure out some effective use of all its equipment, assuming you believed the propaganda that Ukraine was inflicting asymmetric losses on the Russians (rather than what was likely: Ukraine was suffering significantly more losses maintaining ground against Russia's professional and better equipped army and then later mercenaries).

Russia takes 20% of Ukraine territory and your conclusions is:

Russia meanwhile has demonstrated the ability to take territory by assaulting a relatively small sector of the front with a large, grinding assault. But the losses this causes are apparently very heavy and it's very slow.
— Echarmion

But the losses this causes are apparently very heavy and it's very slow. Ukraine meanwhile has failed to penetrate heavy russian defenses.
— Echarmion

Apparent to whom? What evidence?

You demand others provide evidence (often of completely obvious things to anyone following the conflict, which is what we do here) and yet provide none yourself. — boethius

Very easy to do. Just look at how much Russia has gained more territory after the initial thrust.
Let's remember that Russia has lost considerable territory as it lost the whole Kyiv front.

Just look at how much Russia has gained more territory after the initial thrust. — ssu

The thing is, Russia not gaining more territory is entirely congruent with the view that Russia is pursuing limited goals in Ukraine,

which in turn would be much more in line with common military logic (troops counts, etc.),

which in turn would be much more in line with sensible strategic planning

which, I'll repeat it again, was likely first and foremost concerned with avoiding a repeat of the Soviet-Afghan War against a US-backed insurgency.

Let's remember that Russia has lost considerable territory as it lost the whole Kyiv front. — ssu

It's more accurate to say that the Russians left the Kiev front.

We know what bitter fighting looks like in the context of this war. It looks like Bahkmut, the Ukrainian offensive, Avdiivka, etc.

That's not what we saw in the north.

The thing is, Russia not gaining more territory is entirely congruent with the view that Russia is pursuing limited goals in Ukraine, — Tzeentch

Equally congruent is that Russia failed to reach it's goals.

Equally congruent is that Russia failed to reach it's goals. — ssu

Which would be incongruent with common military logic: why would Russia deploy a fraction of the troops required to occupy Ukraine?

And also with sensible strategic planning: why would Russia try to occupy a country which is already deeply enmeshed with the United States, with a gigantic insurgency being basically guaranteed?

Sure, one could hand-wave all of this under the idea that the Russians are simply incompetent, but that's a very weak explanation in my opinion.

You can't win a war without taking casualties. Pretty obvious. — Tzeentch

Pah. A weak evasion. Is that what you call a discussion?

Crimea became strategically vulnerable when the US sought to change Ukraine's neutral status. — Tzeentch

After 2014? Again you're not even trying.

If you're saying that, I highly doubt you actually understand the implications of the size and disposition of the initial Russian invasion force.

It's a clear indicator of the fact that they had limited objectives going in. — Tzeentch

Oh really? What major maneuver forces were held back?

Flimsy? It's right there on the US state department's website. :lol: — Tzeentch

Again you're mixing together times and places to create a lie. Why? I don't believe you're simply unable to keep a coherent timeline in your head.

Or maybe you'd rather hear it from chief neocon Nuland in 2013. Even before the violent coup d'etat of 2014 the US was already deeply involved in Ukraine. — Tzeentch

Yeah "deeply involved", so what?

I never said anything like that. — Tzeentch

In that case I retract my claim insofar as it implied you did. But plenty of people who did now make the same arguments you do.

I've actually extensively argued the opposite. It is clear by Russian troop counts and disposition that capturing all of Ukraine (or Kiev, for that matter) was not their goal. And Mearsheimer makes that point as well. — Tzeentch

Out of curiosity, I looked this up, but all that Mearsheimer says is that Russia would have been unable to take all of Ukraine, but he does actually say they intended to capture Kiev.

Capturing all of Ukraine would be crazy, and would have invited an US-backed insurgency. In fact, there are good indications that is what the US was planning for.

Here is a lovely panel by CSIS in which they elaborately explain why occupying Ukraine would be a terrible idea, and how stupid the Russians are for trying it. The joke turned out to be on them, however, since the Russians never did.

They even invited Michael Vickers - the man responsible for the US-backed insurgency in Afghanistan against the Soviets. He literally states the insurgency they could create in Ukraine would be bigger than the one in Afghanistan. — Tzeentch

I think the joke is on the Russians for failing at their objective. Your claim that Russia couldn't possibly have intended something that would have been a bad idea doesn't seem convincing given that the entire war is a spectacularly bad idea either way.

If Russia was convinced they couldn't possibly occupy Ukraine because of US interference why did they think they could invade in the first place?

The US was in the process of creating a fait accompli. They almost succeeded. — Tzeentch

More empty, outrageous claims.

That's not what we saw in the north. — Tzeentch

You should tell the paratroopers at Hostomel. Or all the dead tank crews on the road to Kiev.

Which would be incongruent with common military logic: why would Russia deploy a fraction of the troops required to occupy Ukraine? — Tzeentch

They used what they had. Period. In a rapid short war, Ukraine ought to have collapsed and a favorable pro-Russian government would have taken over the rump-state of Ukraine (what was to be left of it). And if it was easy, why not take all of it?

And they had objectives that were not met and occupying everything to the Western border wasn't that. But even those "limited" objective were not met.

And I think it's obvious what those objectives now are as Putin has actually annexed territories that he doesn't occupy in full.

Apparent to whom? What evidence? — boethius

Apparent from reading reports by the ISW, Oryx, or various commentators who cite their sources.

You demand others provide evidence (often of completely obvious things to anyone following the conflict, which is what we do here) and yet provide none yourself. — boethius

I demand argument mostly, and some reference to facts on the ground rather than airy declarations.

You, I might remind you, have provided zero evidence yourself.

While Ukraine was "winning" the battle for Kiev, Russia simply rolled out of Crimea (on bridges that were neither bombed nor shelled) and created a land bridge from Crimea to Russian mainland. — boethius

So are the Ukrainians fools for strategically deciding which front to defend? Because earlier you lauded Finnland for that strategy.

However, true that Ukraine was at least able to defend Kiev and did not entirely capitulate and clearly demonstrated that if Russia was to settle things militarily it would be extremely costly (which it has been). Of course, when a smaller force makes such a demonstration to a larger force it is extremely likely that continued fighting will be even more costly to the smaller force.

Therefore, the smaller force should aim to use the leverage of the prospect of a costly and risky war (not only in itself but in terms of extrinsic events) to negotiate a peace on the most favourable terms. — boethius

These are the kind of airy statements unmoored from facts on the ground that I meant earlier.

Unfortunately, if temporarily winning one battle among many losses, against what is essentially an imperial expeditionary force (not remotely the whole your adversary can muster) — boethius

Hahaha, yeah the famed second russian army they kept in reserve. Too bad it never made it to Ukraine...

Why the myth of the incompetent Russian soldier who essentially wants to die was so critical to make Ukraine's commitment to further fighting and explicit refusal to negotiate make sense. You'd have to believe that the Russian soldier is essentially retarded to maintain the idea that the Russian army won't figure out some effective use of all its equipment, assuming you believed the propaganda that Ukraine was inflicting asymmetric losses on the Russians (rather than what was likely: Ukraine was suffering significantly more losses maintaining ground against Russia's professional and better equipped army and then later mercenaries). — boethius

You're discussing a strawman. The russian army has demonstrated ability to learn in various areas. That said it still seems to suffer from C&C flaws, which aren't surprising in an autocratic regime.

But anyway what's the point of discussing when you're clearly have a very different picture of reality but don't seem interested in naming your sources.

And they had objectives that were not met and occupying everything to the Western border wasn't that. But even those "limited" objective were not met. — ssu

Ok, so what do you believe those limited objectives were?

My guess would be something along the lines of:

- Occupy strategically vital areas, ergo landbridge to Crimea.
- Try to force the West to negotiate a quick end to the war through a show of force around the capital.

In March/April 2022 the West blocked a peace treaty that was in the final stages of being signed, signaling the end of the first 'phase' of the war. The Russians shifted gears, rearranged their lines to cover vital areas and be able to withstand a long war since they were probably overextended initially.

And that's pretty much the war in a nutshell.

The media has been propping up this war to no end, but it really isn't much more complicated than that.

Crimea became strategically vulnerable when the US sought to change Ukraine's neutral status. — Tzeentch

After 2014? — Echarmion

Clearly. All that connects Crimea to Russia is the Kerch bridge, which would not last a day under normal war-time conditions but was probably spared due to political reasons. (i.e. the Americans pressuring the Ukrainians not to push the Russians too far, as per arguments).

Imagine what the Russian situation would have looked like had the US been able to continue their militarization of Ukraine.

Oh really? What major maneuver forces were held back? — Echarmion

For example, only 20,000 Russian troops participated in the battle of Kiev. Woefully inadequate to effectively occupy a city of nearly 3 million inhabitants, not to mention the some 40,000 - 60,000 Ukrainian defenders. It's just not feasible by any stretch, considering a 3:1 advantage is pretty much the bare minimum for large-scale offensive operations.

There was a 3:1 advantage alright, in favor of the Ukrainians.

Of course, this was spun as a heroic defense by Ukraine. It obviously wasn't. The Russians rolled up to Kiev and then stood there for about a month to see if the negotiations would bear fruit. Skirmishes took place and of course the Russians took losses. That's what happens during war. The Russians aren't afraid to break a few eggs in order to bake an omelet.

Again you're mixing together times and places to create a lie. — Echarmion

No, I'm not.

The US was investing billions of dollars into Ukraine even before the Maidan and the 2014 Crimea invasion. That's what they're openly admitting.

Yeah "deeply involved", so what? — Echarmion

The US is admitting to giving the Ukrainians billions in military aid - a country that had a critical role of neutral buffer between East and West, and you say "so what"?

Well, so what? The Russians told us, over the course of some 20 years, that they view it as a threat to their vital security. We, the West, snubbed them at every turn because we thought they were weak.

To put it in academic terms; the US fucked around and found out.

Out of curiosity, I looked this up, but all that Mearsheimer says is that Russia would have been unable to take all of Ukraine, but he does actually say they intended to capture Kiev. — Echarmion

He does not. In his 2022 lectures he says something along the lines of 'the Russians intended to capture or threaten Kiev' (which was already a controversial statement at the time). In more recent lectures he states outright he doubts that the Russians ever intended to capture Kiev, and that's the argument I am making.

Your claim that Russia couldn't possibly have intended something that would have been a bad idea... — Echarmion

That's not my claim. I just think that's an extraordinarily weak explanation, probably borne of lazy thinking by lesser minds, and not really worth considering.

If the Russians are a bunch of dummies then why are we even discussing? Victory is surely right around the corner. I can't wait to see it.

If Russia was convinced they couldn't possibly occupy Ukraine because of US interference why did they think they could invade in the first place? — Echarmion

Ah, but here's the strategy.

The Russians bit off a strategically relevant chunk that is small enough for them to pacify.

I would not be surprised if there is going to be a second invasion of Ukraine which follows roughly the same pattern. Mearsheimer seems to believe as much. He expects the Russians to take another belt of oblasts to the west of what they have occupied now.

Personally, I have my doubts about that, as expressed in this comment.

You should tell the paratroopers at Hostomel. Or all the dead tank crews on the road to Kiev. — Echarmion

A failed raid or successful ambush tell us nothing about the actual goings-on of the war. These things are milked by the propaganda machine to no end, but you'll need to poke through that if you want to get a more accurate picture of the war.

War requires sacrifices and military friction supposes failures small and large. That's the nature of war.