It seems that Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism fills the bill, for a metaphysics combining Idealism and Realism.

"I like the Eliminative Ontic Structural apart, but I don't agree with the Realism part." — Michael Ossipoff

You'd have to define what the realism part means to you, that you don't like it. — noAxioms

Didn't I do that?

Realism isn't really a view, it just means you consider something to exist, but without a definition of existence, that can be taken a number of different ways.

If I understand you correctly, you're saying that, because "real" is undefined, and "real-ness" is a matter of opinion, then Realism isn't a factual claim...if the advocate of Realism acknowledges that "real" is just a matter of opinion.

Of course.

So I'm just saying that I don't agree with that opinion or impression expressed by Realism.



You're the center of your life-experience possibiity-story. You're its essential component. It's about your experiences.

"Could our possibility-world be there without you, could it have existence apart from you? Sure. But then we're talking about an entirely different story, and that doesn't have relevance to your own actual life-experience story. "


That is the gist of the new thread I'm working on, once I seem to have time to attend to it.

"So sure, the physical world without you has some sort of existence, as do all of the infinitely-many hypothetical possibilty-worlds and possibility-stories--but that doesn't matter because that isn't the story that you're living in. There are infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-stories, and only one of them is real for you. ...the one that you're in."

So I suggest that Realism is unrealistic."

Nonsense. You've just described existence in sort of idealistic terms. Inferred things exist, even to you.

Of course they can be said to exist in some way. But, it's also arguable that the possibility-world in which we actually live, which includes your solid desk and chair, exists in a sense that the infinitely-many other possibility-worlds don't.

That's all I was saying.

The far side of the moon makes no difference to my life, but that doesn't mean I think it doesn't exist.

The far side of the Moon is definitely part of your life-experience possibility-story. The Soviets photographed in in 1959, if I remember correctly.

(Not that it's relevant to this discussion, but the far side of the Moon is relevant to your life, if the Moon's tidal forces made possible the tide-pools, and if the tide-pools were necessary or helpful for the developement of life, as some have theorized. Of course an object like the Moon inevitably has a far-side (whether or not that far-side always consists of the same part of the Moon's surface.)

"By the way, I was pleased to find,in an Ontic Structural Realism article, that the article refers to Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) as Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), because that means that Skepticism is different from MUH, and so Tegmark didn't propose exactly the same metaphysics that I propose. "

Tegmark himself did a post or two on the old forum, and actually referenced my post where I noted that a determined structure need not be instantiated (computed say) for the elements within (us) to be functional. My tiny little claim to fame I guess. I think that statement is the gist of what you're saying with this if-then terminology of this thread.

Yes, that's a way of saying something that I'm saying.

"Do you advocate Physicalism?"--Michael Ossipoff

This was also asked of me, and it seems irrelevant to the thread. Physicalism isn't really any ontological stance. It is mostly a view that the mental supervenes on the physical

You're saying that Physicalism is only a position in the philosophy of mind, not in metaphysics. That's contrary to what seems to be the consensus regarding what Physicalism means.

Yes, Physicalism can refer to a position in the philosophy of mind, but it's also fully recognized as a metaphysical position.

"Supervenes"? :) Western academic philosophers have exhibited a need to invent expanding terminologies, evidently to obfuscate, to justify continual publishing.

, and yes, I think that is the case. If the other way around

You're the body. The Eliminative Physicalists are right about that, and about the fact that the philosophy of mind is balderdash.

The first error of the philosophy of mind is the fact that there's even a philosophy of mind at all.

Each person is the body, and that's it. Supposing there is or might be a separate metaphysical substance called "Mind" is the basis of philosophy of mind, and is--as I said--philosophy of mind's first error. In other words, philosophy of mind is, itself, an error.

...an error that leads to the nonsensical "Hard Problem of Consciousness", which is a problem only to some Physicalists (by whatever name) and Dualists.

If the other way around, it is idealism of sorts

Call it what you want, but I advocate an Idealism, the metaphysics that I call Skepticalism , and I don't doubt that the each of is nothing other than a body. (...recognizing, of course, that the body is a system, a device, if you like, rather than just an ordinary object.)

None of the three assert a foundation for ontology. Materialism does I think, the view that nothing is more fundamental than, well, material.

That's metaphysial Physicalism too. (...as opposed to philosophy-of-mind Physicalism)

If you don't want to say whether or not you subscribe to that view, then I respect your right to your privacy and your personal secrets.

The only difference between metaphysical Physicalism (as opposed to philosophy-of-mind Physicalism) and Materialism is that the word "Physicalism" acknowledges that the physical includes such a thing as a field, which isn't pieces of matter.

So, in its metaphysical meaning (its only meaning that I recognize) "Physicalism" is just a modern extension and update of Materialism.

I'll say that I must admit that I'm probably what you'd call a "philosophy-of-mind Physicalist".

Henceforth, when I say "Physicalism", I'm referring to metaphysical Physicalism, because I feel that the philosophy-of-mind, itself, is an error.

Though I'm not a Physicalist there are matters on which I agree with Physicalists.

Michael Ossipoff

If I understand you correctly, you're saying that, because "real" is undefined, and "real-ness" is a matter of opinion, then Realism isn't a factual claim...if the advocate of Realism acknowledges that "real" is just a matter of opinion. — Michael Ossipoff

I think of the word as an adjective, not so much a noun. If I believe in God, then I am a deistic realist. It means I think thing X is real. Without the X, the term means little, but often carries the implication of 'that which I experience'. I see a cup, the cup must be real.

But in this thread we've been getting picky not so much about if it is a cup or something else that is real, but what we mean by 'is real' or 'exists' itself. The root definition of those concepts is 'stands apart', which is why I didn't like litewave's definition since I could thing of nothing that isn't identical with itself without first setting up a context with rules about what might make it not identical with itself.

I'm not sure if you offered your definition of 'exists'. Maybe it is buried up above.

The far side of the Moon is definitely part of your life-experience possibility-story. The Soviets photographed in in 1959, if I remember correctly. — Michael Ossipoff

So let's pick something the Soviets can't measure for me. How about really distant planets (say 30 billion light years away). I can make a case for their existence, and I can make a case for their nonexistence. I can drive both arguments to apparent inconsistency, mostly by not having a stable definition of existence. Point is, all the models of the universe that work imply their existence, but such planets cannot have relevance to me personally.

Yes, Physicalism can refer to a position in the philosophy of mind, but it's also fully recognized as a metaphysical position.

Metaphysics includes more than just hierarchy of ontology. The definition by google says "the real world consists simply of the physical world". The word 'simply' is the mind part, asserting lack of a second mental substance. The reference to 'the real world' carries implication that it is the only real world, with no existence beyond it. So yes, ontology is in there. My definition of existence makes that statement not wrong, but incoherent.

"Supervenes"? :) Western academic philosophers have exhibited a need to invent expanding terminologies, evidently to obfuscate, to justify continual publishing.

I am unaware of another word for it, but am open to suggestions if you have one.

None of the three assert a foundation for ontology. Materialism does I think, the view that nothing is more fundamental than, well, material. — noAxioms

That's metaphysial Physicalism too. (...as opposed to philosophy-of-mind Physicalism)

I thought that was the difference between materialism and physicalism, which is whether material is fundamental or not. No, I don't think it is, especially since nobody has every actually found material. I keep reading articles stating that say rocks are 99.<something>% empty space. My reaction is always: Really? Somebody found some nonempty space??
Nevertheless, I am a physicalist in the sense that I think the stuff we see is real and we're made of only it.

The root definition of those concepts is 'stands apart', which is why I didn't like litewave's definition since I could thing of nothing that isn't identical with itself without first setting up a context with rules about what might make it not identical with itself. — noAxioms

Doesn't 'stand apart' mean 'being different from others'? That's part of my definition of existence.

Doesn't 'stand apart' mean 'being different from others'? That's part of my definition of existence. — litewave

Not quite. A cup stands apart from the apple. That usage would be what makes two existent things not be the same thing, but are in fact different from others. But existence itself needs a definition that distinguishes something existent (something that is itself), from something nonexistent (that is not itself), and thus not part of 'others'. I couldn't think of an objective (context-free) example of the latter (or the former for that matter). All examples require some sort of context. An abstract four sided triangle can be itself, and is not itself only in a context where three and four have meaning and are not each other. I guess this is a fairly non-platonic view since platonism does in fact assert that numbers are real and 3 and 4 are different ones.

I thought about it, and our definitions are the same, boiled down. It seems I just word it differently, and assert that a context is required to assess the consistency of whatever is in question, and it is incoherent to ask if the context has objective existence, lacking a context to give meaning to the consistency of it.

So unicorns don't exist in the context of my personal empirical experience, but they do exist in the context of imagination, language, and perhaps somewhere in this universe, if one's delimitation of 'this universe' is more than just one's personal empirical experience.

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I'm not sure if you offered your definition of 'exists'. Maybe it is buried up above.

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I don’t have a metaphysical definition of it. When I use it with metaphysical meaning, I usually use it with quotes, and emphasize that I’m talking about an impression or an agreement, rather than a fact.
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My definite statements don’t use “exist” or “real”
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But, when I do use “real” or “existent”, I use them with the same meaning. I feel that anything that’s real and existent in the context of our lives is as real or existent as we could ask for, so I agree about such things being real and existent, though I don’t consider those words to really mean anything in metaphysics.
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“The far side of the Moon is definitely part of your life-experience possibility-story. The Soviets photographed in in 1959, if I remember correctly.” — Michael Ossipoff
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So let's pick something the Soviets can't measure for me. How about really distant planets (say 30 billion light years away). I can make a case for their existence, and I can make a case for their nonexistence. I can drive both arguments to apparent inconsistency, mostly by not having a stable definition of existence. Point is, all the models of the universe that work imply their existence, but such planets cannot have relevance to me personally.

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NPR news and tv have no relevance to me, but I don’t call them nonexistent.
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As I described, above, about what I agree about “exist”, I’d say that almost surely planets exist 30 billion lightyears away, because, as you said, physical science predicts them.
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“Yes, Physicalism can refer to a position in the philosophy of mind, but it's also fully recognized as a metaphysical position.”—Michael Ossipoff
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The definition [of Physicalism] by google says "the real world consists simply of the physical world". The word 'simply' is the mind part, asserting lack of a second mental substance.

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Ok, of course, now that you mention it, the metaphysical definition of Physicalism, seems to imply the philosophy-of-mind definition. If I understand it correctly, I agree with philosophy-of-mind Physicalism (though I consider philosophy of mind to be pointless and unnecessary) But I don’t agree with metaphysical Physcalism, which believes in a big brute-fact.
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“ "Supervenes"? :) Western academic philosophers have exhibited a need to invent expanding terminologies, evidently to obfuscate, to justify continual publishing.”—Michael Ossipoff
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I am unaware of another word for it, but am open to suggestions if you have one.

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When I was in Junior High School (pre-secondary school, now called “Middle School”), I’d never heard of “Supervene”, but I didn’t perceive any “Hard Problem of Consciousness”, or any need for a philosophy of mind.
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We’re biological organisms. …animals, to be more specific. Animals have evolved—been designed--, by natural selection, to respond to their surroundings so as to maximize the probability of their survival, reproduction, and successful rearing of offspring. We can be regarded as purposeful devices.
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Other purposefully-responding devices include the other animals, and such things as mousetraps, refrigerator-lights, thermostats, etc.
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That was obvious to me in Junior High School. It didn’t even occur to me that there could be some “Hard Problem of Consciousness”, or a need for a philosophy-of-mind, even though I’d never heard the word “Supervenes”.
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Academic philosophers like or need to make things complicated, allegedly difficult, so that they’ll have something to write about.
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Of course we’re remarkable and amazing devices, and I certainly don’t mean to belittle us.
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None of the three assert a foundation for ontology. Materialism does I think, the view that nothing is more fundamental than, well, material. — noAxioms
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“That's metaphysial Physicalism too. (...as opposed to philosophy-of-mind Physicalism)”—Michael Ossipoff
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I thought that was the difference between materialism and physicalism

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As I was saying, what I’ve understood about metaphysical Physicalism, vs Materialism, is that Physicalism is just the modern extension and update of Materialism, to include something physical but not material, such as fields.

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…, which is whether material is fundamental or not. No, I don't think it is, especially since nobody has every actually found material. I keep reading articles stating that say rocks are 99.<something>% empty space. My reaction is always: Really? Somebody found some nonempty space??

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That sounds like a reasonable expression of what’s wrong with Physicalism/Materialism.
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Nevertheless, I am a physicalist in the sense that I think the stuff we see is real…

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I agree about calling it “real”, because it’s real in the context of our lives.
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and we're made of only it.

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I agree with that too. Everyone is a body, and nothing more.
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(But we’re still primary, in the sense that we’re the essential component of the hypothetical life-experience possibility-story that we’re in.)
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So I fit your definition of “Physicalist”, except that I don’t really regard “real” or “existent” as having meaning in metaphysics.
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But I call myself an Idealist, not a Physicalist, because I don’t believe that the physical world is primary, fundamental, objective, or independent. It’s merely the hypothetical setting for our hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories.
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By the way, regarding the word “conscious”, of course it isn’t obvious or clear where “consciousness” starts, in the hierarchy of life, from viruses up to humans. At what point can an organism be said to be conscious. Surely mice are. Insects too, right?
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Bacteria swim in accordance to what they seek or avoid.
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Viruses do purposefully-responsive actions, when they perceive a cell that is the kind that they can use, and drill into it.
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And, as I mentioned above, mousetraps, refrigerator-lights and thermostats are purposefully-responding devices too.
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How do we draw the line for consciousness?
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I suggest that the difficulty of drawing that line tells us that “conscious” isn’t really a useful or meaningful word.
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I suggest that all that can really be said for sure about that is that everything from humans down to mousetraps is purposefully-responsive.
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As for “conscious”, that’s purely a matter of opinion and individual labeling-choice. I consider it obvious that insects should be called conscious, but I don’t know if I’d apply that word to viruses.
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Maybe a good definition of a conscious being is “Something that a humane person wouldn’t want to harm, unless in self-defense, or to protect someone or something else.”
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I don’t squash insects when they enter my apartment. I put them out. If an ant is on the counter or table, I brush it onto the floor instead of squashing it. If any insect, including an ant, is drowning in water, I fish it out with tissue, and leave it on the tissue, to give it the opportunity to dry and recover.
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I do squash spiders, because, for one thing, each spider you squash means lots of insects that won’t die in a particularly unpleasant manner. …so it more than balances out. Also, of course some spiders dangerously bite us humans.
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But I don’t squash Fire-Ants, in spite of their great propensity to bite (sting, actually) us. And, in fact, I protest the extermination of them However I feel justified in squashing a fire-ant that has just bit me. In fact, if you have a dozen or two of them biting you, then there’s really no other practical way of avoiding continuing to get bit by them, other than by squash-rubbing them all off you with one swipe.
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I don’t have a feeling of doing harm, when we protect ourselves from viruses and bacteria, and so that would mean that I don’t feel them to be “conscious”, as I defined it above.
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But I emphasize that that’s just an arbitrary definition.
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Michael Ossipoff

An abstract four sided triangle can be itself, and is not itself only in a context where three and four have meaning and are not each other. — noAxioms

But an abstract four sided triangle is defined only in such a context.

So let's pick something the Soviets can't measure for me. How about really distant planets (say 30 billion light years away). I can make a case for their existence, and I can make a case for their nonexistence. I can drive both arguments to apparent inconsistency, mostly by not having a stable definition of existence. Point is, all the models of the universe that work imply their existence, but such planets cannot have relevance to me personally. — noAxioms

NPR news and tv have no relevance to me, but I don’t call them nonexistent. — Michael Ossipoff

Your're evading the question and also disproving your own statement by posting about something you say has no relevance. I'm asking if something outside your causal influences (a distant object) is real (part of the context of the universe). Answering tells me what you consider to be that context.

We’re biological organisms. …animals, to be more specific. Animals have evolved—been designed--, by natural selection, to respond to their surroundings so as to maximize the probability of their survival, reproduction, and successful rearing of offspring. We can be regarded as purposeful devices.

Pretty much my answer as well. The 'me' that everybody seems so bewildered by is actually an illusory carrot on a stick leading you to behave in a fit manner. Not recognizing it as such seems to lead to that hard problem. At least that's how I see it.

So I fit your definition of “Physicalist”, except that I don’t really regard “real” or “existent” as having meaning in metaphysics. — Michael Ossipoff

Well I suppose I don't regard them as having meaning either, since my prior thread was exactly about my inability to pin down the metaphysical meaning of those words.

By the way, regarding the word “conscious”, of course it isn’t obvious or clear where “consciousness” starts, in the hierarchy of life, from viruses up to humans. At what point can an organism be said to be conscious. Surely mice are. Insects too, right? — Michael Ossipoff

I've been torn apart by others when I express my opinion on that. I put it on a scale from zero on up. Insects are more conscious than a mousetrap, but less than the mouse. It is arrogant to presume that there cannot be something more conscious than us.
So it isn't something that is a line crossed, a thing that you have or don't. The dualists invented the binary consciousness since it means you have the mind thingy or you don't. But they're largely in charge of the vocabulary, so the question becomes "is a bug conscious?" and not "how conscious is a bug?".

I don’t squash insects when they enter my apartment. I put them out. If an ant is on the counter or table, I brush it onto the floor instead of squashing it. If any insect, including an ant, is drowning in water, I fish it out with tissue, and leave it on the tissue, to give it the opportunity to dry and recover.
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I do squash spiders, because, for one thing, each spider you squash means lots of insects that won’t die in a particularly unpleasant manner. …so it more than balances out. Also, of course some spiders dangerously bite us humans.

Funny. I kill most bugs indoors, but leave the spiders, only putting out the scariest looking ones. Are you vegan, that you consider it inhumane to kill even bugs?

But an abstract four sided triangle is defined only in such a context. — litewave

Like I said, our views seem to boil down to similar things.

Point is, all the models of the universe that work imply their existence, but such planets cannot have relevance to me personally. — noAxioms

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NPR news and tv have no relevance to me, but I don’t call them nonexistent. — Michael Ossipoff

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Your're evading the question and also disproving your own statement by posting about something you say has no relevance.

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Surely mentioning something that’s existent but irrelevant to me needn’t contradict a statement of mine, unless I’ve said that there’s no such thing. When the relation between relevance and existence came up, I mentioned NPR and tv, as examples of something existent but irrelevant.
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But I didn’t mean to evade the question. I replied that if physicists and astronomers, the people who’d know about that matter, say that there are almost surely planets that are billions of lightyears from us, then I’d say that almost surely they exist.
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…because, though I try not to use “exist” and “real” in a definite statement, I feel that it’s perfectly reasonable to say that our physical universe and its contents “exist”. …because they exist in the context of our lives.
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So those very distant planets exist. Or, more accurately, they almost surely exist if physicists and astronomers say that they’re almost surely there.
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I'm asking if something outside your causal influences (a distant object) is real (part of the context of the universe).

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It is.
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If the people whom I trust to know about such things say that it’s almost surely there , then I accept that it is almost surely real and existent, because I regard the physical universe and its contents to be real and existent, because they’re real and existent in the context of my life.
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Those distant planets become part of my experience when the physicists &/or astronomers tell us about them almost surely being there.
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Likewise subatomic particles, etc.
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I’d said:
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We’re biological organisms. …animals, to be more specific. Animals have evolved—been designed--, by natural selection, to respond to their surroundings so as to maximize the probability of their survival, reproduction, and successful rearing of offspring. We can be regarded as purposeful devices.

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You replied:
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Pretty much my answer as well. The 'me' that everybody seems so bewildered by is actually an illusory carrot on a stick leading you to behave in a fit manner.

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“Me” isn’t illusory (unless you say the physical world is illusory). “Me” is a physical human, a physical biological organism.
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But yes, what’s illusory is a “Me” that consists of a separate metaphysical substance.
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But that’s probably just a wording-difference, rather than a disagreement.
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Not recognizing it as such seems to lead to that hard problem. At least that's how I see it.

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Yes, the Hard Problem is a made-up problem based on a belief held by the people who express that “problem”.
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I’d said:
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By the way, regarding the word “conscious”, of course it isn’t obvious or clear where “consciousness” starts, in the hierarchy of life, from viruses up to humans. At what point can an organism be said to be conscious. Surely mice are. Insects too, right? — Michael Ossipoff

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You replied:
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I've been torn apart by others when I express my opinion on that. I put it on a scale from zero on up. Insects are more conscious than a mousetrap, but less than the mouse. It is arrogant to presume that there cannot be something more conscious than us.
So it isn't something that is a line crossed, a thing that you have or don't. The dualists invented the binary consciousness since it means you have the mind thingy or you don't. But they're largely in charge of the vocabulary, so the question becomes "is a bug conscious?" and not "how conscious is a bug?".

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Yes of course there isn’t really a definite line, for what’s conscious.
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We just take different wording-approaches:
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I call everything from mousetrap to human “purposefully-responsive”, in order to avoid the controversy and flak that you’ve drawn.
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And then I say that what we call “conscious” is an arbitrary individual choice, an arbitrary line that I place just below insects.
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But, strictly-speaking, you’re right: a demarcation-lined doesn’t really make sense, and it would make sense to say “conscious” where I (uncourageously) say “purposefully-responsive”.
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I’d said:
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I don’t squash insects when they enter my apartment. I put them out. If an ant is on the counter or table, I brush it onto the floor instead of squashing it. If any insect, including an ant, is drowning in water, I fish it out with tissue, and leave it on the tissue, to give it the opportunity to dry and recover.
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I do squash spiders, because, for one thing, each spider you squash means lots of insects that won’t die in a particularly unpleasant manner. …so it more than balances out. Also, of course some spiders dangerously bite us humans.

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You replied:

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Funny. I kill most bugs indoors, but leave the spiders, only putting out the scariest looking ones.

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Then it averages out, and you cancel-out my effect on the arthropod-population.
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I used to leave the spiders, partly because the “Daddy-Longlegs” (Long-Bodied Cellar Spiders) weave webs from which long single strands can be easily gotten (I didn’t take it till the web was dis-used). Those strands are fascinatingly-useful for detecting and roughly-measuring the smallest air-currents.
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For example, in the morning, when one external wall of my apartment had just begun to receive sunlight, measurement with a web-strand revealed a brisk wind blowing in at the bottom of a door to the rest of the apartment, and out at the top of that door. …a convection current that registered as a powerful convection current, with the web-strand flapping in the breeze.
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Likewise, a web-strand will be “flapping in the breeze” when held close to one’s body, due to the body-heat convection current, which the web-strand registers as a powerful convection current.

In fact, those sensitive air-current measurements with the web-strands can sometimes have practical value, for judging how well a room or apartment is ventilated.
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But then there was a big proliferation of winged termites, which swarmed into the apartment. Everywhere around the apartment, the spiders were eating the termites, in a distinctly inhumane manner. So I squashed all the spiders, except probably for some that were unnoticeable somewhere.
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You ask:
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Are you vegan, that you consider it inhumane to kill even bugs?

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No. I don’t live alone, and I can’t unilaterally choose our diet. I will say that we don’t eat animals every day. Maybe about every 3 days Yes, ideally I should be vegan, and I admit that I’m unethical by not being vegan, or even always vegetarian. But I feel that it would also be unkind to pressure my girlfriend about all-the-time vegetarianism.
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Am I hypocritical to spare insects while eating vertebrates, which of course are practically our cousins in my opinion? No, but eating vertebrate animals, our cousins, admittedly feels like cannibalism. Maybe we can try vegetarianism.
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But there’s no household social mandate to make me kill insects, and so I don’t kill them.
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Michael Ossipoff

You really should consider fleshing out your replies a bit more.

You really should consider fleshing out your replies a bit more. — Terrapin Station

Well, maybe you need to flesh-out that statement more. It's easy to make vague criticisms, without giving an example of what you're talking about.

Feel free to specify a particular reply of mine that didn't adequately answer the comment to which I was replying, or was incomplete or not sufficiently detailed

But do so politely, calmly,objectively, and within this forum's behavioral rules. I don't reply to flamewarriors.

(It seems necessary to say that, due to your first reply to me.)

Michael Ossipoff

Well, maybe you need to flesh-out that statement more. It's easy to make vague criticisms, without giving an example of what you're talking about. — Michael Ossipoff

lol -- classic

In my previous reply, I gave the terrapin the benefit of the doubt, after his previous violation of conduct-guideliines. ...meaning that I granted to him the respect of replying as if he were making a sincere statement.

I try to reply respectfully to everyone, but, in this instance, that respect was undeserved.

Alright, then, there will be no more replies from me to the terrapin, who has demonstrated an inability to abide by conduct-guidelines.

As I always say at this point, when I don't reply to some reply from terrapin (and I won't reply to any), it doesn't mean that he's said something irrefutable. It's just that, as I said, I don't reply to flamewarriors.

Michael Ossipoff

Everyone is a body, and nothing more. — Michael Ossipoff

What about a conscious electronic AI?

"Everyone is a body, and nothing more". — Michael Ossipoff


What about a conscious electronic AI? — Jake Tarragon

Sure, that too. Change "body" to "chassis"? No problem.

Better, just call it "the physical AI", to avoid philosophy-of-mind issues.

...just as you could call the body "the physical organism", when referring to the body of a biological organism. The reason for saying "body", or "physical organism (or physical person) is to emphasize that we aren't playing the philosophy-of-mind game...to distinguish what we're talking about, from some other metaphysical substance hypothesized in the philosophy-of-mind.

This apparent need to even speak of someone's body (as opposed to what??) in these discussions, is symptomatic of the fact that we're dealing with fall-out or spill-over from the philosophy of mind.

Michael Osspoff

I'm asking if something outside your causal influences (a distant object) is real (part of the context of the universe).
. — noAxioms

It is.
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If the people whom I trust to know about such things say that it’s almost surely there , then I accept that it is almost surely real and existent, because I regard the physical universe and its contents to be real and existent, because they’re real and existent in the context of my life.
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Those distant planets become part of my experience when the physicists &/or astronomers tell us about them almost surely being there. — Michael Ossipoff

The definition of exists is one of choice, and physicists often switch between a subjective and a more holistic inclusion of all the parts of the universe.

To illustrate, a live T-rex exists on earth (is part of the universe), but does not exist now (an arbitrarily defined slice of the universe that goes through a reference point, typically the point of the statement being made.
In the same way, the distant planets exist, so you seem to take that more holistic view. The distance place is not a different universe, just another part of this one like the Jurassic is part of Earth. But it doesn't exist now since if it did it would be receding faster than light. It doesn't exist in our reference frame, and never will. No violation of light speed since only two things in the same frame are confined to sub-light speed. But these places do exist, I agree. If find it offensive to describe it as a multiverse, which is like calling the USA multi-country because the map is a book with a page for each state.

In the subjective view, the universe is only some max size (about 27bly across) because it has not yet had time to expand beyond that. It still has infinite mass, meaning almost all of it is bunched up at the edge.

The subjective view is also often 'what I see' and not 'what is now'. So the article read that the merging of two black holes was about to occur and they were going to measure the gravity waves. That statement said that we were about to observe it, and ignored the fact that it happened over a billion years ago. It would not be of any interest if it were happening now.

You asked:
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I'm asking if something outside your causal influences (a distant object) is real (part of the context of the universe).
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I answered:
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It is.

If the people whom I trust to know about such things say that it’s almost surely there , then I accept that it is almost surely real and existent, because I regard the physical universe and its contents to be real and existent, because they’re real and existent in the context of my life.
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Those distant planets become part of my experience when the physicists &/or astronomers tell us about them almost surely being there. — Michael Ossipoff

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The definition of exists is one of choice, and physicists often switch between a subjective and a more holistic inclusion of all the parts of the universe.

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We’ve already agreed that “exists” can mean what anyone wants it to mean, as long as s/he specifies what s/he means by it.
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But, as Litewave pointed out, “exist” has a broad default meaning that includes every valid non-inconsistent fact, including abstract facts and hypothetical facts about hypothetical things, and inter-referring systems of such elements.
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(The “things” can be regarded as part of the facts.)
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So I don’t think that there’s any point in quibbling about what “exists”.

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To illustrate, a live T-rex exists on earth (is part of the universe)

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No it doesn’t. You’ve used a present-tense verb, and live T-Rex no longer exists on Earth.
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You could say that it “exists” in spacetime. But the meaning of a present-.tense verb implies this time, unless there’s an understanding
otherwise. You can make a mess by mixing mutually-contradictory definitions.
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, but does not exist now (an arbitrarily defined slice of the universe that goes through a reference point, typically the point of the statement being made.

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Yes.
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In the same way, the distant planets exist, so you seem to take that more holistic view. The distance place is not a different universe, just another part of this one

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I agree with calling something physically “actual” (a stronger word than “existent”) if it physically exists in the context of your life.
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This physical universe, and everything in it, exists in the context of your life. No, you don’t directly sense-perceive the more distant parts of it, but you experience scientists of various kinds telling you about their observations and conclusions about it.
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If you’re driving, and there’s an obstruction that prevents you from directly perceiving a car coming, on the boulevard that you’re about to drive across, then you slow down and proceed cautiously, because, though you don’t directly perceive that possible car, you know that there nevertheless might be one. What you don’t directly sense-perceive can still be actual, as you might find out if you don’t slow down in that intersection.
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like the Jurassic is part of Earth.

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T-Rex lived in the Cretaceous period, not the Jurassic. …Jurassic-Park notwithstanding.
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I guess “Cretaceous Park” wouldn’t have as good a sound to it.

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But it doesn't exist now

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What doesn’t? The live T-Rex, or the distant planet.
The live T-Rex doesn’t. The distant planet does.
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since if it did it would be receding faster than light.

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I assume you’re referring to the distant planet, not the T-Rex.
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First you say that science predicts planets billions of lightyears away, then you say that they don’t exist unless they’re receding super-lumnally?
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Nothing that distant from us exists? That’s a novel minority position.
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I don’t know how you determined that a planet a billion lightyears from here would be receding faster than light if it existed. But please, we needn’t go into that.
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Obviously our telescope observations of very distant objects are showing those objects as they were when the light now received by our telescopes was leaving those objects. But that doesn’t mean that they don’t still exist now. Things very distant exist right now, even though it will be a long time before we receive the light that they emit. …and even though we have little information about them.
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It doesn't exist in our reference frame

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It doesn’t share the same motion as our solar system, if that’s what you mean. But distant things nevertheless exist, and are actual.
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, and never will. No violation of light speed since only two things in the same frame are confined to sub-light speed. But these places do exist, I agree.

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Yes. I must have misunderstood you, above, when I thought that you said that they didn’t exist unless they’re moving super-luminally.
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If find it offensive to describe it as a multiverse, which is like calling the USA multi-country because the map is a book with a page for each state.

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Unfortunately, “multiverse” implies that it consists of some separate universes. I personally don’t call something a “universe” if it’s physically-related to something outside it.
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So, if our big-bang “universe” is part of a multiverse, then it’s that multiverse that’s really our universe, and our big-bang “universe” is really a sub-universe.
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But “multiverse” could reasonably refer to a universe consisting of sub-universes.
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In the subjective view, the universe is only some max size (about 27bly across)

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A Scientific American article about 14 years ago said that it wasn’t known whether our big-bang universe (BBU) is finite or infinite.
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But the article said that evidence is beginning to pile up in favor of the BBU being infinite.
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Of course new information could have been discovered since then. Maybe, during the last 14 years, it has been determined that the BBU is finite, and is about 27bly across.
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Not very likely though. Surely that major discovery would have been in headlines of all sorts of publications, and would have been mentioned a lot on radio, etc. too.
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Are you sure that you aren’t referring to the observable universe?
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…the part of the universe whose recession-speed from us isn’t red-shifting its radiation to unobservably low energies?

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because it has not yet had time to expand beyond that. It still has infinite mass, meaning almost all of it is bunched up at the edge.

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Of course there’d really be no edge, even if the BBU is finite. …any more than the surface of a globe has an edge.
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But yes, from any point on a globe, or in a finite but unbounded BBU, there’s a most distant place.
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But if the universe is finite in size, wouldn’t one expect only sub-luminal speeds of recession from us? …and only finite mass?
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What source would one consult, to find the fact that a finite BBU has infinite mass? Or that the BBU is finite, and about 27 bly across?

The subjective view is also often 'what I see' and not 'what is now'. So the article read that the merging of two black holes was about to occur and they were going to measure the gravity waves. That statement said that we were about to observe it, and ignored the fact that it happened over a billion years ago. It would not be of any interest if it were happening now.

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If they’re distant, then it wouldn’t be visible if it were happening now.
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But there are still very distant things that exist and are real and actual right now, even though we can’t observe them, and have little information about them.
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How did this topic turn into a physics topic? The metaphysical discussion doesn’t need physics argument.
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Michael Ossipoff

I'm not sure why this "Skeptism" is anything more than saying about existence "it is what it is..."....

I'm not sure why this "Skepticism" is anything more than saying about existence "it is what it is...".. — Jake Tarragon

That claim of equivalence would need some justification. ...which you haven't supplied.

But yes, the observations of Physics don't require or establish that the physical world consists of any more than the system of inter-referring hypotheticals that I described. That was first pointed out by Michael Faraday in 1844.

Such a system, referring to nothing outside itself, doesn't need any external explanation, and couldn't not be (because no one's saying that it "is", in any context other than its own). ... for the reason that I've explained earlier in this topic.

Is that an "unfalsifiable proposition"? Sure. But it's one that doesn't make any assumptions or posit any brute-facts.

Any reasonably well-written proposable metaphysics is an unfalsifiable proposition, because no metaphysics can be proven.

Michael Ossipoff

To illustrate, a live T-rex exists on earth (is part of the universe) — noAxioms

No it doesn’t. You’ve used a present-tense verb, and live T-Rex no longer exists on Earth. — Michael Ossipoff

The verb is tenseless. The Tintanic sinks in 1912. Betelgeuse goes supernova in 2700. The tensed version would be "a live T-rex is existing on earth".

You could say that it “exists” in spacetime.

If the universe doesn't include spacetime, then it isn't a very holistic definition: It exists only if I'm present with it. It is valid to do that, but when questioning the existence of something beyond reach, we can't use that one.

T-Rex lived in the Cretaceous period, not the Jurassic. …Jurassic-Park notwithstanding.
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I guess “Cretaceous Park” wouldn’t have as good a sound to it.

I stand corrected. Guess it wasn't important to the point, and I didn't bother to actually look it up.

"But it [30bly planet] doesn't exist now since if it did it would be receding faster than light."
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First you say that science predicts planets billions of lightyears away, then you say that they don’t exist unless they’re receding super-lumnally?
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Nothing that distant from us exists? That’s a novel minority position.

No, it is simply a different choice of coordinate systems. The distant place exists in spacetime, but doesn't exist 'now', and we don't exist in their 'now'. Two different coordinate systems, usually left unstated because locally they're the same thing. In the 'now' view, the planet is so young, it's galaxy has yet to form, so that region of space has yet to form stars and such. In the comoving coordinate view, the planet is there, 30bly distant, but the system allows speeds greater than light. Most of the physics equations cease to apply. For instance, an object in motion tends to slow down in the absence of forces, which is why all the galaxies are not going anywhere fast.
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Obviously our telescope observations of very distant objects are showing those objects as they were when the light now received by our telescopes was leaving those objects. But that doesn’t mean that they don’t still exist now. Things very distant exist right now, even though it will be a long time before we receive the light that they emit. …and even though we have little information about them.

Light from there will never reach us, even given infinite time. Look up Hubble-sphere, which has little meaning in classic coordinate system. Things outside that sphere recede (have a divergence speed, not velocity) greater than light. A short ways beyond that is the event horizon (15bly) beyond which signals from objects the same age as us can never reach us, even given infinite time.
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All the physics crap aside, the physicists say these distant places exist: There are no viable models where they do not. But the places are permanently beyond reach, so some consider this to be a multiverse situation despite lack of boundary between ours and the next one over. 'Universe' is one of those words that means a lot of different things in different contexts. It usually doesn't make a difference, but in cosmology it does.

Unfortunately, “multiverse” implies that it consists of some separate universes. I personally don’t call something a “universe” if it’s physically-related to something outside it.

Same here. Tegmark categorized them.
Type 1 is distant places, all from the same bang, very physically related, but too distant to every make a causal difference to us. I don't consider this a multiverse.
Type 2 is other inflation bubbles, which are related only through quantum mechanics. Different spacetimes, some without space or time or both. Some with multiple temporal dimension. Those I consider 'other universes'.
Type 3 is alternate worlds from Everett interpretation. These lack boundaries like type 1, but I hold no identity if it is one universe. They are very related to us and all part of the one common bang, so in that way, one thing. So it is context dependent if I consider the other worlds to be part of the universe. If the interpretation is wrong, then there is no type 3 in our physics.
Type 4 is other structures, and to say they have any kind of objective existence seems to carry as little meaning as saying our universe has objective existence, but I certainly don't consider them part of 'the universe'. Some do, making the word synonymous with 'all objective existence'. I have no word for that since it carries no meaning to me.
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So, if our big-bang “universe” is part of a multiverse, then it’s that multiverse that’s really our universe, and our big-bang “universe” is really a sub-universe.
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But “multiverse” could reasonably refer to a universe consisting of sub-universes.
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In the subjective view, the universe is only some max size (about 27bly across)
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A Scientific American article about 14 years ago said that it wasn’t known whether our big-bang universe (BBU) is finite or infinite.
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But the article said that evidence is beginning to pile up in favor of the BBU being infinite.
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Of course new information could have been discovered since then. Maybe, during the last 14 years, it has been determined that the BBU is finite, and is about 27bly across.

Sounds like they're mixing coordinate systems, like one of them is more correct than the other. Bad form by SI if that's the case.
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Not very likely though. Surely that major discovery would have been in headlines of all sorts of publications, and would have been mentioned a lot on radio, etc. too.
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Are you sure that you aren’t referring to the observable universe?
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…the part of the universe whose recession-speed from us isn’t red-shifting its radiation to unobservably low energies?

That term has nothing to do with red-shift or real limits. It is about the subset of material/energy that can in principle have any influence on us now, even if beyond the CMB wall through which light does not penetrate. Most matter in the observable universe is seconds old. The SI article might have been talking about this, but the current figure is about 90 bly, meaning that the most distant observable matter (seconds old as we observe it now) is 45 billion comoving light years distant in when that matter is about 13.7 billion years old in its own frame. The matter is in our reference frame, but only a few more seconds old than what we're observing now. There is no planet there 'now'. Still going blam.

What I've been talking about is the set of events whose light/influence can reach us ever, at whatever energies. My distant planet is outside that set, meaning light sent from there goes at c, but since the place recedes faster than c, the light actually still moves away from us, thus never reaching. That's the event horizon, which doesn't have a concept of 'now'. Those events are beyond causal reach, and are as inaccessible as events in the alternate world where I have a sister.

Such a system, referring to nothing outside itself, doesn't need any external explanation, and couldn't not be (because no one's saying that it "is", in any context other than its own). ... for the reason that I've explained earlier in this topic. — Michael Ossipoff

This is why it is such an elegant solution to the cosmological argument, which outside religious answer, argues something on the lines of: "Why is there something instead of nothing". The question presumes there is objectively something.

That claim of equivalence would need some justification. ...which you haven't supplied. — Michael Ossipoff

I may not be able to,but I will dip my toes in these waters and wade in slowly.

Any reasonably well-written proposable metaphysics is an unfalsifiable proposition, because no metaphysics can be proven. — Michael Ossipoff

Presumably the whole point of metaphysics is that it is thinking largely detached from scientific analysis - or at least from scientific falsification. I don't think complete detachment is necessary - even your Skepticism is based on Occam's Razor, for example, which is, arguably, a scientific principle. Also,. there must be some metaphysics that are potentially falsifiable (or realizable ) in the future through discovery - either of knowledge of new scientific concepts, or through new knowledge of a general sort. For example, a fifth dimension could be discovered that confirms a certain metaphysics, or Alpha Centauri could be reached and shown not to have the planet Zog orbiting it, and controlling a huge simulation containing ourselves as proposed by the Zoggist metaphysics.
Solipsism is presumably a metaphysics - but one that is completely detached from scientific thinking, and also unlikely ever to be falsifiable ever (though Witt. had a go I understand, based on assumed knowledge of the principles of language acquisition).

So where am I going with all this? I think I'm trying to generate classes of metaphysics, based on 1) amount of scientific content - some or none; 2) potential for being declared falsifiable/realizable or not now or in the future - if not why not - logical or through knowledge 3)means of being declared falsifiable/realizable - e.g. new scientific concept or new knowledge.

BTW, is it valid to speak of a metaphysics as being potentially realizable (declared "true")...?

I’d said:
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Any reasonably well-written proposable metaphysics is an unfalsifiable proposition, because no metaphysics can be proven. — Michael Ossipoff

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You reply:
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Presumably the whole point of metaphysics is that it is thinking largely detached from scientific analysis - or at least from scientific falsification.

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Yes, though I guess someone could propose a metaphysics that conflicts with physical observations.
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I don't think complete detachment is necessary - even your Skepticism is based on Occam's Razor, for example, which is, arguably, a scientific principle.

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Though it seems to me that Occam was speaking of physics, the Principle of Parsimony seems independently relevant to metaphysics. In fact, isn’t it more even compelling in metaphysics than in physics?
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...to the point where only the more parsimonious metaphysics should even be considered?
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That’s my feeling.
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That’s why the suggestion of all possible metaphysicses—including unparsimonious ones--obtaining, in various domains of infinite-Possibility doesn’t seem convincing to me, because wouldn’t the Principle of Parsimony apply to discussion about infinite-Possibility itself? So wouldn’t we expect it to not have an additional unnecessary metaphysical substance, anywhere?
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Also, there must be some metaphysics that are potentially falsifiable…

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Sure, it seems like someone could propose a metaphysics that contradicts observations.
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…(or realizable ) in the future through discovery - either of knowledge of new scientific concepts, or through new knowledge of a general sort. For example, a fifth dimension could be discovered that confirms a certain metaphysics

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One thing like that that stands out for me was the book by a physicist who is a recognized academic authority on quantum mechanics (Its title was “Quantum _________”, where I don’t remember what was in the blank. I don’t remember his name either. It was a long time ago that I saw the book. He said that quantum-mechanics lays to rest the notion of an independently-existent objective physical world.
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That seemed like physics saying something about metaphysics, something that I hadn’t thought possible.
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, or Alpha Centauri could be reached and shown not to have the planet Zog orbiting it, and controlling a huge simulation containing ourselves as proposed by the Zoggist metaphysics.

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Well, the theories about our universe being a simulation say that the simulation is being run in a different universe.
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(I don’t believe that a simulation could create a universe, because possibility-worlds are “there” already, and don’t need a simulation to create them. The only thing a simulation could create would be an opportunity for the operators of the simulation to observe a possibility-world.)
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Solipsism is presumably a metaphysics - but one that is completely detached from scientific thinking, and also unlikely ever to be falsifiable ever

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Each person is the center of their life-experience possibility-story. Obviously your experience-story must be set in a possibility world in which there are other members of your species. And, among the infinity of life-experience possibility-stories, of course there’s one for each of the other beings in that possibility-world (…and all the other ones, of course).
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It seems to me that that fits some, but not all, definitions of Solipsism. But someone can’t discredit a metaphysics by applying a name to it.
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So where am I going with all this? I think I'm trying to generate classes of metaphysics, based on 1) amount of scientific content - some or none;

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Even if there are exceptions in which science can say something about metaphysics, I don’t know if science could be part of a metaphysics. Isn’t physics and its findings, for the most part, just a [consequence of a metaphysics?
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2) potential for being declared falsifiable/realizable or not now or in the future - if not why not - logical or through knowledge

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I don’t think there could be anything during life that can distinguish Physicalism from some Idealisms. …from Skepticism in particular.
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Pairs of metaphysicses could have different predictions, conclusions or consequences for what will be experienced at the end of a life. …Physicalism and Skepticism in particular.
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But, coming to the rescue of indistinguishableness, most likely when the body has shut down sufficiently for there to be a difference, the person no longer knows that there was ever such a thing as metaphysics. So one can’t expect to find out, at that time, which metaphysics is better confirmed.
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BTW, is it valid to speak of a metaphysics as being potentially realizable (declared "true")...?

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That question has occurred to me too. Can it be said that one of the metaphysicses is true, but just can’t be proved?
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So important and conclusive does parsimony seem, to me, that I’d say “Yes” to that.
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Michael Ossipoff

This is why it is such an elegant solution to the cosmological argument, which outside religious answer, argues something on the lines of: "Why is there something instead of nothing". The question presumes there is objectively something. — noAxioms

Yes. As the Physicalist means "something", there isn't something; there's nothing.

But I don't think it would make sense to call the life-experience possibility-stories, or their possibility-worlds "nothing".

So I'd say that there's something.

And I've told why I claim that there couldn't have not been those life-experience possibility-stories.

But life might be temporary, and the maybe temporary duration of life would then be small compared to the approach, and maybe arrival at, the timelessness that, at least in some ways, sounds a lot like Nothing..

So I suggest that, if so, that timelessness, "Nothing", is the most natural state of affairs (Apologies to "Naturalists")

...natural, right, and good, if and when it's time for it.

(...natural in the dictionary sense of "ordinary or usual".)

Michael Ossipoff

Though it seems to me that Occam was speaking of physics, the Principle of Parsimony seems independently relevant to metaphysics. In fact, isn’t it more even compelling in metaphysics than in physics?
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...to the point where only the more parsimonious metaphysics should even be considered? — Michael Ossipoff

Well if a metaphysics has to become more elaborate in order to avoid refutation then certainly it becomes more suspicious... But at the other extreme, can high parsimony become tautology? As I mentioned earlier, I have a feeling that your Skepticism borders on the tautological .. "it [existence] is what it is". You quite fairly asked me to justify this claim... I'm still working on it, albeit rather lazily...

I claim that the metaphysics that I propose here doesn’t need or use any assumptions, doesn’t make any controversial statements, and doesn’t posit any brute fact(s). — Michael Ossipoff

also true of a tautology!

But at the other extreme, can high parsimony become tautology? — Jake Tarragon

But what's wrong with that? If the world could be explained essentially without saying anything (much less assuming anything), then wouldn't that be even better?

As I mentioned earlier, I have a feeling that your Skepticism borders on the tautological ..

Yes, I can say that Skepticism doesn't need any explanations. It would be even better if I could show the world doesn't even need any explanation, because there's a complete explanation that's a tautology, that would be even better. But I don't claim to be able to say that. But I'd appreciate any help, if you can help me to justify such a statement.

Maybe that's the best that I an claim. . ...that Skepticism borders on tautology.

"it [existence] is what it is".

...and, if I could say that, then what nicer, neater explanation could I offer, than showing that, not only does Skepticism not need any assumptions, but it shows that the world doesn't even need any explanation.

Well, yes, I see what you mean: Maybe Skepticism is an explanation that shows that no explanation is even needed.

I like that. It doesn't get any neater.

I'd said:

I claim that the metaphysics that I propose here doesn’t need or use any assumptions, doesn’t make any controversial statements, and doesn’t posit any brute fact(s). — Michael Ossipoff


also true of a tautology!

But it's still a good thing. ...and even better if it's close to being tautology.

...or, even more ideally, if it fully were tautology. (But I'm not claiming that it is.)

Michael Ossipoff

I liked the idea of Skepticism being a tautology, because tautologies are completely undeniable.

But now I must admit that I can't say that Skepticism is a tautology, because:

A tautology is true no matter how things are. But Skepticism would be false if Physicalism were true.

And, unlike the absolutely unquestionable certainty of a tautology, no metaphysics can be proved.

A tautology doesn't state any information or make a substantive claim, but Skepticism says that our physical world is just a system of inter-referring hypothetical or abstract facts, including some that are always true, such as mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts; and (as conditions in if-then facts), some hypothetical facts, such as physical laws, and hypothetical quantity-values which (because they're those facts' topic) are part of those facts; and if-then statements referring to and relating all these things--facts about conclusions that some particular fact is true if a set of other facts are true..

So Skepticism is an explanation for our physical world, but, because no metaphysics is provable, Skepticism doesn't have the absolute certainty that a tautology has.

And Skepticism is a substantive propositiont that contradicts other metaphysicses.

Yes, not needing, using or including any assumptions, and not positing any brute-facts is something that Skepticism has in common with a tautology, but it seems to me that I can't go so far as saying that Skepticism has the absolute certainty of a tautology.

Michael Ossipoff

And, unlike the absolutely unquestionable certainty of a tautology, no metaphysics can be proved. — Michael Ossipoff

But all metaphysicses would LIKE to be proved ...there is nothing special about being non-provable is there?

Sure, metaphysicses aren't the only unprovable propositions. And no doubt all proponents of metaphysicses would like to prove them.

I just meant that unprovability surely distinguishes Skepticism from a tautology, because a tautology is true with complete certainty.

But I just feel that parsimony is the standard for comparing any two metaphysicses.

...and that the absence of assumptions or brute-facts--a rare attribute for a metaphysics--counts strongly in a metaphysics' favor.

Michael Ossipoff

"there’s no evidence that our physical universes consists of more than inter-related if-then statements". — Michael Ossipoff


Here I am, sitting in my chair. My fan is on. It's almost time for dinner. The sun is a bit low in the West. The chair arms are brown-stained wood, ash I think. It's smooth. The varnish and stain on the right side, which gets more use, is fading in some spots.

Please explain how this concrete expression of physical reality consists of interrelated if-then statements. — T Clark

First, replace "statements" with "facts". ...because "statements" misleadingly implies that I'm speaking of an utterance.

Of course an if-then fact consists of two parts: Its "if" clause and its "then" clause.

(I call them "clauses" for want of a better word. ...with no intention of implying utterances.)

Some of those "if" clauses or "then" clauses could, themselves, be if-then facts.

...but of course they needn't.

So, the parts of an if-then fact, the two clauses, needn't, themselves, be if-then facts.

So, when I said that there's no evidence that our physical universe consists of more than inter-related if-then statements, i should have said, "...including their parts, hypotheticals which needn't, themselves, be if-then statements."

Those facts that you listed in your example are hypothetical facts, suppositional facts, that are parts of the "if" clauses of some if-then facts, and part of the "then" clauses of other if-then facts.

(An if-then fact's "then" clause can be called "hypothetical", because it might not be true. It isn't necessarily true if the "if" clause isn't true.)

Michael Ossipoff