If we have a reason for choosing something, then those reasons determine our actions....The "choice," between S1 and S2 has to be based on something for us to do any "choosing."...........................so it seems like we can be free in gradations and we are more free when our choices are "more determined by what we want them to be determined by," not when they are "determined by nothing."..................a sort of recursive self-aware self-determination, as opposed to a free floating non-determinism. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist see a red postbox. — RussellA
For the Indirect Realist, the name is of the representation in the mind. For the Direct Realist, the name is of a material object in the world . — RussellA
But there is nothing whatsoever in the perceiving from which knowledge of the perception follows.
— Mww
This problem applies to both the Indirect and Direct Realist. — RussellA
the Direct Realist believes that the object is red, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that only their perception of the object is red. — RussellA
Depends on what you mean by the word "see". — RussellA
We know that if there has been an effect there must have been cause, even if we don't know what the cause was. Let us name the cause of the broken window A. — RussellA
IE, we have named something even if we don't know what it is. — RussellA
The Indirect Realist approach is that of metaphysics, whereas the Direct Realist approach is that of Linguistic Idealism. — RussellA
….both approaches are valid, and each has its own place in our understanding. — RussellA
Kant's response to Hume was that we ARE time and space. Both held the world to be phenomena but Kant held that world to be inside us in a sense. If we are time and space than the world would appear to us falsely because we usually experience time and especially space as outside us. Hence the noumena is the world minus time and space — Gregory
Seems clear to me that that is precisely the wrong way around. We do not go from propositional and cognitive understanding to non-propositional and non-cognitive understanding. There is no such thing as non-cognitive understanding. There is such thing as non-propositional thought, belief, knowledge, and understanding. It's what precedes the propositional. — creativesoul
There is also the humoncular regress to consider. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I can understand the mechanics of Determinism, in that our choice at state S2 has been pre-determined by state S1, but the mechanics of free will elude me, causing me to come to the conclusion that the world is Deterministic and our belief that we have free will is just an illusion.
It is quite absurd to consider that there is a theater in the brain, so why would a theory describing a method for what goes on in the brain, make room for one?
it seems to me that "representation" is really more about how we describe relations within the parts from which the cognitive system emerges…. — Count Timothy von Icarus
…..not the relations that obtain between the whole cognitive system and the objects of experience. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I feel confident in saying we "see trees”….. — Count Timothy von Icarus
….“in-itselfness" seems to be a fraught abstraction. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Is this possible?
Is it possible to have a thought about an internal logical process, when the internal logical process has caused the thought in the first place?
In other words, can an effect cause itself? — RussellA
I don't see why it has to have caused itself. I think it's commonly known as "reflection". — Metaphysician Undercover
Not as I understand it.The indirect realist does not and knows it; the direct realist does not but thinks he does.................Yes, which fits with what I just said, but doesn’t fit with both seeing a red postbox......................No human can see with his eyes closed. — Mww
the direct realist should be able to name the red postbox even if he didn’t even know what a red postbox was. — Mww
The indirect realist conceives the color red as one of a multiplicity of properties belonging to the phenomenon representing the thing he has perceived. It takes more than “red” to be “postbox”, right? — Mww
You name it A, but because neither of us know the cause, I’m perfectly authorized to call that same cause, B — Mww
. As soon as it is determinable, it cannot be a thing-in-itself. — Mww
the point is that an unknown thing, a thing-in-itself, has been named. — RussellA
but until it has been determined, it is still a thing-in-itself. — RussellA
Logically, how can something reflect on itself? — RussellA
There is also the humoncular regress to consider. If we "see representations" by being "inside a mind" and seeing those representations "projected as in a theater," then it seems we should still need a second self inside the first to fathom the representations of said representations, and so on. Else, if self can directly access objects in such a theater, why not cut out the middle man and claim self can just experience the original objects? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Questions about freedom are questions about: "to what extent we are self-determining as opposed to being externally determined.".............We can be alien to ourselves...............We can identify with and exercise control over what determines our actions. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I suppose there’s nothing inherently wrong with naming an existence as such. But naming a mere existence doesn’t tell me as much as naming the object of my experience. — Mww
My understanding of Kant on this point is that if the world is timeless and without space, objects are eternal and the becoming we see is like the motion of the experience of motion pictures. The vase is real but it's eternity acting as becoming, presence showing life. We don't really know what things are in eternity but we can speak of them while in time by observing them acting outside eternity. Try not asking first what noumena is and instead focus time and space being intuitions. Then maybe noumena come into focus — Gregory
It is true that the names "A" and "B" don't tell me as much as the names "the colour red" and "the colour green", but they do tell me something, that "A" and "B" exist and that "things-in-themselves" exist. — RussellA
Philosophers today tend away from this kind of thing, which suggests some kind of non propositional knowledge of red that is there prior language and naming. — Astrophel
His question really is, how are apriori synthetic judgments possible? Take causality — Astrophel
Of course they do. In what other world would they lie?
They do not lie in the perceived world.
A thing-in-itself is still just a thing. — Mww
Things in themselves are neither apriori nor aposteriori. — Astrophel
They are not empirical, not in time and space….. — Astrophel
…..just postulates. — Astrophel
Pure reason is only shown in our visible affairs. — Astrophel
They themselves cannot be witnessed. — Astrophel
You agree that a screen in a flat surface. What is the difference between seeing a portrait of a person in an art gallery and seeing a portrait of a person on a screen. Don't both these appear the same in our visual field, ie, as two-dimensional images? — RussellA
There needs to be some flexibility in what we mean by knowledge. For example, I have the innate ability to see the colour red but not the colour ultraviolet. The distinction between knowing how and knowing what is relevant here, a distinction that was brought to prominence in epistemology by Gilbert Ryle who used it in his book The Concept of Mind. (SEP - Knowing-How and Knowing-That). I am born with the innate knowledge of how to see the colour red even if I don't have the innate knowledge of what the colour red is.
In today's terms, we can account for our a priori knowledge by Innatism and Enactivism, given that life has been evolving in synergy with the world for at least 3.7 billion years. We are born with a brain that has a particular physical structure because of this 3.7 billion years of evolution.
Enactivism says that it is necessary to appreciate how living beings dynamically interact with their environments. From an Enactivist perspective, there is no prospect of understanding minds without reference to such interactions because interactions are taken to lie at the heart of mentality in all of its varied forms. (IEP - Enactivism)
Innatism says that in the philosophy of mind, Innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, that the mind is a tabula rasa (blank slate) at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses, is called empiricism. (Wikipedia - Innatism)
Innatism and Enactivism explain our non-propositional knowledge of red. — RussellA
We see a snooker cue hit a stationary snooker ball and see the snooker ball begin to move. It is not our ordinary experience that snooker balls on a snooker table are able to spontaneously move. Whenever we see a snooker ball start to move we have seen a priori cause, either another snooker ball or a snooker cue.
Where does our belief in causality come from? For Kant, our knowledge of causality is a priori because the Category of Relation includes causality. In today's terms, our knowledge of causality is a priori because of the principle of Innatism, in that the principle of causality is built into the very structure of our brain. The brain doesn't need Hume's principle of induction to know that one thing causes another, as knowing one thing causes another is part of the innate structure of the brain.
Suppose we perceive the colour red, which is an experience in our minds. As we have a priori the innate knowledge of causality, we know that this experience has been caused by something. We don't know what has caused it, but we know something has caused it. We can call this unknown something "A", or equally "thing-in-itself."
The fact that we know "The most distant objects in the Universe are 47 billion light years away" does not mean that we know 47 billion light years. The fact that we know "for every effect there has been a prior cause" does not mean that we know priori causes. Both these statements are representations, and the fact that we know a representation does not mean that we know what is being represented. Confusion often arises in language when the representation is conflated with what is being represented. What is being represented is often named after the representation. For example, Direct Realism conflates what is being perceived when we say "I see a red post-box" with the object of perception, a red post-box.
So what exactly is "thing-in-itself" describing? When we say "our experience of the colour red has been caused by a thing-in-itself", the thing-in-itself exists as a representation in our mind not something in the world. — RussellA
Maybe the noumena is that which connecs the appearances to reason, not behind but within — Gregory
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